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

OUTLINES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

BOOKS BY

HORATIO W. DRESSER

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Outlines of the Psychology of Religion

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OUTLINES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

BY

HORATIO W. DRESSER, PH.D.

AUTHOR OF

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PREFACE

Within the last quarter of a century the psychology of religion has become one of the special disciplines. It occupies a highly interesting intermediate field in which ways diverge for exploration of the science, history, comparative study, and philosophy of religion. One need not be an adherent of any one of the great religions, to engage in the investigation to advantage. Nor need one decide between the several types of psychology advocated in our day, save for purposes of this study. Writers on the subject have sometimes acknowledged their preference for Christianity or for Buddhism. Some of the recent critics of religion from a psychological standpoint have limited themselves to one type of applied psychology, such as psychoanalysis. But the general tendency has been to follow one of the pioneer authors, William James, whose very important work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* 1902, set the standard for description of the great religious types. Thus the clue has been found for the most part in the analysis and description of religious experience, by adopting any psychological principle that might prove its utility.

The aim of this volume is to correlate the leading topics that have been under discussion in this field, to aid both the college student, the general student of religion, and readers who are interested in religion in the light of the changing conceptions of the present time. Some writers on this subject omit such topics as personality and immortality. Others limit the discussion to an ethical view of religion. Still others are either preoccupied with mysticism or are extremely unsympathetic in their treatment of it. Nearly every writer fares forth at times on the road to philosophy or theology. The purpose of this work is to

consider these various approaches as impartially as possible, while not hesitating to introduce philosophical topics at the close.

Some of the best works on the general subject are devoted to the philosophy rather than to the psychology of religion. Hence the references at the close of chapters include works on the philosophy, sometimes to books on the history or the science of religion. Since every study of religion implies a psychology, and every psychology involves propositions indicative of a type of philosophy, this has seemed to be the best plan of investigation. Furthermore, this book is admittedly constructive in method, at crucial points where recent writers appear to be unduly negative or critical. It is in part a protest against works in which religion is judged by its less promising origins, its adverse conceptions, in conflict with science; and against estimates based on the hypothesis that religion is merely an escape mechanism, or a survival from primitive times. For it would seem fitting to judge religion also at its best, to be fair to the highest religions, to the values which have been conserved despite criticism. In any event, it seems impossible to avoid value-judgments, even in the case of those writers who announce that their study is to be purely psychological. It is also apparent that however sophisticated this investigation makes us, we are likely to retain the conviction that religion is most intelligible in case of those for whom it is most real and true. Thus it is especially profitable to read books on religion by religious people, by people who earnestly adhere to their faith. It is important too to attend services of worship where people devoutly believe in the great objects of religion, to compare notes with people who sincerely believe in prayer as the greatest spiritual enterprise. Still another clue is found by keeping in close sympathy with youth in current reactions against organized religion. This volume is an attempt to make explicit the psychology of these more affirmative approaches to the subject, even when this means the inclusion of beliefs in the real existence of a spiritual world, a topic usually neglected by writers on the psychology of

religion. So too in the study of such topics as worship it has seemed right to consider modes of worship other than those espoused by the ritualist.

The writer's indebtedness is indicated by references in the body of the text and by foot-notes. Although writers like James, Starbuck, and Pratt have proved most helpful as guides within the distinctively psychological field; the outlying issues have been developed by reference to the works of Inge, Höffding, Sabatier, and others who have resolutely pushed matters through to a determinate position, for or against metaphysics. It is hoped that this book will stimulate inquiry into such problems as the nature of human personality, the soul or spirit, in contrast with types of psychology bordering on biology. The trend of thought today seems to be in favor of a constructive or philosophical view of religion in ever closer accord with the higher types of recent science. The prime result may well be universal religion, the conservation of essential or permanent values finding new formulations in each new epoch, allowing for the fact that the types of religious experience are likely to persist despite all efforts to reduce believers to uniformity. In describing the types of religious experience, the writer has followed James up to the point where rationalism is in question. This book is therefore for the most part an empirical study, developed without taking sides, although suggesting toward the close that reason in religion is the criterion, and that some kind of philosophical idealism is likely to grow out of an adequate psychological analysis. The partisan of religious institutions will make due allowances, in contrast with the conviction here advocated that religion is essentially inner experience. The partisan of scientific psychology will also make allowances, when he finds that the existence of the soul or spirit is taken for granted as a fact essential to adequate psychological description. Finally, the believer in a subconscious or subliminal self will find that the hypothesis of a larger or deeper self is adopted with much caution. Nearly all the terms employed are descriptive. In such descriptions the writer has sought to withhold his

type and his convictions so far as possible, although strongly inclined to favor the modes of worship and beliefs of the Religious Society of Friends and to agree with the adherents of what is now known as the Religion of the Spirit, in contrast with all religions of authority. From such a viewpoint, one is justified in defining religion with reference to the proposition that in man the spirit is fundamental, that man's basic nature is spiritual. The natural conclusion is that religion is a way of life: if its psychology implies a philosophy, it also implies an art.

HORATIO W. DRESSER.

South Hadley, Mass.
January, 1929.

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OUTLINES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE FIELD OF RELIGION

The Scope of Religion.—For many people religion means private devotions, public worship at stated intervals, together with an æsthetic and social appeal which brings rest and relaxation. Others regard it as essentially service for the needy and the afflicted, from love toward God and man. Belief may be negligible, especially for those who identify religion with the acts or ceremonials which they witness and in which they participate. In any event there is recognition of the element of sacredness or holiness connected with the house of worship, if not with the Sabbath. We know what religion is by contrast. Adopting the religious attitude on occasion, reverting to it when there is need, we at least know something about its gifts in rare moments, in those surpassing intervals which make glad the heart, or in those sorrowful periods when our loved ones enter the great beyond.

Even in this brief summary several motives and goals of activity are involved. Religion as a life taken up on occasion or reverted to because existence in general is perplexing or sad, mysterious or disappointing, invests its ceremonials and deeds with hope, faith, beliefs: it is both individual and social. There is an interplay of emotions, sentiments, volitions, thoughts; as well as interchanges between groups, types, and leaders widely representative in the recent and remote history of religion. While the

many know religion chiefly as a type of individual and social response, as a way of life; the few articulate it as theology, and organize it into an institution, with its officials and its professionalism in general. Thus it becomes a part of human culture, a highly significant part, enriching that culture as a whole.

Primary and Secondary.—Sometimes indeed religion has seemed to be identical with the system by which it has acquired a creed, a priesthood, ecclesiastical authority, and the right to demand attendance in the house of prayer; to insist on charity, the support of the church; to demand self-examination, confession, penance, and salvation from sin. Again, its prophets have instilled new life into it by criticism of its habits, creeds, officialisms, its undue conservatism and the assumption that no one can be genuinely religious outside the fold, that no one can be inspired save the authorized few and the books which contain sacred truth. Thus a distinction has grown up between the transient and the permanent, the essentials and the conditions or forms wherewith religion is vested in a given age. Thus too religion has become an object of profound study as part of human history and culture, essential to knowledge of man in his integrity in relation to the total universe in which he lives.

Another distinction is also implied in the study of religion as a whole. One frankly admits at the outset that for a great majority religion consists in unthinking acceptance and conformity. To attend divine worship at the appointed times, to participate in the singing and repetitions, to follow the prayers and pay respectful attention to the sermon, then revert to the interests of mundane life is indeed sufficient in most cases for those who deem themselves religious. To permit interest in religion to go further than this would apparently be to take ourselves, our sentiments, and experiences too seriously. But religion for the devoted few has meant far more than this throughout the centuries, notably among prophets, missionaries, poets, mystics. For the great leaders and for many who have followed them with eager desire to win the multitude, religion has filled

life as a whole, the main concern of every day and hour. It would be impossible to understand the grip of religion upon humanity without recognizing the fact that in a primary sense it has been coextensive with personal experience, with special reference to the sources of peace and freedom, security and salvation in the eternal values. Indeed, it might be said that without this intimately personal form religion would never have existed for the multitude. For religion offers freedom from the burdens of worldliness and sin, a freedom which would be unknown save for those who dedicate themselves to its most intense form, who insist that all men shall take it thus seriously.

Religion and the Whole Man.—Regarded in the light of its great hopes and possibilities, religion in its most complete and intense form involves the whole man; for the whole man is appealed to, the whole self may act in response to this appeal, and life in its social fullness may be involved. We are most likely to understand its lesser manifestations if we bear in mind the possibility of such singleness of devotion that the religious life seems veritably to be life in its greatest extent and truest depth. The proposition that in the largeness of religion man acts with his whole nature also involves the fact that the mental states associated with it are highly complex, the reactions complex, the relationships infinitely extensive. Indeed, on the outskirts of the religious consciousness man's states may range into hallucinations and ecstasies in which the individual deifies himself. We need therefore a standard wherewith to approximate at least all that is normal, worthy, that we may know what true wholeness is. Such a standard is especially needed for the study of the more intense forms of personal religion in past ages, the ages which have given us the greatest religious literature. Again, it is required for the interpretation of types of belief and vigorous reaction against religion in our own time.

The Philosophy of Religion.—We might approach the study of the universal elements of religion in the light of the arts, notably music, architecture, poetry; or by means of an analysis of general literature, history, civilization.

When religion is thus studied independently of tradition, sect, nation, or theology, we have a philosophy of religion. For there can be a philosophy of religion as truly as a philosophy of the sciences with respect to the ultimate nature of the physical universe, a philosophy of art concerned with the meaning and nature of beauty, or a philosophy of history dedicated to the significance of human civilization. The religious view of the world may lead to an appreciation of human life rather different from the theologian's interest in revelation or a special creed. If we include primitive beliefs in the soul, in the gods, in a future state, the religious view of the world is one of the oldest of man's responses to the universe, an interest which has covered a surprisingly rich field of beliefs in invisible or spiritual realities. A philosophy of religion may be founded on a general view of the universe, possibly in protest against materialism, intimately concerned in correlating the realities of religious consciousness—inner experience, worship, prayer, conversion, belief in God, in the future life—so that these realities shall find proper recognition in a complete system of human knowledge. Such a philosophy would raise the question whether religion is ultimately true, whether the human self is real; and whether religious truth involves a higher type of knowledge, or religious experience, a higher means of approach to the realities of the universe. Until the psychology of religion became a distinct discipline, this was the more usual approach to the subjects we are to consider. Granted a psychology, that is, a conception of the mental or human constituents, apart from the more difficult questions which we usually designate as metaphysical or ultimate, there would still be a place for the philosophy of religion as the discipline which is concerned with the highest meanings and values of religion in its totality.[1]

The Science of Religion.—This philosophical enterprise has sometimes been taken to be too difficult or general. Hence the science of religion has been delimited in a much more restricted field, independent of the typical views of

[1] Cf. D. Miall Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1924.

the universe, and also apart from the presuppositions of theology. From this point of view it follows that "what religion is in its essence can only be ascertained as the result of our whole inquiry." [2] Hence the utmost that can be said in advance is that religion involves "those manifestations of the human mind in words, deeds, customs, and institutions which testify to man's belief in the superhuman, and serve to bring him into relation with it." Consequently, Tiele adopts an entirely objective position towards all forms of religion while seeking to distinguish religion itself. The special fields of study include the lowest nature-religions, the ethical religions, and other types, with regard to the directions of development in particular religions. Hence the question of the influence of the individual in this development becomes particularly significant, also the essentials of religion regarded as a social phenomenon. Thus the historical method becomes the indispensable condition of such an investigation, with special reference to the implied moral precepts, philosophy, psychology, history, and cultural values investigated through the impartial accumulation of facts about religion everywhere.[3]

To adopt the method of the science of religion would be to set aside all preconceptions regarding one's own religion, and to begin with the evidences and sources among all nations. Christianity would not be regarded as identical with religion, nor would it be assumed that Christianity is superior to all other religions, although this has been a thesis which many have been eager to prove. Granted a study of primitive forms of religion among all peoples, one would in time be concerned with the history of the great religions.[4] From this investigation one might proceed to an analysis of living religions, with a view to determining the best.[5] Thus the comparative study of religions follows as a corollary of the historical treatment. This in turn

[2] C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, 1897, Vol. I, p. 4.
[3] Cf. Morris Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*, 1902, p. 19.
[4] See A. Menzies, *History of Religion*, 1903. At the conclusion of his work, Menzies considers universal religion and special claims for Christianity.
[5] See R. E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, 1924.

has become a special discipline, fostered in the United States, for example, since the pioneer work of James Freeman Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*. In this study religion comes to be regarded as "one phase of human culture," expressing "man's attitude to the powers around him and the events of his life," with the implication that its various forms "repose on the unity of the race."[6]

The Psychology of Religion.—The psychology of religion marks off for itself a still more restricted region within the great field. It adopts some of the interests and methods of the other disciplines. Thus theology, defining or delimiting the idea of God, the soul, salvation, worship, the sacraments, and other essentials, elaborates these into a system for instruction within the religious body in question, in contrast with precepts and practices implied in religion as an art or way of life; the psychology of religion is more directly concerned with the beginnings of belief in these great matters, as developments of human experience. Granted a theology of one of the Christian types, its authority becomes a standard by which to discern such a heresy as pantheism, with its assumed identification of God and nature, or God and the soul, in contrast with a more personal view of God. But a person may be devoutly religious who holds views disloyal to Christian theism, and his beliefs and experiences may be inquired into as independently as one might study the structure of the atom or the sources of a given movement in modern history.

Doctrines may be refined into sectarian differences of vital moment for an organization identifying its tenets with what is universal in Christianity and with what is ultimately true in religion. Thus doctrines and dogmas may become central, the apology for them of vital moment. But for psychology what is universal is vested in religious experience or consciousness wherever found, in its more significant acts, convictions, attitudes. Doctrines are of course meant to be true. But religion itself also proclaims its constituents as true in a concrete way which more directly pertains to psychology, that is, to the processes of the human

[6] J. Estlin Carpenter, *Comparative Religion*, p. 33.

mind, the elements which make up the mind, the factors of belief, of prayer, worship, social service, faith in immortality. While a philosophy of religion, noting the functions and values of religious experience, compares these with a system of ultimate realities; psychology gives special attention to man's progressive efforts to purify his moral and spiritual life, as he labors in the vineyard of truth.[7] This special study is not limited to any one of the world's religions; it is directly concerned with the inner content of religion, including the religion of those who are dedicated to theology, the Church, the teachings of modern science, or to a type of philosophy—the great company of the church invisible.

In the same way the psychology of religion is concerned with man's religious consciousness without regard to the special type of philosophy with which it has been associated in a given country, such as India, or Europe during the Middle Ages. It matters of course whether a man is a materialist or an idealist, what he believes concerning the ultimate ground of the universe, the soul, the future life, the greatest good. Beliefs like fatalism, pantheism, reincarnation, make a difference. These and many other considerations may enter into a man's philosophical outlook. Occasionally, philosophy and religion as a life may in large measure coincide. Thus the Stoics displayed a remarkable consistency. But theory or argument and practice may also differ, as in case of believers in fatalism or predestination who in daily life proceed as we all do on the assumption that we are in a measure free. The psychology of religion is especially concerned with the way the mind works in religion, the elements of man's religious consciousness with respect to his actual life or conduct, whether Jew or Buddhist, orthodox theologian or humble believer taking his religion on simple faith. Many matters are held over for later inquiry.

Religion is so frequently confused with theology, as if its devotees must follow what theology prescribes, that we must emphasize the approach which concerns the psycholo-

[7] Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

gist, that is, the practical and personal side of religion.[8] Compare, for instance, (1) the teachings of Jesus as received by the disciples, made manifest through works, imparted as a vitalizing faith, when there were as yet no dogmas, no officials, institutions, or books in which ecclesiastical authority was vested, with (2) the doctrines of Paul and other apostles, whose propositions were reared into a theology which has undergone innumerable vicissitudes during the sectarian ages, under the guise of the Roman Church, the Greek Church, and Protestantism. As difficult as it may be to reconstitute what we in this remote age take to be the original gospel, we know that there was one, that its followers took their clues through discipleship; and that Christianity assumed other forms when it was organized as a group of doctrines to persuade the world. One may at least try to discern something like the original gospel in its inmost integrity, that we may consider how religion as personal experience impressed people as a way of life. It was not at first a question of reasons for believing, but of the realities believed in, the spirit made manifest, the love displayed, the soul's inmost response through prayer and earnest aspiration. Moreover, religion in this more original sense of the word, as a way of life, is far simpler than theology. It has a directness that shows the futility of a thousand and one doctrinal distinctions. The psychology of religion is especially concerned with the richness of life in this its native beauty, when the mind is essentially affirmative, when faith is seen in its fullness, when deeds count for more than arguments, and love than efforts to arouse it.

The Need for Philosophy.—Yet it is difficult to sunder the life from the beliefs which it implies, difficult to distinguish between the philosophy and the psychology; for a philosophy of religion implies a psychology on which the description and interpretation of religious phenomena more or less depend, the psychology is inseparable from the science of religion, every theologian is in some sense devoted to psychology, and different types of psychology

[8] Cf. J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, 1921, p. 6.

imply different types of philosophy. The psychology of religion as a description of the elements of religious consciousness implies a philosophy of the ultimate meaning of that consciousness, even when there is persistent effort to avoid all references to first principles.

Inevitably, one brings to the study of religion certain presuppositions concerning both religion and psychology, and in either case a philosophy is implied. Thus religion may be either minimized and degraded or enlarged upon and exalted by using a psychology which involves a philosophy. One of the greatest writers on the subject was a psychologist who was a keen critic of rationalism, and some of the living writers are habitually negative concerning religion, although undertaking to describe and explain it. The study of this subject may either undermine or increase one's faith, according to the neglect of or insight into first principles. The science of religion will naturally include both the history and the comparative study, while a psychology tacitly implying a philosophy will afford both clues and standards. Here again much depends on the view of religion and the type of psychology, although the investigator may strive to eliminate all preconceptions. Moreover, something will depend on the personal experience and general insight of the investigator, notably among students who show a fine appreciation for mystical and poetic types so readily scorned by those who judge religion from the outside. Every one should be free to introduce any principle or inquiry needed to make his investigation complete, at the risk of passing from psychology to philosophy.

It is well, however, to limit the inquiry to the lesser field, while reminding ourselves that psychology is in some respects the most fundamental of the sciences. Naturally, the student will look outside the field of description to some extent to show why a changed attitude has come about within the field of experience in our day. What we take to be the chief elements of that experience will greatly depend on our view of the sources and objects of experience in general, our ideas concerning youth in its protests

against the age, and the quest for new modes of expression. To understand a given phenomenon, like conversion, it is necessary to be equipped with a conception of human nature as a whole in the light of its stages of development. Possibly a literary person, with no doctrinal axe to grind, will describe this phenomenon more impartially than any religious worker. Even the description of prayer turns upon our view of life, its ultimate sources and values, the possibility of error and the subtleties of auto-suggestion. Recent works on the psychology of religion disclose a wide variety of motives and interests, and the results may be either highly practical or very theoretical, according to assumptions from other fields. The student who possesses a constructive faith will wish to preserve it in one region of his mind, as he would conserve the values of friendship; while patiently analyzing processes and elements in another sphere of thought.

Definition.—The definition of religion greatly depends upon the approach and mode in which we propose to treat it, whatever type of psychology we adopt. To record the history of religion in its typical and national forms so that in narrating the history we shall be faithful to the religious ideas of primitive man would be to adopt a definition implied in crude beliefs and observances, far removed from what we commonly regard as religious enlightenment. The assumption that religion has come into fullness of being by natural evolution is sometimes taken to mean that it is a survival thrusting itself upon us from primitive times. Consequently, the definition is made broad enough to include gross misconceptions, fantastic ideas or dreams, repulsive notions of bloody sacrifices, and the like. The minimum degree of reality necessary to account for religion at its lowest stage is somehow supposed to be a sufficient explanation of religion at its highest stage. Very few writers who thus approach the historical or comparative study seem to consider what is requisite in order to explain or even describe religion at its best. They are like the psychologists who so enlarge upon the crudest description of the processes of sense-perception that they have no

space for the study of what most interests us in the human mind in its deeper meanings.

It has been said that religion, because of its great value, consists historically of religions; hence its reality is a truth of truths, to be persistently delved for, implied in many types of belief and response. Thus one may endeavor to appreciate, in succession, the world's living religions, as indeed one tries to put one's self sympathetically into the viewpoint of both Catholics and Protestants. Yet, when avoiding prejudgments as resolutely as possible, we compare definitions by many types of believers and experts we are greatly bewildered. It would seem more feasible to limit the comparison to a few definitions selected from the best, and then proceed with a working definition to determine the relation between religion and psychology.

Typical Definitions.—Taking account of both the reality of its objects and the inner struggles and sources of duality out of which it grows, Sabatier describes religion as the "inward happy crisis by which human life is transformed and an issue opened up to it towards the ideal life."[9] Religion is thus a "commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." It is also the "vital act by which the whole spirit seeks to save itself by attaching itself to its principle." It involves an active and a passive element, both a movement of liberty and a feeling of dependence, a "free act" which Sabatier identifies with prayer and recognition of God as "inward presence," the conscious realization of this presence being true salvation or deliverance.

In more explicitly psychological terms, Thouless defines religion with respect to its elements of behavior, intellectual beliefs, and a system of feelings, the peculiar mark being belief in God. In brief, "religion is a felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman being or beings."[10] Defined with regard to its distinctive

[9] A. Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, 1899, p. 27.
[10] R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, 1923, p. 4.

mark, religion is "the response of the 'finite' mind to the 'infinite' whole, to Reality as the embodiment of spiritual value," the travail of the imperfect striving after the perfect.[11] So too Watson finds that a man's religion is "the expression of his total attitude to life . . . that which gives meaning and direction to all that he thinks and feels and does."[12] Thus viewed, religion involves the same elements noted by Thouless: a *life,* a "living personal expression of what is to be the highest form of activity of which a man is capable," namely, a "direct and effective consciousness which in some way transforms a man's whole nature;" a *belief* in "something higher than any given object of sense, and higher than any finite object . . . something divine;" and an *expression* of this consciousness in "certain peculiar acts . . . at least of service, as the external signs or symbols of religious emotion." Religion being in brief a life, a creed, and a ritual, it is essentially the "direct and spontaneous expression of the spirit," the "consciousness of the divine," including responses which come within the comprehension of the intellect.[13] The psychological clue is especially implied in the term "consciousness" as thus employed: man as a religious being is a being "who in all ages has been conscious of himself as standing in vital relation to a supreme object of reverence and worship whom he calls God."[14]

In accepting the central point in these definitions, for all present purposes—belief in the existence of divine reality as a presence or ultimate object of thought and worship—we may well reserve a place for the widely shared conviction that religion was originally due to divine activity. Starting with the idea of divine realities, religion ordinarily includes a view of the universe, a belief in the self or soul, its welfare and destiny, and probably an idea of the future life or the spiritual world. An attitude toward life in the present existence follows from these central

[11] R. F. A. Hoernlé, *Idealism as a Philosophy,* 1927, p. 315.
[12] J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion,* 1907, p. 1.
[13] *Op. cit.,* p. 22.
[14] E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,* Vol. I, p. 2.

convictions. Our interest in the psychology of religion turns upon the responses man makes according to these and similar convictions, with special reference to his view of human nature and the religious view of the world. We are at liberty therefore to regard as the essence of religion that which seems to the worshiper or group to bring man nearest the divine, whatever may be the given conception of the holy or sacred element in the special case; and whatever the belief in revelation, inner experience, reason, instinct, sentiment, intuition to which religion is primarily attributed. Thus we find Caird saying that "Christianity and all the higher religions have claimed to be the great power that consecrates and idealizes the life of man by relating it to that which is eternal and divine." [15]

Consciousness of that which marks out and fills its precinct is then in one sense religion itself, namely, awareness that this region is sacred: consciousness of the eternal verities. From this primary consciousness comes the thought of religion defined as an art with special reference to the element of beauty, notably in the services of worship and in the literature which fosters the "sense of the holy by appeal to the highest arts, poetry, painting, architecture, and music." [16] There follows also religion as an art of life and method of thought in daily conduct. Although religious thought may seem to be moving in a circle, as if it were merely "the self-affirmation of the soul," there are also references beyond the practical interests near at hand, references to the eternal verities which surpass psychological description. In undertaking to define this the finest of all arts, religion in its fullness, we are mindful then that religion pertains to God "in all His richness, immanent and transcendent," religion being man's "whole response to the Eternal and Abiding of which any one man is capable." [17] Implied in this art is "an objective vision or certitude, something to aim at; and also a total integration of the self, its dedication to that aim." Hence our

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
[16] Cf. C. G. Shaw, *The Precinct of Religion*, 1908, p. 50.
[17] E. Underhill, *The Life of the Spirit and the Life of Today*, 1922, p. 192.

study is concerned with "all the various beauties and achievements of this life of the Spirit," including the "reactions of different temperaments to the abiding and inexhaustibly satisfying Object of their love."

Religion as Personal Response.—While religion as thus defined seems essentially personal, demanding a self-dedication so intimately conscious that the individual must endeavor to subordinate every impulse to his ruling love or ideal with a view to unifying his whole self round a supreme interest, the complete definition includes what have been called the "serious and social attitudes" of both individuals and communities "toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies."[18] Here, religion is understood in relation to an *attitude* which all members of a group may share. The great objective becomes what Pratt calls the "Determiner of Destiny," a term that is applicable to a religion in which God is regarded as a Person and also to one which reveres the moral law, rather than a God, as supreme.

There are excellent reasons for agreeing with William James that religion as human sentiment or response cannot be identified with "any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name."[19] Man's response is very far from being limited to one religious sentiment, as if this were an entity by itself: religious experience contains "many characters which may alternately be equally important." These characters relate to well-known "concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling *plus* a specific sort of object," such as God or the spiritual world. Thus religious love is man's natural emotion directed to a religious object, religious joy is the "same organic thrill which we feel in a forest at twilight." Nor is there an essential kind of religious act. For in religion, psychologically described, we are concerned with all the "feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may

[18] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[19] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 26.

consider the divine.'' [20] Since religion is a man's ''total reaction upon life,'' man's religious nature is his whole self ''accepting the universe'' in his individual way. To say this is not in any sense to underestimate well-known religious responses, such as prayer, worship, communion; but to note that, ''like love, like wrath, like hope . . . like every other instinctive eagerness and impulse, it adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything else. This enchantment, coming as a gift when it does come . . . is either there or not there for us. . . . Religious feeling is thus an absolute addition to the subject's range of life. It gives him a new sphere of power . . . an added dimension of emotion.'' [21]

The Quest for Unity.—Furthermore, there is, as we shall see, no religious instinct, no single faculty or sense, not even the so-called God-sense which appears to guarantee the divine presence as the unmistakable source of all religion. It will follow that there is no single religious truth differentiated from other truth by assigning a special province to miracles, revelations, and the supernatural. Since there are varieties of religious experience, there are types of religious people (such as the high churchman and the Quaker), and types of religious belief in more or less common objects. One investigator might agree with James in noting the pluralism of responses thus implied, as if a pluralistic philosophy or radical empiricism followed. Another thinker might, with E. Caird, trace the development of criticism and its results from the point where philosophical reflection appears, when reflection becomes free in ancient Greece and seeks system or unity in contrast with the relatively separate interests of practical life.[22] Some students of the psychology of religion will be content to leave the description of religious types on the descriptive level, baffled, it may be, by the astonishing variety of cults and faiths, for instance, in India. Others will find a clue in the unity or whole in which our existence is said to

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 47, 48.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 28, foll.

be contained, agreeing with Caird that "all that we know is a factor in one experience, the experience of one world, and . . . such a unity is the presupposition of all consciousness, both of ourselves and of our objects." The idea of what Caird calls "the unity and self-consistency of the intelligible world, as a system throughout all its differences . . . the manifestation of one principle," may seem to point to the one source of all our spiritual life. For, reflectively speaking, it may appear impossible to render the idea of God as the supreme religious object intelligible save on this conviction that "there is a principle of unity in [the] whole akin to that which gives unity to our own existence as self-conscious beings." [23]

So it may seem to us that Plato is "the first philosopher who grasped the idea that lies at the root of all religion, and made it the center of his whole view of the universe . . . the idea of God as an absolute power or principle." [24] Religion is indeed profoundly identified by some with "the *Supreme Reality* who is the Fountain of All Good," since religion implies not only faith in the highest values but the conviction that these values are eternally realized, God being the "Perfect Fulfillment." [25] Religion will then become truly itself through the "full, total and harmonious union and fulfillment of the human functions at their highest power, recognized as the self-revelation and self-realization of God, the Cosmic Spirit, through the human person in the human community or fellowship." [26] Yet most students of the psychology of religion find their interest centering almost wholly about the process rather than the attainment. Although religion may indeed be what Leighton describes as the "total attitude of the spirit of man in which he affirms his faith that the values of life are rooted and grounded in the nature of things," [27] religion as experience is a problem, and the difficulty is to attain unity amidst a perplexing variety and distressing duality.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[25] J. A. Leighton, *Religion and the Mind of Today*, 1924, p. 4.
[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 78.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

Summary.—Instead of defining religion by appeal to any system of belief or alleged essence, instinct, faculty, superior type of knowledge, or supernatural origin, we shall consider its nature and significance by investigating various lines of approach and various phases of religious consciousness. Religion thus regarded is not a generality. It is not limited to prophets or followers. It is resolved into the attitudes, beliefs, emotions, sentiments, modes of worship, types of conduct; the thoughts, feelings, and acts which enter into the religious life in its manifold forms. For certain of its devotees, religion constitutes man's whole life in its most intense and complete form. For others, religion is observance, acquiescence. In any event, processes are involved which yield the subject-matter of our inquiry into the traditions, symbolisms, types of prayer and belief which constitute religion as inner experience or personal consciousness and personal response. The description and explanation of these elements and processes belong with that larger inquiry which includes the history and science of religion, and a philosophy of the universe in which the meaning of religious values is disclosed.

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CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

Humanism.—There are marked advantages in favor of the psychological study of religion. Psychology is concerned with human nature, its sources, conditions, processes, laws. Human nature tends to conform to types which involve variations in disposition, temperament, character; individual differences readily describable by reference to modes of response to sensation, mental tests, methods of utilizing intellectual power. It also displays a trend toward introspection in certain types of character, or toward objectivity and external interests in general. Under psychology these types may be freely analyzed apart from special interests, with a view to determining the varieties of religious experience. Hence religion may be approached in the light of universals or essentials, with less emphasis on transitory matters. The prime result is likely to be humanism, broadly speaking, an investigation of religion as an expression of man's total selfhood, interesting in the same sense in which so many other activities engage our attention. It may well be that religious differences are in large part due to varied combinations of elements and characteristics which psychology can best explain. Furthermore, hidden regions or aspects of the mind, subconscious or unconscious, may throw light on the obscurer phenomena of religion.

Recent Systems.—To ask what type of psychology is most adaptable, is to recall the fact that psychology has always been compatible with current views of religion. For example, the rationalistic psychology of a former age agreed with the theory of revelation as disclosing a higher type of knowledge, the view that knowledge implies a uni-

versal principle of reality which generates all the particulars, and the conception of intellect or reason as supreme in the human mind. When psychology was defined as the science of the soul, the idea of the soul was taken over bodily from philosophy, ethics, and religion. But with the effort to explain human interests and beliefs as outgrowths of experience itself, in contrast with principles prior to it, psychology became in time empirical; and the human mind was studied more cautiously, to avoid uncritical assumptions. This meant increasing emphasis on sense-perception and its deliverances in the sphere of feeling, ideas, emotions, and will or desire, with special reference to laws of association between these deliverances, elements, or "ideas." Thus experience, understood in the light of its development, assumed an importance formerly assigned to intellect or reason, with its claims for priority and supremacy, in the rationalistic systems. Finally, the study of mental elements and processes wholly displaced the former view of psychology "with a soul." Various types of experimental psychology came into vogue, with special reference to those factors of our mentality which may most readily be reduced to standards of quantity or measurement and may be made to harmonize with a mechanical view of the universe. Recent psychology has depended more and more on the physiology of the sense-organs, on biology, the theory of evolution from simple to complex forms, the study of glands and the possibility that these condition or limit our dispositions. In fine, it has tended to become the science of the behaving organism.

In its crudest forms, such psychology is purely external, on the assumption that if mind or consciousness exist at all our mentality is a mere accompaniment of bodily processes without any efficacy. Hence the introspective or subjective method has been wholly rejected, thought has been underestimated or ignored, will has been reduced to something like the reactions of "the muscular sense," while emotions have been identified with bodily expressions, such as weeping, or clenching the fists. To apply such a theory of mental life to religion, apart from any saving

grace in favor of worths or values, would be to assume that religion is nothing more than what the body is seen doing when, for example, the organism kneels in prayer or when the priest goes through a series of mechanical motions before the altar. This psychology has added little to our knowledge save so far as the description of the most elementary behavior or the behavior of childhood is concerned. When offered as a substitute for adult psychology, as if psychology were mere behaviorism, it has been relentlessly criticized. Thus it has been said that (1) it oversimplifies, as if human activity were reducible to visual-tactual events; and (2) it repudiates the difficult tasks which are the real problems of psychology.[1] Little light is thrown on the nature of religion as inner experience by describing the external behavior which is but one of many modes of articulating that experience.

The contribution to the psychology of religion is somewhat greater in the case of psychoanalysis, in so far as certain forms of religion may be correlated with sexual emotion, repressions or complexes, and crude or primitive modes of substitution and escape-mechanisms. On this view there is a concealed "psyche" which differs radically from the soul of former ages of religious thinking; the seat of all significant activities is in the unconscious, and much depends on an assumed "censor" which somehow presides over incoming experiences or beliefs. Religion on the whole appears to be a mode of relief from repressions, a substitute mechanism. When this view is taken seriously, the treatment accorded to religion is negative. Yet the hypothesis of the unconscious offers a suggestive rival to offset its popular competitor, the subconscious, and in comparison with Myers' theory of the deeper or subliminal self. It does not follow that the *soul* is subconscious. Nor does it follow that any type of experimental, physiological, or biological psychology is the last word in mental science.

Meanwhile, the empirical psychology which began in large measure with Locke and was modified by the theory

[1] Cf. H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology: Its Facts and Principles*, 1928, pp. 9, 99.

of the association of ideas, had been advancing far beyond this interest in "ideas" through new emphasis on attention, will, feeling, emotion, the stream of thought, in the type of psychology advocated by William James, who gave a classic description of the "stream of thought," the various phases of selfhood which constitute our individual and social self-consciousness, and the higher values of belief. Thus came into vogue an enriched voluntarism (emphasis on attention and will) in contrast with the old intellectualism, with full recognition given to instinct, and the life of feeling in general. It is this type of psychology which to a large extent has been taken over into the field of religion, in sympathetic appreciation of the fact that in religion for most of us the stress falls on the individual type, the favored mode of belief and emotion, the attitude toward practical life, and the temperamental variety of religious experience. On this view, much depends on ascertaining what religious experience *practically means* to the one who has the experience.

Spiritual Psychology.—Whether under the guise of rationalism or some other type of thought, the old-time view of the soul or spirit has always survived in religious circles. A new version of this psychology has come into vogue with the propositions that life as universal energy is spiritual rather than physical, and that the brain is an instrument of the spirit. On this assumption matter is a group of energies taken on by the spirit, and spirit ceases to be a by-product of the organism. In Bergson's terms, intuition is as original as intellect; one should try to envisage the world-order as an objectified result of creative evolution, by persistently maintaining the point of view of this upspringing life or energy and what it takes on or acquires.[2] Thus to regard the universe is to view it from within outward, mindful of the fact that spirit possesses enduring reality, is appreciable through its wholeness or integrity. Emphasis will then fall on time rather than on space, on freedom instead of its conditions, on immanent activity far more than on its processes or stages. Especially significant for

[2] *Creative Evolution,* 1911, tr. by A. Mitchell.

religion is Bergson's theory of memory as subjective in character, independent of matter, and a basis of belief in spiritual reality.[3] Sir Oliver Lodge has adopted the spiritual view of reality by a somewhat similar emphasis on spirit as more central or primary than matter.

This return to an inner point of view, in vigorous reaction against the mechanical theory of the universe, is in accord with the attitude which a religious person would naturally take when adopting a psychology adequate to the spiritual life in its fullness. For religion, the human spirit is profoundly real in its own right, whatever the dependence on the bodily organism and the environing physical world. That is to say, an essentially spiritual psychology is implied in what may be called the higher types of religion; and we have as good reason to be fair to these as to those types which dispense with a definite view of the human self. The conviction that the human spirit is thus real is especially true when belief in the eternal verities or an eternal spiritual world is a cardinal principle.

Unless our religious thought postulates or starts with the existence of the spirit, with man's entire religious nature or whole selfhood, long and arduous indeed will be the effort to derive spirit from nature, eternity from time, immortality from the stream of experience, and eternal truths or values from the relativities of sense-perception. Beginning with the spirit in its integrity, one may proceed as it were both up and down: up to God as immanent or ultimate object of belief, down to the unconscious or subconscious, as well as outward to the material world. We may call this a constructive view of the self, if we will, leaving various matters open until we come to them, notably belief in immortality. The vital point is the outward look upon the world involving an essentially spiritual approach to life, all compromises with materialism having been rejected. Moreover, there is a sense in which recent emphasis on the emotions, attention, and will coincides with the new interest in intuition with respect to the instruments which creative evolution uses. In both cases there is a profound

[3] *Matter and Memory,* tr. by Paul and Palmer, 1896.

appeal to the wealth of human nature on its instinctive-emotional side, on the original drives or dispositions which have found expression in the more highly developed mental elements which we call will and intuition, in contrast with the former exaltation of the intellect. This appeal is significant for the psychology of religion, because religious values are for the most part products of this side of our nature. The human spirit may be said to be, in brief, the locus of religious values.

Spirit and Matter.—This vision of things from within outward is essential if we are to be concerned with the height and depth of religious experience at its best in prayer, worship, faith, love, fellowship, conversion, the beatific insight. Religious experience may indeed involve an insistent dualism of matter and spirit, a conflict between the flesh and the higher self; hence a long series of antitheses and bondages. Religion on the whole may be a struggle to maintain values which seemed incompatible with the type of life led by the majority in this pleasure-seeking, economically determined world. But there are influences enough to remind us of all these bondages on the nether side: religion is also an ideal, a conviction that spirit will triumph, that faith will accomplish its perfect work, and love fulfill the law. What is most apt to be lacking is the reminder that man is a spirit, with an outlook toward an ideal world.

However lowly the origin of many religious sentiments, religion is also an aspiration quickened by its great seers and prophets, its literature and its saviors, who have valiantly protested against the rule of worldly things. One naturally demands a conception of the human spirit adequate to the living reality of religious personality in the highest forms known to human history. One measures the spirit by the greatest leaders and the greatest books. We look to those who have been supremely dedicated to religion, as in other fields we consult specialists in arts and sciences, in governmental and other practical affairs. As in physics we assume the existence of forces operating according to law, in order to describe the push and pull of things;

or in chemistry assume first the atoms and molecules, then the electrons and protons, or whatever other centers of force may be required; so in religion we begin with feelings, emotions, sentiments, volitions, ideas, hopes, experiences collectively implying what we call the religious consciousness in order faithfully to describe and explain, and at least partly interpret the processes taken to be real by the participants.

Spiritual Values.—Granted a view of the human spirit large and deep enough, with capacities great enough to compass the emotional, intuitive, intellectual or formal, the moral and social elements of religion, we are ready to begin a study of the psychological details, heartened by the realization that we have neither surrendered to materialism nor assumed that any type of idealism thus far propounded is complete. As in the fine arts one must presuppose the experience of beauty before undertaking to describe the perception of it as a synthesis of subjective and objective elements, so in religion we presuppose the values which have led to the discrimination of the eternal verities. Thus we take cognizance in a preliminary way of that phase of experience which is frequently termed incommunicable or indefinable, not deterred by the fact that the phraseology employed by religious people is often vague. We are not concerned for the moment to ask whether this surpassing phase of religion is purely a matter of symbols, as if values did not qualify ultimate reality. Religion is dedicated among other things to what Höffding has called the conservation of values, and these are real for religious consciousness even though we are unable to determine how far values and ultimate reality correspond. A man's progressively formulated ideas of God, changing dozens of times during his lifetime, may be said systematically to refer to the same divine principle, despite the fact that each idea falls short and is rejected; psychologically each idea is significant. So in general—religious consciousness having indicated the wealth and scope of religious experience—psychology takes its clues from the field thus disclosed. Psychology does not show how extensive that field is on the

side where consciousness of eternal values awakens into power. A pantheist's experience may be as suggestive as a theist's, for the psychologist need not pay attention to heresies. Some effort will be required for the high churchman to appreciate the Quaker, and for the Friend to enter into the spirit of an elaborately ritualistic ceremonial. There are more religious types than psychologies. Fortunately, the standpoint of values or appreciations is one which most of us can adopt, however greatly we may dissent from doctrines and types of worship when, for instance, we seek the inner meanings of worship in a Hindoo temple, or when Catholic and Protestant exchange places imaginatively.

Religious Situations.—Yet having postulated a growing psychology approximated by the conflicting types current today, a psychology coextensive with experience, our study will be aided by the researches of recent psychologists of various schools. Some of these investigations are conclusive for religion. At the outset, we may well guard against the fallacy of the group mind, avoiding all presuppositions uncritically implying what is popularly called crowd psychology. It is possible, to be sure, to overemphasize the individual, particularly his inner life as a subjective consideration. Yet all psychology of groups is essentially a psychology of individuals.[4] Unless we understand what actuates the individual, it will be impossible to describe and explain his relationship to any group, least of all a religious group. To assume the existence of a collective or class mind is to make a purely theoretical approach to the subject as if there were an entity known as social consciousness embodying its motives by means of a brain and nervous system of its own in a social organism. Instead, a group, congregation, crowd, or mob, however peaceful or warlike, is a *social situation* in which individuals find themselves. A typical instance is that of a revival meeting, with the progressive appeal to the emotions by means of hymns and personal confessions of faith, the use of suggestion and other devices calculated to win the impressionable audi-

[4] Cf. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 4.

tors. Both leaders and followers conduct themselves differently in such a situation. The facts insisted upon by the various schools of social psychologists are doubtless true; hence the reason for making special studies of tradition, fashion, public opinion, custom, and other social elements and patterns. Yet each member of the group, whether agreeing or dissenting with the multitude, is a particular individual reacting to the given situation in his own way, according to his own inner history, his prior social responses, and what he takes to be the views he assumes as prevalent. In brief, each brings his group of thought-patterns and patterns for social conduct. Individuals within stimulating distance of one another may respond in a more or less similar way. Each is likely to carry away an impression which coincides with what he believes, coupled with his appreciation of what he assumes that the crowd believes. Thus a house of worship is a socially significant edifice into which each worshiper brings his religious patterns, finding in large measure what he anticipates, carrying away what his modes of response make possible, stirred it may be by what he attributes to the congregation as if the group possessed a collective mind.

Social Patterns.—It readily follows that the conduct of individuals in a group cannot be understood save through knowledge of both the social life and the patterns of culture which obtain in the groups, such as those of Catholicism or Freemasonry, in which the individual participates.[5] Since all have been born into social groups, with their types of culture, language, techniques, social codes, moral beliefs, religious views, and other classes of belief or knowledge, the individual mind is to be regarded in terms of these patterns as factors in the social process, which we describe, now in one phase, now in another. Thus Cooley shows that the "essential nature of the social process is the dual relationship of the individual and the social group made up of other individuals . . . representing a type of social interplay at various points of contact . . . influenced on all

[5] Cf. Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, 1927, p. xxv.

sides by the cultural formulations."[6] Hence we put with any proposition concerning man as a social being or man the individual Cooley's statement: "A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social . . . general aspect . . . society and individuals do not denote separable phenomena."[7] Cooley holds that "a *complete* view of society would also be a complete view of all individuals, and *vice versa,*" individuality and sociality being taken together.

If we adopt "human association" as our working term, a group of individuals "which survives in competition with other groups" will then be the unit of evolution for any social psychology. Such a term as moral sense will therefore be intelligible by reference to the individual in his interchanges with the group.[8] It follows that the socializing influences of life in the group will yield the clue to explanation of the mental faculties and moral nature of mankind.[9] Life in societies is thus seen to be "the most powerful weapon in the struggle for life." Granted the group in question, the motives which prompt the individual may be classed with reference to what Young calls the "in-group," namely, through love, sympathy, loyalty, mutuality, directed towards its members; and the "out-group," toward which may be directed hatred, fear, suspicion, avoidance, or even warfare.[10] It is a noteworthy fact that the tribal or national religious pattern has oftentimes proved to be the most powerful pattern of conduct control exercised in human history. Thus religion as a motive may be organized with warfare as the social pattern adopted towards the neighboring nation, or it may be coupled with such a mode of conduct as the Inquisition.

[6] Young, *op. cit.*, p. 4, summarizing the viewpoint of C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order,* 1902.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 1.
[8] Cf. Kunkel, quoted in *Source Book for Social Psychology,* p. 32.
[9] Chapin, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

Individual Adjustments.—To understand the peculiar influences to which the individual is subject within and without his group, for example, in case of the ancient Israelites, when religious motives are paramount, is above all to consider the growth of personality in the social situations characteristic of that nation. Given hereditary patterns for thought and feeling, social conditions for moral conduct according to the established code, prohibitions concerning food and other matters, the religious conduct required of the individual will then be one of several rôles which he is expected to fulfill; and on occasion a religious motive may predominate over all, by invoking the tribal deity in warfare. The particular integration of such a personality will depend not alone on his physical make-up, instinctive tendencies, intellectual powers, emotions, feelings, desires and will; but on his adjustment to his group with reference to the way he adopts its stereotypes. It will be much simpler to adopt these social patterns than to try to originate a satisfactory mode of expression of moral and religious feeling. In the economy of man's social nature, the formal element will thus make adaptation to the group a matter of habit. To find himself one among many of the chosen people will therefore be to assimilate both the convictions which make for solidarity within the group and the prejudices which on occasion make for intolerance.

Without subscribing to that view of knowledge which identifies it with what is socially useful, adopted as true by the individual simply because it works, we must admit the fact that for the majority knowledge signifies those responses which the members of the group have found successful in given social situations. Thus the moral code, with its restrictions and permissions, is essentially practical; it represents the traditional approvals and disapprovals of that tribe or nation, as indeed the tribal or national god is deemed an efficacious deity, in both peace and war.

Social Participation.—What is especially to be guarded against is the notion that there is a class of mental processes or functions called social apart from the dispositions and motives of individuals in mutual relationship in the group,

tribe, or nation. Consciousness is not social; it is individual with social references, as we note in the case of patriotism, with the attitude of the individual toward the flag, the interpretation of loyalty, political affiliation, local citizenship, and the other matters which constitute the several obligations of life in the community. Experience is not social. But objects, for example, in a house of worship, are social through the traditions and values affiliated with them, through the consciousness brought to them; so are events occurring within the sacred edifice and constituting a social situation, when people worship, partake of the sacraments, listen to the sermon and respond to it according to the way it is received. Objects and events are "social when their meaning or significance implies more than one observer."[11] In relation to other religionists therefore we shall use the term "partaker." The communicant may be said to participate in social events of religious value. He is a partaker through his presence in the congregation, in a spirit which characterizes worship in contrast with his private devotions (prayer). In his social attitude he shares, whereas an unfriendly critic might maintain a running fire of inner thought, setting him apart as an individualist. This sharing may be such that for the time being the communicant lives in the ideal world of his appreciations of the Bible, his thought of the "crucified Lord," his reverence for the priesthood and the apostolic succession, and his anticipations of the type of heavenly future prophetically foretold by the Church.

Instinct and Habit.—In avoiding over-emphasis on either the individual or society, it is equally important to refrain from attributing mental factors of religious significance to instinct, to a special sense or faculty, either gregarious or individualistic. If there is no group self-consciousness, so indeed there are no emotions and sentiments which become intelligible for religion merely because we have presupposed an instinct to which these motives are due. The individual may indeed have a sense of responsibility for the good of the group. Thus a great deal will depend on his

[11] Cf. M. Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 633.

loyalty, for example, to his denomination, to the corporate spirit of the Christian Church. Yet all this will come about by his successive relationships with groups, beginning in the home and continuing in the schools. So far as possible, the responses and development of the individual may well be described by reference to interactions within groups on the ground that these social interchanges have been acquired. Such acquisition implies the well-known truth that man is a creature of habit, beginning with the first patterns of behavior instilled into his psychophysical organism in infancy and continuing throughout every aspect of his bodily, mental, moral, and religious life.

If man inherits only the most rudimentary patterns of response, the control which he exerts over his behavior is not limited by those internal factors which were once uncritically called instincts; his control is describable with reference to gradually developed adaptations to his social environment. This is notably the case in the emotional responses attributed to fear, rage, and love.[12] These emotions may be differently conditioned according to the given social affiliations. It does not follow that external behavior conditions all our religious responses, as if we were mere products of environment; howbeit we note the presence amongst us of any number of communicants who are like sheep in a flock in their response to a typical religious emotion (fear), and in their allegiance to the priesthood. Recent criticism of the former conception of instincts suggests caution in regard to habit-formation, so readily taken as the sign that the process of learning is essentially a development from within. If the basic structure of mind is hereditary and therefore permanent in the individual, as many psychologists assume, the actual content of the mind involves what has been called a "*network of mental elements.*"[13] This is in part an organized system of memory-traces implying "*association* between mental elements as a fundamental condition of all psychical processes." It is

[12] Cf. J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist,* 1919, p. 219.

[13] A. G. Tansley, *The New Psychology,* revised ed., 1922, p. 57.

partly due to the interaction of impressions formed in connection with the inherited mechanisms from which the energy is derived.[14] The significant consideration is the more or less modified structural energy, native to the individual, and affecting those strivings toward self-maintenance and self-expansion which were formerly called instincts.

Structural Units.—Once formed, the groups of activities determine the modes of expression of the so-called instinct. In Josey's terminology, instincts are "structural units of the nervous system," physiologically speaking; but, psychologically, they are purposes, desires, or interests belonging to the native endowment of man."[15] Thus have appeared four great native "drives" or "urges": self-preservation, development or growth, reproduction, and companionship. From the interactive expression of these four trends have come the sentiments, with conflicts between them incidental to their diverse modes of expression. The instinct of self-preservation, as it is usually called, "may put its veto on any risk sanctioned by our instinct for self-expansion."[16] Hence may arise a complex. In Tansley's terms, the three universal complexes are: the ego-complex, the sex-complex, and the herd-complex.[17] The importance of this descriptive terminology for our purposes is that it presupposes perfectly normal "drives" native to the individual, prior to any complex in the sense in which the term is used by specialists in abnormal psychology and psychoanalysis.

It is natural for all individuals so to respond to the stimuli of experience that mental structure *plus* its implied energy—the energy of the universal complexes—unites with events in constituting the network of activities. The implied psychology is dynamic, whatever emphasis may be put upon the so-called inherited mechanisms which

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 62.
[15] C. C. Josey, *The Psychology of Religion*, 1927, p. 24.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 65. W. Trotter has popularized the gregarious or herd instinct, as a well consolidated instinctive mechanism, in his *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 1916.

used to be emphasized at the expense of the modifications acquired by experience. We may then picture the native drives, going forth into action or expression, but constantly hampered by what Tansley calls "the refusal of the world to lend itself to the gratifications of the heart's desire."[18] Human conflicts are due in the first place to a struggle between grouped activities whose strivings would lead to "incompatible actions." Hence arise the contests between sex and religion, patriotism and the family, religion and the family. To explain religious conflicts within the individual is to presuppose mental conflicts, chronic, acute, repressive; with tendencies toward projection (attributing parts of the mental content to outside entities), idealization, self-justification, and other modes of response to the subject-matter of one's experience. While it does not follow that religion is a form of defense-reaction or means of escape from inner conflict, we may well bear this hypothesis in mind when we come to the problem of religious symbols and values. In any event, the initial emphasis falls on the non-rational springs of human conduct, on emotion, desire, impulsive strivings likely to involve either conflict or progressive unifications in accordance with an ideal. Religious promptings once said to be instinctive are now seen in the light of the great original trends of human nature without which religious experience as such cannot be understood.

Modes of Approach.—Our method of study will therefore approximate the scientific study of facts, as objectively and impartially as possible, with the qualification that religious experience has little meaning apart from values. The effort of those who investigate the psychological content of religion is to avoid prejudices for or against religious customs and beliefs, by first determining the constituents of the experience or consciousness to which value is attributed.[19] The revivalist or missionary is likely to

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[19] For example, the experience of the Roman Catholic in attendance upon the "mass" in contrast with that of the Protestant, to be considered in the following chapter.

identify the experience of a convert with the creed he himself accepts in endeavoring to make converts. The theologian as readily identifies religion with the system, denomination or sect he espouses: the creed in question is true, religion is true, *because* it produces precisely these fruits. Meanwhile, converts easily enlarge both experience and the interpretation put upon it, by repeatedly narrating what happened when they "accepted Christ." Much more cautious is the literary man, who, like Harold Begbie, seeks to portray conversional experience with minimum reference to creeds and systems.[20] Naturally, the account given by one who wishes to make converts will not only favor his creed but the variety of experience preferred; while the liberal worker may object to every variety of evangelical creed and all mystical interpretations. Religious autobiographies and confessions possess distinctive value, also studies of remarkable instances, such as the conversions of Paul and Augustine.

Undertaking to describe and account for the workings of the human mind in its religious activities by appeal to the processes which psychology has disclosed by studying the mind in general, the psychology of religion proceeds with a certain remoteness from special points of view, without deciding in favor of any variety of religious experience.[21] This is a difficult undertaking for writers who are predisposed to minimize mysticism or to identify certain aspects of religion with the abnormal or pathological. The assumption on which most psychologists agree is that as man's mind works in the same way in his religion as in any other activity, religious experience implies the same laws and is subject to similar conditions. The use of questionnaires has tended to confirm this presupposition, and thus has thrown light not only on conversion but on belief in God and immortality. But the respondents may be as unaccustomed to discriminations between experience and tradition as some psychologists to discrimination of religious

[20] See, especially, *Twice-born Men*, 1909, and *Souls in Action*, 1911.
[21] Cf. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 6.

experiences from within. The introspection of one's own experience is of some value in determining the importance to be assigned to the actual processes, although it is probable that most of us prefer one approach to religion above all others; and it is difficult for the ritualist and the believer in silent worship to understand one another. We are reminded that "no intensity of religious feeling guarantees the value of the experience, or gives any real explanation of it. It is the *content* of experience, not its feeling-tone, that matters. . . . What matters is whether my feeling is indeed an experience of Reality."[22]

Theory and Practice.—The same considerations which seem to explain religion away, to one partisan of the unconscious, appear to throw light on its crude origins and impeding conditions when the unconscious is reinterpreted by another writer. So too all theories of the subconscious and of psychical research are subject to qualification, according to estimates of conscious processes. Discovery of the way the mind works need never be taken to mean that what it produces is unreal or worthless. As man may be either a creature or a master of habits, so he may succumb to or utilize doctrine, dogma, tradition, institution, or any other factor with which religious thought has been associated. The student might for the most part lose his faith by becoming absorbed in these relativities, or might achieve a reasoned faith for the first time. What is to be avoided is the assumption that weaknesses in one aspect of religion, such as its officialisms, signify failure in all other departments. One is not likely to fall into this misconception if the distinction between science and practice is kept clearly before the mind.

In the one field, knowledge being the chief interest, it is essential to raise objections as persistently as possible. Hence intellect predominates: all possible efforts must be made to discover and allow for every factor constituting the personal equation, notably, emotion, imagination, desire, the will to believe. In the other field, immediate needs and difficulties lead to postulates required for practice, for

[22] F. R. Barry, *Christianity and Psychology*, 1923, p. 123.

example, the demands of love, loyalty, and faith. Religion has developed out of the needs of heart and will. It is intimately personal. It is most intelligible when regarded in the light of its meaning for the inner life of the individual. Psychology, as applied to religion, is essentially descriptive. It undertakes to portray rather than wholly to explain. Interpretation lies beyond its province. Yet there is also a psychology of values, worths, ideals or symbols. Thus the psychology of religion, like that of moral experience as a contribution to ethics, offers results for philosophical consideration.

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CHAPTER III

WORSHIP

Significance of Worship.—To the devotee, worship seems relatively simple in character and meaning. To the observer, considering why men worship, how they worship, and for what reasons they continue the practice, the subject seems complex. If worship is not the essence of religion, in any event all the religious motives are involved, also the entire series of relations between the subjective and the objective elements of religion. The one who abstains from participation in worship, but who is nevertheless deeply religious, doubtless gives expression in private devotions and philanthropic service to similar motives. Moreover, his abstention may be in large part due to dislike of the modes of worship in churches near at hand. To compass the whole field is to note that worshipers of various types adopt modes of expression differing as greatly in the symbols or rituals employed as in the motivation to which the ceremonials are due.

Motives for Worship.—If fear in some sense made the gods—fear of the forces rampant in thunder, lightning, earthquake, fire, flood, pestilence—it was no less natural for man to render thanks for deliverances from such mysteries and calamities, and to voice his veneration for the gods whose presence seemed to offset these terrors. Worship spontaneously gives utterance to the sentiments which imbue the heart on various occasions, and in the groves which were "God's first temples" it began long before congregations existed. Religious rites were also observed in the family group, where the father was leader. In a primitive sense worship involved the twofold act of prayer in presenting an offering to the appropriate god and the

passive response when man seemed to hear the voice of the god.[1] If prayer was the constant element in such activities directed toward the divine, the doctrines and forms embodied in worship may be regarded as essentially external. Thus regarded, the embodiments of worship as a certain spirit or sentiment will naturally be modified as changes take place in the inner life. Hence the student of the various types and modes of worship will try sympathetically to follow the developing spirit or abiding essence, amidst the varying forms through which it finds expression. Tiele defines worship, with respect to what he calls the religious frame of mind underlying these modifications.[2] This sentiment is the common root of the doctrines, the church, and its modes of worship. Belief in God's supremacy combines with belief in man's kinship with God as the central motive.

Various terms have been employed to designate the chief motive—awe, veneration, reverence, adoration—unifying the "wonder, love, and praise" to which worship in general is due. If the acts of public worship were originally prompted by this sense of awe or adoration, a whole series of religious acts came in time to represent it. Thus was implied an attitude toward the power or powers to whom adoration was due, acts springing from the motives aforementioned: beliefs concerning man in relation to the divine, and regulations involving the cult, the rites and sacraments. Included in these rules and customs were prohibitions concerning what was unseemly or undoctrinal, the ascetic or other practices essential in a preparatory way, the subsequent feasts or other devotional activities harmonious with the given ideas of fasting, penance, special days and observances. Both fear and love, dread and adoration might mingle in the devotee's heart as he approached the place of meeting or the altar. It might be difficult to discern the individual attitude by appeal to the external features of such ceremonials as anointing with oil, washing the feet, or partaking of bread and wine. What concerns

1 Tiele, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 128.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 191.

us is the collective activity or corporate modes of expression which distinguish worship from prayer as essentially individual.

Worship differs from prayer through a difference in attitude, when adoration (or its equivalent) becomes the motive, when supplication gives place to praise, and God's holiness is given precedence over His love.[3] Hence men worship in groups, employing terms and modes of expression suggestive of social psychology. Interpreting worship as due to "an innermost spiritual need," Jordan assigns a high place to the divine transcendence, which suggests awe in the presence of the holy: this sense of the holy is the universal element amidst changing forms and symbols. Other writers on the psychology of religion regard this sense of the holy as the very essence of religion.[4] The adoption of a ritual naturally follows, also an established order of service, including collective prayer and other features calculated to reach a climax by eliciting successive responses from the worshiper. Private devotions anticipate this corporate expression of religious consciousness; what was felt and perceived in isolation is assimilated into the activity of the group. By common consent a certain solemnity pervades the house of worship. The worshiper responds accordingly. Tradition seems to have decreed that while blessedness is the religious ideal, and while happiness or joy in the ceremonials is permissible, any levity that might imply lack of respect or seriousness belongs outside.

The Values of Worship.—Although worship thus signifies for the initiate a group of ideals finding articulation in ritualism, the observer is interested in the particular states and processes of mind by which the elements of worship may be distinguished. The actual adoration which prompts the pious soul to worship doubtless commingles the divine transcendence (as surpassing formulation) with the divine immanence (the qualities of love, power, wisdom, that are appreciable through inner experience), so that God in His integrity seems present. Thus in adopting the term "adora-

[3] Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[4] See, especially, Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy.*

tion'' to represent its essence, worship is often taken to mean the ''holy awe, reverence, grateful acknowledgment of every token of love, hopeful coincidence, lowly self-abasement, a deep sense of one's own unworthiness and shortcomings, total self-abnegation and unconditioned consecration of one's whole faculties.'' [5] But this is worship in highly developed inwardness of response. For the less consecrated person worship is apt to be identified with one or two of its values or objective symbols, coupled with a few assignable motives. The actuating motives originally leading to worship seem altogether lost in some cases in the habit; conventionality, loneliness, appreciations of the æsthetic features (especially the music), and a desire for the change or rest which the Sabbath brings appear to mingle as motives in the minds of the devotees.

Social Values.—Men worship in groups because they are by nature gregarious and the welfare of the group is involved, so it has been said. But they also seek this companionship because individuals discover that they can thus seek and find religious consolation better than when alone. The emotions experienced in the group seem indeed to surpass any response evoked by private devotion, although some earnestly religious people protest that they never in large measure yield themselves to the influences of the group. In the group the worshiper is more likely to experience such sentiments as those enumerated in the foregoing; for he brings to the house of worship a consciousness of values which he probably identifies with his religion, his church, its history, its special traditions. All these associations combine in producing what has been figuratively called group-feeling, although this means what each individual brings and takes away according to his modes of approach and response. The worshiper is supposedly reinforced by this contact with an essentially social atmosphere. It is not likely to occur to him that strictly speaking each individual brings his inner equipment, taking away what has impressed his personal consciousness; some of the worshipers being more emotional, others more intellectual in

[5] Cf. Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

type. Religious and æsthetic sentiments probably commingle with a certain satisfaction in the enjoyment of the service. Only the psychologist would think of distinguishing these values, although people sometimes admit that all they cared for in a given service was the music. So too the worshiper may declare the sermon "beautiful" without reference to its doctrinal content and the appeal to the moral will. Having "enjoyed" the sermon while it was being delivered, he may be unable a half hour later to tell what the text was or what the sermon was about; howbeit if the sermon was too long, too doctrinal, too formal, or too informal, he may at least remember that much.

Worship might seem to be identified in origin with the inner experience of the prophet who has stood on holy ground. The prophet's experience having been formulated with respect to his God, the divine commands, the requisite attitude on his part, the leadership called for, the instructions to be given, worship in a group would then appear to be representative and in a way secondary. Indeed, the congregation may venerate the prophet's God, may devoutly adhere to his doctrines and rear these into a tradition. But doubtless the performance of rites, the reiteration of the commands and beliefs, the externalizing of the modes of worship is meant to preserve the spirit thus finding embodiment. The facts of revelation, inspiration, divine authority are also represented in the service, so that in a concrete way all the essentials of the Church may be regarded as present or as embodied. Not anywhere else does the worshiper find such an impressive synthesis of values, worths, and symbols, the greatest of which he distinguishes as the "eternal verities" or ideal objects of all religion in its highest estate.[6] These are to be cherished as unspeakably precious, regarded as manifesting anew the Holy Spirit, making possible the values of private worship or prayer, and inducing or quickening spiritual intuitions.

Symbols and Ceremonials.—Since the religious values thus conveyed with authority are symbols, the elements of

[6] Compare Plato's "Ideas," which constitute the "intelligible world" of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.

worship may be regarded one by one, as imaginal (pertaining to mental imagery, but not necessarily imaginary), emotional (including what is popularly known as "feeling"), intellectual, and volitional, with reference to these symbols.[7] The external objects in the temple, the altar, the statuary and pictures, as well as the deeds done in performing the rites, are symbols also, notably the cross or the crescent. Hence it has been said that worship "moves and lives in an atmosphere of double meaning," for example, in the sacrificial flesh, the sacramental bread and wine, to which correspond the sentiments aroused in the communicant. In both series there is a wide sweep of symbology, amidst manifold types of imagery. The worship may be as dependent on imagery drawn from spatial concepts as on tangible things, some of which are offerings which serve both as ostensible food for the gods and as actual food to be eaten by the worshipers. The objective symbol may become identified with the religious reality itself, as if the spirit of worship transmuted its visible objects, its bread and wine, into spiritual entites. Or the inward symbol may become crystallized as a mere form. Again, the outward performance may greatly outlive its usefulness for both official and worshiper. The inward sentiment may survive as a value for worship, while the historically hallowed creed is repeated long after it is believed as true save by the most orthodox. So indeed an entire scheme of worship, especially the hymns, may survive because of æsthetic values and hallowed associations, after the intellectual values have waned.

Internal Worship.—When worship becomes identified with externals, so that what the worshipers really enjoy is what they apprehend through their senses, it is natural to protest that only the inner process, namely, the thought and sentiment, is really worship. Obviously, the ceremonials are witnessed with varying attention, interest, and response; much depends on the approach, and unless love of the ritual were brought to the house of worship the spirit of worship would not reside there. Participants in an elaborate cere-

[7] These elements or constituents will be discussed in subsequent chapters; here they are taken for granted.

monial sometimes insist that worship is so truly of the heart that, this once being recognized, the spirit needs no outward sign. The visitor may follow to the extent of finding the hymns and responses, bowing the head, and otherwise conforming in outward behavior, while inwardly carrying on his own type of aspiration.

While it is true that "adoration of the Lord from the heart" through love and charity is real worship, externals may be an aid in keeping the inner life in holiness, even for those who are most genuinely spiritual. The mere frequenting of churches, attending sacraments, hearing preachings and prayers, and observing feasts can hardly be called worship in its fullness, even when there is the most regular adherence to these formal requirements. For what a man really loves he worships, and this may be himself or the world. Where the heart is, there is worship. The Church can hardly be said to exist because of external worship as such. Indeed, it has been said that without internal worship the external is only a gesture. Yet when all this has been said, worship begins in large measure with externals, external worship may be a form of internal; and the forms and ceremonies may be fostered very earnestly and diligently by those who place the essentials in love and charity, in acknowledgment of God and love toward the neighbor. If "the more sensuous a man becomes, the more exterior his worship," nevertheless the more holy and vitalizing the external worship may become, in so far as the essentials are apprehended through the embodiment.

Granted that the internal element is the soul, worship of doctrines that inhere in the memory may be as hollow as habitual repetitions uttered by the lips only. Worship is profaned by any sort of idolatry, and becomes purely external when degraded into mere custom. Hence it has been said that external worship is exactly measured by the attitudes of the communicants.[8] For worship should yield an increase of religious life; man should be progressively puri-

[8] The grotesque images in Oriental lands which the Occidental missionary takes to be proofs of gross idolatry, may be regarded by the Hindoo as aids to spiritual meditation.

fied from evils and falsities, receiving implantations of goodness and truth instead. Hence the emphasis which some have placed on freedom and spontaneity, or the voluntary part of worship. It readily follows that "worship from freedom is real," and that the worshiper may rightfully anticipate the imbuing of those energies which make for interior development.

Objective and Subjective Elements.—Yet before we pass judgment in favor of internal benefits, it is well to note how different may be the values assigned to external worship when the objective (external) ceremonial forms part of a different ecclesiastical system. Thus in the Roman Catholic Church the mass, as essentially objective, aims at producing an effect upon God by establishing relationship with Him; whereas worship in the Protestant Church may be intended to make some change in the mind of the worshiper through influence on his mood, his emotion, his beliefs or attitude.[9] To understand why the priest turns his back on the congregation, going through rites which not all communicants apprehend (and possibly the Protestant observer not at all), uttering words which only the few can hear, is to appreciate the "mass" as primarily worship of God. So too one penetrates to the motivation of the Chinese official cult of heaven, which can be performed only by the Emperor (or President), or the worship in the Hindoo temple ceremonials. Pratt calls attention to the fact that the temple in India is in no sense a "meeting-house." It is not built for the benefit of the human worshipers, but for the greater glory of God. Pratt finds extreme examples of subjective worship in two of the Indian religions, Jainism and Buddhism, in which there are *substitutes* only for God. "The Catholic Church seems to consider the direct worship of God as much a part of its duty as the salvation of souls."[10] The idea is that "God is pleased with this chorus of prayers and praises rising to Him in unison from all quarters of the globe . . . not that the worshipers should be able to behold and follow

[9] Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 290.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 295.

the service or be impressed by it, but *that God should be properly and gloriously worshiped.*"

The Protestant will of course raise objections at this point, contending that God is supposed to be present in Protestant churches also, although not so intimately identified with a particular place, unless it be the altar. He will call attention to the church as the house of God, to the doxology, to hymns in praise of God, to the Psalms used in the responses, the prayers, and the benediction. It will be said that prayer in its first intention is essentially directed towards God as able to answer.[11] So too prayer has found its place in the service of worship as a mode of expressing the highest religious sentiment, apart from special requests, and utilizing the language which tends to conserve religious values. Prayer would hardly seem to fulfill its highest end unless directed to God, voiced by one person that all may respond in spirit. Even when the worshiper fails to listen to the long prayer, he may be in the spirit of prayer. Thouless points out that if prayer were solely for the sake of the effect on the mind, the worshiper could depend on auto-suggestion. Prayer is different from auto-suggestion because the mental effects are incidental to the act of worship. In prayer the belief or thought is realized in actual conduct which occupies a significant place in the service as a whole. Yet Pratt calls attention to the fact that nearly all the details of the Protestant prayer are "planned out with the deliberate purpose of producing certain psychological effects."[12] So too great emphasis is put upon the sermon, and the chief function of the hymn is subjective. The Protestant would be unable to follow the mass with appropriate religious feeling, because he does not share the Catholic belief in the transmutation of the elements. Naturally, the scheme of worship in the Protestant churches is the result of efforts to combine objective and subjective phases, so that moral precepts can be correlated with the religious sentiments without neglecting the appeal to reason.

[11] Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 302.

Thus we find Dean Sperry defining worship as "the adoration of God, the ascription of supreme worth to God, and the manifestation of reverence in the presence of God."[13] What the psychologist says concerning the social processes at work is doubtless true—in its own place. Apparently, the official manipulates the congregation so as to attain certain subjective effects. A crowd seems to be essential. Yet with the motives sometimes attributed to the leaders and followers the whole service "ceases to be worship and becomes a clinic in morality."[14] Hence Mr. Sperry concludes that a service of worship cannot be "translated into the direct manipulation of men and keep its integrity. . . . The secret of the power and efficacy of a service of worship lies in man's confidence in its absolute integrity. Its eye must be single for God."

The Scope of Worship.—Putting worship in its larger context, as known by minister and worshiper rather than in terms of what interests the psychologist and confirms him in his conclusions, Sperry sees in the act of worship an affirmation and experience of the worshiper's "inalienable place" in the true society of souls. A crowd is not therefore necessary, one might sit alone in a cathedral; for "a service of worship is an artistic recapitulation of Christian experience." It has two aspects: (1) "the experience of the single individual coming from the solitude of his own disciplines and struggles to a place where he may find perfect self-expression;" and (2) "the experience of two thousand Christian years . . . as that experience is reconsidered, revised, and restated." Hence Mr. Sperry maintains that the service of worship is "an affirmation of that which the Church holds to be permanently valid and true in Christian history as a whole."[15] Since the field of the gospel is the world, the whole community is, ideally speaking, the public of the church in question. This highly persuasive conclusion coincides with Höffding's definition of religion as the conservation of values.[16] The gifted

[13] W. L. Sperry, *Reality in Worship*, 1925, p. 164.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 171.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[16] *The Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., p. 10.

psychologist should be able appreciatively to understand what worship means for the gifted worshiper.

The Test of Worship.—Those who wholly separate religion from magic are likely to conclude that worship intended to produce an effect on God (who must then be a Person of a certain type, only) remains purely external; hence that any values attributed to objective worship are in reality subjective or internal. There may then be a synthesis of values through recognition of worship as essentially acknowledgment of God in the respects in which He is deemed approachable, and recognition of the effect upon the worshiper, without which worship would be a mere form. If God is worshiped when He is loved, much will depend on the gratitude and adoration with which He is approached. Real worship of Him would therefore seem to be inseparable from religion as a life, through good works; otherwise worship is likely to remain an external rite or act, giving place to mere recreation on the Sabbath when the alleged holy portion of the day has been dutifully observed. Hence it has been said that in veriest truth worship is "according to each person's state of spiritual life," a proposition which some have confirmed by noting how deeply impressive is the spirit of worship testified to by the Catholic priest. Such worship becomes a real "implantation," an enduring benefit. Springing from faith and love, it is divine in origin in so far as love and faith are from the divine: acknowledgment, faith, and love are thus the essentials of worship. On this view, it especially follows that "where the heart is, there is worship." If it be love that worships, one may indeed worship "in spirit and in truth."

Silent Worship.—If difficult for the Protestant to appreciate the Catholic mass as a type of objective worship implying a different attitude, it is also difficult for the high churchman of any school to understand the view that worship in spirit and truth is worship as such. For the ritualist is unlikely to be psychological. The worship which retains only the *inwardness* as the essential does not seem to be worship at all; true realism is identified with the

external series of symbols to the neglect of the internal. To penetrate still further into the inner world in quest of the spirit and the truth behind even the internal symbols is apparently the acme of neglect of the forms and ceremonials so dear to the heart of the ritualist. Hence the alleged barrenness of worship among Friends or Quakers, in a perfectly plain meeting-house, without music or other æsthetic accessories, and without ceremonial of any sort, sometimes without even an audible prayer. The Friends have frequently been judged without any effort to appreciate the values of silent worship, as indeed quietists, pietists, and devotees of meditation in former ages were judged on external grounds.

Quietism.—When quietism became a heresy, for example, it was denounced for its doctrines, to the neglect of the inner experience out of which it sprang. As a doctrine, Quietism is of course to be distinguished from Quakerism, with its mode of silent worship, widely current since the days of George Fox. The objectionable doctrine known historically as Quietism has been defined as "the exaggeration and perversion of the mystical doctrine of inner quiet" as a movement in the religious life of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.[17] For St. Teresa and other medieval mystics, the "state of quiet" was said to be that "busy rest" in which the soul "abandons all superficial activity in order that it may engage in the deeper activity of opening itself to God. It contains of necessity a "passive element" the aim of which is to gain new strength. But this in time became a negative state that proved sterile, thus a stoical state in which feeling was renounced, with "a perfect abnegation of all purpose, desire, thought, and will," notably in the doctrine of Mme. Guyon. This negativity was due in turn to Asiatic rather than to Christian sources, although it also bore relation to the doctrine of the total depravity and helplessness of human nature. The implied method was essentially negative, through "the exaltation of an empty consciousness—an experience with-

[17] E. Herman, article on "Quietism," in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics.*

out differentiations, in which distinction of actions vanishes and the soul can neither will nor not will," a state which, according to Herman, "paralyzes morality."

The Basis of Silent Worship.—In contrast with the passivity of Quietism, the believer in silent worship among the Friends and those who agree in method with them is constructively critical or selective; he has adopted a different psychology of religion; and has rejected all transitory emotions in favor of constancy in spiritual attitudes, the enduring values or essentials of worship. He believes that God (as Spirit) should be approached in a purified, adaptive spirit, through inward listening, readiness of heart and mind, with the conviction that God is ever-present guidance, imbuing the heart with love and infilling the mind with wisdom. Such guidance becomes intelligible in contrast with ordinary religious emotion. Spectacular or highly ritualistic ceremonials would be disconcerting. Any ritual is likely to be both formal and external, whatever value it may have in its place. Quiet spiritual meditation, divorced from external devices and æsthetic appeals to emotional imagery, has been substituted, so that the individual may grow in that inner constancy which fosters response to the immanent Spirit. Thus Rufus Jones has written, "There are times when, in the hush and silence, with no appeal to the senses, and with nothing outward to stir emotion, low breathings of a diviner life are felt and the entire group is fused and baptized into one spirit."[18]

Thus silent worship has been substituted as a social function in the Friends' meeting-house, instead of stereotyped modes of worship, with their objective appeal. The hope is that the inner life will be deepened into readier communion with God in the great stillness. There is presupposed not only a criticism of emotional types of religious ceremonial and belief, but of all emotionalism affecting religious conduct. One is to know by profound and vivid stillness what communion with God actually is, in contrast with the illusions of sentimentalism, the enjoyment of æsthetic values, absorption in mystical sym-

[18] *Studies in Mystical Religion,* 1909, p. xx.

bolism, and the conservatism which retains creeds and hymns as values for worship long after their doctrinal content has been rejected.

The Holy Spirit.—The implication of silent worship is that the widely present, ever-living Christ is accessible to all who obey the conditions; the Holy Spirit is known through a witness of the human spirit which is impressively contrasted with all confusions between one's self and deity. To countenance deification would be to exalt the self beyond all possibility of guidance: by contrast the Holy Spirit is contiguous to our spirit when the witness of the spirit has discounted every element of our nature that might intervene. The command, "Quench not the Spirit," implies recognition of a greatly superior voice to be heard through what Emerson calls lowly listening. The Friend has deepened his conviction through the cultivation of serenity and composure. He protests against any theology which makes God, Christ, and divine revelation merely historical. For him revelation is, or may be, a continuous process. In the past, we have closed the doors of the soul in so far as we have believed in a remote God, a merely traditional Holy Spirit, an exclusive Christ. Thus we have reverenced the religious past as more real than the aspiring and responsive present.

The Friend thus stands for a typical attitude with regard to worship. There are people who, whatever their ancestry, tend to become believers in the inner quiet, adopting those dispositions which make for stability of character, poise, and inward peace. The ritualist is apt to discount both the implied beliefs and the method of inner quiet, because he identifies religion with elaborate modes of worship calculated to develop and conserve appropriate emotions. Unaware of the psychological significance of these expressions of worship as viewed by religious believers of other schools, he readily deems his type universal, his authentications those which any true worshiper would accept, as if the simplicities could not be as genuine as the authorized complexities. For him "the religion of authority" *is* religion in verifiable essence. Yet for the

devotee of silent worship "the religion of the Spirit" is no less persuasively religion as such.

Spirit and Form.—To be present while a group of Friends are still waiting in silence for the elder at the head of the meeting to "break the meeting," when his sense of the fitness of things gives the clue although no word has been spoken, may be to experience a distinct reaction against these simplicities. To the partisan of a complex, rapidly moving ceremonialism, entrenched by hallowed custom, it may seem impossible that there can be genuine worship in this simple form. But the sympathetic observer, although remote by ancestry and tradition from Quakerism, may readily apprehend the meaning of this silence, impressed by the remarkable accord between leaders and followers. There may happen to be three or four speakers, and their extempore addresses may disclose a wholly unpremeditated harmony of utterance, a deeply impressive harmony of spirit. Thus without any prearrangement there may be a maximum expression of spirit, within a minimum degree of form; and this is doubtless one of the typical ideals of worship.

The Friend is not likely to identify a type of worship with religion as a whole. He will be ready to admit that there are various modes of worship, and will seek the spirit beneath all ecclesiastical forms. But for him form has come to occupy a different place. Spirit is inward. Form is likely to be external. Spirit is more than any word or external form. It is more interior than ordinary feeling or emotion, which may be too intimately personal. Spirit is universal. The forms, notably the words and modes of worship wherewith we clothe or manifest it, are particular. To apprehend the Spirit as envisaged by the Friend, one finds it important to preserve a certain informality, freedom, or spontaneity. This informal freedom is the vital element some of us miss in other types of religion.

Summary.—Granted appreciation of modes of worship as far removed in type from one another as the Catholic mass, worship in a Hindoo temple, in the Protestant

church least resembling Catholic churches, and in a Friends' meeting-house of the original type, one realizes how richly varied is the psychology of worship. Some observers will find it almost impossible to appreciate the motives and modes unless they have visited India, China, and other Oriental lands; conversed sympathetically through a considerable period with both Catholics and Protestants; and devoted some time to sympathetic relationship with the Friends and others in our day who believe in silent worship. Apparently, the observer who most intimately discerns the spirit behind all types will best be able to compare the several modes of worship without permitting prejudice to intervene. He will then endeavor to penetrate the attitude characteristic of worshipers of different schools and lands, without permitting undue emphasis on intellectual matters, such as the sermon in Protestant churches. He will also be mindful of the fact that even the disciple of silent worship may become crystallized in thought and manner; while in a measure neglecting the witness of the spirit, the value of preparation for the ministry, and the significance of system in religious matters. It may be as easy to overdo one mode of worship as another. The problem of worship may be said to be this: to retain and foster the spirit in greatest measure by duly subordinating and utilizing form. The problem here suggested is that of the permanent and transient in religion. The objective is the preservation of what is vitalizing, by passing beyond ceremonials to the spirit and truth.

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CHAPTER IV

PRAYER

Definition.—As extensive as the religious life itself, with its manifold types of belief and varieties of experience, prayer is for many the most direct means through which religion becomes more vitally real for the individual. In what follows we shall for the most part neglect the uses of prayer in public services, since prayer is the individual's mode of worship, and is most intimately understood as inner experience, at any time and place. Defining prayer as "the movement of the whole soul putting itself into personal relation and contact with the mysterious power whose presence it feels even before it is able to give it a name,"[1] we may appreciatively penetrate its meanings by considering both the motives which have led to it, in childhood and maturity, in distress and repose, and the values assigned to the mysterious power on which the worshiper feels that his destiny so surely depends. Allowances should also be made for those who in more recent psychological terms find an equivalent for the verbal prayers of old in their silent outreaching toward the Spirit, with special thought of the inner sanctuary of the soul, the deeper or larger self. Our study will be partly concerned therefore with the mental processes functioning in prayer, partly with the conception of the human spirit in the light of its capacity for contacts with the energies and values of the spiritual world.

Prayer as a Mental Process.—Beginning as a mental exercise engaged in because one is taught its forms and words, prayer is likely to continue to be conversational in so far as the soul approaches God in an attitude of

[1] Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 28.

humility and receptivity, at once grateful and responsive. Regarded in this way prayer superficially resembles auto-suggestion, as if it were a merely circular process within the mind of the devotee, the lesser self making the requests, and the greater summoning the answers out of the subconscious. But while "in auto-suggestion the personality turns upon its own axis, in prayer it is focused on God." Thus there is "all the difference in the world" between auto-suggestion and prayer.[2] When making auto-suggestions one indulges in a monologue, and there is no apparent reason why it should be continued. But prayer has become a habit and tradition, faith has been heightened through results attained by prayer. The differences also become plain with recognition of the motive to which prayer is due, the function which it fulfills, the aim or purpose in view, and the consequences which show that prayer is efficacious.

Accepting the fact that prayer, like auto-suggestion, embodies *as a process* emotional associates centering about an idea, concentration on comprehensive ideas, and a quiescence essential to such fixity of attention, Streeter holds that prayer is distinguished by actual belief that God exists.[3] Granted His existence, the name we give to the process is of no moment; for the idea, once introduced into and accepted by the subconscious, will function, and the results are sure to be good. To pray is ardently to believe that God exists, that the idea of God is true. Prayer involves "the absolute surrender of the self, subconscious as well as conscious, to an idea—the idea of God as a present, personal, spiritual Being. But it is the truth of the idea, not the mechanism of its acceptance, that makes it to be prayer."[4]

Since prayer is designedly an effort to obtain blessings, to receive aid in time of need and distress; or to give expression to gratitude, happiness, peace, trust in the divine presence, it is appreciable by reference to both the motives

[2] Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[3] B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, 1926, pp. 287, 289.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 289.

and the experiences of those who believe devoutly in it.[5] Classifying prayers with reference to their transcendental or highest object, namely, God in the plenitude of His love and wisdom, there appears to be little that we can say with reference to the supreme meaning of prayer. For the finite mind is keenly aware of its limitations in addressing God as infinite or perfect, personal or superpersonal, beyond all definition. Hence the idea of God as immanent or indwelling is substituted. Doubtless, the majority personify or humanize God, praying to the divine in the human, the divine-human, or to the Savior. Aware of wants, longing for and praying for that which will minister to these, the human appeal is essential to the divine response, which in turn gives opportunity for direct access to man in proportion as his heart desires it. Imaginal, emotional and volitional elements enter into man's appeal for divine aid. The visual imagery associated with God in the quest for such aid encourages the uplift of heart and will. The emotional element of the appeal gives warmth of feeling. The volitional element is not merely an uplift or aspiration; it involves a readiness to do and to be what God would have us become, and by this inner response to manifest His will in loyal conduct, according to the interpretation of the man who prays. So too there is doubtless an advance, in both imagery and emotional response, from the simpler stage of childhood when God is envisaged as a greater Man who hears and grants all our responses to the more intellectual conception which accords with our discrimination between wise and foolish petitions addressed to God as "the giver of every good and perfect gift."

Prayer as Activity.—Since prayer has functional value for the individual, it is measured both by the reigning love and derivative faith voiced in the prayer, and by the active attitude which the worshiper adopts with regard to the thoughts and desires he is ready to abstain from, the effort he is willing to make that his prayer may be answered. The æsthetic element of the activity, or image of

[5] Cf. Josey, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 286; Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

a good and beautifully perfect Being held before the mind while praying, depends of course upon the particular way in which the divine kingdom is pictured, the manner in which God is approached—as Father, immanent Spirit, Savior, or Holy Spirit. Hence the emotional imagery will greatly vary with the type of belief and the individual's type of response or conduct. Some Christians insist, for instance, that one cannot pray to the Father (as infinite) but only to the Son. But what makes prayer effective on the human side in any event is doubtless the activity upspringing through this mental process by which man establishes contact with the source of spiritual power, however that power is regarded. The process is accessory. What avails is "making an act of the presence of God," vividly realizing that presence so that the realization becomes dynamic. Consequently, it is a stimulus to prayer to have a definite way of thinking about the human spirit as interiorly open to the divine life, envisaged as love and wisdom, imbuing both will and understanding. Each one who thus earnestly prays will seek the modes of expression which most directly aid him in making his prayer a realizational experience. Thus there is kinship between prayer as understood by participants who believe in a personal God and spiritual meditation as practiced by those who regard God in a general way as Spirit or Ultimate Reality.

If by prayer we mean then an outreaching activity combined with responsiveness, so that it is at once a concentration of activities and a preparation, there is obviously a breaking through of the crusts of life's daily routine and besetting conditions. The soul's interiors having been opened towards God, the ensuing thought or perception takes its clue from this illumination. Hence the emphasis which has been put on faith as "the affirmation of the entire mind," the element of the process which even more than the directing of the attention or the idealistic imagery, makes prayer an activity. Granted sufficient faith to make the determinate effort, prayer gives expression to desire, while the intellectual benefit comes through focusing thought upon the opportunity which is at hand, with

special reference to its problems, the needs to be met, the resources to draw upon. Thus belief may be transformed into vital realization. Again, prayer, arising from faith, becomes efficacious when a man makes a public confession of faith, in his desire to lead a better life. It becomes efficient also on special occasions, such as sickness or sorrow, when power and courage are needed to undergo an ordeal. As a preparation for a new venture, the beginning of creative work, and as an incentive to renewed activity when difficulties arise, prayer has efficacy according to the type of belief in God, combined with belief in the spiritual world and its resources, and one's relationship with his fellowmen in the chosen field. As a means of moral and spiritual growth, of intellectual illumination, the fostering of poise, and the increase of social utility, prayer also has values which depend on the type of person, the stress put upon difficulties to be overcome, the function assigned to inner peace, to spiritual meditation, silent worship, and other factors. The believer in God as guiding presence is likely to regard prayer as a realizational experience in seeking divine guidance, without any special appeals or particular mental imagery.

Modes of Approach.—Granted acceptance of a progressive scheme with reference to meditation, contemplation, mystical union with God or Spirit, prayer is a widely inclusive means to an end, involving such special stages as consecration, the "prayer of understanding," the "prayer of simplicity" (acquired contemplation), and mystical prayer, with the differences which distinguish the "prayer of quiet" from mystical prayer.[6] Thus the prayer which is under voluntary control, occupied with a variety of subjects, is distinguished from the prayer which, not thus directed by simple alternations of the attention, is solely dedicated to mystical union. Obviously, the entire series of steps would largely depend upon the idea of the divine adopted by the worshiper. The devotee of spiritual pantheism (such as the Vedanta philosophy, in India) identi-

[6] Fr. Poulain, *Graces of Interior Prayer;* Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 172, foll.

fying himself with the Absolute, would have so-called superconsciousness in view. Having chanted an appropriate verse for special meditation, his hope would then be that the prayer voluntarily entered into might culminate in that union with the Absolute in which all distinctions between finite and infinite are overcome. Again, the medieval Christian, specializing in the practice of the presence of God, will have his particular method, implying a different view of God, a different psychology. The idea of the objective to be attained seems essential to prayer. The Christian, worshiping God as Father or adoring the Son, would protest against merging of subject and object, finite and infinite. Theists in general, adhering to their particular idea of God, would associate the efficacy of prayer with their own conception. Thus it would be said by some that one must know the true Lord or be unable rightly to pray.

So indeed there seems to be special efficacy in the words adopted as the beginnings and endings of prayer. But psychologically one idea or form of words seems as effective as another, if the same endeavor or sustained effort is put forth. Hence the indispensable conditions are: (1) the more or less ardent desire for the object for which one prays; (2) the concentration of the imagination upon this end, the direction of attention or will, with the accompanying responses of thought; (3) the continuation of this activity for a sufficient length of time to produce an adequate impression or yield satisfaction.[7] In the actual experience of praying this may of course be one simple process. Prayer thus regarded is compatible with silent worship dedicated to the inner light of the Spirit in a much simpler way than that of spiritual meditation as a special method, with a series of steps. The emphasis here falls on the finite spirit communing with Supreme Spirit, not on the words; on the inward witness of the spirit, with its reposeful realization, not on the form or upon any stages of ascent toward mystical absorption. In this way the individual's prayer at home may be essentially the same

[7] Cf. Josey, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

as his participation in worship, so that prayer and worship coincide. Doubtless, many worshipers in our day respond in the spirit of prayer who give little heed to conventional prayers in the various churches they attend.

Prayer as an Open Door.—Having acknowledged that there may be many modes of approach, each with its devotees who insist that theirs is the highest if not the only true way, we may well guard against the tendency to mistake distinctions for realities, as if prayer were a highly elaborate device capable of being refined away into mere details. Streeter's proposition is that if God is " 'the Beyond that is also Within,' it is only from within that we can know Him."[8] Naturally then we would expect Him to communicate with human minds according to the laws implied in the operations of finite beings. Hence the value of our *idea* of God, for example, as Creative Love, also an emotional response which makes this idea vivid. Really to appropriate this "idea," is to surrender one's self completely to it, namely, through "an aspiring submission." Granted the open door, prayer is in brief *ascensio mentis ad deum*, an upward flight or "offering of the mind to that which is more real than itself."[9] Our desires will never be the same after being offered up before God in prayer, for prayer is "the training-ground for character . . . it actually *succeeds* in being (what all true prayer *aspires* to be) a realized contact with Creative Spirit—the Spirit that makes all things new."[10]

If then we regard prayer in a profound sense as communion with the divine, regained as best we may on one occasion or another, man's responses may be in large measure coöperative; the essence of prayer may be a divine-human give and take. Thus Glenn Clark suggests that a real need may also be "a command of God," so that the sincere request of the soul coincides with the divine means to it.[11] For many people, prayer is most approachable in the light of needs which we as human beings feel

[8] *Reality*, p. 289.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 291, 292.
[11] *Fishers of Men*, 1928, p. 5.

unable at the time to meet. Thus a sudden contingency arises, amidst an over-plus of anxiety or fear, possibly amidst grave danger, when some one is terribly ill, or when war is impending. In utter uncertainty or helplessness, one who perhaps has not prayed for years will cry out through prayer. This may be a reversion to a childhood's habit, or one may be genuinely praying for the first time. In any event, when there appears to be no way which the human self can discover, all resources having failed amidst the imperative situation, the yearning or despair may be like an open door. The responsive experience may be such as profoundly to affect one's whole life, one may know at last what prayer is, what it can do, what it might bring were one faithful to it; dedicated to its leadings, conditions, laws, and divine sources.

The Volitional Element.—Whether indicating the person's courage in breaking through reserves and repressions, venturing forth into objectivity, or penetrating through habits of many years' standing, prayer as a new or unique experience may often be chiefly volitional on the human side. The sense of need, anxiety, or distress, is not adequate by itself. Both the volitional outreaching and the outcry for guidance to meet the given need may be required to give the prayer energizing definiteness. No man may be said to pray effectively who has not made up his mind what he wants or needs, howbeit some pray for whatever may be right, whatever be God's will, what the Spirit guides them to do. While serving two masters, compromising with mundane or selfish interests, a man's half-hearted or pretentious prayer will bespeak his self-division. But when, having positively affirmed his ideal by definitely turning away from external and sensuous enticements, a man prays for divine support, he has already separated himself in attitude and heart from his old life. His prayer is in a measure answered before it is uttered, because it springs from his constancy. Hence it is that prayer is "the soul's sincere desire, uttered or unexpressed."

Naturally, the thoughtful man will not petition the Father to make a change in his disposition or conduct

which he is unwilling to try his best to make himself. If true prayer sometimes springs from weakness, it is at least from willingness, with the realization that unaided one will find it difficult to advance from weakness to strength. When a man has too greatly depended on himself, by asserting his own knowledge and will, there may be real strength in the humility wherewith he turns from self-conceit and self-assertion in quest of light and power, frankly admitting his own present incapacity.

The Formal Element.—It once seemed necessary to give God information concerning personal needs and the needs of those for whom we prayed. Such prayer was in accord with the belief in God as responsive to intercession in a very provincial way, prone to intervene as a king might in behalf of the faithful, likely to make some change in the course of events as a time-card might be changed without notice, even ready to perform a miracle. With the change to the belief in the God who already knows our needs before we ask Him and has fully provided for these, came prayers for discovering and acknowledging what was thus provided in contrast with petitions for changes and the granting of special requests. Prayer was still needed, namely, as a vitalizing experience or renewal of faith and ideals. It was necessary because of the pressure of external circumstances tending to defeat this effort to be faithful to the All-provider. Thus prayer, instead of dictating terms or informing God what was needed, took the form of readiness to do the Father's will, whatever that might be.

Prayer naturally assumes a conversational form, when the heart reaches out for communion with the divine as a personal Being. Doubtless, the majority who make this approach as a child might seek maternal sympathy and paternal wisdom adopt conventional phrases, as indeed public prayer finds expression in stereotypes. But habitual speech may manifest genuine motives, a real yearning of the heart for spiritual gifts, an intuitive freshness of spirit. No prayer should be judged solely as a pattern or formula. It is the spirit or attitude that is decisive, not its

modes of articulation, save so far as these contribute the element of definiteness. Many a prayer is indeed a "vain repetition." But full many a prayer is so genuine that it borrows little from prayer-books and the mannerisms of those who pray in public. All the great prayers which have become traditional or otherwise authorized, doubtless sprang from genuine outreaching in newness of spirit. An endeared formula may well serve to arouse the heart's conversation afresh, as if one were recovering the spirit of the one who first phrased it.

Prayer and Service.—Prayer may be a sign of willingness to abide by one's faith, when one is venturing to live by it in fuller measure. If faith shall have "its perfect work," one must be loyally active when prayerfully taking now this step, now that. When a deed of self-sacrifice seems like a "leap in the dark," it may manifest the soul's eagerness to do whatever one may be called on to do, having first put one's hand to the plow. But again the deeds which make concrete the prior prayers of those who faithfully live by what they profess are often those almost commonplace deeds referred to in the ancient saying, "To labor is to pray." Labor in this sense is consecrated work done day by day in response to life's purposes. We praise service done by those who put their hearts into it, whose prayers may have been brief but whose works show the real motive. In this sense prayer may be understood as coincident with purpose, as beginning in thought and will, and attaining fullness through work. Hence we expect people who pray for the succor of the needy and afflicted to do something more than to wait for God to do it all, or for other people to do the work and make the sacrifice.

The Value of Silence.—Naturally, those who believe devoutly in prayer as definitely directed activity, in firm faith that God or the invisible order of reality is at hand to meet the needs of the soul, will not permit themselves to lapse into the half-waking state of mere recollection or day-dreaming. Prayer is not meant to be mere self-benefit. Hence we need not dwell on the possibility that by increase

of suggestibility the mind is more able to generate the conditions of prayer as a subjective process. To confuse the process with the objective of prayer would be as unfortunate as to permit prayer to become merely historical —on the ground that ages ago people directly communed with God, when revelations were given and miracles happened. To pray is to commune with spiritual reality, *living today*. Such a prayer may refer to God in the personal sense, or may be otherwise phrased; but it is essentially inner realization of some sort. Silence before and after verbal prayer is often evidence of this. The Friend does not "break the silence" until the reality of this silent worship seems to have touched the soul. The preparatory silence may be as helpful as the act of disengaging one's attention from every contact with the world involving trivial and selfish interests. To close the door upon the world may be as necessary as to seek the hidden region where the Father "seeth in secret." So prayer may be largely anticipation. But, the actual moment having approached, the attitude which this silence suggests may be the greater element of the realization which ensues. Having regained the center or found one's poise anew, one may follow any number of realizational clues according to the type of mind or need. But by hallowed association this consecrated attitude becomes personal prayer itself. The implication is that "something is transacting," as James has said, adopting Sabatier's view that "prayer is religion in act."[12] The interchange between the self and the higher powers involves both mutuality in the sense of consciousness and conviction that active results are being wrought. The more faith we put into this activity, the more prayer is likely to be an inner experience which scarcely needs words.

Prayer as Renewal.—Hence prayer may be defined anew for those who thus approach it as a mode of affirmative inner experience in which, without articulating any personal need, want, wish, or desire, we seek what is divinely wisest and best. In this sense prayer may be intensely real,

[12] *Varieties of Religious Exper.*, p. 465, cf. Sabatier, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

springing from faith that God unmistakably lives, is beneficently near, ready to give to those who ask Him what is needed according to purposes already in operation. Without such firm implicit faith in the divine readiness, there would not be, could not be ardent prayer in utter sincerity. With such faith at heart the attitude of one's spirit is a constant prayer. What is needed is, *return to the center* and the upward look, as unto the hills.

Dynamically, prayer is this act of opening the spirit to divine incoming love and wisdom, power and light. The ensuing peace or restful conviction which follows may be regarded as the vitalizing response to prayer on the Godward side. Thus an interconnection is established, so that the spiritual resources which lie open to the soul become vividly real. Prayer as an outreaching or uplifting activity thus opens a way, sets the spirit free, renews, by putting the spirit in more direct contact with the unseen.

If some worshipers envisage the divine presence as if seeing and conversing with the Savior, while others insist that they pray directly to the Father, the words may come as readily in either case, as the child in need voices both need and praise, gratitude and aspiration. Prayer, alike in will and thought, in attitude and feeling, is participation, wherethrough giving and receiving have special significance. He who thus dynamically seeks the place of inward prayer anew has been receiving from the divine bounties, else he would not seek yet further power, wisdom or love, with the implication that what is needed is the removal of obstacles on his part in preparation. He seeks by giving, as if reporting what blessings have ensued meanwhile. Thus his activity may be said to measure what in turn shall be added to him in this newest moment of aspiration.

Prayer as Participation.—Coming into the presence of the Father who already foresees and by foreknowing provides, one anticipates and aspires toward the forthgoing divine power to which one gives renewed recognition and response. Implicitly, there is acknowledgment of the divine economy, ardent wish for harmony with it, and readiness

to follow where the renewing guidance may lead. Prayer as participation in a higher order of reality is thus part of the way of life for the good of all, it is far removed from all effort to control by one's will or shape matters by influencing others. For the participant knows himself to be a member of his fellowmen through working out the function he is best able to fulfill. Hence his participation is social, and his response is partly measured by his social renewal. He does not try to tap higher resources as if these were passive treasures, or as if he could generate divine gifts. Even the plant that is put into the fertile soil in a favorable position relative to the sunshine and the earth's atmosphere must have an organic structure essential to growth. Much more depends on what the human spirit brings into the atmosphere or locus of prayer. Yet the spirit does not regulate the divine inflow, does not impose any term on the radiant presence which is the real efficiency of prayer. The greatest prayer is to "our Father" in the eternal kingdom where all who pray in consecration of mind and heart may commune simply by being there and opening the doors and windows of the soul. It is not then for any one who identifies prayer with its external modes, with a system, a church, with official sanctions, to deny the values of realizational prayer. Nor can one on psychological grounds more definitely limit either the motivating experiences or the objectives. What we have sought to do is to chronicle what may be called the progressive impetus of prayer, outward bound and inward bound, as it searches the deeps and aspires to the summits, with a movement from forms to spirit, from the transient to the eternal. If the unusual occasion be needed to demonstrate prayer, what we do in the spirit of prayer during the days, the weeks, months, and years will show the depth of our realization. We may learn from those who have specialized in prayer as such, and to these we naturally turn if we would know the fine distinctions which mark every step toward union with God. But some devotees of the Spirit seem to have found a simpler way without making prayer a distinct enterprise. To them prayer is a means rather than

an end. It is not meant to impress either participant or hearer. God, the religious life in communion with Him and with one's fellowmen, is the objective. The more likelihood that we will become immersed in the processes and conditions, the greater the need for utilizing this means to the great end. Through frequent returns, the way will become the more sacred with the passing of the years, the experience of returning will be more nearly instantaneous; and the ensuing consciousness more deeply fraught with convincing life and power.

If prayer is "an energy of soul, definitely laying hold on the almighty strength of God," as some one has maintained, it is nevertheless, as Mrs. Herman puts it, "in the last resort worth exactly as much—or as little—as the man behind it," prayer being "the expression of a life." [13] Prayer is "not the whole of the spiritual life, or even, taken by itself, the most important factor in it. It depends upon ulterior sources. . . . While the faithful practice of prayer cannot fail to react upon the personality, we cannot achieve true personality simply by praying for certain virtues" (as the child prays to be "made good"). Prayer is rather "a process by which man is to avail himself of the spiritual forces of the universe." Hence to know what prayer really is, "we must study it from the center. And its central significance is not that of a spiritual process by which mountains are removed and benefits evoked. Prayer in its essence is communion with God," the prime condition being "right attitude of soul." Genuine humility and fundamental simplicity of aim are essential to power in prayer, as indeed "singleness" is essential to love. Prayer then is "the highest and most dynamic form of interaction between the human and the divine." [14]

Summary.—We note that prayer may be distinguished with reference to its mental process, the modes of approach, the types of prayer, the imagery identified with the idea of God, what we anticipate from it, the effort we put into it, and according to the way we think about benefits

[13] E. Herman, *Creative Prayer*, p. 19.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 23.

to be bestowed through responses on our part. While the actual process is not decisive, sufficient attention should be given to it to avoid confusion between prayer and auto-suggestion. Something will depend on our idea of the human spirit, because our preparatory attitude or silence will turn for the most part on what we think about the spirit and its secret place or sanctuary. But more will depend on our thought of God, and each worshiper will naturally adopt the terminology or imagery which proves most efficacious. The whole experience of prayer in its deeper values seems to imply the idea of a largeness of the human self, in accord with man's relations to God and the spiritual world, his "energizing in fellowship with the Lord of all life" (Herman). Thus for some ardent believers prayer will be described as inner experience of or contact with the spiritual world, interior openness to divine life, through which come love and wisdom according to need. The implication is that God foresees and provides for our needs, hence that prayer is essentially realization in which the whole man energizes with special regard for his high destiny.

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CHAPTER V

FAITH

Origins.—Arising originally out of experience and passing through all stages of man's religious history, from the dawn of childlike trust to rational acceptance of a creed, faith is so intimately related with belief that it has often seemed identical with it. Thus faith appears to be knowledge of truths necessary for salvation, acknowledgment of these essentials, and obedience to what they teach. Yet to know, to acknowledge, and to have faith in principles regarded as knowledge or accepted as truths are three different considerations. The first may involve little more than memory of precise facts or propositions, with its recital of the "tenets" of faith. The second may be merely intellectual acceptance. The third becomes faith as such in alliance with love or the "heart," and with reference to life or conduct proving that it is genuine. Hence acknowledgment and obedience both depend on elements which correlate faith with the whole context of the inner life. Accordingly, it has been said that love toward God and man is the source from which come perceptions which give faith its power. Thus faith has power in a religious sense of the word which distinguishes it from that knowledge which is power in other fields.

If faith came originally by an external way as an affirmation of what was to be believed without evidence, as sheer confidence or courage in practical directions, analysis shows it to be intermediate, dependent on its sources, while also intensifying religious consciousness in proportion as its evidences become cumulative. So, too, it changes from dependence on such externals as miracles, mysteries, priestly authority; it allies itself with what pertains more inti-

mately to salvation, thus with the conservation of values. Disengaging itself from feeling and emotion, from personal desire and imagery, it comes to occupy a place in relation with science, although it is often contrasted with science, which is based essentially on reason. Thus faith may be the leader in an age-long conflict which is as baffling as it is absorbing. The tenets of faith may be kept apart in the mind, as if science were forbidden to enter its precincts; or the mind may claim the right to retain truths or values in the precincts of faith despite the fact that reason is no longer able to sustain these essentials.

When uncritically identified with assent to doctrines essential to salvation and obedience thereto, faith seems to be a merely intellectual price to pay for benefits. Yet intellectual assent and subsequent obedience to precepts essential to daily practice may give place to love for truths previously accepted without evidence. Thus it may once more follow that "the faith of every one is according to his love." Indeed, belief, transfigured by faith and love, may thus become more interior and influential. So a man may accept and will from the heart those principles which he now sees to be true—the principles which he adheres to as righteous for the sake of the life which is to follow. Faith may then be said to become internal in so far as it takes its forms from love. Psychologically, very much depends on those items of belief and those idealized associations which the worshiper has come to love as the essentials of faith.

The Intuitive Element.—As allied with intuition faith has been called sight, when, for example, statements concerning religious objects of belief are held up, as it were, for inspection to see if they conform to spiritual reality as one interiorly discerns it, as sacred writings spiritually interpreted disclose these matters. The implication is that to see things in spiritual light from love of divine truths is different from reasoning about them by appeal to concrete evidences. Faith sees or discloses ideals, far-off objectives, including ideals of the future life. It discerns the hearts of men, finding evidences in their deeds of the sort

of love from whence they spring. A vision of the goal to be won, trust that it will be gained, differs then from acknowledgment of truths and obedience to precepts.

The Postulates of Faith.—Faith becomes more explicitly intellectual with recognition of the fact that it involves characteristic assumptions. Thus faith postulates God, freedom, and immortality; affirms the supremacy of good over evil, the conservation of values, the ultimate triumph of a religious view of the world, the establishment of brotherhood or a heavenly kingdom. By an act of faith religion assumes that the will of God is operative in human experience, whereas science would raise the question whether this dynamic presence could be established in particular instances which are supposed to prove divine providence in the lives of individual men today. Such postulates are still true for faith when what seems to be the last stronghold is attacked. Driven from one position to another in a long series of baffling contests, faith still seeks and finds another approach; declaring that God's activity is needed to sustain the world, originally due to divine creation. Deprived of its hold upon the supernatural as adhered to before the reign of law was promulgated, it interprets the natural anew and extends the dominion of law into the spiritual world. So faith renews its hopes and promises, when the special sciences push their explanations to the limit and apparently prove that even the existence of the soul is a myth. It persistently postulates or assumes what is needed for the moral and spiritual life, what must be true because religion is real.

Perennial Values.—Once coextensive with whatever knowledge man possessed, the sphere of faith became in a measure more restricted as one field after another was yielded to science. But this was in part a cleansing process, when superstition waned, when faith ceased to be blind, and no longer fed upon wonders or depended on credulity. Eventually, it won special prerogatives in contrast with factual or precise knowledge: it still supplemented such knowledge where facts gave place to the great beyond. Thus pushing on before, disclosing new fields, anticipating

greater power and more marked achievements, faith demonstrated its value. Even in the field of science itself religious faith has done pioneer work, adding propositions yet to be demonstrated. On occasion, it counteracts doubt by denying materialism and other teachings which seem to disprove its great objectives. Thus its life is perennial: it springs up afresh in the new generation, confronted by its special problems and insistent demands. Such a readjustment took place when the sun instead of the earth was declared to be the center of the universe, when people ceased to believe in miracles as infractions of law, and when the idea of creation out of nothing gave place to a view founded on evolutionism.

Faith as Affirmation.—Falteringly, faith no doubt at first exclaims, "I believe; help thou mine unbelief." In this sense religious faith is akin to the virtues, and the volitional element may be as prominent as the intellectual. But the initial affirmation is as elementary as the mere readiness to be led where one does not see, an attitude which later gives place to assurance. By mature faith we ordinarily mean an energizing of the whole spirit, whole-hearted conviction or moral integrity. As "an act of the whole personality," faith endeavors to "see life truly and see it whole." Thus envisaging life's reality, faith sees other people in their integrity, too, affirming that character shall triumph, that love must conquer both hate and fear, war and bitterness, and establish peace on earth. If this shall come to pass, why not faith's declaration concerning man's future life? In any event, the character of faith is more decisively seen when, distinguishing it from factual and discursive knowledge (as applicable especially to temporal processes, external or earthly considerations), we affiliate it with the eternal verities.

If by faith we make the venture, when prospects are meager and evidences are far from complete, it is by dwelling on everything favorable and minimizing what is negative or doubtful. Thus we integrate the essentials into an intuitive whole. Either the intellectual or the volitional element of faith may take the lead. In any event, if we

follow up the first venture by throwing ourselves into the immediate opportunity, conviction will ensue when life sums up its values or lessons. Thus experience often proves what faith has dared to accept. Trusting that good will *somehow* be the goal of ill, in actual daily living we make persistent effort to achieve the good, often uncertain from moment to moment how the great achievement shall be made, sometimes groping in the dark. Faith calls for realizational obedience to what we claim to see when our vision is clearest. It warns us against judging by mere conditions, stages, processes, or even by results as ordinarily understood. It counsels us to keep moving toward the goal, even though in the midst and conflict of events we seem to see no goal at all. Giving an impetus to both head and heart, it seems at times almost to desert either one or both; yet by a rebound it proves that its impetus has carried us on.

The Element of Loyalty.—Thus the psychological elements of faith, while relating especially to intellect and will, pertain to the details of life along the way by which we prove that we are in earnest in what we affirm. Loyalty to the God we believe in, to Christ, to the religious group with which we are allied, calls for successive deeds where we must often break through resistance within and obstacles without, precisely as patriotism calls for acts, not words only, when our country faces an emergency. Faith in one's God also includes constancy in standing for what we deem His promises, His revelation, the evidences of providence, mercy, love. Trusting that His power is sufficient, we affirm that He will see us through. Not only accepting the word, but *doing it*, we anticipate greater enlightenment to meet greater needs. Thus to live by doctrine is to grow in knowledge of it, to increase the cognitive element of faith, an element which may have been meager in the beginning. "This do and thou shalt live." Make the venture, although all the way seems dark, and retrospectively you will see not only why the venture was imperative but why you could not see clearly until you made bold to believe and to do.

Types of Faith.—Obedience or trust to the first religious promises has indeed sometimes been carried to an extreme, as if "faith alone" could save. Hence the force of the alternative proposition: "faith without works is dead." Faith in the larger sense turns not alone upon acceptance of God, Christ, the Savior, the Church, or revelation; but on the means chosen to make it good through both intellectual orientation and concrete deeds. Who shall expect to envisage faith in its wholeness until he shall have plunged into actual life in faith's behalf?

What has been called saving faith may seem originally to be a gift of the Spirit, created in us. Doubtless every religious person believes this who attributes religion to supernatural sources. For no one is expected to generate faith out of hand. Human nature seems to be against faith. It is natural to doubt. By education we are critical. But whatever the sources of the impetus to believe and the will to achieve, man is able to respond to this impetus and unless he responds whole-heartedly he does not know what faith truly is. Granted the impetus, one may endeavor to make explicit the hidden meaning, obediently following the clues of experience itself, as we learn the law of love from love, not from theorizing about it. Thus we may articulate and correlate the postulates which constitute conviction, noting how each essential came to have power over us, notably the dependence of belief in immortality on the prior belief in the existence of the soul, while belief in the soul depends on faith in God. The religious view of the world as a moral and spiritual order or system comes as a climax. Once in possession of this constructive or culminating faith, we may look back with the realization that unless it were true in this sense faith could not have been true point by point in those matters which we grasped haltingly day by day.

The Tests of Daily Living.—The dependence of secondary matters on the principle which we adopt through faith is even more clearly seen in the sphere of conduct. Given the impetus to engage in a particular enterprise, we trust that having made the first move as an act of will,

because of practical demands, the requisite guidance to take the next step will be discerned when necessary to take the step. It seems imperative to make the first move on meager knowledge, possibly by sheer effort, in order to receive benefits which follow. It is imperative, too, on occasion, to live very much in the present, taking one step at a time, possibly where all the way seems so dark that apparently all resources have failed. It is good for the soul thus to push on. Reasons why it was better not to know the contingencies along the way are seen when obstacles have been met in sufficient numbers to warrant generalization, on the ground that there is a law of faith. Granted evidences of divine law in living by faith, one sees that the initial step was indeed the earnest of things hoped for. Thus it seems literally true that one must first seek God, dedicate one's spirit, in order that the things to be added shall imply a law of religion. At any rate, we hear religiously successful people declaring that without faith, followed by beginnings prompted through earnest prayer, they could hardly have received any impetus to press forward, prayerfully making a still greater venture. Only through enriched experience does one realize at last that apparently detached deeds were not at random. Moreover, those who have proved the law assure us that had they first sought things, with the hope that the kingdom would be added, this transposed process would have resulted in nought. Thus comes the conclusion that in its special sphere faith wins a type of knowledge unlike that of science: an empirical knowledge won by individual contacts with spiritual reality.

Justification.—Thus the faith which seemed so nearly blind in the beginning may prove in time to be grounded in reason, based on the spiritual nature of things. We hear people affirming therefore that they propose to substantiate faith by all possible evidences. Hence it is no longer customary to justify faith by merely confirming ourselves in it. This might mean the exclusion of the facts and arguments which seem to militate against it, as if we feared to come forth into the open. It formerly seemed virtuous

thus to defend the faith.[1] The modern effort to acquire reasoned faith proceeds very differently. It is not a question of elaborating the best reasons for a creed, by remaining within its stronghold; but of appeal to actual experiences to show that in the spiritual life there reigns a law.

Religious faith tends to move out of the region of promises and dogmas to that of experience and facts in its support. Hence the religionist no longer justifies his faith by marshaling texts and theological arguments. In so far as rationally grounded in the spiritual nature of things, its allegiances are greatly enlarged in scope and value. Moral faith thus displaces the former assent to doctrines. The integrity of the moral order is such that we expect the religious faith of the present to be verified by the ethical readjustments of the future. Unless our moral activities are to be continued into the future life, we scarcely see how our religious faith can be what we now claim for it. It seems far more important to arouse the moral wills of our fellowmen than it once seemed when there was an appeal to their will to believe. Indeed, the greatest venture of faith has been said to be this choice between alternatives, when we affirm the moral will.[2] For if the postulates concerning the justice or goodness of things is true, we must help to make them actual by working together with our fellowmen. Thus faith changes from trust in God as omnipotent and all-decisive in any event to a reasoned view of human coöperation with "the Power that makes for righteousness," on the ground that God needs us as indeed we need Him. It changes from a determinism which is a thin disguise for fatalism to a realization that social conditions can be improved through religious zeal and activity, that social betterment can become an established fact.[3] We are not predestined to succeed. But there are

[1] Consider, for example, the scope of faith during the ages of Augustine and Anselm in the history of the Christian Church, and in the philosophical controversies over faith and reason; cf. Weber, *His. of Phil.*, tr. by Thilly, Secs. 28, 32.

[2] Cf. J. Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles*, 4th ed., revised, 1898, p. 9; J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, 1911, pp. 428, 448.

[3] W. James has exposed such determinism, in *The Will to Believe*. 1897.

indeed tendencies which we may take advantage of by pooling our efforts, in large measure creating our destiny. Thus our faith becomes more substantial, in accord with our knowledge of the actual law-governed nature of things.

Transient and Permanent Values.—Faith also gains an incentive from the distinction between the eternal and the temporal.[4] Granted a vision of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, religious faith finds a certain philosophical support. The world of time is a secondary realm in which we are meanwhile immersed. Ordinary religious experience fluctuates between such considerations as life and death, health and disease, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsehood, justice and injustice.[5] In its almost incessant oscillations between light and darkness, pleasures and pains, interior interests and worldly matters, the religious consciousness seems to be at the mercy of circumstance. Only in a measure is the soul free to live its full life. Hence the significance of the ancient view adopted by Plato that the soul is in part a prisoner in the flesh.[6] Hampered both within and without, the soul endeavors to accomplish what it may by repeated efforts, sometimes renewed morning and night, again by ideal glimpses that pass as rapidly as the sunset glow. "Our faith comes in moments; our vice is habitual," says Emerson.[7]

Hence Emerson notes that we seem to live more truly in these our occasional moments and to fail in the intervals. Yet we persistently try to bring temporal life into conformity with eternal ideals, while admitting the utility of our difficulties. The soul is marvelously sustained by faith in the ideal order, regarded as profoundly real, as constituting what Plato described as a realm of Ideas and Augustine "the City of God" or kingdom of heaven which may sometime be more nearly realized on earth. From such faith may come in time a determined effort to establish "faith by works" as essential to this concrete social order

4 Cf. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Lect. XX, p. 468, foll.
5 Cf. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 116.
6 See, for example, the argument for spiritual vision, in the *Phaedo*.
7 *Essays*, First Series, "The Over-Soul."

in which we live. Faith becomes more enlightened with this deepening realization of the enduring elements in contrast with the changing factors of this or that age.[8] A council might adopt or reject an "article of faith." It neither creates nor destroys the principles inherent in religion as a life for the eternal values. Religion is greatly enriched by this transition from the loyalty of those who "preserved the faith of our fathers" to the conservation of values. Thus the attitude toward the whole sphere of faith changes when insight takes the lead, where formerly the officials of greatest power "defended the faith" by an appeal to traditional authority. The psychological content of faith takes on a new interest with recognition of the function of value-judgments, appealing to experience and intuition, and brought within the province of the individual. The certainties of faith no longer turn upon what the conservatives deem fundamental. What is really fundamental is what insight finds to be permanently true in spiritual experience and progressive enlightenment, tested by criticism.[9] The great essentials may be testified to by a movement among spiritually-minded people at large, as well as by the exceptional seer or prophet: in any event, first-hand experience is requisite.

Creative Faith.—Thus our analysis brings us to recognition of the persisting elements of faith which, functioning through the various factors of mental life which we are studying in these chapters, implies an intuitive whole. It may be that faith always involves an idea, a belief in the object of that idea, and a volition in conformity with the idea.[10] But this analysis suggests the older psychology, on the assumption that our motives are for the most part ideas; it overlooks the element of love, that element of inwardness which is frequently so much more vitalizing than the idea. Inge regards faith as transcending experience, and therefore constructive. Hence it "employs the imagi-

[8] Cf. H. E. Fosdick, *Christianity and Social Progress*, 1922.

[9] For a discussion of the nature and definition of values, see E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1925, Chap. V.

[10] J. Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, Vol. II, p. 12.

nation to fill out what is wanting in experience. Faith endeavors to find harmony in apparent discord, and to anticipate the workings of the divine purpose."[11] The precondition is not necessarily "belief in certain ideas," as formerly maintained. Faith springs out of a yearning of the human spirit which Höffding has analyzed in a profoundly suggestive way by tracing man's efforts to *maintain continuity* amidst the fluctuations of experience.[12]

The Continuity of Values.—Höffding presupposes the "striving after unity and interconnection" as germane to every personality, persisting in its quest despite the clouded and weak moments which are so profoundly contrasted with those that are bright and powerful. Indeed, religious faith is precisely this "conviction of a steadfastness, a certainty, an uninterrupted interconnection in the fundamental relation between value and reality, however great may be the changes to which the conditions of reality and hence the appearances of value are subjected." We respond to such a conviction when we believe in a man whose life, although unconcluded and incompletely known, will yet prove consistent with itself amidst all changes; when we believe in ourselves as capable of being true to the best that is in us. In itself "a subjective continuity of disposition and will," faith endeavors to hold firmly to the "objective continuity in existence" for which it strives. The conservation of values which gives faith its great objective is thus exemplified by "the conservation of value in the particular personality." Hence the close relation between faith and will in the individual, and the world-view which becomes significant through indication of the lines of development along which religious values are to maintain themselves.[13]

Beset by the fatigues and exhaustions of ordinary existence, by unrest and distractions of mind, different aims offered to the will, changing feelings which threaten inner harmony, we seek that rest which faith offers, beyond all

11 W. R. Inge, *Faith and Its Psychology*, p. 53.
12 *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 116, foll.
13 *Op. cit.*, pp. 117, 119.

alien elements. Man's aim is infinite, yet he is assigned to finite pursuits. Spurred on by an inner need of self-development, man seeks rest even from his own aspirations, in this world of finitude, where existence is spasmodic and no finite object can satisfy. Hence the yearnings of men like Spinoza who found the greatest satisfaction and higher perfection in the contemplation of things "under the aspect of eternity."[14]

Again, there are great moments of faith in the "confident boldness" of Luther, the intense part sometimes played by resignation, the more or less arbitrary or spasmodic act by which one affirms a postulate despite its paradoxical character, the adherence to an example on authority; and in "the greatest word ever spoken," in the prayer of Jesus: "Not my will, but Thine be done." Höffding once more finds his clue to the common element in the contrast between darkness and light, apathy or hopelessness amidst failures, over against deliverances from struggle on those occasions when the goal seems to be gained.[15] The "high sublimity of felt union with the highest" thus sets the standard, and with the intensification of the contrast, through the fall into gloom and depression, faith has a supreme opportunity to maintain the continuity of the personal life. Finally, there is a possibility of correspondence between the concept of faith and that of God. Höffding is willing to concede that the experience of the presence of God leads to faith in the preservation of value in and through all things. Indeed, religious experience acquires its special character through experience of the relation between reality and value.[16]

Summary.—Reviewing our analysis, we chronicle the fact that faith compasses a marvelously rich field in its transition from external to internal considerations, and from the internal in its temporal aspect to the realm of the eternal Ideas, a realm which has meant much to philosophers who have enriched our conception of religion.

[14] The reference is to Spinoza's *Ethics,* Pt. V., Prop. XXXI.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 133.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 135.

The intellectual element persists to the end, since belief is essential to that view of the religious life and the universe which gives faith its field, yielding the postulates and principles wherewith man's moral and spiritual progress anticipates immortality. The extent to which the individual identifies his scale of values with his conception of God, will turn upon the acuteness with which he has developed these two great types of thought. Doubtless the average religious person, instead of pressing the relationship between value and reality to a philosophical conclusion, prefers such a picture of the objectives of religious experience as Whittier discloses in "The Eternal Goodness," and in his portrayal of "the great enigma" in "Questions of Life" and other poems. For the religionist is directly concerned with the faith of the heart or love, which, affirming the Eternal Goodness anew, finds rest and composure, an inner peace which he yearns to convey to his fellowmen. "Here let me pause, my quest forego," exclaims the disciple of faith. Granted the certitudes of faith, the outreaching for continuity in both the self and the world in which the self lives, practical considerations recur to mind, as reminders that these certitudes also imply divine guidance (for those who thus interpret their faith). If faith is "the dynamic expression of the whole man . . . the dynamic urge of life itself" (Leighton), its embodiment will be found rather in the endeavor to live the religious life abundantly than in any investigation of the problems which the history of faith has disclosed. In this its practical guise faith is creative: ready to wager, willing to make the venture in an "attitude of confident trust and boldness in the response of reality to our deepest needs and highest personal strivings."[17] Faith is thus the conative or accomplishing principle of our nature in one of its prominent guises. We trust and try before we know, and become experts by experiment.[18] Thus our experience in large measure justifies our faith, fulfilling the trust of the great spiritual pioneers.

[17] Leighton, *Religion and the Mind of Today*, p. 219.
[18] Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

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CHAPTER VI

BELIEF

Nature of Belief.—Our beliefs pertain so intimately to our personal history that it is difficult to disengage belief from faith, and from the various sources which pass in brief as "reasons for believing." The foregoing studies imply beliefs in the objects and activities of religion which most of us would rather take for granted than investigate. Belief for many of us is simply faith, and we care more for actual worship, prayer, service, than for the intellectual elements which taken collectively imply a creed.

Our beliefs appear to be essentially intellectual, as if we had taken careful thought and wisely selected the most reasonable theology or the one true church. Yet psychology shows that even in our beliefs we respond to our instinctive and emotional nature, to custom, tradition, racial association. Indeed, the history of belief covers the entire period from credulity or superstition to beliefs which have withstood the tests of skepticism. Moreover, belief involves both conviction regarding the reality or value of the objects believed in and an incentive to conduct shaped by this belief. Our beliefs are sometimes adhered to on purely practical grounds, or because the attitude determined by them has become a matter of habit. It is difficult to revert to the motives from which have come highly influential beliefs still passing current in the world; for we have lost the point of view with which those beliefs were congruous, and what remains is the pattern for religious conduct which we have uncritically borrowed.

Belief as a Duty.—Much effort is required, for instance, to put one's self back to the centuries which ushered in the Middle Ages, when Christian beliefs were becoming deter-

minate, when it was a duty to believe what was essential to the Church. Belief was supposedly necessary, as a preparation for the understanding which might ensue, even though its several propositions seemed absurd. Thus belief generated its own world, progressively enlarged upon when new content was officially added. We have only to remind ourselves how Christian apologetics came into being to realize how elaborate the structure of belief eventually became, in contrast with the simplicities of the original gospel. For ages the intellect was little more than an instrument for the justification of faith, a "handmaiden" to lead men to the Church.

The nature of belief delimited by doctrine is well illustrated by man's readiness to credit the mythological view of creation out of nothing in six days, so long as interest centered about the world-view essential to the dogma of original sin and the fall of man. So too miracles wrought through divine interference were credible as long as such occurrences seemed congruous with the actual world. With acceptance of the Copernican system of astronomy, dogma lost its right to dictate to cosmology, although the significance of this readjustment of religious belief scarcely dawned upon people in all its bearings until the philosophy of evolution came to the support of the new system.[1] Almost as critical as the changes in belief which were wrought through the progress of science have been those periods of intellectual upheaval when a great cataclysm like the earthquake at Lisbon evoked atheism; or when the horrors of famine, pestilence, and war made belief in God extremely difficult. Eventually, it becomes a question what can still be believed without ignoring the advance of philosophy and science, without denying the integrity of human reason. Once it was a sin to doubt: in time it became imperative to pursue doubt to the utmost end, in quest of beliefs which withstand the test of criticism. Hence the importance of distinguishing between an affirmative attitude which in

[1] On the changes wrought by the Copernican revolution, see A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 1926, Chap. I; J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 1926, Chap. X.

all sincerity acknowledges the facts, or the whole situation before us; and those denials or negations by which we deprive ourselves of truths or values. It is no less important to know what evidences are valid for religion, how we confirm ourselves in fallacies, how persistent is the hold which tradition has upon us.

Belief and Doubt.—Praising the simplicity of heart of the religious man who, unaware of first principles, believes the Bible as true because God uttered everything it contains, we have been inclined to attribute belief (as an inward activity) to a prior love of goodness, which we have in turn identified with innocence or the golden age of the world. Consequently, the road to belief seemed to be volitional, through persistent effort to put critical issues aside. This type of belief is seen when a wave of conservatism sweeps over the religious world amidst new efforts to reaffirm every statement in the Bible, however literal, whatever miracle may be implied. Thus in our day we have witnessed an attempt to reëstablish belief by attributing all heresies to the theory of evolution.

But the affirmative attitude must keep pace with man's maturity. Doubt is not necessarily a canker. It may be the sanest incentive, compelling the believer to become as sincere in his public utterances as in his private devotions. What a man is unable to believe at heart he will eventually scrutinize, adhering to beliefs that are compatible with the best he knows about his fellowmen. If earnestly looking toward God, desiring to be led by Him, confident that He will save, a man will readily sacrifice whatever is theoretical or artificial in his creed. Such progress in religious thinking is ordinarily impeded only so far as loyalty to the Church prevents a man from publicly declaring his new allegiances, or when fear of consequences leads him to retract. The inhibitory power of religious belief is seen in the case of Descartes, who, a devotee of doubt in philosophy, withheld views concerning the cosmos which conflicted with the doctrines of the Church.[2] The consequences attendant

[2] In his work entitled *Le monde ou traité de la lumière,* begun in 1630, and not published by Descartes.

upon entire fidelity to what is believed, even at the risk of being classed as an atheist and excommunicated from the synagogue, are notable in the experience of Spinoza (1632-1677), who a century later was welcomed as "the God-intoxicated man."[3]

The Fluctuations of Belief.—The man who becomes an atheist because of a great sorrow, such as the death of his wife under painfully unjust circumstances, may learn after a period of perplexity and torment that the God in whom he once believed was purely artificial, in contrast with the newly won belief after years of doubt and inquiry. It is indeed a shock to find that a God who formerly seemed so real had no existence outside of one's belief. The mind is troubled too for a time by the discovery that, psychologically speaking, God is always one's own idea, even when a complete theology is accepted. But belief comes with the realization that in all one's thoughts about God one is progressively referring to a Being who becomes more real, true, merciful, beneficent, worthy of admiration through purification of one's desires, emotions, prayers, conduct. For a considerable period one may be so troubled by the facts of evil, sin, and misery in the world—utterly conflicting with one's belief in the God of love—that one will cling to the facts and permit the belief to die. Thus one may insist that the facts of injustice are the most crying facts in the world, despite every consideration once so vital to belief in God. Yet one may have tried to reconcile an impossible God with the facts, abstracted from their social context. Some people ground their belief in God in precisely these the most cruel facts, superficially speaking. So too the world may assimilate the convictions of the alleged atheist of one age as essentials of belief in the God of a century later, when liberalism has won fresh victories.

Worlds of Belief.—It is plain that man's belief in the gods, later in one God, originally arose through a sense of need, and that his beliefs have been transformed with increasing awareness of needs. Psychology discloses not only the motives for believing amidst successive upheavals,

[3] Cf. J. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892, p. 41.

but also shows that man continues to believe in ultimate religious objects despite the greatest vicissitudes. What it does not wholly do is to create for us the complete world of belief of any period. That picture we must make vivid by appeal to the imagination, as one tries to recover the geocentric viewpoint of the universe by picturing the crystal spheres of Aristotle and the æsthetic paradise of Dante. An act of the imagination is also required to show how it is still possible to entertain two or more spheres of belief at the same time, one springing from the teachings of science with which one happens to be familiar, another from the doctrines of the church to which one owes allegiance; and possibly a third from interests essential to success in the world. What we believe in the given direction we tend to envisage as true with respect to that particular field, as the economist or politician delimits his sphere of interests and his partisanship. The given field has its own presuppositions or categories, and within this department or "universe of discourse" we tend to make our beliefs complete.[4] Few consider how one sphere coheres with others.

Types of Belief.—Our ideas of God, beginning with the first acceptances of childhood, range from crude beliefs in a great Man, a King reigning in heaven and exacting obedience from His subjects here by spying and listening in upon their actions and thoughts, to a Creator devoutly worshiped because of the beauty and wisdom of His works, or a Supreme Spirit who is active in the total universe as the ground or source of all life and energy in cosmic evolution. God may be as personal as a human father or mother, an intimate friend of the heart's own kind revered through prayer as the Father; or as impersonal as the spiritual pantheism of India and the absolute idealism of the Western world make Him out to be. He may be personal as giver of revelations, source of inner guidance, the moral law; as love, goodness, mercy, wisdom, justice; or personified through successive incarnations and supremely so

[4] Cf. the term "universe of desire" in ethics, J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics,* 4th ed., 1901, p. 47.

in Christ.[5] The Trinity may seem as essential to some communicants as the Divine Unity is to others. He is for some believers prevailingly transcendent, but for others so truly immanent in His world that only with technical acumen can He be distinguished from it. The devout Christian is likely to insist that most of these ideas must be wrong because Christian theism is right, because pantheism is "heresy," and absolutism is devoid of belief in a God of any sort; or because any conception is at fault which does not begin by discriminating what is *in quality divine* from what is human (created by the divine). Yet prayers devout in character have arisen both to the unknown God and to the pantheistic Deity, the impersonal Spirit, and the Absolute of mysticism. In any conception the human responses are more or less the same, the difference being in the phraseology, the imagery, modes of approach, and the types of conduct ensuing.[6]

Why We Believe.—We come to believe in God in the first place because we are so taught, because of tradition, culture patterns, national mythology, and moral customs to which divine sanction has been added. We find evidences for ourselves, some of us in adolescence, others when a great crisis occurs, through awakening interest in religious instruction, as the beginning or as a consequence of conversion, by means of a spontaneous awakening or vision; or by acceptance of some argument which, by convincing the head, persuades the heart. Imitation or suggestion may be a factor in our belief, so may the affective or emotional element, ethical reflection, or a metaphysical argument.[7] In general, it may be said that belief in God in a genuinely reflective sense begins either with criticism of mythology, as in ancient Greece,[8] or with acceptance of a constructive spiritual principle in contrast with material things. Given an impetus due to an inner experience yield-

[5] See the summary comparison of the living religions, R. E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions,* Chap. XIII.

[6] Note, for example, the dictum widely current in India: "That which exists is one; sages call it variously."

[7] Cf. Josey, *The Psychology of Religion,* p. 98 foll.

[8] See F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy,* 1912.

ing succor, strength, guidance, peace, or a sense of companionship, then arguments of some sort are likely to be adopted in support of the Reality in which one has come to believe. These arguments might not be convincing to others. Objections to every proposition on which they are founded have been raised at one time or another in the history of speculation.[9] The significant fact is that these arguments are convincing to the believer, in the context of precisely his experience or personality; or to an age, to successive ages during which the world was envisaged according to a typical pattern. Given the arguments in their historical sequence, one may classify them according to the emphasis put on rationalism or empiricism, as in the studies of thirteen types of theism by which Caldecott groups the beliefs in God which have obtained in England and America.[10]

Conflicting Motives.—In primitive as in modern times, thought about God may begin with a vague groping after a conception of causality, although the view that nature gradually developed out of a primordial Reality may come as readily as the idea of a Creator or First Cause. It was natural for some if not most primitive peoples to project personal sentiments into cosmic objects and events. Thus the raw material for either creationism or evolutionism was at hand.[11] Nature might seem friendly or unfriendly, good or evil; monism or dualism might result; or a conception of God in nature. So too man's fleshly desires led some believers to renounce desire as evil, to condemn the body, and with it the world; while among other peoples bodily life seemed wholly good, also human nature, which then became a means of belief in the goodness of the divine nature. The world was as readily renounced as it was adored, while the negative road to salvation was found through asceticism and self-sacrifice in one case, and through self-realization in the other. Repulsion and repression had much to do with determining belief in God, as indeed evi-

[9] For example, the ontological, cosmological, and psychological arguments.

[10] A. Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1901.

[11] Cf. Thouless, *Introd. to the Psychol. of Religion*, p. 31.

dences in favor of mercy, justice, beneficence, beauty, harmony in the universe might also be taken as signs of their origins by a different class of believers. In any event the process is selective, by emphasis on those aspects which make for a monism of divine goodness, for example, or a dualism of good and evil contending for mastery, amidst facts indicative of justice or injustice, beneficence or malevolence, harmony or discord, beauty or ugliness. Man tends to intellectualize his experiences and observations, so that, in the end, one consideration triumphs.[12] He may react against existence as he finds it, and dwell on considerations favoring an impersonal moral law, as in Buddhism; he may adopt pessimism or optimism, as sad in the one case as complacent in the other; or, with Paul, distinguish between the mind of the flesh and the mind of the spirit, proceeding from a human dualism to belief in the divine unity, when inner experience has disclosed the decisive way.

Classification of Motives.—The fourfold classification long ago proposed indicates the usual modes of approach to belief in God: (1) Authoritative or Habitual; (2) Reasoned; (3) Emotional; (4) Volitional: with respect to the natural credulity of the human mind, the arguments employed, the emotional or affective appeal of experience, and the influence of the will to believe, in these four cases.[13] Thus children, once taught to believe, continue doing so by force of habit, without appeal to new experiences or arguments. Faith in one's parents and first teachers may gradually be succeeded by faith in the words of Jesus, then in the Bible, and the doctrines of the Church, including convictions shared by one's nation. Arguments devised after the fact come to the support of the fact. The original act of adherence to a creed may seem slight in comparison with the cumulative evidences of the years. The believer is not likely to distinguish between his own assent to the tenets of his faith and this same faith regarded as a creed

[12] Cf. Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[13] Cf. Jordan, *Short Psychol. of Religion*, p. 131; Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 210.

contributed by men of authority. The fact that we are permanently influenced by what we take to heart and confirm, so that belief becomes part of ourselves as an act of will or love, is seldom noted.

The Priorities of Belief.—We are not in the habit of considering whether we first believed in God as a result of human outreaching or if God first manifested His presence and revelation to us. Yet it might be profitable to discriminate two streams of tendency: (1) a *descent* from the divine mind or wisdom progressively mediated to man, generating faith, belief, enlisting prayer and worship, inspiring men to love one another; and (2) an *ascent* from lesser to greater consciousness through varied responses, thoughts, emotions, volitions, and daily acts of service, due to the prior descent of divine life or wisdom. Some believers have differentiated in this way, and so have satisfied the desire for an adequate cause. Hence belief in revelation, or at least in spiritual perception capable of detecting the grades nearest man, has formed part of the belief in God. Out of this approach has come a form of rational or constructive religious psychology, that is, a conception of the human spirit taking its clue, not from sense-experience or relationship with nature, but from within and above, on the ground that the degree of interior openness, receptivity, or response on man's part has determined the measure of divine manifestation within the heart. On this basis, man believes in God because God is made known to the human spirit; not because of fear, awe or wonder in the presence of nature, or from a sense of need. In any case, it seems plain that experience, inner or outer, subjective or objective in its reference, was prior to belief. Following either clue, man finds reasons for his faith. Practical, emotional or affective, volitional and intellectualizing motives commingle.

Complex Motives.—Adopting the fourfold classification, Pratt finds that his classes of belief are more or less interchangeable. By beliefs of an emotional type he understands especially sentiments, affective convictions of God's existence interfused with a whole system of potential emotions

"whose past activity and whose possible activities are kept constantly in the dim background of the mind."[14] The larger percentage of people belong in this group. The "incipiently mystic 'experience of God's presence' belongs here. The will to believe unites with authority, each reenforcing the other, in many instances of the fourth type." Pratt quotes a respondent as saying, "I believe in God because of the need of my moral nature. I need Him as a child needs its parents." He finds that belief can "actually be brought about by wish and nourished by systematic acts of will."[15]

Jordan narrates the case of a woman who, although she had experienced the presence of God, lost her faith through the trials of life and remained skeptical for twenty years, when a great moral crisis "called for the old spiritual resources in order to carry her through. She deliberately set herself to recognize the sense of God's presence which she had not experienced for twenty years. 'I reënforced my reason by reiterating my reasons for assuming such a personality, and I prayed constantly after the manner of the old skeptic: "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul." Then one night after a week of this sort of thing, the old sense of God's presence came upon me with overpowering fullness. I cannot express the sense of personal intimacy, understanding and sympathy that it gave me.'"[16] Jordan notes the importance of regarding belief and religious consciousness vertically as well as horizontally, ever mindful of the richness of the roots of belief, and avoiding over-analysis.

The Values of Theism.—Doubtless, belief in God renders the nature of things more intelligible for those who accept conventional arguments for design or purpose in the cosmos, the dependence of such belief on practical considerations having been noted. Thus the utility of believing in God's existence is seen in connection with all other religious beliefs.[17] Obviously, this belief acts as an efficient restrain-

[14] *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 214.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 219.
[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 136.
[17] Josey, *op. cit.,* p. 99 foll.

ing force, as an urge to righteousness; an aid to objectivity in moral judgments, aiding meditation, fostering sympathy; as a source of strength, of conviction that the great values are imperishable, also as a means to the appreciation of beauty. But Josey points to the fact that a too rigid conception may act as an obstacle to belief in God. The same is true regarding the proposition that God is the Unknowable, if there is undue emphasis on authority or on disturbing emotional and affective experiences. Eventually it becomes a question of relative values. It may be as important to consider sources of disbelief as to discover why men believe. Any one might admit the moral values of theism, for example, although unable to adopt any form of personalism.

A recent writer suggests that the way through the mazes of religious belief is to be found by giving up the definition of theology as the doctrine of God and redefining it as "the science of the religious consciousness."[18] Theology must therefore become consistent with all known truth, granting to each branch its legitimate place. Theology, essentially personal, will not have the permanence of the natural sciences; but, embodying its vision with rigorous economy, will endeavor to make that vision easily communicable. Hence the theologian should have "the scientist's adventurous and incorruptible love of fact, the philosopher's synthetic and critical mind, the poet's imaginative vision and re-creating speech. . . . Religion craves, and theology must strive to make visible, a God who is a living Person, commensurate with the universe, yet not remote from man, and whose character, purposes, and emotions are intelligible to him, whose goodness rises beyond human standards, and yet is approachable by them, who governs His world with minute care, and yet respects the freedom of His creatures, reacts toward them, and suffers with them." Accordingly, Mr. Brown suggests starting anew with Berkeley's theistic idealism, with the universe as conceivably existing in the mind of God, "so far real as God sees it." If the universe were thus approached,

[18] Hugh Brown, in *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1928.

evolution would be seen to cover certain contents of it, in response to a creation still in process.

The Testimony of Inner Consciousness.—Religious people who are keenly aware of the inner life are apt to regard God as inward presence. This may be because God seems intimately near in a personal way through prayer, as the object of worship, the giver of life and faith. Or, the divine presence may seem akin to the heart as Love, as the Father in whose mercy all beings are tenderly cared for. Again, the presence may seem to be a great Peace, hence the significance of any realization turning upon equanimity or composure as the approximating idea. Some think of God as Power, and so regard His presence as energizing the human spirit.

The more analytically intellectual believer is inclined to distinguish between the immediacy of experience and those mediating or interpretative ideas through which the mind comes to see that God is *present for thought* rather than for emotion or feeling. Our religious sentiments may be vague. We may tend to confuse our own feelings, emotions, and inner experiences in general with the divine presence. To avoid this we must discriminate personal sentiment, desire, wish, hope, aspiration, from divine wisdom and love as present to guide and sustain in so far as we coöperatively attain the right attitude. Thus God is said to be personal so far as by profoundly searching we find Him. So too He is present for the moral will: when by seeking right motives we earnestly try to do what we believe to be right. Thus there may be said to be a moral test for the presence of God. Hence the value of lowly listening to hear the right word, and the significance of silent worship as an expression of belief.

Other Inward Sources.—We have observed in the preceding chapters that belief in God is the central idea in our investigation. Thus the definition of religion turns about His existence as the decisive factor in our destiny, according to theism. Worship appears to have little meaning save so far as we tacitly affirm on the basis of our general convictions that *God exists.* Prayer brings Him nearer

still. Faith is the equivalent of belief and more; for it implies that inward trust and courage which send us into action, faith being *belief in exercise*. In these and other approaches we implicitly assume that God not only exists but that we possess knowledge of Him. This may not appear to be empirical knowledge on our part, not the knowledge of personal experience like conversion or the mystical vision. It may not mean that we have examined the reasons for believing in God's existence, and have come to accept those evidences which most appeal to our reason. For we may be well aware of our own incompetence, and may have accepted the teachings which have come to us by good fortune, the truths of revelation and the doctrines of the Church. In any event, the religious life has significance for us both through what has come by affiliation with believers in God and through our responses, although we may be scarcely aware that acceptance means an attitude, a sentiment, a volition, and other tacitly active elements. What is thus implicit we learn to make explicit by appeal to psychology. Thus the test of inward consciousness may come to mean more and more for us.

A Symposium of Beliefs.—Naturally then the religious thinker will dwell on those considerations which for him mark the approach to belief in God. This kind of approach is clearly shown in the symposium of faith which is edited by Joseph Fort Newton.[19] Thus the representative of the Jewish faith dwells on the experience of walking with God, so thinking of Him that what he thinks becomes part of his life, while his life and conduct become part of God.[20] Another religious leader, admitting that the experience of the individual is essential to love of God, defends the view that the intellect is still primary; hence that our contact with God is based on knowledge of Him, notably in revelation. The Friend holds that man must discover his soul or spiritual nature, directing and dominating, in order to find God as "the Eternal Goodness." Yet another leader, willing to grant that religion may become experimental,

[19] *My Idea of God*, 1926.
[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

finds in God that "dependable Factor which always responds ultimately to the right religious adjustment" which, in turn, is "a conscious volitional state, characterized by spiritual aspiration, concentrated attention upon God as the source of spiritual help." Given our adjustment in such terms, God, "reality, or some Factor in reality . . . produces in the spiritual experience of the individual a difference which lies in the direction of the spiritual ideal." [21]

The humanistic note is sounded in various terms by the majority of these writers, notably by Dr. Crothers, who raises the great question of personality anew: "To me, personality is not something which I understand; it is something which I experience. It is a word which stands for what I am, and not for what I comprehend. It is that which I cannot get away from. I think, I feel, I love, I hope. . . . When I think of that in which I live and move and have my being, and ask what it is like, it does not seem reasonable to eliminate the very thing which I find to be the greatest, and of whose reality I am most certain." [22]

Reality Feeling.—This emphasis on the legitimate appeal to personality and human experience as the basis of belief, with the implication that in some sense it involves knowledge other than the mere matters discussed by the special sciences, aids our inquiry into the nature of belief in contrast with factual knowledge. Religious belief assuredly pertains to the subjective side of judgment (Baldwin) and the emotion of conviction (Bagehot). It involves what has been called the reality feeling, and in this sense it is taken to be primary or unanalyzable.[23] We believe in a thing because we have seen it. We believe in an event as something that has actually occurred, because when vividly present we witnessed it or because others in whom we have confidence saw it. We believe in realities suggested by feeling or emotion because of an element of satisfaction, whereas disbelief would give pain. Thus we may be horri-

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[22] S. McC. Crothers, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[23] On the perception of reality, see W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, Vol. II, Chap. XXI.

fied when a man announces himself an atheist, but proud of our fellowmen when a friend stands by his convictions in favor of God, man, moral ideals, in the face of any opposition that may arise. So we may appreciate why, for the mystic, the immediate experience of the presence of God is the surest basis of belief in Him, although by type and persuasion our own approach to belief may be radically different. Again, penetrating behind the epithet, "atheist," hurled at Spinoza, we may come to appreciate why the conventional belief in God was no longer what James would call a live hypothesis, and why a century after he was relegated among the lost as an atheist he became reverenced as a "God-intoxicated" man. What remained for Spinoza, after his penetrating critique of the dogmas of his day, was what could be believed with explicitly clear reasons for believing.[24]

Intellectual and Volitional Elements.—Pausing for a moment to review the elements of belief, we readily agree that for the believer knowledge of some sort is one of its constituents, that it appeals to the understanding as well as to the emotions; and that we strive to sustain those convictions which we deem significant for human personality. The religious beliefs of the past may indeed have arisen out of hazy evidence, with maximum dependence on custom, tradition, fellow believers, suggestion, and the practical need for adhering to something definite or workable. However crude its origin, belief may become progressively intelligible, notably when we try anew to correlate belief in God with modern knowledge. Much depends on the type of mind, the sort of evidence demanded, the ability to withhold assent or raise objections. In any event, we know its appeal in contrast with what Emerson called the pale negations of sheer liberality, the uncertainties of an inquiry which yields nothing positive, the fluctuations of doubt, and the struggle with a besetting skepticism. To become affirmative by entertaining a live hypothesis, is to find that positive states of mind increase with our interest. Thus belief in God may be greatly heightened by the prop-

[24] *Ethics*, Pt. V, Prop. XV, foll.

osition that He is not only real but "immediate to man," present in our aspirations, even in our doubts.

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CHAPTER VII

BELIEF IN GOD

Belief Is Decisive.—Religious belief doubtless means for the majority, belief in God or the Determiner of Destiny; since the ideas of the soul, the life after death, and the essentials of prayer, worship, and the other matters of chief moment imply in their turn this central conviction. Hence in the foregoing discussion we have assumed that belief is most intelligible when taken to mean belief in God as the basis of the spiritual life. Postponing the question of personality for the most part, and the problem of immortality, we are still to be concerned with certain aspects of belief in general, in accordance with which belief in God may be the better understood.

It is observable that when we believe profoundly in a person or doctrine, we rule out whatever is incompatible with this allegiance. God being good, the triumph of evil is unthinkable. One's friend being virtuous, sincere, loyal, disloyalty of any sort is incredible. Since the acceptable doctrines are true, many others are unmistakably false. Loving these doctrines, I hate heresy, despise error, and loyally cleave to my fellow-workers whose beliefs reënforce my own. Unless we realize how vigorously such partisanship crowds out its opposite as infidelity, we will hardly be able to appreciate the natural history of religious belief, for instance, in the Christian Church. Even those doctrines which closely approximate one's own creed may be deemed "perversions" of the true faith, subtly insinuated into the minds of the unwary. For the zealous partisan, the notion that an error can be partly true is utterly inadmissible, even as an hypothesis. Terrible indeed are the

denunciations sometimes heaped upon the "infidel" or "atheist"—one who does not believe as we do.

Obviously, the persistence of belief is frequently due to failure to examine either its foundations or the considerations which militate against it. Wholly devoted to his special tradition, the believer's thought is given over to the sentiments, volitions, and ideas which sustain that tradition only. Breadth of view and training are essential to the hazardous venture of those who investigate even the complexities of disbelief. The untutored mind would be amazed to learn the array of presuppositions taken for granted in a relatively simple tenet of faith. As long as we are undisturbed in our beliefs, emotion and imagination freely enlarge upon what we uncritically accepted at the outset, doubt has no destructive access, and sentimental association entrenches what we habitually adhere to, as sacred association endears even the errors of a faulty translation of the Bible. Partisanship is as natural in religion as in politics, and may be as uncritical. It seems incredible to the politician that one should become dispassionate. Strange indeed sounds the ancient dictum, to the religious devotee, that "he alone knows God who has doubted Him."

The Personal Equation.—Religious belief is seen at excellent advantage therefore when it is dynamic, especially when he who gives assent also gives himself so fully to his creed that he commits his future to it, come what may. Such devotion does not necessarily mean that one could justify one's faith in God, or zealously inculcate it to another by meeting objections to this faith. But it may mean that one is able to draw up one's own statement, revising it from time to time. Thus one may attain the state of mind characterized by Emerson, with reference to the drawing of ever larger and larger circles around one's belief. So too belief may steadily tend to become less emotional, less dependent on tradition; hence more stable and intellectual. The ability to formulate one's own belief in God, for instance, may seem to be the test of genuine conviction. Yet other religious adherents look with sus-

picion on any change of terms which apparently sets up personal conviction as the test. Conservatives, while protesting against all evidences of what they deem "self-intelligence" or "pride of intellect," horrified by the approach of modern criticism, would be amazed could they become aware of the assumptions of their own faith, of the part played by the personal equation.

Belief Is Projective.—By enlarging upon evidences of design in nature or providence in our daily affairs, belief acquires a certain extension beyond the present sphere. So too the believer may enlarge upon his knowledge of human personality by attributing a personality to God which he modifies in proportion as his idea of the human self changes. By a similar mode of thought, the spiritual world as the home of the future life may be an extension of belief in this life and this world. Indeed, the religious person may so project beliefs referring to the social medium in which he lives that the unseen order becomes more real for his belief than the world of space and time. The more devoutly a man believes in his spiritual present, the more he may claim truly to grasp the world of experience which his faith tells him will continue without a break into the heaven of his future. This may not seem to be a projection of belief. It may appear to be a matter of spiritual evidence concerning what is assuredly real and true in an ideal present which knows neither space nor time. For the emotional element, the feeling of sacredness associated with the belief greatly sustains it. Again, one's conviction becomes the more secure when attacked by non-believers in the fire of controversy. The problem for the psychologist is to determine the extent to which a world of belief has its locus in the imagination or subjectivity of the believer.

Personal Attachments.—Belief is sometimes due for the most part to love for persons in whom one devoutly trusts. One may join a church for this reason, or may transfer one's membership because a greatly revered person has done so. So, too, a young person may continue to believe for the sake of a parent, when doubts might otherwise be

admitted; or because the struggle of breaking away from the family tradition seems too intense to contemplate as an actuality. Heart-rending indeed is the wrestling with belief, when the loved one puts allegiance to a church above the love which makes for marriage. Others take the position that no religious belief should ever intervene, as if mere loyalty to a church were to be more esteemed than love for the one person to be prized above all others in the world. Thus it becomes a question of motivation, when an institution dictates the terms of religious belief.

If there is a disjunction between religious belief and knowledge of science, between one's creed for Sundays and one's working principles for daily life, there may also be a break between private thought and public profession. The devotee may remain in the fold because of personal attachments and hallowed associations, long after the creed has ceased to be persuasive. A person may "love the service" as indeed he enjoys the music of outgrown hymns, while cherishing little interest in the doctrines. The service, with the repetition of the creed, survives as a value which in large measure sustains belief in God as envisaged according to that particular creed. Meanwhile, another group of beliefs have gathered about the main interests of daily life. The disjunction is radical indeed in case of the religious leader who has two groups of beliefs on spiritual matters, one for himself and one for his congregation. It is naturally said that a man really believes what he actually lives by, and so "the life" becomes the test where once it was belief. Thus, too, the sometime zealous worshiper may acquire his own way of thinking about God, on the basis of inner experience.

The Intuitive Element.—The association between belief and reality feeling is so intimate that people have naturally held that what is profoundly akin must be true, or must have been innate. Hence the widespread conviction formerly so prevalent that moral and religious truths in general are innate. The diversity of beliefs thus cherished, together with the fact that other peoples, perhaps whole nations, are devoid of ideas said to be native to our

minds, sufficed to undermine this assumption.[1] What we intuitively "feel" to be right may indeed be true for us, practically speaking, at present. Hence the significance of the saying, "what is right is according to my constitution, what is wrong is against it." But what has been true for us may cease to have validity, although a later belief may assimilate the values of the earlier. Thus one still believes in God, though a God of a very different sort; as indeed one continues to pass moral judgments, after decisively rejecting former deeds declared to be "right" in the name of conscience as emphatically "wrong" because of greater enlightenment. So too "natural" religion displaces "revealed," and deism comes into being instead of a belief in God based on the doctrine of innate ideas.

The element of feeling or intuition is represented by the values associated with our changing beliefs, for instance, the change from the austere God of a former type of orthodoxy to the indwelling God whose presence is more in accord with our modern views of nature. We undoubtedly have a predisposition to believe what agrees with our general religious attitude. Sometimes this is chiefly due to tradition and association. Or it may imply prejudice, a bias due to our strong inclination to be sectarian or partisan. Again, we like beliefs that are symmetrical or harmonious; we wish to be consistent æsthetically speaking, if not rationally so; and the God of beauty in nature and in human life may replace the God of dogma or tradition. In any event, motives involving feelings, emotions, hallowed associations and preferences combine to give us what we regard as an intuition. By a circular process, intuitional products are accepted as assured beliefs on the assumption of the existence of intuition as a faculty which renders the mind immune, whereas "mere intellect" might corrupt. Both conservatives and progressives defend their convictions as intuitive, while eagerly assailing their opponents' beliefs as open to fatal

[1] Hence the reaction against conventional beliefs in God, due to Locke's critique of the doctrine of innate ideas, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1690, Bk. I.

objections.[2] The fact that beliefs persist as values long after we have ceased to hold them on rational grounds is significant for the psychology of belief in God.

Practical Demands.—Pratt aptly describes the imaginative and conceptual elements of belief in God as dodging each other within the mind, "each coming to the center of attention only at the call of certain conditions."[3] Meanwhile, the attempt is perhaps being made to retain both elements by regarding one as symbolic. The symbol, in Pratt's account, "makes one's belief more concrete and thereby more vivid, comforting, and effective . . . in suggesting the indefinable, the illimitable, the ineffable." Hence the emotional power of the symbolic expression of a religious truth may be tremendous. The dogma which seems to the Protestant wholly indefensible may, for the Catholic, generate a vision of faith, arouse a certain emotional satisfaction which meets the demands of the heart. The practical need, expressing itself in emotional and imaginal terms, may in many cases be the real meaning of belief in God. In this respect, different consequences are anticipated by various individuals whose God is in each case the result of these practical demands. In the terms which James made so familiar, and which Pratt and others tending toward pragmatism have for the most part accepted, there is good reason for believing as true that which thus meets our needs: it *is* true for us while our interests remain as they are.[4] But Pratt, for one, protests against the notion that God is *only* "the totality of our purposes and values," as if the pragmatic idea exhausted the conviction that God exists. To limit belief in God in this way would be to neglect the "something genuinely transcendent" which goes with widespread beliefs in the existence of God."[5]

Personal Instances.—The reasons for continuing to believe in God despite all changes in attitude, experience,

[2] The validity of intuition will be considered in a later chapter.

[3] *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 205.

[4] Pragmatism is a method of testing conceptions by the way they are understood, in the light of what we take to be their consequences.

[5] See Pratt, *op. cit.,* p. 209.

and practical modes of daily living, are well seen in specific instances, like the one which came within the writer's observation during a considerable period. This devout believer was emotionally converted to the most rigid Calvinism, during an adolescent "change of heart" which wrought manifold readjustments. His conversion involved full acceptance of God as a regal Person seated on a white throne above the world, in vigorous judgment on the ways of men in this degraded sphere we call our earth. This highly doctrinal deity, sustained by the literal imagination and the warm ardor of the believer, was utterly rejected during a much more moderate religious experience, at twenty-two, six years after the emotional conversion. Not a vestige of the old imagery or symbolism remained after a year or two, and not a fragment of the theology; for this "real" conversion was so penetrating that the recipient discarded both theology in the doctrinal sense of the term and the Church, in favor of a newly won belief in God as immanent in the world, approachable in the heart.

When the writer came to know this deeply spiritual man, who even ruled out religious observances from his home and kept his children away from both Sunday-school and church lest they should be caught unawares and emotionally persuaded before the age of reason, he was an exceptional believer in God as near-by love and wisdom or omnipresent guidance, without being a mystic in this belief. His new God was the product of freshly formed convictions quickened by a very religious teacher who rejected all conventional theology, coupled with reflections on his own later experience wherethrough he verified his teacher's belief. His was an exceptional instance of "going to the sources." One could not say his belief in God was merely pragmatic, because experience seemed to be prior to belief and to outdistance belief in the usual meaning of the term. This earnest Christian, as he might be called, rejected theology and the Church but retained the gospel, and continued without a break to believe devoutly in Christ—not "the Christ of theology,"

he was fond of saying, but the real Jesus who pursued a way of life, proving the life by the works and teaching universal spiritual truths. Thus the emotions which had been so deeply stirred at adolescence found other modes of expression, the volitional element was expressed in a type of life which verified the idea that God is "omnipresent wisdom"; while the intellect was satisfied by the growing literature of the day typified by such works as those of Joseph Le Conte.[6]

Similar instances within the writer's observation suggest that while the revolt against the doctrinal deity may be so vigorous as to arouse vociferous hatred, so that certain terms ordinarily applied to God are never uttered again, religion is kept, the Church invisible is adhered to, and the newly achieved belief in God is assigned to another category, as if "the real God" lacked even the remotest connection with theology.[7] In three of these instances, the believer undergoing the change renounced Catholicism in favor of a practical mode of regarding God, a much more difficult undertaking than to reject orthodox Protestantism in favor of belief in the divine immanence.

Another respondent, whose belief in God is certainly typical, declares that while he "believed" in God prior to his two decisive inner experiences, mere "belief" seemed to him essentially intellectual in contrast with these "experiences of God's presence."[8] The first experience was a moderate mystical vision, without ecstasy, coming when the respondent was eighteen, and disclosing what he took to be the purpose which he was to fulfill in his life on earth: he was to devote himself to "spiritual work" with special regard for what he describes as "realizing the presence of God." The second experience came the day after his father's death, nine years later, when, because

[6] *Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought*, 1888.

[7] A sometime Calvinist said, concerning her former God: "I *hate* him; I *hate* him; I utterly dispise him." This respondent was a minister's wife, who had undergone her change of belief after the age of sixty.

[8] The question of the immediacy of experience will be taken up in subsequent chapters.

of his great sorrow, he seemed (according to his version of the matter) to be "most weak" in himself, most greatly to need comfort. He describes his experience, not as one which came to meet a need in response to his own volition; but because he appeared to have no resources within himself and nowhere to turn for help. His experience was the more impressive precisely because he apparently made no effort in the direction from whence came this succor and inner peace. This experience disclosed, for him, the real or true God, the God who quickens faith, whose presence my respondent describes with reference to love and wisdom as the essentials. Hence in his view experience is prior to doctrine.

This contrast between one's own strength, knowledge, personality and God as Father, Wisdom, Love, bestowing inward strength, yielding guidance and sustaining love, is doubtless the antithesis on which many earnest believers put first emphasis. Such believers insist that belief in God does not aspire toward God as if growing psychologically by what it feeds on: the belief develops out of the experience regarded as decisive, as one of the elements of which their religion consists. First comes the immediacy of the quickening experience, ostensibly unsought. This is the real evidence. Then come the several results in daily living. Eventually, belief articulates itself amidst a context that is much larger than the explicit belief seems to imply.

Correcting this description, we may say that the belief does indeed in time express the experience as a whole; we have in the foregoing discussion interpreted belief with reservations in favor of values, the projections of faith into the spiritual world, and the sense of the ineffable which leads the believer to regard God as somehow transcendent as well as immanent. The significant consideration, so the more earnest believers would have us understand, is the fact that experiences generate belief; not that belief generates one's God, who then seems to be only one's own "idea," as if He were a mere projection demanded by personal values. For the real God is disclosed as one who meets needs of which one was for the most part unaware,

instilling a faith one did not seem to possess, and with the certainty of a vitalizing presence which seems to require no will to believe. One "cannot help believing," so one respondent says. The psychological formulation of one's belief is a mere incident. Yet in addition to the quickening experiences which lead to changes in belief we must also acknowledge the fact that religious believers of a more intellectual type usually alter their beliefs by critically reacting against them. "Only conviction can displace conviction. To conquer existing belief we must replace it with one more convincing."[9]

The Priority of Experience.—The persistence of conviction is shown by the fact that no sooner does one argument for the being and nature of God fall short than another way is found to approach the question. Thus the argument to prove that God exists, for instance, the ontological argument indulged in by Anselm, surviving the objections brought against it, reappeared centuries later, to be skeptically analyzed by Kant, together with the other classic arguments; and to persist in terms of its inherent truth when its original values were recognized.[10] In due course, the attempt to prove that God exists gave place to recognition of the truth that any philosophy of His being *must start with Being,* and then develop the implications of this fundamental principle. Thus in time the interest began to center about the experience of the presence of God as prior to any attempt to describe or justify it, and to be concerned with the general proposition that "experience is prior to doctrine," a proposition which won increased assent with the publication of William James' epoch-making work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*

Granted an empirical incentive, the actual argument has depended on the theology, philosophy, or science of the period for data; and the emphasis on God's nature or character in relation to such matters as law, order, system;

[9] W. A. Brown, *Beliefs That Matter,* 1928, p. 10.
[10] Cf. Windelband, *History of Philosophy,* tr. by Tufts, revised ed., 1901, pp. 292, 549.

creation or evolution; force, energy, spirit; or mind, spirit, and personality. The discussion has been even more vitally dependent on the psychology of the day than on the theology or philosophy. Hence it has become almost a commonplace that the experience or motivation is the clue, whatever the subsequent doctrine.

A Typical Believer.—We may illustrate the process of reconstructing belief to meet time's changes by outlining some of the main points in a recent work by a pronounced theist, who gives persuasive reasons for his conviction.[11] Streeter approaches the question of the references to reality involved in religion by distinguishing between the modes of representation used by science and religion.[12] Science represents ultimate Reality by means of a diagram, in terms of *quantity;* religion represents this Reality also but by a picture rather than a diagram, through recognition of *quality.* The clue is found in the nature of art, which *suggests,* whereas the method of science is to *state,* to explain: "art is the apt externalization of an inward spirit."[13] Since life is something known from within, in the last resort only from within, art is needed to portray its essentially qualitative character, to disclose man's inner spirit; for example, in the drama, the novel, and the lyric. Quality, in turn, is something conterminous with conscious life; consciousness is primarily the capacity to distinguish qualitatively. While art falls short in its portrayals, religion is concerned with quality or value in both its moral and its æsthetic aspects. The central proposition is that "*if* quality as well as quantity is an ultimate constituent of Reality, then Reality in Its qualitative aspect can only be expressed in some adequate representation."[14] This is found in religion, that is, in the inward spirit, and only secondarily in customs, rites, and creeds. Personality is, in fact, "the only real expression of religion." In religion that statement is "true" which evokes the emotional and volitional response which is "appropriate to the quality

[11] B. H. Streeter, *Reality,* 1926.
[12] *Op. cit.,* p. 30.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 34.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

actually inherent in Reality."[15] Science falls short through inability to explain *all* the phenomena of the universe, notably the phenomena of life. In agreement with many thinkers of the day who follow Bergson in this respect, Streeter contends that Reality is *dynamic,* while our thought about it tends to make it "static."[16]

Life and Intuition.—On this view, widely accepted in our time, we have immediate or intuitive acquaintance with "life." Science does not tell us what life is: it is able at best to classify, describe, and explain according to biological laws or modes of operation. Thus the term "mental life" has come to designate the energy or activity which psychology describes under the head of "mind," as little able to tell us what such life is as the physiologist to tell what bodily life ultimately is. Again, what moral life is, we must learn by intimate appreciation of moral experience and values. Still further removed from mere description is spiritual life, which the religious person is apt to regard as life in its highest phases. Here description largely gives place to intuition. The phenomena of the spiritual life may indeed be reduced to laws, conditions, and elements, as our whole inquiry shows. But spiritual life as such is discerned appreciatively through *the religious consciousness* as essentially intuitive.

Interpreting spiritual life in this manner, as *"a principle of organization, creative in character,"* Streeter connects life with individuation: life is "essentially that which organizes matter for a constructive end . . . the continuance of itself, in the face of serious obstacles, through self and race preservation."[17] Since then life is "self-organizing individuation," pertaining to the end or purpose, also to the "quality" of existence, it lies outside the sphere of science; and to have direct experience of it we must begin with that which we directly experience in ourselves, with that which we *feel* rather than "know," taking it for granted that every man has awareness of it

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 67.
[16] H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* pp. 140, 165, 176.
[17] *Op. cit.,* pp. 88, 90.

in precisely the same way. Life being in the last resort that which each one of us "can only apprehend from within," it becomes a question of a new phrasing of the idea of personality, with its approaches to belief in God.[18]

Personality as an Approach.—While Streeter's argument belongs in the sphere of metaphysics, it implies a typical psychology and falls in a measure within the scope of our inquiry. His initial propositions turn upon the conviction that individuality is "the synthetic focus of the living organism." Implied in this view is the idea that individuality and freedom increase, in the ascending scale of evolution, while life is disclosing itself in forms ever more intense and highly organized.[19] By analogy, it may be said that this principle also applies to the Life in the universe as a whole: the universe is thus a coherent system expressing a living Power, this organizing Life being in any case no less vital than our own powers. We are justified then in ascribing to that Power the element in personality as known by us through which it becomes "a focus of synthetic, directive, coördinative" energy. Thus it is describable as "a closely knit, highly centralized, self-consistent, fully self-conscious, eternally creative Unity."

Well aware of the objections to this procedure, Streeter still finds it "a dangerous necessity" to personify the Power behind all things, the idea of personality being the least inadequate of possible conceptions.[20] It is a question of the divine purpose in the universe, and the idea of personality is at least "a window through which we look out upon the limitless Beyond." To employ this conception is not to read our finite ideas into the divine nature, but rather to expand the thought of human personality to meet this the great special case. For our mere thought, God indeed transcends all comprehension, yet "qualitatively" He can be apprehended: the great mystery has been revealed to the heart. In any event, an idea of the "living

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 133, foll.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

God'' is the result of our endeavors; since in developing the idea of personality as our clue we are following those considerations which we intuitively cognize at first hand. Moreover, there is a choice between the ideas of personality which have been adopted as clues, such as that of a Judge, Sovereign, or Creator. The thought of God as Parent to be loved and trusted is greatly to be preferred to these, the clue being found as the main burden of Jesus' message, namely, ''the positive, active, creative righteousness in the life and teaching of Christ.'' [21] Christ is thus appreciated anew as ''a perfect embodiment in concrete experience of an ideal principle—the principle of Creative Love.'' Of unique importance in any conception of the universe is the occurrence in history of such a life, the actual emergence of that transcendent personality. Hence Streeter contends that in the causal argument for the being of God the ''Infinite Creative Life'' as cause can be no less than that character ''in which Love is an essential element.'' This love is implied too in the moral quality of the universe, the Infinite Mind being a mind which really loves the individual as ''a directive activity.'' Some symbol at least is required, and this symbol Streeter finds (despite all objections) in the idea of a supra-personal Personality.[22]

Streeter endeavors to meet the traditionally greatest objection to such a view, the problem of evil, by subordinating some of the attributes of God formerly deemed central.[23] Apparently, the reign of law in the universe is incompatible with Christ's teaching that God is love. But in any case good is more fundamental than evil, and there is at least a possibility of overcoming evil, that is, a *dynamic* solution of the problem. If we assign the first place to the Will to Good, there is no conflict between justice and mercy in the divine mind. The divine life in nature is curative as well as creative; hence the opportunity for redeeming the sin, remaking the man, and thus vindicating righteousness. At this point what Streeter has

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 193.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 209, 212, 214.
[23] *Op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

described as religious representation comes to the aid of his argument, namely, through appeal to the story of the cross of Christ as the ideal. It by no means follows that all suffering is of moral value. But religion offers the opportunity to man to do his part in coöperating with the divine trend toward man's regeneration, thus making the love of God in Christ "the focal point in prayer and meditation." Religion becomes a power in all seriousness, when we thus regard God, doing our best to trust Him and to follow Christ.[24]

Changing Conceptions.—Whatever the significance of such a defense of the idea of God, its meaning for our purposes lies in its motivation: the appeal to an intuitional experience of "quality," the emphasis put upon an essentially religious mode of representation, and the utility of the personal conception of God approached in this interior way. Whatever might be said concerning the appeal to analogies and to symbols, the symbology of values is here put on a basis characteristic of religious belief in our time. Thus Beckwith, surveying the field of theistic arguments anew, and finding the most direct means of approach in such values as happiness, welfare, truth, beauty, goodness, justice, friendship, loyalty, love, and sacrifice, contends that "wherever is consciousness of values, there is consciousness of God . . . where value is, there is God."[25] Hence ideas of God will change as the consciousness of values varies. The argument from the mere "idea of God" is therefore no longer needed. The scene has shifted in favor of such conceptions as that of a finite God, a conception which depends on whether the sphere within which the Power of the universe energizes is finite. If, however, space is said to be boundless, time without beginning or end; if the universe in duration and extent is infinite, then the "ideal-forming" or creative Power within it can be no less than the immeasurable universe. The idea of the "immeasurable" thus has the value of the infinite with respect to the energy or purpose which functions in the cosmos.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[25] C. A. Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, 1922, p. 199.

Hence Beckwith retains the well-known phrase, "the sense of the infinite." [26] So too the idea of the divine immanence finds its meaning as a working religious conception when grounded in the prevalent view of the world under consideration at a given time. Again, the conception of God as transcendent might be taken to involve a metaphysical reference to a God who is remote, unrevealed, inconceivable, as the Absolute; or transcendence might be the ideal meaning which we signalize when distinguishing God from the actualities of the world in which He is said to be immanent. In this valuational sense, God is transcendent "so far as there are infinite possibilities in the creative process which may be realized under temporal, spatial, and conscious forms." [27] By this we mean that the divine resources are "various and inexhaustible," howbeit we thus far know those only with which experience has made us aware. But more specifically still, the divine personality may be approximated by appeal to the purposive activities of the universe, the character of these ends being a revelation of the divine character. In other words, the values before mentioned have emerged in a universe which is not hostile to them, but is on their side. Indeed, the Power which in Beckwith's phrase is inseparable from the world in which it operates is "energizing mightily" in behalf of these values. It is admittedly *a postulate of faith* that there is such an ideal-forming activity resident in the universe, that a universal purposive Will exists.[28]

But here, as in Streeter's argument, the motivation is noticeably modern. Belief in God here takes the form, not of an argument in which the alleged "necessities of thought" take the lead; it is based on those appreciative experiences and insights which characterize the inner life in its most spiritual moments. Hence the religious consciousness is said to possess qualities or values of its own. These values are conserved despite the vicissitudes of all arguments for the being of God based on such considera-

[26] *Op. cit.*, pp. 206, 221, 225.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 269.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 297, 303.

tions as causality and teleology, whatever the changing conceptions of the world, and even when the natural world is said to be hostile to morality.

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CHAPTER VIII

CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

The Meaning of Childhood.—It was once customary to idealize childhood with respect to qualities highly favorable to religion. Thus innocence was identified with the unspoiled childhood of the world, before man lost the open vision of heavenly things, in the golden age of unsullied virtue. Eulogies of this sort are akin to the pre-scientific psychology of former generations when moral and religious ideas were said to be innate, and conscience a "voice" telling man in unmistakable terms what promptings are right and what ones wrong. On the ground that man possesses a religious instinct, it was feasible to assume that his religious nature as a whole was inborn, that religion as such was implicit in every man.

If the recent psychology of childhood has sometimes given almost exclusive consideration to biological facts, judging the human infant by animal behavior, it has at least cleared the ground by dispelling illusions. Granted that the baby is little more than an animal or behaving organism, we may proceed cautiously, noting evidences of psychophysical equipment in the senses, reflexes, or prepotent tendencies which give promise of the more mature responses of childhood.[1]

The Original Equipment.—If the child is born "without mental endowments," as some psychologists maintain, the least that can be said is that he has "an immense capital of preformed and innate ability which takes the form of physiological vigor and instinctive and impulsive actions,

[1] The term "prepotent" avoids the assumptions formerly associated with the eulogistic term, "instinct." Reflexes are said to be evoked with reference, for example, to protective or adaptive behavior. See F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 49, 65.

performed for the most part automatically and unconsciously.''[2] An adequate psychology will take account of all these prepotent tendencies, and give special attention to the emotions which appear very early in childhood, for example, fear, rage, love.[3] The investigation will start with facts indicating that the animal nature is dominant in infancy. As a consequence, an infant cannot be said to possess personality, although by the fifth year what we call personality may indeed begin to appear. Accordingly, the child will be regarded as a ''self'' only so far as selfhood is said to be gradually developed amidst social relationships. As mental development goes on, the fact will be noted, for example, that the child has begun impulsively to assert himself, in popular phrase, to become ''willful.''

It should also be said that the world into which the child is born is remarkably well fitted for precisely the needs and potentialities which the child displays. As Pratt says, the world has been ''humanized'' for the child by many centuries of effort, life, thought; ''preëminently it is a social world, a world of people . . . stamped with certain traditional ways of action and thought.''[4]

Social Influences.—Although the child is submerged in a social medium, bespeaking many forms of what we vaguely call social heredity, in the course of time various affections prepare the way for dominant tendencies; self-consciousness appears in due season amidst these affections, and a certain selectiveness is possible through the wealth of alternatives offered by life at home, at school, and during playtime.

Whatever is not true of the child, the fact remains that susceptibility to influences of various kinds is actual, that the child is in high degree receptive, responsive, plastic, and thus far ''innocent,'' essentially unsophisticated. The little child especially is dependent on the incentives of circumstance, as one object, play, or interest gives place

[2] C. J. Herrick, quoted in *Source Book for Social Psychology*, p. 139.

[3] Cf. J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, 1919, p. 199.

[4] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 92.

to another. Grievances are as readily dropped and forgotten as matters which parents and teachers try to emphasize for the sake of character. Both emotions and feelings are in evidence, but both swiftly come and go. Alert in responding to changes in the environment, the child is so dependent on habits early instilled according to the wisdom or foolishness of nurses and parents that the tree is likely to grow as the twig was bent in the early and very crucial years, popularly assumed to be the first seven years.

Fortunate indeed seems the child's susceptibility to imaginative stories. Hence parents and teachers greatly count on cherished folk-tales, imaginal incidents, and pictured instructions registered by appeal to associational imagery of ideal types, suggesting religious values, as in case of favorite biblical stories. For although the child lacks experience of religious objects and also lacks religious memories, part of the racial heritage into which he is born is religious. Religious influences may be said to become effective almost as soon as language is admittedly a factor. Therefore great dependence is rightfully placed on early associations likely to persist, associations which will later make religious experience possible. Other influences are registering effects which will in time serve as contrasts, so that when religious consciousness appears a comparison will be possible.

Early Responses.—The child is naturally imitative. Witnessing religious observances at home, in the Sunday-school and at church, he is acquiring mental associations which are likely to commingle with those of imaginary stories and the influences of bedside prayers, on which the first emphasis is likely to be placed. However inexact the term "imitation" may be, it at least stands for observed similarities of behavior.[5] It would hardly be intelligible to say that a child imitates the emotion of others: what is imitated is the behavior, as the child is encouraged, for example, to wave a "good-by," to copy manipulative motions, and is shown how to kneel by the bed and fold its

[5] Cf. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

hands in the attitude of prayer. So too the beginnings of sympathy, pity, and many other emotions may be traced to external activities, any one of which may have a suggestive influence. The use of poetry and music is also noteworthy as an influence, in which many important associations play a part.[6]

The child is deeply influenced by personalities, by incidents connected with people which strike home and leave a marked impression, for better or worse, notably in instilling either affection or fear, likes and dislikes. Much too depends on the formation of habits favorable to moral strength, integrity, the virtues in general; for moral development is essential to religion, especially in the early years. There are many aptitudes in the child which may be turned to religious account, if not hindered by influences which negate them. Much depends on the prevailing spirit of the home, however great the occasional lapses of the adult members. Sometimes a home is religious only on rare occasions. But some homes are religious in a sense which compares favorably with the best churches. Religious life at its best may be said at least to begin in the home, notably in the way the parents meet contingencies and in their readiness to answer the child's questions. Later, one may come to revere the home because it seems profoundly religious by comparison; or, one may revolt against it because of its many exactions, the early infusion of doctrines, and the biblical matters to be committed to memory.

The First Values.—Children are credulous, as ready to believe in Santa Claus as in God, eager to adopt mythology of any sort, confounding poetic illusions with reality, enlarging upon imaginal emotions and ideas. Hence manifold impressions are being made in an indiscriminate mass, some of which will be effaced with difficulty when the time comes to drop figurate ideas of God as a sort of policeman spying into all their actions or a monitor watching all the impulses and temptations, ever ready to blame or punish.

[6] The term "association" is very general, and should not be taken to mean the traditional "association of ideas."

In general, the child's religious teachers may be said to be the influences of his social surroundings. "The child is like soft clay in the hands of the older generation. Customs, attitudes, feelings and ideals are involuntarily copied by him. He is uncritical and passive, almost completely at first and increasingly less as the years pass by. Religion, for him, is therefore caught and not taught."[7]

Writers on the psychology of religion commonly agree however in saying that religion is actually taught, otherwise it would not be acquired at all. The child's love (its "sensitive zone responses") is "early conditioned by the signs of approval and disapproval of the parents," the deepest affective cravings being "satisfied through continual *rapport* with father and mother."[8] So in general the instruction it receives tends to establish desirable trends which under other conditions might have been shaped differently. Formerly, it was assumed that filial love was an instinct, hence that every parent had a right to expect it from the child. But if "some children do not love their parents at all, while others love them far too much," the modern inference is that the parent is responsible, that the child's affections must be *won* by the parent.[9] Indeed, higher characteristics in general are recognized, elicited, and intensified by the parents. The same is true of habits instilled through regularity in religious observances in the home, especially in making the Sabbath a different day, and regularity in attending the services at church is an important factor. Sympathy for the unfortunate, kindliness, patience, readiness to forego pleasures when there are opportunities to serve may begin under the auspices of the home so that a social program will be the outgrowth of such influences.

Religious Instruction.—No very definite impression due to church services seems to be produced before the child

[7] Jordan, *Short Psychol. of Religion*, p. 43.

[8] Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 337. The term "affective" refers to both emotions and feelings, including what are popularly called "the affections."

[9] Allport, *ibid.*, p. 355. See Allport's restatement of the Freudian theory of sexuality in children, p. 361.

is twelve, yet early impressions form a basis for instruction concerning the meaning of worship. If religion begins in the emotions, not in the intellect, if the child is a poet before he is a philosopher, the early impressions, stored away, constitute what has been called "a precipitate of values which have come down to the infant from parents and grandparents." [10] The child may therefore be described as at least "incipiently religious." [11] He is "beginning to have some sort of attitude, extremely indefinite and lacking in self-consciousness." The beginnings of his religious sentiments are in "a network of personal relationships." Hence it is that the first explicit formulations are "crassly anthropomorphic in form," the first God growing directly out of the feeling and thought toward father or mother. To follow the child's development imaginatively, with respect to its beliefs, is to note that three factors are at work: (1) the indirect influence of the actions of older persons, (2) the direct teaching on religious subjects, (3) the natural development of the child's mind.[12] What Pratt calls "the child's own imaginative contribution produced in the process of mental digestion" becomes in time a more important factor, for example, when doubts appear. In any event, prayers, the initiating sentiments, belief in God, in the Bible, Christ; also the appropriate virtues—obedience, respect or reverence and the rest—are actually taught. It is impossible to say what a child's religious development might have been with less emphasis on tradition, doctrine, and the supernatural; with less emphasis put upon compulsory observances, and more heed given to the recognition and preservation of the child's spontaneity or freedom of spirit. Whatever belief is early instilled is likely to be profoundly influential, for instance, either in a very liberal direction, involving an idea of God as indwelling Spirit, or in a strictly orthodox direction. A child reared in conservative orthodox surroundings is likely to assimilate the doctrinal influences as a standard by which to judge other

10 Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
11 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
12 Pratt, *ibid.*, p. 97.

teachings.[13] So he may be thrown on the defensive, strongly inclined to repel any other view as a "temptation."

Religious prejudices are likely to begin in this early period, also the loyalties, racial and otherwise, by which religion is bound up with matters that many would regard as neutral or non-religious. But some children begin very early to ask searching questions, and if these are answered with a decent respect for the child as an awakening spirit, so that the answers of today can be connected with the consistent answers which one expects to make tomorrow and next year, then associations essential to reason in religion may also begin. Children are sometimes as quick to detect inconsistency as to reject the authority of parents and Sunday-school teachers when these persons are proved to be in the wrong. Naturally, the child who has been disillusioned concerning Santa Claus will wonder if Christ be real. When a child has been repeatedly put off with evasive answers regarding the query "Who made God?" the mother may be the last court of appeal, as in case of the little fellow who, after putting this question to several people, asked his mother in despair of any answer, "Mother, do you happen to know who made God?" Unfortunately, beliefs in sin, hell, and the devil are sometimes inwrought with worthy beliefs in such a way that to reject the bad may be to discard the good, when the time comes for the day of reckoning. It is a question how many of these matters would be credible, if the child were reared with a wise minimum of religious instruction, without restrictions which will later lead to repulsion, and with emphasis on a defensibly intelligent idea of God.

The Social Environment.—The fact that very much depends on race, environment, custom, tradition, and the other social factors which tend to shape the child's mind and lay the foundations for character, becomes plain when we compare the children of Chinese, Hindoo, Semitic, and other diversified peoples with children of European descent of Anglo-Saxon parentage and nurtured in America, where

[13] Cf. F. S. Hickman, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, 1926, p. 457.

Protestanism or Catholicism has been their heritage. For children, religion is naturally identified not only with what they have been taught to believe and do, but with social customs and tabus. Thus what is religious to one is nonsense to another. So too within the social range of a single people the customs and beliefs will greatly differ, and in one part of the country, for instance, in Pennsylvania, where many sects prevail, the child will have a heritage and nurture peculiar to type.

It is to be noted that the actual mental equipment of the child is relatively simple, while the social conditions to which it is subject tend toward a high degree of complexity. The religious beliefs and customs instilled amidst all this complexity depend on the social sanctions in the given case. Thus, as J. B. Watson has pointed out, "a Chinese baby must use chopsticks, eat rice, wear certain kinds of clothes, sit in a certain kind of way, worship his ancestors and the like. The American baby must use a fork, learn quickly to form habits of personal cleanliness, etc."

It is well too to observe that we know very little as yet about what human beings instinctively do, or would instinctively do if permitted more freedom of development apart from traditional beliefs. "From the moment of birth," writes Hollingworth, "human infants are taken in hand by managing adults who are stimulated by vigorous symbols of the 'future welfare' of the child and of society. The very objects, implements, and other stimuli of the environment are vastly different from those to which his 'instincts,' if any, are presumably adapted by biological heritage. And the period of human infancy is so helpless and so prolonged that native proclivities become buried under the garments of habit." [14]

Psychologically, very much will depend in adult life upon the vestiges of early social association and mental imagery which, as remains of childhood, will form a basis for later religious development. Granted profundity of insight in maturity, it should be possible to discriminate be-

[14] H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology: Its Facts and Principles,* 1928, p. 335.

tween (1) those early associates which genuinely fostered religion, as one comes to know it after years of experience; and (2) the affiliations which on the whole have proved detrimental. Fruitful indeed are those early influences which have led to appreciation of the religion of the Spirit. In contrast, the dogmas and doctrines acquired in childhood may seem worse than a millstone tied round the neck of the believer. But, on the other hand, it has been urged that without these vestiges of early religious association not even regeneration is possible.

Adolescence.—So much has been said and written on the period known as adolescence, which extends from about the age of 12 to approximately 21 for females and 25 for males, that people informed in psychology have acquired great caution in identifying religion with the phenomena of this stage of development. Distinguishing the period into early, middle, and later adolescence, psychologists have called attention to the rapid changes during two or three years at about the age of fifteen, an intensified transition which might seem to be essentially religious, if one were to judge by conventional interests in conversion. The ripening of hereditary tendencies and instincts is accompanied by characteristic disturbances of the mind and nervous system, during adolescence as a whole. Moral consciousness assumes new forms, at different stages of this period. The emotions increase in type and quantity. Intellectual interests awaken, especially in the later stage. Artistic and literary appreciation begins. Many factors of the personality are in a state of flux, partly because of the organic changes in process, partly because of the plasticities germane to youth, the capacities for new and vivid impressions, amidst manifold feelings and rapid processes which youth does not understand.

These phenomena tend in a way to direct attention inward upon the processes of the organism and the emotions concurrent with them. Yet in another respect adolescence is a movement away from self toward the discovery of others, a change from egocentric motives to the larger social processes with which we identify both cultural values and

ethical principles. The individual now finds and affirms himself anew, while also meeting other individuals in a diversity of influential ways; sometimes thrown back upon himself, depressed, beset by doubts; again, called out of himself while being trained by his mates, educated by them as well as by his teachers. It is commonly agreed that the "set" now achieved amidst the various traits and tendencies, while dispositions are being shaped into character, is likely to persist through life. But the psychophysical tendencies are in large measure neutral. Virtue and religion or vice and crime may begin here.[15] The tendency toward a prevailing love or ruling passion which drives the individual from within may either be offset, antagonized, or fostered and intensified, as "nature" meets "nurture," as man meets his fellowman, organizing his life amidst varying integrations. There is an intimate temporal correlation between the awakenings of the sexual nature, the heightened social influences, and the emotions which may take a religious turn. No period seems more favorable for the beginnings of religion. But none affords greater opportunity for confusions between emotions. The highest impulses may commingle with the lowest—those adjudged "lowest" by the way they have been regarded in some religious circles.

Conflicting Motives in Youth.—A youth of the introspective type, unless carefully guarded and habitually encouraged to be sociable, to participate in sports, to commune with nature, to acquire mechanical or musical skill, or in some other way to find productive self-expression, is likely to turn in upon himself at the most unfavorable time: when religious and sexual emotions are most readily confused. Hence there may be no discrimination between self-centeredness (tending to introversion), bodily facts, psychophysical trends or drives, and values which might receive religious interpretation. Bewildering urges and emotions might seem to be either temptations or tendencies toward divine ends. If unsympathetically opposed in the

15 With reference to offenses at puberty and in adolescence, see M. Hamblin Smith, *The Psychology of the Criminal*, 1923, pp. 151, 161.

household or imposed upon outside of the home, the youth may be stung by a sense of injustice, and become extremely uncommunicative. Unaware of the nature of creativity, mental imagery may feed upon emotion rather than on productive interests. But, again, there may be a creative opportunity from the beginning; hence an outgoing mental trend which will save the youth from an inward struggle. Emotional changes which might under certain auspices be fostered into a religious conversion may be forestalled by wise paternal and maternal guidance until the later period, when the adolescent begins more consecutively to think for himself. The habit of thinking matters through for one's self may date, for example, from the age of seventeen or eighteen, the period popularly called the age of conceit with respect to youths who do not think consecutively. If reason is fostered at this fortunate juncture, the youth may postpone all religious decisions, and so may have the rare privilege of reflecting on various important subjects before doctrines and dogmas have established an intellectual "set" that can only with difficulty be overcome in later years.

Intellectual Crises.—This is also the age when, entering college amidst a complexity of inchoate points of view and modes of instruction, the youth finds himself torn between the religious beliefs of the home and the church, and the teachings of the special sciences, notably biology and comparative (behavioristic) psychology. This period of struggle in the youth of today corresponds in general with the centuries of conflict between faith and reason, while the Church dominated philosophy during the Middle Ages. The youth may not have any teacher alert and wise enough to see him through this contest. His parents may be too greatly occupied to be aware of it. There may seem to be an utter disjunction between science and religion. Unless the youth can find his own way through the intellectual mazes, he may not find a solution for several decades. But science may be consigned to one category, religion to another, and values may reign in the latter field, to the exclusion of all effort to find a common ground. Many partisans of religion insist that adolescence is the period of

conversion, and that conversion should forestall conflict, while the emotions are dominant.

New Social Impulses.—Avoiding undue emphasis on either the sexual or the gregarious instinct, Jordan notes the significant fact that the youth's new interest in other persons may lead the adolescent to join a gang or club, but to revolt against the Sunday-school as standing for "class" rather than "company" in the social scale.[16] Three processes of development become manifest through the heightened sense of personal and social relationships: search for an ideal, surrender to it, and call for companionship to share it. Hence the response, through enthusiasm and self-respect with which the youth may join a military company. Initiation ceremonies also make a strong appeal. Again, distinctively religious motives may be implied when there is allegiance to a personality inspiring devotion, enthusiasm, and self-sacrifice. In accord with other religious leaders, Jordan maintains that the religious craving for a personal ideal can find satisfaction only through self-surrender in the experience known as conversion.

Adolescent Conversion.—Time was when conversion at adolescence seemed to be conversion at its best. Hence the eagerness with which the first results of religious questionnaires were welcomed. Starbuck, who undertook a pioneer study in this field, concluded that conversion is a distinctively adolescent experience, intimately associated with the impressionability and the rapid physiological transformations of adolescence.[17] There are among females, for example, "tidal waves of religious awakening" at about 13 and 16, followed by a less significant period at 18; a decline at 20, with a falling away such that conversions are rare after 30. There appears to be a close connection also between the psychological disturbances of this period and the motives or intervening experiences which are akin to the results of adolescent conversion.

Starbuck's results warrant careful consideration, but with caution regarding his findings as a whole, until one

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 55.
[17] E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, 1899, pp. 28, 34.

has compared the instances of conversion, the accounts given of adolescent religious experiences without conversion, also the period of spontaneous awakenings leading toward "storm and stress" and readjustment, in order to determine the factors to which conversion may be specifically attributed.

The surest fact at the outset is the coincidence between mental and bodily growth, and the stages of religious change which begin with the impressionability of childhood and extend through the development of spiritual insight and the acquiring of a point of view, at the close of adolescence. The possibility of religious change seems to be greatest when bodily growth is most rapid, while the awakening emotions and rational powers favor religious conversion. Indeed, the physical and spiritual development seem to be supplementary, also to be mutually conditioned. Thus too there is a correlation between such bodily affections as loss of sleep or appetite, nervousness, weeping; and mental affections ranging from (1) depression, sadness, pensiveness, restlessness, anxiety, to (2) humility, seriousness, earnestness, and a tendency to resist conviction attendant upon a sense of sin and of estrangement from God.

Hence conversion proves to be a struggle away from distressing emotions rather than a progress toward righteousness. The typical process is from dejection and sadness through an intervening struggle, and finally joy and peace. Escape from sin is the noteworthy fact in some cases, spiritual illumination in others. The "feeling of incompleteness" in certain types is as significant as the sense of sin in others. Subsequently, the impulse to "give up the will" is a notable sign of the regeneration toward a completer self. The spontaneous awakenings of a later stage are also evidences of this effort to attain a more complete self; for Starbuck finds that these are fructifications of processes that have been maturing in the deeper nature. Thus the conscious result is, inferentially, a direct sign of what is in process beneath the threshold of consciousness. Without the volitional factor this integration into the conscious field might never have taken place. The self-sur-

render of one stage of the process may be the forerunner of the assurance of the next. The new insight is also a component in the organizing activity which signalizes the conversion. In the soul's deepened attitude of receptivity, faith too is disclosed as an essential. Thus various factors combine in producing what is ostensibly a new personality. The conscious factor appears especially in so far as the will has given "point and direction to the unconscious processes of growth, which, in turn, work out and give back to clear consciousness the revelation striven after." [18] Self-surrender may be the essential process in this convergence of activities.

Values and Results.—Among results following conversion, Starbuck mentions as the "functioning of a new and exalted personality," with the "clear-cut positive experiences" which follow the intenser pre-conversional phenomena; also peculiarities of temperament underlying the likenesses and differences which come before the crisis and after it. With the change of heart which involves the organization of life about a new center, comes a changed relation to persons, to nature, God and Christ. One of the intimate results is active sympathy with the world outside; and with this altruistic impulse comes a "heightened worth of self" which Starbuck sometimes refers to as if it involved the formation of a new ego, again as a "fresh point of reference for mental states" or an "unselfing." [19] The new factors thus becoming prominent in experience are in any case "new to consciousness." They involve the utilizing of dormant powers, when the convert emerges from his smaller world of existence into a larger world of being.[20] Sometimes the incentive seems to be a surrender of the personal will to the guidance of the larger forces of which the convert now feels himself to be a part; again, it may be described as a new adjustment or transfer of interests when the ego is "lifted up into new significance." [21]

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 112.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 124, 130.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 146.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 146.

The New Self-integration.—Whatever the phraseology, the "sense of newness," the consciousness that life is on a higher plane and that the ego has emerged from a smaller into a larger life, seems to show that the conversional experience as a whole means *finding one's true self*. This is the change most naturally to be expected as the goal of adolescence. Starbuck's subsequent analysis of the physiological, biological, sociological, and psychophysical factors of the experience tends to confirm this view.[22] If the native forces tended for a time to break the harmony and unity of consciousness, those forces brought the soul into awareness of ideals. Thus the way was prepared for conscious self-direction and participation in "new" because *higher* experiences. The progress toward unity, to be successful, must be able to survive the emotionalism and excitement sometimes attendant upon revival meetings and other abrupt phases of the transitional experience, notably any tendency toward the abnormal. The least that can be said of the cases described by Starbuck is that transitional religious forces are unmistakably at work, whatever the permanent value.

Other Religious Changes.—No less significant than his analysis of the factors of adolescent conversion is Starbuck's study of religious growth in childhood and adolescence not involving conversion, but gradual and relatively uneventful growth, usually "just as definite," and described by persons as capable of self-analysis, generally speaking, as those who have experienced sudden crises.[23] Characteristic features of childhood are credulity, close relationship with a supernatural world, a sense of right and wrong, religion being "distinctively external to the child rather than something which possesses inner significance." The implication is that the child's response is according to the way he was taught. In the adolescent period, however, "with its undercurrents of will and emotion, and its cross-currents contributing to the varied phenomena," there are evidences of spontaneous awakening, emotional

[22] *Ibid.*, Chaps. XI, XII.
[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

and moral clarification, not essentially different from the experiences of the conversional type. Given the evangelical phraseology, some of these deepened experiences would have been called conversions. Hence Starbuck concludes that "conversion is not a unique experience, but has its correspondence in the common events of religious growth."[24]

Starbuck also describes the "storm and stress period," in which "the welling-up of new forces on to the plane of the higher consciousness" is the chief thing, subsequent to a sense of incompleteness and imperfection (which might become a sense of sin).[25] There may also be intervals of brooding, depression and morbid introspection, amidst friction against surroundings, distress over doubts, and an effort to control the passions. Comparing conversion, the period of spontaneous awakening, and storm and stress, Starbuck finds that the same fact underlies them all, namely, the physiological and psychical adjustment incident to this whole period of transition in the young person's life. One of the most critical periods of human development, adolescence is a time when the germinating personality, "poised between an infinite variety of possibilities, new forces tending to sweep it this way and that," is subject to the religious feelings which border on the pathological in some cases; while the "forces that are imperative to consciousness are out of reach of the ordinary individual," and the new budding personality is "usually filled with self-distrust."[26]

Intellectually speaking, there is widespread presence of doubt—doubt of the authority or inspiration of the Bible, the divinity of Christ, the goodness or justice of God, immortality—that is to say, concern over problems which cannot well be settled during youth. Again, there is apt to be a feeling of alienation from conventional life, aloofness from the social environment, and possibly ill-health. Psychologically, adolescence is complex indeed, with its great diversity of coloring, with forces interplaying, oppos-

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

ing and conspiring, amidst the birth of a new and larger spiritual consciousness, a larger self appearing, together with new powers and the capacity for new functions. The individual is likely to be affected at times with the apparent futility of all his striving. Yet, despite all the anxieties and upheavals, and even the extreme pain, the whole experience is "one of nature's ways of producing a full-fledged, self-poised human being with a high degree of self-reliance and spiritual insight."[27] This period is, in brief, "the time for the awakening of that clear consciousness which is the distinguishing characteristic" of man in contrast with animals; and great clearness may emerge from the "inextricable mesh of impulses" which then spring up. But if, as Starbuck concludes, "there is more of ferment than contentment and evenness of feeling, more of doubt than faith," while the personality is thus filled with unrest and uncertainty, with comparatively little display of feelings which could be called distinctively religious, one questions whether adolescence is the period of conversion. More striking than the religious sentiment is apt to be "the willful activity and the disposition to take control of the universe" which Starbuck also finds to be characteristic of the period. On the whole, what Starbuck uncritically calls "the ethical instinct" seems to be the only quality which persists or is heightened, "often the only thing which remains firm in the midst of chaos."[28] Again, the intellectual interest may be the all-absorbing one, or perhaps the æsthetic interest continues or is heightened during storm and stress. In any event, Starbuck's analysis suggests the conclusion that all the sentiments and interests under consideration have rather begun to function than to become dominant. The profounder values of conversion will come before us for consideration after we have taken up the problems of the divided self and the integration of personality. For the moment we chronicle the fact that the significant religious changes of adult life are likely to have their beginnings during the adolescent period.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 263.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

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CHAPTER IX

DUALITY OF SELF

Inner Rivalries.—Whether described as a duality of selves or forces, or as a division within the self, the fact of duality is so widely recognized that no evidences need be cited to show that it exists. What is significant is the fact that this contrast is susceptible to such wide articulation, extending far beyond the confines of religious experience as commonly described, although religious consciousness may be said to begin in large measure with recognition of duality. The contrast may be taken to imply an opposition of forces which have always been in discord, or may be regarded as implying a break in the unity and harmony of consciousness amidst which there arises the effort to realize ideals, an antithesis which seems to demand what is commonly known as conversion.[1] Before arriving at a decision on this point, there is every reason for noting the characteristics of duality in general.

The popular assumption is that two selves or natures divide the field, or two voices, one "lower," more or less irresponsible or morally weak, listening to and impulsively responding to temptation; the other, as inward monitor, explicitly if not decisively "higher," pointing out the dangers of temptation and at least struggling to overcome its subtle insinuations. The antithesis becomes conversational in some people, as if two mortals resided in the same breast, the one conspiring with the world, the other potentially in league with heaven and on occasions triumphantly so. The contrast may also take the form of moods, both deep and superficial, moods of inner peace or

[1] Cf. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 155.

of restlessness, optimism or pessimism, hope or despair, faith or doubt: the faith which, as Emerson reminds us, comes in moments, while our vice is "habitual."[2] The poetry alternates with the prose of life, conviction alternates with alien facts which resist all classifications and creeds; sentiment offsetting criticism, and values rising above statistics. So too the antithesis takes on persisting rivalries between (1) will and (2) the impulses, passions, or desires; between (1) spontaneity, freedom, openmindedness, self-abandonment or expression prompting the whole personality to self-realization, and (2) conventionality, patterns of thought, fixed modes of conduct, orthodoxy, restraint, habits that mean crystallization.

Faith and Reason.—A typical form of contrast, when it becomes a persistent conflict, is that between faith and reason, a situation which may endure for half a lifetime, like the age-long warfare between science and religion. The doctrinal conflict in which natural reason and revelation were brought into relation for centuries is continued within the individual, for the same reasons. Reason having been abstractly distinguished as a faculty, faith by abstraction seems to be hopelessly opposed to it. A man seems to be deserting science, if he adopts a religious postulate involving matters devoid of tangible evidence. Yet one is apparently disloyal to faith when resolutely trying to carry the evidential method to the limit. One would not disbelieve at one's peril, or deprive the spirit of a transcendent value. Yet one should not be credulous. To press freedom of thought as far as possible might be to exalt one's own intellect. Such pride of intellect would be like great darkness rising athwart the light of heaven. But neglect of individual experience or thought might mean surrender to that deadening orthodoxy which tends to stifle genius and oppose all growth. Religious leaders inadvertently prolong the conflict by discounting reason as a man's own unaided intellect—as if intellect were sundered from universality and condemned to the merely accidental, peculiar, or eccentric.

2 *Essays,* First Series.

The Antithetical Process.—Sabatier suggests that the antithesis which becomes so pronounced in religion originates, psychologically, in the contrast through which man is distinguished from animals and by which he progressively disengages himself from animality.[3] Phenomena of new kinds, implying their own laws, make their appearance as man advances to maturity. The spirit, mysteriously emerging from the physical life, unfolds itself like a divine flower. At last the realm of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good is disclosed, amidst this progressive opening of consciousness, with its movement from within outward. Sabatier sees in the double movement, from externals to internals and from internals to externals, a representative of the movement inward from the outside to the center of the ego and the trend of activity from the center to the circumference in the mind's response. Thus the microcosm is itself profoundly antithetical. As there is an action of external things upon the ego by sensation (passivity), so there is a reaction of the ego upon things by the will (activity, that is, overt or social conduct) which is characteristic of the "internal flux and reflux" of our whole mental life.

Whether or not sensation seems to crush the will, so that "the free expansion of the ego . . . checked and crushed by the weight of the world" is subject to what Sabatier calls a perpetual "collision" between the ego and the universe, in any event reflection begins with the antithesis between subject and object. What the philosopher describes as the beginning of profound self-knowledge—when the ego doubles upon itself and regards itself antithetically—the religious person is apt to regard as a conflict signifying pain and perhaps defeat. Separating itself from the world of mere things, then from its own sense-processes as of the "body," its passions as of the "flesh," the ego judges and in a measure condemns itself, the more decisively as introspection penetrates motives and dispositions to the core of the "lower self." Hence come the more intense self-condemnations, the remorse and shame, the

[3] *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 13.

interior struggles and torments which become so terribly real in some religious types.

Hence too comes the effort which the human spirit persistently renews, with the undying conviction that harmony can be brought out of discord. Sabatier finds in this initial contradiction the most direct clue to the deliverance in which religion, springing from "this feeling of distress," writes its entire history.[4] Salvation, through "a moral act of confidence in the origin and aim of life," is sought in response to "the life-impulse" herein implied. So too the feeling of dependence on universal Being arises here. Religion as a practical need, as "a vital act by which the whole spirit seeks to save itself by attaching itself to its principle," is precisely the endeavor toward mastery of this antithetical situation "into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." For this conflict yields "the feeling of subordination" in which Sabatier finds the mysterious presence of God in our lives, "the deep source from which the idea of the divine springs up within us irresistibly."[5] Hence it is that religion becomes "a commerce and willed relation" into which the soul enters, where there was sheer conflict before.

The Struggle for Unity.—So too E. Caird, using other terms, finds a "schism between man's immediate experience and the reflection in which he is involved whenever he attempts to understand himself."[6] Faith does not move steadily forward, in the soul's first direct grasp at truth, but frequently "withdraws itself from criticism by raising a plea against the incompetence of the critic." Reason is meanwhile treating faith as another name for illusion. Thus in the conflict, faith, which might become the great principle of unity in human life, becomes stunted and perverted, and the "most unhappy of all its divisions." Caird attributes the conflict to two claims arising within one's own nature, as signalized in John Stuart Mill's *Essays on*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[6] *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol. I, p. 11.

Religion, in which Mill tries to find how much may still be believed and hoped for consistently with his scientific integrity. The struggle need not be regarded as a warfare between two hopelessly antagonistic principles; but as indicating the fact that religious experience passes through stages from the unconscious or unreflective into the conscious or reflective, beneath which there is essential linkage amidst the differences and the opposition. The secondary principles are capable of being explained from their unity, as in organic evolution greater differentiation of function discloses its outcome in the deeper integration and more highly concentrated unity.[7] Out of the unconscious construction, amidst the relationships of intuition and faith, with the movement toward reflective analysis, can actually come a religion which understands itself. Although reason is critically pruning away the accretions of time, counteracting the tendency toward stereotyped or fossilized forms of life and thought, in the effort to give room for the human spirit to advance still further, there may be a constructive outcome which will show the philosophic unity of the whole age-long process.

Experience as actually apprehended from day to day may seem very far from achieving the unity which the philosopher here describes, by emphasizing the life of reason. For most of us live in our emotions and feelings. We do not analyze. We become aware of the inner life in contrast with the outer, the higher self in relation to the lower, our ideals *versus* our attainments, without technically knowing subject from object. What we do seem to know is that there are verities with which we might ally ourselves more valiantly, intuitions which are somehow true, a stand we might take which would insure subordination amongst our impulses and the overcoming of excess. This is not merely a religious situation; for we need peace, unity or integrity in our moral and social life in general. In religious terms there is real conflict between faith and the long array of its opposites, such that the mild dissociations with which life is full are in danger of becoming real

[7] *Op. cit.,* pp. 17, 19.

divisions in a far-flung line between the mind of the spirit and the mind of the flesh. But in our general life we do not take the opposition so seriously, we expect to become consistent; or, at any rate, we are not troubled by the fact that we harbor various loyalties side by side.

Opposing Types.—According to the approach to "the divided self" which William James adopts throughout, the significance of the conflict is best seen in the light of two types of religious experience, the religion of healthy-mindedness and the twice-born type.[8] The first of these seems equivalent to minimizing the conflict out of which religion is said to emerge. The once-born person adheres to "a sky-blue optimistic gospel" in response to his own need, and so he seems justified in conforming to type. To pass from this "one-storied world" in which religious joy is cultivated to the neglect of contrasted emotions, is to find that even morbid-mindedness "ranges over the wider scale of experience, and that its survey is the one that overlaps."[9] To avert one's attention from evil, while "living simply in the light of good," may be reasonable enough as long as it works. It breaks down impotently when melancholy comes, with recognition of the vanity of mortal things, with the sense of sin. The first attitude is indeed "unspeakably shallow," in comparison with the morbid-minded way of looking at things which finds something essential or significant in the experience of evil. The evil facts of experience are as genuine as the good ones. In the psychopathic temperament, for example, there is a very real need for "straightening out and unifying the inner self." If at first there are higher and lower feelings, both useful and erring impulses, a "comparative chaos within us," it must somehow be possible to achieve a stable system of functions in which all impulses shall be in proper subordination.

In the actual experience of persons so insistently needing unification, there is for a considerable period "little

[8] *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* Lectures IV-VII.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 163.

more than a series of zigzags, as one tendency and now another gets the upper hand,'' with haunting and insistent ideas contending with irrational impulses, moral scruples and inhibitions, so that man's interior is ''a battleground for what he feels to be two deadly hostile selves, one actual, the other ideal.''[10] Indeed, the self may be so acutely torn between wishes or wills that it lacks precisely ''the last acuteness, that touch of explosive intensity'' which is needed to quell the lower tendencies forever. In James' description, there is a possibility of either a gradual or an abrupt crisis, that is, two ways in which inner unification may be brought out of the conflict. In any event, there is need of firmness, stability, or equilibrium.[11]

One might add that James' description suggests the possibility of a synthetic attitude toward life by avoiding the extremes of either healthy or morbid-mindedness. There might be a two-storied experience in which the soul is imbued with hope and peace precisely because soul-sickness as described by James has been overcome by actually facing the problems of evil and sin. The morbid person may be given over to melancholy because immersed in the process, without vision or understanding. Hence his morbidity may be as superficial as the shallow optimism of the one who cultivates joy as a religion. In other words, optimistic and pessimistic moods may alternate in the same person. Schopenhauer, confirmed pessimist, may need conversion as greatly as Leibnitz, confirmed optimist. How can we say which type of religious experience yields the wider range until both have attained that higher synthesis for which the religious consciousness persistently yearns?

Furthermore, one might remark that if one were to take seriously the proposition that a religion be made of healthy-mindedness, the resource would be to return to the standards of ancient Greece, when goodness was said to be natural. It would seem strange indeed to try to make a

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 169, 171.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 183. The book by the present writer to which James refers, *op. cit.*, p. 99, n., was an *exposition* of the popular movement in question. The writer is not an adherent of that movement and has never believed the so-called joy-philosophy.

religion out of the popular therapeutic cults, with their appeal to suggestion by ignoring facts, their wholly unscientific psychology and theory of disease, amidst vague ideas of the soul and the subconscious mind, mingled with pantheistic confusions between God and man, and denials of the existence of evil. Religion might be said to begin when one rids the mind of such fancies, with their invertebrate optimism and their fallacies. It is a significant fact that no progress has been made in this popular movement since 1900.

Inhibitions and Social Conflicts.—Psychology shows that the covert conflicts are more extensive than the overt forms. Allport graphically illustrates a typical situation by picturing a hungry man impelled to break a window and seize food in a bakeshop but restrained by the presence of a policeman near by.[12] The food-getting reaction to the hunger stimulus contends with the tendency to withdraw from situations entailing punishment. If the man yielded to the overt or social form of conflict, he would seize the bread despite the impending struggle. Driven more intensively within, the social aspect of the covert conflict is now repressed by his own "reaction system," in an attitude of avoidance of anti-social acts. More intensive still is the conflict within an infatuated person, where the sex-drive contends with socially conditioned attitudes amidst the throes of conscience. The contest which might become an overt attempt to possess the desired object is driven so far within that "the other person" is a subjective embodiment of socialized habits, while two antagonistic drives struggle in the same individual. The "evil" factor of the situation is due to what Allport classes as "the unwise controls" through which these drives are brought into antagonism.[13]

Meanwhile, the factor known in ethical terms as "conscience" is psychologically conditioned by habits which began with the first days of character building, for example, when "the sensitive-zone responses of the child"

[12] *Social Psychology*, p. 336.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 379.

were affected by the conduct of the parents.[14] Presupposing the covert conflicts between individual and socialized drives, a perpetual *"social conflict compressed into one individual"* (notably the major conflict centering about sex), the religious struggle known as duality of self adds the final personages of the drama.

Allport describes the sexual forerunners of this situation by reference to sexual differences, the attitude toward women, and the varied adjustments of family life. "As adolescence approaches, jealous parents set up barriers against the free expression of the sex interest by building up in the girl a repression based on fear or abhorrence. Sex life is submerged and introverted; and emotionality towards persons who appeal to her is therefore raised to a high intensity. No understanding of her own nature, no true knowledge of the forces about her, is permitted. All problems are solved for her in advance. All her thoughts and actions are controlled by custom, which in this regard is largely the product of male jealousy."[15] But this is only the beginning of the more intensive story of inhibitions which, continuing into maturity, are complicated by inferiority conflicts amidst new adjustments of personality traits. It is natural that in our day a new literature is appearing on "the revolt of youth," in so far as the young people of the day have traced such repressions to custom and their parentage.[16] Plainly, it is necessary to know the inner history of these repressions in general before their religious significance with respect to duality of self can be determined.

Paul's Problem.—If we could read Paul's epistles as a personal confession coming hot from the press in our non-doctrinal age, we might find in it an unrivaled description of the religious duality of self. Paul's conversion, doctrinally interpreted, is still the ideal instance of radical change: since the "Saul" of the first personal epoch seems to have become the great Christian apostle of the next,

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 377.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 345.
[16] See, especially, D. Seabury, *Growing into Life: A Magna Charta of Youth*, 1928.

as if all conversional processes had ceased on the road to Damascus. But it is the autobiographical Epistle to the Romans which admits us into the apsotle's physiological psychology. There we find so many evidences of the after-effects that Paul's problem is to know how he shall be delivered from his wretchedness, which seems to be so great that he scarcely seems to have been converted to Christ as yet.

For the great apostle frankly admits that despite his utter allegiance to Christ he is torn asunder by his own conflicts, frequently at the mercy of an unruly will or warring element of his nature which makes him seem like a victim of death, whereas he wills to be splendidly alive. His stress on bodily appetites would gratify the most insatiable disciple of Freud, as indeed his messages to the Corinthians betrays his masculine attitude toward women. He actually does what he hates, what he resolutely wills not to do; he is brought into captivity to the very factor of his nature which he absolutely despises. Thus his higher will becomes distinguishable as essentially aspiration, baffled as he is in his efforts to perform what he knows to be good. Long and arduous indeed must be his struggle until he shall overcome these warring appetites and acquire constancy in all his ways.

The Paul of one moment finds nothing good in his whole selfhood, almost identical as he seems to be with the "carnal mind" which is selling him into slavery. Yet, no, this is not the self which was summoned into fullness of power on the road to Damascus, the self that has the mind of Christ, which so well knows how to renew the mind of the spirit from within, day by day. It is not Paul that wills to do these carnal things, but a hold-over of "sin" dwelling in his mind of the flesh that so stirs him to the depths, checking him when he would be wholly faithful. He must see and acknowledge this "evil" that is present with him, involving what he calls a "law" (a trend in his nether selfhood), in order decisively to separate (1) "walking after the flesh" from (2) "walking after the Spirit," dedicated to the things of the Spirit. Yet, not even the spiritual mind

is wholly identical with Paul; for it is Christ's life dwelling in him that inspires him to will and pursue what is good. Again, walking in the Spirit is no merely general process, as the apostle makes clear in writing to the Galatians by sharply distinguishing the consequences of carnal-mindedness from "the fruits of the Spirit," which one must know in detail so that one may by first "living in the Spirit" also walk in it according to "the law of Christ."[17] Evidently, Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus was only the initial step in his progress toward complete self-realization or regeneration.

Paul's Social Psychology.—That this autobiographical realism does not disclose the complete psychology of religious integration, becomes clear when we turn to Paul's remarkable social psychology, which as shown by the Epistles to the Romans (Chap. xii) and the Corinthians (I. Cor., xii), turns upon two fundamental considerations: a conception of individual gifts and an ideal of functional coöperation. The symbology of bodily organs and limited processes essential to one another in a conjunct relationship suggests the formal element of this partnership. The truth that we are "members one of another" implies both diversities of operation of the "same Spirit" and diversities of "gifts" as organic functional activities imbued with this centralizing Spirit. The brief summary of spiritual abilities and types suggests an ideal for each man whose self-knowledge shows him his type. To find one's self and do one's work, acknowledging both one's finitude and the great truth that all gifts and all powers are from the same source, is to discover the "mind of Christ" in a far more important way than in the autobiographical psychology, which leaves us still perplexed by our duality. But even the corporate ideal of relationship of many members in Christ will fall short as the standard, unless we assign great prominence to the scale of mental qualities and virtues culminating in the love which is also charity, a goal so important that even faith is as nothing in comparison.

[17] Gal. v. 16, foll.

The Spiritual Will.—Does this description of personal struggle which is to eventuate in individualized Christian service in a corporate whole disclose all the elements of spiritual integration? Whatever answer one may give to the question, the psychology of the stages to be passed through and the conditions that will be encountered on the road seems much more important than that of the conversional change which marks the great beginning. Apparently, we are to conclude that to delight in "the law of God after the inward man" is not enough, or even to know precisely what baffles and defeats the will. The mind of the spirit is functionally to be known by searching the heart. He who loved us conquers through us. The essential word of guidance is nigh, even in the mouth, the heart: the veritable word of faith, convincingly at hand for the one who "believeth unto righteousness."[18] So prone are we to lapse into that carnal-mindedness which is "death," that we need to be vigorously awakened out of sleep, to walk honestly, to put on the armor of light, following after the things which make for peace, discerning spiritually. "For what man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit which is in him?"[19] Thus knowing one's self, one will see in detail in what sense one is rewarded according to his effort, each man's work having been made manifest.

Paul's psychology is first and last a type of voluntarism: love imbuing will is the highest motive, in contrast with the will of the flesh whose elements are so graphically portrayed in the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. If Paul's intellectualism sufficed, he would not be baffled by this antithesis. For his epistles, taken as a whole, show the most detailed knowledge of the method of affirmatively renewing the mind of the spirit from within. The problem of the moral will is more than psychological. We are left with the realization that the imbuing Spirit, or living Christ disclosed on our road to Damascus, is the real efficiency. What the psychological insight reveals is the in-

[18] Romans x, 10.
[19] I. Cor., ii. 11.

dividual and social form and content. Each individual is to find himself at his own point on the road, with respect to the drive from the rear that yields his current problem and the incentive from above which will unite the divine with the human purpose when he has discerned his type or gift.

While the decisive experience which shows the way to freedom may be radical and sudden, as in Paul's case on the Damascus road, the ensuing stages of readjustment are more illuminating from a psychological point of view. Apparently, the sense of duality persists until the old self (Saul) is assimilated into the new (Paul); until a new intellectual synthesis has been wrought, as in the case of Augustine, the Christianized pagan, whose erstwhile philosophy was assimilated into the theology of his later period. Naturally then one will distinguish between the sudden change of heart commonly known as conversion (when a man is said to "experience religion"), and the progressive coördination between new and old ideas. It is not a mere question of duality of heart or will but also of intellect, and the ensuing changes if fundamental will awaken many other dualities into action.

Duality of self is apparently a state of affairs which may appear at any stage of development. We note it in the case of young men and women who, although well grounded in religious instruction before entering college, pass through either the typical struggle between faith and reason or a period of rebellion when they object not only to religious exercises in the chapel but even to wise regulations and good government. We note it even in very elderly people whose religious faith is admittedly strong, confirmed by the habits of several decades, but whose periods of doubt and inner contest disclose the fact that they have not yet attained inner constancy. The contrasts that are so noticeable in the case of great leaders like Paul and Augustine seem indeed to have their correspondence in the ordinary dualities of mental life in general. Hence arises anew the great problem of the permanent integration of the self.

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CHAPTER X

CONVERSION

As a Gateway.—Conversion has been compared to a gateway leading to the more significant region of the religious life. Coming between the various modes of approach and the inner road which directly leads to the soul's destination, it marks the culmination of processes which psychology helps us to understand, even though psychology may not disclose all the motive-powers which actuated the soul in its approach to this crisis, and may not be able to describe the inner pathway so well as those ways which lead to the gate. Allowance should be made therefore for the ineffable element of the religious life, apart from which the mere process would be like describing highways and byways without reference to the traveler journeying over them on an important mission. For conversion is not the outcome of a calculable situation, as if by appropriate training every novice could be persuaded to respond precisely as we wish. At best the self-conscious novitiate is only one type. Conversion also results spontaneously. Indeed, it has seemed to be a gift of the Spirit to those who, like Paul on the road to Damascus, have found themselves suddenly entering the gateway in a decisive but transcendent moment of the soul.

It is not here a question of any of the external devices or methods employed at home, in the Sunday-school, the church, the missionary enterprise, or the effort to convert people from one religion to another; but of the elements involved in the internal process in so far as the individual decisively responds. Religious training may indeed be utilized to advance the process by means of the confirmation class and by appeal to special prayers or revival meet-

ings. It may utilize emotional disturbances attendant upon adolescence. Again, it may be doctrinally organized to foster change from one religion to another, notably in the field of foreign missions. But we are concerned with the inward changes which may or may not run parallel to influences induced from without. It is a question of conversion as a type of experience, divested of special descriptions put forward as proofs of doctrine. The religious worker naturally identifies the experience with doctrines ostensibly producing it. Hence we must look to those who regard the experience dispassionately, whatever it seems to prove or disprove.

What Conversion Is.—On the assumption that man has somehow missed his way to the fullness of life, that there is a primary defect in his attitude and conduct, conversion may be described as the recovery of the way, the overcoming of the defect by a decisive change of heart and life. Hence to be converted is "to possess within ourselves such moral qualities as answer to moral qualities in God."[1] Through this inner change man is to attain those powers through which the human self corresponds to or at least emulates the divine in the fullest measure. Through it man is to come into permanent possession of those moral and spiritual qualities which, owing to the duality of self, were merely occasional in the fluctuations of his nature between lower and higher propensities. The mind of the spirit is at last to triumph over the mind of the flesh, so that goodness shall reign, virtue become a habit. Whereas, it was once an easy matter to yield to temptation and do wrong, extremely difficult to "be good," temptation is to be remote indeed and wrongdoing a thing of the past. This change may be said to imply making goodness a "second nature," or it may be regarded as the recovery of our own true nature, as interiorly good. In the latter sense goodness implies higher self-realization. But in any event there must be moral reconstruction in attitude and conduct; a transformation of mind and heart, together with the modes of activity which make the inner life mani-

[1] H. W. Clark, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, 1906, p. 52.

fest. It does not follow that all moral struggle is to cease. The struggle is now to be persistently successful. Nor does it follow that we were so badly made that we need to be remade by a new birth that is to rectify God's first attempt. The divine image and likeness in us are presumably not "lost," but rather submerged. Salvation is from our errors, faults, sins, self-love; from all that is partial to that which is complete, in the transformed life. Yet if the new birth is in some sense recovery or realization, it no less truly involves a real struggle from darkness into light, a genuine victory of spirit over matter, life over death. The test of this "remaking of man from qualities kindred with God's own" has been said to be found in the fact that God's Fatherhood has become real in human experience.[2]

This change comes to one man by slow and imperceptible changes, while another apprehends it in a sudden flash. Conversion is simulated by persons who fly from temptations and struggles, renouncing the world in favor of the cloister, and by others who undergo a nervous disorder such that the alleged conversion is a defensive neurosis or escape mechanism. To account for it in its fullness would be to explain in its entirety the experience of Paul on the road to Damascus, the remaking of Augustine, and the changes wrought in St. Francis of Assisi, John Wesley, or General Booth.[3] In these typical instances there was no effort to escape from hardship by a subterfuge, nor was a neurotic fantasy the occasion. If those who have described their own conversion, in the spiritual biographies of the past, have shown abnormal interest in their own inner states, the resource is to seek out what is sane and normal in religious remaking, on the assumption widely prevalent among religious thinkers today that this change is "eminently natural," the very need for it being an evidence of vital energy in the individual which needs redirecting.[4] If then the *intensity* of the experience can be explained on psycho-neurotic grounds in some cases, the real question

[2] Cf. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 76.
[3] Cf. B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, pp. 251, 278.
[4] Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

is to account for the *quality* of the change, the thoroughly healthy "sentiment" of the one who becomes dedicated to the Fatherhood of God.

The Factors of Conversion.—The religious worker is likely to put first emphasis on factors in religious experience which were conventionally prominent before the days of the psychology of religion, namely, the sense of sin, the miracle of divine grace, the sudden acceptance of the Savior. The preliminary process seems to be as inconsequential as the emotional, volitional, and intellectual details of the inner change which means the birth of a new life and the creation of a new will. Yet psychology has made a contribution by describing the process through appeal to its details, history, and gradual advance toward inner coördination, regarded as any other synthesis or integration is explained, when experience enlists activities long in process of gestation. However great the forces beyond the reach of psychological analysis, such powers function through activities which seem to explain the sudden fruition in much the same way as the bursting bud gives expression to the stages of vegetative life which went before. We need not minimize the crucial experience to justify psychology, as if there were no divine grace, which may still be definable as "the spontaneous, unmerited manifestation of divine love upon which rests the redemption of the sinner." But it may well be that what is permanent in a sudden conversion came gradually. What is of value may be those elements of the experience which withstand the upheaval or crisis, when the spectacular features have waned. Whatever may be said concerning "the means of grace," such as the Word and the sacraments; the view that man lost "the will to do good" by his "fall," or the doctrine that the real blessing is the forgiveness of sins (dependent on Christ), we are concerned with the ensuing experience when it comes within the purview of psychological description.

Sudden Conversions.—Opinions differ concerning adolescence as the special period of conversion. The difficulty, we have seen, is in the discrimination of factors unmis-

takably due to conversion, in contrast with those indicating psychophysical disturbances. Religious partisans who assign high values to mystical experiences are likely to look with great favor on adolescent awakenings and visions indicating that the time has come for conversion, but rationalists protest in favor of gradual changes. Sudden conversions in adult life are apt to be mystical in type; hence the significance attributed to a decisive vision, inner voice, ecstasy or revelation, in contrast with what has sometimes been classed as normal religious experience. Yet the striking phenomena of these intense experiences may not be so clarifying as the several elements of ordinary religious change, described in the light of the gradual inner history of the individual. Indeed, the unwitting anticipation of the crisis may be deeply significant: conversion may make actual those potentialities which have always constituted the human spirit at its best. The world became increasingly skeptical, a generation or so ago, concerning revival meetings, sudden emotional changes, public confessions enlarged upon for the benefit of possible converts, in so far as deeper knowledge gave prominence to moderate changes and gradual development.

Again, the individual who suddenly surrenders to his Savior, convinced of righteousness because convicted of "sin," has a subsequent history, as surely as he had a period of preparation. We wish to know not only whether his new-found sense of restfulness and peace has come to abide, but to be enlightened concerning both the change of heart which means newness of will and the change of belief which may mean little more than a new synthesis of doctrines entertained before. Without his decisive interior experience on the road to Damascus, Saul might never have become Paul; but we are especially concerned with the problem of duality which persisted into the great apostle's ministry, interfusing realism into his most valiant efforts to be faithful to the idealism of his conversion. So too a decisive inner change came to Augustine, but the prime result was a new synthesis of Greek and Christian elements of thought in which philosophy still wrestled with dogma.

When religious confessions leave us in doubt regarding the more readily describable features of the process, we say, 'Life or conduct is the test.' This is always the test of time. It is as possible to exaggerate the suddenness of conversion as to overestimate the meaning of a religious biography in which conversion apparently does not figure. The sense of sin with a need for conversion, the effort to find rest and peace may be so great in the pre-conversional stage, that apparently the crisis is a human achievement. Hence the "new" will may be the old one, the new birth a self-conscious process, the conviction of righteousness a consciously adopted motive long under consideration. For most of us are rather keenly aware of a diviner truth we might believe and a quickened mode of life we might have identified as our own. Now at last we make the supreme effort to be unselfish, when we knew all the while we ought to be. What was needed was the predominance of this better or higher self.

Looking back to our study of the divided self, we note afresh that there was an intensely real problem. The prior analysis of faith showed us that there is a trend toward continuity, in contrast with the oscillations of religious experience at large. There are trends also in the stages of growth which begin in childhood, and run on into adolescence and maturity. These drives which carry the self onward in general are distinguishable from the particular drives through which the individual discovers his gifts, adopts a purpose, and finds his place in the social order. The religious life apparently tends to pass through successive stages, implying general conditions and certain laws, whatever the type of person, whether the experience during the adolescent period involves conversion or occurs without it. But however all this may be, and whatever the trends or drives, we are concerned with the fact that peace and harmony actually come to a soul that was sore distressed. Efforts to attain unity which were fruitless now become successful. Where there was a warfare of dispositions there begins to be constancy of character. Instead of the conflict of desires ranging through an extensive scale, there

now comes to be a prevailing "universe of desire" implying dominance of moral will. Where the emotions were once flighty and erratic, impulsive in high degree, they now acknowledge their master. So too a system of beliefs takes the place of intellectual inquiry. Hence the outcome has been admirably described by reference to what one writer calls the new atmosphere, the new character, and the new aim of life which it implies.[5]

Growth and Conversion.—After his careful analysis of adolescence, as a complex period sometimes yielding conversion, Starbuck turns to adult life as the period of reconstruction; and finds that this readjustment may mean reversion to the beliefs of childhood, it may be an independent working out of convictions, or a mixture of these two, amidst relatively keen insight into enduring values. For example, one respondent says: "I have come back to a firm belief in God as revealed in Jesus Christ, but I cannot return to the traditional beliefs concerning inspiration, atonement, the person of Christ, election, etc."[6] A common way of finding escape from "storm and stress" and doubt is by means of some kind of work, or by following an intellectual thread, the thread of duty, interest in æsthetics, appreciation of the strength and beauty of personal life. Some find relief through surrender of self, others come to regard religion "from within" in more penetrating insights than those of the early years. Again, discussing life with reference to growth without definite transitions, Starbuck finds that "the ethical instinct," although not the most prominent, is "the most constant and persistent factor in the religious life."[7] The inmost central tendency is toward an appreciation of religion as a life within, and toward a realization of this as a part of the life of God." Dependence, humility, and resignation are most prominent as religious feelings; also feelings of trust, rest, and peace, a yearning after the higher life, and at times a sense of oneness with God or of divine companionship.

[5] E. A. Annett, *Psychology for Bible Teachers*, p. 192.
[6] Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 278.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

In contrast with writers on religious subjects who assume on general principles that man is originally and persistently actuated by self-love, Starbuck, surveying the whole period of development from childhood to maturity, finds that the trend of life has been persistently away from the self-assertive instincts to those which lead to altruism and love toward God. Comparing the lines of growth with and without conversion, he finds that religious difficulties following conversion are rather more frequent than those which otherwise accompany adolescent growth. Still the prime result of conversion is a changed attitude toward life which is fairly constant in type, howbeit the accompanying feelings fluctuate. Conversion, in Starbuck's account, seems to be more emotional and subjective—lacking intellectual or rational apprehension—than in religious growth without conversion. Sanctification—the process by which the personality is at last identified with the spiritual life—does indeed bring the requisite constancy. Conversion is apparently transitional, in relation to four distinct lines of advance in the religious life: (1) the transfer of "the center of activity from self-interest to interest in the whole of which the self is but a part"; (2) the individual "tends to become a spiritual force"; (3) nature seems to be producing a mature person who will act wisely; and (4) the stage in which the person "reaches out after a fuller life." [8]

The central meaning is the birth of selfhood or the awakening of self-conscious personality. Granted the awakening of any one of the impulses, an impetus may be given to the others. So without overemphasizing the sexual instinct Starbuck finds that this impulse opens the door to the exercise of other impulses not of sexual origin. Temperaments and the complexities of environment are likely to be as manifold as the individuals composing a group. In the long process of advance to maturity, there may be (1) a transition without hitch or break, (2) breaks at the surface which render the youth more or less tempestuous, (3) a crisis mostly due to temperament, or (4) the person may enter either adolescence or maturity by a conversion

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 392 foll.

(very likely occasioned by greater impulsiveness). Comparing the experiences recorded by his respondents with the methods of religious education in the various churches, Starbuck finds that "the persons in those churches . . . scattered among all the groups studied . . . follow the laws written in their own being rather than the ideal held up by the churches." Naturally then Starbuck emphasizes the fact of "stages of growth from childhood to maturity."[9] If, noting the tendencies in human growth everywhere, one were to follow the clues afforded by the individual himself in his progressive changes, the prime results summarized by Starbuck might be attained without the conversional crisis which is so readily susceptible of evangelical interpretation.

Interior Changes.—Thouless, calling attention to the close relation between conversion and adolescence, doubts that conversion is an adolescent phenomenon; and finds evidences of an outbreak or irruption into consciousness of material apparently lacking continuity with subject-matter previously in the mind.[10] Coe, noting six senses in which the word "conversion" has been used, finds four marks distinguishing the process: (1) evidences that "the subject's very self" has been profoundly changed; (2) signs that the change was wrought upon the subject, not by him; (3) facts indicating that the sphere of change is in the attitude constituting one's character and mode of life; (4) indications that the change includes a sense of attaining to a higher life.[11] Coe finds that the ideational factors are "predominantly reproductions from antecedent experiences of the convert," although there may be "fresh sensory elements."[12] Instinct, habit, the subconscious, and suggestion as a combining power are factors in some of these changes.

Thouless observes that the irruption into consciousness seemingly due to objective influences, when associated with a prevalent view of conversion, would be attributed to a

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 411.
[10] *Introd. to the Psychol. of Religion*, p. 187.
[11] *The Psychol. of Religion*, p. 153.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

supernatural process. The explanation offered by Thouless at this point is that the process of incubation is unconscious. Hence Thouless is inclined to accept the view proposed by Jung that even in the conversion of Paul there was a psychical mechanism at work, involving a growing sentiment "kept unconscious by a resistance" which finally overthrew that resistance and became dominant in Paul's mind.[13] The conflict in many minds approaching conversion may be chiefly moral, or may involve loyalties to two opposed communities. If moral, the conflict may be between the desire to be "right with God" and a tendency toward excessive drinking or sexual indulgence, or any other conduct regarded as "sinful." Some of the most important determinants of conversion may be very far from apparent to the introspection of those undergoing the process. A predominantly intellectual conversion may be difficult to describe, because it is likely to involve a man's earlier moral ideals and his former course of life, as in Augustine's case, where paganism gave place to Christianity. Hence the intellectual difficulties may be solved first. Thouless infers that in such a case the choice had already been made in the unconscious while the moral conflict was progressing. Therefore the moral and religious process required only a slight additional stimulus to burst forth into consciousness.[14]

The Process of Assimilation.—In contrast with this hypothesis is the view that in many instances of conversion the higher tendencies have already voiced themselves in consciousness, but have not been granted an adequate hearing. At heart, one may already will to be faithful to the nobler promptings; but one must overcome habits and patterns of behavior of long-standing, or give them opportunity to run out. In such a case the decision is conscious, and if the subconscious is a factor it is an after-effect. So too in instances of intellectual conversion, when a conscious interest or aspiration has come to the fore, the conflict conventionally described as conversion may not manifest

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 190.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 200.

itself until the aspirant has adopted new rules of life, ardently prayed for help, and found himself plunged into a period of readjustments, possibly involving dreams which he does not understand, also visions, and other processes incidental to the inner change. Augustine seems carefully to have compared his former philosophy with his Christianity, and to have reached a highly conscious integration.[15] So too we may infer from his *Confessions* that the comparison between his pagan mode of life and his Christian ideal was painfully conscious. The hypothesis of an unconscious mechanism seems gratuitous. What is subconscious is the process of assimilation, not the determinants of the radical change.

Painfully conscious in the extreme is the experience of breaking away from the traditional loyalties when a sometime Romanist undergoes an inner change and then passes through a social upheaval amidst his family and friends, tearing apart all the bonds which relate him to his fellowmen. No instance of recent changes of a radical sort is more impressive than that of Sundar Singh, the Hindoo Christian missionary who endured persecution in its worst forms while sundering all social ties whatsoever.[16] The central question is, What gave this remarkable man the power to undergo such a revolution, with all the odds against him save that of his intense conviction that he had experienced the presence of Christ? It would be absurd to mistake the process for the cause. Acceptance is conscious, not unconscious or subconscious.[17]

The Decisive Process.—Granted that conversion may be sudden or gradual, and may involve such stages as (1) a sense of unrest, awareness of struggle due to a divided self, with a desire to do better; (2) an intellectual, volitional, or emotional crisis, "a sense of being in the grip

[15] Hence we may determine the precise point at which dogma intervened in favor of his view of the will, freedom, and the fall of man. Cf. Windelband, *His. of Philosophy,* Part III, Chap. I, Sec. 22 (4).

[16] E. Sanders and E. Judah, *Sundar Singh,* 1923.

[17] See Pratt's study of the comparatively rare instances of conversion of the violent type, *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 153; cf. Jordan, *Short Psychol. of Religion,* p. 86.

of another power," followed by a more or less conscious readjustment with respect to former beliefs and ways of life; (3) an ensuing sense of peace, a new intellectual coordination, a sense of the newness of life eventuating in a determined effort to be true to this new life, we are especially concerned with the process as a mental change. There may be, as Jordan says, at least twelve gates to the City of God, each one different; and conversion may not be complete "until it has been accepted by the reason and worked out in the life."[18] This being so, the appeal to psychological mechanisms or subconscious responses is incidental, does not carry us beyond mere description. Real conversion is from selfishness to unselfishness; from idleness, the scattering of one's forces, and self-indulgence to constructive work for the community.

Whatever the ultimate sources of radical inner change, each phase of the accompanying process—the birth of a new self, the creation of a new will, the acceptance of a different creed, the social readjustment—may well be considered as if it were decisive. The ensuing regeneration of character has been admirably described by James and other writers who have compared the pre-conversional phenomena with results attributed to the new birth. The description of the actual process always presupposes the period of yearning for a better mode of life amidst alternations of doubt, struggle, feelings of insecurity, and possibly a sense of guilt or remorse coupled with extreme conscientiousness. Although the personality is already in some sense an organization of instinctive promptings and emotional tendencies, desires, aspirations, and intellectual yearnings which look forward to settled belief, there is thus far no satisfactory system or unity. It can hardly be said that there is a dominant desire or ruling passion which has enlisted all the activities of the self. Various typical desires compete for supremacy, although the individual may be intimately aware of the conflict only, not of the desires as yielding rival interests for which he is consciously striving.

[18] *Op. cit.*, pp. 93, 95.

Interest and Attention as Factors.—Yet in so far as there is a prevailing interest, for example, in one of the ordinary vocations, one of the arts or sciences, we may describe this interest as the center round which gather the feelings, emotions, desires, thoughts, and volitions of life's daily routine. Dominance of one interest means a pushing, jostling or commanding activity comparable to that of leadership in a crowd where the person rising to supremacy suppresses rivals and foes alike. Ascendancy of interest is (in other terms) *attention,* and this in turn means the relegation of other matters to the rear. Thus one may give heed to social conventions and the standards of commercial success, while rejecting all motives that conflict with this interest. If inwardly desiring to be unselfish, free from unscrupulous motives, antagonism, hatred, anger; outwardly, one may find one's self behaving for the most part in a self-seeking way, responding to the very motives one wishes to overcome. The problem is to give attention, love, effort to the higher motives so that these shall become coördinated and gain supremacy over the lower. In this description we are not assuming that the individual is thus explicitly self-conscious. But if we could penetrate his actual processes we would doubtless note this struggle to attain freedom by alliance with motives promising relief. Granted conversion, the successful eventuation may be described by this ascendancy of a higher interest over less efficient processes of attention.

The New Integration.—It may be an exaggeration to say that conversion ordinarily means that "a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, becomes unified and consciously right, superior, and happy."[19] But assuming the ideal instance of a person who becomes "a permanently transformed being," the change becomes intelligible with reference to the substitution of one group of interests and ideas for another through an alteration of emotional excitement.[20] Hence it is that matters which today are "hot and vital" become cold and lifeless tomorrow, while through the supremacy of these "hot parts," as James calls them,

[19] James, *op. cit.*, p. 189. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

higher personal desires and volitions make their sallies in new modes of conduct. The former motives having lost supremacy, these "cold parts" leave the participant indifferent and passive. When the focus of excitement and heat, or new point of view which become life's objective, gains the mastery so that this focus lies permanently within this new group of interests, conversion may be said to have occurred. In any event the "hot place" or group of dominant interests and activities is *"the habitual center of his personal energy."* [21] When the "hot parts" of today signalized worldly interests, the religious aims were peripheral. When the latter became central, the worldly motives became peripheral, the former ideas and beliefs now being "cold."

Changes of Equilibrium.—Changing the figure, James suggests that as a result of the interior process the participant's ideas are "recrystallized." Presupposed is a sudden motor efficacy or readjustment of the activities which may be symbolized as a change in mechanical equilibrium. Where there was disturbance, the new center of gravity sinks into a more stable attitude. The change of equilibrium may be due in part to influences working subconsciously, and may be one of two types: (1) gradual or volitional changes; or (2) self-surrender, involving a more pronounced sense of present wrongness.[22] In instances where the subconscious forces take the lead in inducing the change, it may be said that "the better self *in posse*" directs the operation, and is therefore the organizing center. If self-surrender be regarded as crucial, this vital turning-point in the religious life is likely to be attributed to "forces seemingly outside of the conscious individual that bring redemption into his life." [23] For purposes of description these forces do not transcend the personality undergoing conversion, although theologically speaking they may be regarded as "direct supernatural operations of the Deity."

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 196.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 206.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

Granted a real instance of conversion, we may then assume the incoming of the new group of energies, ideals, wishes, powers which together constitute the new man. The old man was in brief a grouping of elements taken on through inheritance, education, and social conditions in general, influences to which all members of the group are subject but which commingle in varying proportions in each individual according to his emotions, imagination, reason, and the degree of his control. These elements have been compared to atoms around a nuclear center.[24] Granted a shifting of these proportions, there will be a readjustment of the mass, described by James as due to the change in the center of equilibrium. In the old man these interfused elements act as a unity upon surrounding circumstances in one way: conversion brings a new relationship into the diffused mass, "freshly charged by a current of will," so that the mass again coalesces, integrates, moves evenly once more.

The Fruits of Conversion.—The description becomes complete only in case we attribute this readjustment in some measure to the somewhat obscure factor termed by Pratt the "feeling mass,"[25] by James the "extra-marginal consciousness," and called by Mrs. Burr a "primordial stuff of consciousness," a residuum, outside, not all used in the formation of the active nucleus of consciousness.[26] In the terms used by James, there are incursions from the ultra-marginal region of which the subject does not guess the source.[27] The subject may then be "in possession of a large region in which work can go on subliminally, and from which experiences may come." There appears to be no way decisively to mark off the orders of excellence so that we may class factors attributable to "natural goodness" in a lesser category, as inferior to "spiritual goodness." Psychologically, the differences appear to be continuous, and only the fruits or results can show what

[24] A. R. Burr, *Religious Confession and Confessants*, 1914, p. 277.
[25] *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 14.
[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 279.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 234.

traits are decisive. But it is intelligible to declare that the subject has touched "an altogether new level of spiritual vitality." By doctrinal interpretation this new level is likely to be classed as spiritual or divine, rather than "natural." Hence the efficiency may be attributed to the divine grace. The idea of the direct presence of God is not necessarily excluded. "*If there be* higher spiritual agencies" capable of affecting the change, writes James, here is the opportunity. James adds to his description an extensive account of the resulting evidences of "saintliness," such as equanimity, resignation, fortitude, patience, obedience.[28] Any of these fruits of conversion may be corrupted through excess. Again, "relative deficiency of intellect" is sometimes noticeable in the saints' interpretations. But James does not venture to rationalize the results as a whole, since any scheme of beliefs is eligible which commends itself to the percipient.[29]

Some will aver that the saints did not know themselves well enough to compare the new with the old, so that they could conclusively say, "I am a new self." For it would have been impossible under the old intellectualism to differentiate the factors due to tradition and suggestion or anticipation of precisely such a type of conversion, with its appropriate consequences. More instructive as a clue to newness of self is Victor Hugo's autobiographical observation at the close of his long life: "There have been four Victor Hugos in me." That is to say, the fifth or integrating Victor Hugo (highly self-conscious) recognized four stages of personality through which he had passed. Thus Wordsworth remarks: "So build we up the being that we are." Even in the case of the very striking instances of conversion described by Harold Begbie, one notes repeated evidences of potentialities which became actual through the conversional experience—granted the assistance or mediation of an evangelist at the favorable juncture when the old tendencies had run themselves out and the newer ones were about to emerge into a more decisive in-

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 271, foll.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 331, 340.

tegration.[30] Inge proposes as the test of permanent conversion a state of spiritual union with our fellow members through love toward God and man, which involves "an inward transit from the false isolated self to the larger life of sympathy and love which alone makes us persons."[31]

Conversion as a Discovery.—John Caird admits that in conversion the old man has been put off, the new put on; but this change involves the persistence of the old or finite self *as a form,* the raw material of nature (including desires and affections), not having been wholly "wrought up by the transforming power of the divine principle that is now dominant within."[32] The struggle over the alien elements has ended only in the inner sphere in which man's true self lies. Meanwhile, the lower elements are blindly seeking their ends. Reason, knowing their ends, is ever seeking adequately to know the ideal end which "dwarfs every realized height of knowledge and goodness." "To *know* my impulses is to make them more than impulse." To become aware of natural desires is to transform them into something deeper than desire.

Caird concludes that these appetites and impulses are not directly hostile even to the highest good, they are not devoid of moral value, are not irreligious. The solution of the inner conflict is found in the truth that the two selves or combatants are not two, but one, locked up in the same consciousness. Hence the same self condemns sensuality and passion, and also condemns itself. The great discovery lies in that experience in which, when religious aspiration is changed into fruition, man becomes "an actual partaker of a divine or infinite life."[33] If we agree with Caird that religion is expressly the sphere "in which the contradiction between the ideal and the actual has vanished," conversion becomes complete only so far as rational integration attains this insight, when man knows the elements of his nature as profoundly one in essence. The objective of all

[30] See, especially, Begbie's *Twice Born Men,* 1909; and *Souls in Action,* 1911.
[31] W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism,* p. 51.
[32] *Introd. to the Phil. of Religion,* p. 268.
[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 271, 274, 293.

our acts of worship is expression of this insight into the unity above all transient differences. So too the great meaning of prayer is that we rise above our temporal selves. Conversion then is in a profound sense of the word *discovery of the eternal verities,* the real world of unchangeable and eternal reality. It is because interiorly we have found this new center that, psychologically, there is a change in equilibrium deeply stirring our nature as a whole, producing what has been called a new will, a new heart or self, with the ensuing effort to live by those qualities which correspond to the divine character. It may be said then that the conversional experience is one in meaning, howbeit its modes differ greatly according to the individual: gradual with some, sudden with others; intellectual, volitional, and emotional, or a running together of all three.

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CHAPTER XI

THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Meaning of Self-consciousness.—What is the central contrast of our nature? Is it between the so-called instinct for self-preservation (ambition, love of power, desire for wealth, greed, pugnacity, self-assurance, pride, vanity, the self-love which in extreme form we call egotism and selfishness) and its opposite—love toward God and man, sympathy, kindness, the "other-regarding" virtues in general? If so, a distinction will naturally be drawn between man the individual as a worthy social being—eligible through self-respect, self-reliance, individuality, industry, courage—and man the religious person who becomes worthy only so far as, facing his selfishness, his vice or sin, he voluntarily adopts the higher group of motives. Religion is admittedly personal to the extent that it thus becomes self-conscious. Man must look to himself, his inner disposition, his conscience, his desires and affections; he must also recognize limitations or weaknesses, demerits, mistakes, errors or fallacies by aspiring beyond these to the complete life. In this sense man's self-consciousness is likely to bring him to that ineffable moment when he is alone with his Maker, impressed by the form which the central contrast assumes in his case; the moment in which, concealing nothing, he is aware that concealment would be as futile as the blurring of moral distinctions.

The Personal Appeal.—Presupposed in our whole inquiry is this priority of emphasis on personal religion. It is incredible that religion could ever have attained first rank among factors making for culture had it not become heart-to-heart relationship in which man, first meeting his Maker in veriest self-consciousness, gave expression to a life

or power which touched the hearts of other men and thus increased from more to more.[1] Granted that personal religion was thus primordial, experience is assigned its due place, religious consciousness in the individual sense of the term is essential. Each person may then put himself imaginatively into the primordial relation. So he will realize through individual experience the place which such consciousness has occupied in human history. Religious consciousness will then be envisaged as it were upon its own plane, as we already picturize man's progress in the sphere of mechanical and other inventions, as explorer, artist, or man of science.

The Modern Revolt.—The tendency of our age to adopt purely objective methods, by appeal to measurements and mechanisms, seems to militate against this scale of values. Biology in the guise of behaviorism has been so far substituted for psychology that consciousness has become a mere observer, or has been ignored. This extreme reaction against the subjectivities of the past seems to confirm the revolt against puritanism, and the trend toward introverted faculties and the abnormal. The resource seems to be the discovery of every egocentric complex and defence mechanism, and the substitution of mechanisms favorable to bodily existence which leave no room for intimately personal consciousness. Our consciousness might indeed be permitted to look on as a criminal condemned for life watches the interplay of objects outside his cell. But granted that consciousness does not share in the world it observes, it can hardly appreciate even those values of which the self is the locus. If this be the case, mayhap there is no such self, and if no self, what remains is an introversion-mechanism, a process of mistaking one's apparent self for a spirit—granted the illusion of subjectivity.

The Existence of Consciousness.—The resource is simple. It consists in a more careful definition of terms. Puritanism is to be known for its contributory values, not for its mere negations and repressions. Morbid introspection does not invalidate introspection as a method dis-

[1] Cf. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 28, 30.

closing the primacies of consciousness, its contrasts, values, meanings, moral and religious significance. Introversion (the mere turning in of the mind upon itself, with a trend toward the abnormal), is not the same as subjectivity.[2] Nor does it follow that to be an extrovert (essentially objective in type) is to compass all the realities of life. To the reflective, intimately self-conscious people of the world we owe most of our ideals, our standards of intelligence (save those of intelligence-tests), beauty, goodness, truth; while the realists are usually the critics, oftentimes the people without vision. We have barely begun to understand disposition, temperament, individuality, personality, the origin of our ideas, the nature of genius, the scope of the human mind. Our present classifications are as tentative or elementary as the attempts to measure high-grade intelligence by a scheme of human abilities chiefly applicable to children and mental defectives.

The point of the critique of consciousness is this: consciousness as an independent entity or faculty, apart from all content, does not exist. Nor is consciousness made of some mysterious stuff utterly unlike the energies functioning through the brain and nervous system. The inner world is not remote from the outer. The artificial barriers have been removed by which theorists once separated mind and brain by an unbridged chasm. Matter, as an independent substance consisting of impenetrable atoms, has ceased to exist, in these days of electrons and protons, defined as units of energy or modes of behavior, as the electrical units beyond which we have not yet penetrated. If these "phenomenal manifestations of an unknown something," as Morton Prince has called them, are units of the energy of the universe, they may ultimately be immaterial, possibly the same in kind, of the same nature as mind itself.[3] We have reached a point in our cosmology where we may intelligibly think of mind and these units of electrical energy in correlation. We may apply the same concept to

[2] See Tansley, *The New Psychology*, p. 102 foll.

[3] "Why the Body has a Mind and the Survival of Consciousness after Death," in *Mind*, Jan. 1928.

the relationship of mind and brain, avoiding the old-time picture of the "little hard lumps" of which matter was once said to consist. The reality of consciousness is made more plain by this description.

Subjectivity.—Avoiding artificial notions in the study of consciousness and its instrument (the brain), we note that consciousness *as experience*—especially in those phases which distinguish it with respect to what we call instinct, habit, desire, emotion, feeling—is *phenomenal.* What the reality behind it may ultimately be is a question for philosophy. Religion with perfect right takes this reality to be spirit or soul in the sense required by religious experience, with its values, its beliefs, faith, and such activities as prayer and worship, such great moments as conversion, inspiration, revelation, or the beatific vision. In a general way coextensive with experience as perceived, consciousness is not limited to subjectivity. The facts or elements once reared into disparate faculties are as real as before. Feeling is no longer identified with consciousness, as if consciousness were nothing more. Nor should self-consciousness be identified with the objectionable. Introspection has not yet "uttered its last word," as cocksure critics have said; nor will it do so until the inner life has been completely universalized, so that we shall know it as we understand principles germane to physics or chemistry. Subjectivity, as a viewpoint for observers distinguishing between items or objects known and the subject or self cognizing them, has no necessary relation with morbid self-scrutiny and extreme conscientiousness. It is also far removed from introversion as a morbid habit in people beset by repressions or complexes, standing in need of a social technique to set them free. No less distinctive is that type of self-examination which even the most normal or objective religious leaders deem absolutely essential to religious development.

Consciousness Is Reciprocal.—What is imperative is recognition of religious consciousness as profoundly real in its own right, disclosing its own movement. For there is an outward tendency of consciousness toward nature, a

process from within outward whereby we express our convictions and sentiments through behavior and conduct.[4] There is also a reciprocal tendency wherewith the world of beings and things admonishes us. There is an inward trend, when we penetrate the depths of self-consciousness, with respect to what we call the inmost self or the heart; also an upward trend in aspiration, prayer, worship of God, in recognition of the great Beyond. Consciousness leads us to distinguish *immediacy* of experience from all efforts to *mediate* by describing, explaining, interpreting. Consciousness or experience is just my consciousness, my experience: feeling, emotion, desire, will, thought, as known by me in the given present context. But consciousness is also in a sense yours; since you too admit its primacies, you too note its tendencies, conditions, laws, verifying by direct appeal what I describe, explain, interpret. For you as for me it is as permissible to begin with the point of view and the implications of subjectivity as with objectively observed and mathematically determined data.[5] Our moral and spiritual values are grounded in those implications, and there is a sense in which religious thought proceeds only so far as it is essentially subjective. Indeed, religous thought must become profoundly subjective, that its objective elements may be conceived in universal terms.[6]

The Certitudes of the Inner Life.—It is primarily a question of the spirit *possessing* consciousness, the soul *coming* to self-consciousness and analyzing human experience to determine the fundamental significance of self-knowledge. Thus approached, consciousness testifies to the central reality of the inner life as the surest grouping of facts within our powers of analysis and synthesis; it is the reflective principle through which we acquire the distinction between existence and value, facts and ideals.

[4] We share "behavior" with animals, with reference to energies functioning in the organism; *conduct*, moral and religious, is peculiar to man.

[5] Cf. J. Royce, "The Implications of Self-consciousness," in *Studies of Good and Evil*, 1898, p. 140 foll.

[6] "Objective" here refers to the realities and principles in which religious experience is grounded. Thus "God" is an object for religious thought in general.

Consciousness discloses the supreme things of life. It is what we live for in so far as we protest against mere things and events in prosaic succession. In religion, it is the basis of study of the individual. Knowledge of religion in the psychological sense of the term is impossible apart from participation in it. The significance of consciousness for the religious life will become apparent, if we glance through history to note when and how human subjectivity became philosophically recognized.

The Introspective Method.—In contrast with the native objectivity of the Greeks in general, moral science came into being with the profound self-knowledge and reflection of Socrates. Plato, correlating the elements of human nature at large with Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, assigned the first place to rational insight, without marring his intuition by negative self-consciousness. Plotinus was far more subjective; and subjectivity was pressed to the limit when followers of Plotinus unified Greek and Christian ideas of personality, giving to succeeding centuries of thought their trend toward meditation combined with penetrative analysis. The theology of Augustine, with its implied "metaphysics of inner experience," emerged in one direction; mysticism, with its identification of the seer with the objects of his meditation, emerged in another. This absorption in the highest moments of the soul, as the true clue to divine reality, involved the introspective method.

Granted emphasis on the immediate certainty of inner experience, very strong in the case of Augustine, the development of thought proceeded in one direction toward the thoroughgoing study of the implications of self-consciousness with which modern philosophy took its beginnings; while in another direction thought remained within the religious fold, and led to the rich contributions to both religion and psychology which signalize the best centuries during the Middle Ages. Fortunately for later history, the introspective method was developed to the full. Thus our knowledge of religious self-consciousness was greatly enriched. As one writer puts it, without defending this method, "introspection and introspective habits have a way

of absorbing a man's religious energies, causing him to watch and follow the religious life as wholly within himself. Fascinated by the inward stir and tumult, he lifts his eyes from it no more, but passes through the world listening only to the inward voice, seeing only the inward vision."[7] Hence the outer world becomes relatively dim and unsubstantial.

Without what Mrs. Burr calls "an original faculty and desire of 'looking within,' we should never have known we had any self-consciousness or personality at all." Hence we owe a great debt to the mystics, notably the two St. Victors, in whose abbey began productive attempts at modern psychology; for example, Hugo of St. Victor, with his "delicate, exalted" temperament, who "endeavored to intellectualize the entire scheme of mysticism," thereby reaching a primary *consciousness of inner experience,* so that the history of the soul became "the most important of all histories." Granted the introspective tendency of the inner life, religious confession, autobiography, personal explanation became the great output.[8] Thus too individuality and emotional power received more recognition, notably in Rousseau's "feeling that he was different from other men," this difference in itself being profound and significant. We now take radical exception to Rousseau as neurotic or hypersentimental. We note that he took himself too seriously, and was notoriously inconsistent. Yet his teachings called attention to the exceptional person or non-typical child, the individual with intense sensibilities or emotions, purging his soul; but yielding clues to our knowledge of human nature and religious consciousness in its intensest forms. Other types of confession, from Augustine to Amiel and Emerson, cited by Mrs. Burr, indicate the wide diversity of contributions to our knowledge of subjectivity.

Objective and Subjective Elements.—It would be a radical misconception to regard religion in ancient Greece or in any other land as "objective" to the exclusion of the subjective life. Primitive animism, in Tylor's well-known

[7] A. R. Burr, *Religious Confession and Confessants,* p. 92.
[8] Cf. Burr, *op. cit.,* pp. 93, 101.

description, was a contribution of the inner life.[9] Primitive man read his emotions and personifying imagery into the objective world. Religious life in India has always been intensely subjective. Among the ancient Hebrews religious consciousness had to be deeply subjective to yield awareness of sin, with a sense of alienation from Jahweh. Wherever religious thought has turned within, it has doubtless increased the sentiments which it has fed upon. To give occupation to the introspective tendency, by aid of imagination and the emotions, was to discern a duality of self, also a something other-than-self which was the great object of religious contemplation. "To possess God is the one thing needful," writes Amiel. Socrates was so far master of his own subjectivity that his thought led the way to the great objects of moral reflection. Plato admits us into a spacious world of the eternal Ideas. The self as subject is normal and universal. Given the commingling of Neo-Platonic and Christian elements, the introspective method was fostered to the limit; and the Christian process of coming to judgment involved its special form of subjective analysis. Eventually it became a question of the worth of the inner life, a term which has come to stand for the higher level of religious consciousness, in contrast with the extreme subjectivities of religious confessions.

The Limitations of Subjectivity.—The thought of recent decades has so far overcome the extreme tendency toward introspection that we are now able to distinguish religious consciousness in general from introspection and introversion. The introspective method is limited in value, and is but one mode of studying mental life. Introversion, as an extreme instance, is usually temperamental, if not morbid. An introvert has been defined as an individual "in whom exists an exaggeration of the thought process in relation to directly observable social behavior, with an accompanying tendency to withdraw from social contacts."[10] The implication is that when introverted a person tends to

[9] E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 3rd ed., 1891.

[10] Max Freyd, "Introverts and Extroverts," in *The Psychological Review*, Jan. 1924.

evade reality. The implied fallacy is that of "attributing to mental facts an importance in life proportionate to their obtrusiveness in attention."[11] One of the results is that the reasoning process also intrudes itself upon attention. Science is neglected. Society is in large part ignored. Thinking ceases to be "the great collective enterprise" which it should be to guarantee a sane approach to reality.

When a religious person is a victim of this fallacy, he is apt to be extremely self-centered, to take himself far too seriously. His sense-experiences being exaggerated for lack of proper perspective, his feelings and emotions are likely to be far too close to him, in a narrow region where misjudgments readily follow. Bodily processes are likely to be confused with religious emotions, painful self-consciousness is a probable result, also extreme sensitivity. Yet by persisting in his penetrative analysis one who is skilled in differentiating subjectivity from introversion comes to know the self more profoundly.

It would be a confusion of ideas and methods to say, with Miss Underhill, that introversion is "the characteristic mystic art."[12] This would be virtually to condemn mysticism outright. Introspection is the characteristic method of the mystics, among whom tendencies to introversion may sometimes appear. Allowances must be made for introversion as "the danger zone" in order to discover the values of mystical experience. The mental state known as "the interior silence," for example, through which the mystic develops his prayer of silence, is merely a means to an end. The aim is *to find Reality,* and Reality is by no means limited to subjective feeling. Miss Underhill makes this clear in a later work, in which she speaks of God as "that objective Power and presence" on which the profounder devotional practice is to be based, in contrast with one's own "subjective feelings, cravings, and needs."[13] Here, the dangers of introversion have ceased.

[11] R. L. Finney, *Source Book in Social Psychology,* p. 425; italics omitted.

[12] E. Underhill, *Mysticism,* p. 362.

[13] *Concerning the Inner Life,* 1926, p. 24.

Subjectivity as a Means.—What I "feel" does not constitute God. My consciousness of God does not change Him, any more than my consciousness of nature changes nature in the slightest respect. It is what is universal that signifies, not what is particular and incidental. Therefore Miss Underhill puts stress on "the utter independence and givenness of God" as the true point of departure. From this may follow "capacious" thoughts of God, in contrast with any feeling or emotion tending to contract the soul. The worshiper's windows are "open towards Eternity." We shall adopt this view of subjectivity, namely, as a basis for the upward look towards God; not as an end in itself. He who looks within himself in this expansive sense of the term is not gazing at a subjective film-play of imagined pictures, introjected still more interiorly into a region already far too confined. He knows himself as finite. He admits the limitations of finite terms. What he is in quest of is that Reality which has always been the goal of religious people who have referred to the Beyond.

The Scope of Religious Consciousness.—The term religious consciousness has come to be a complete substitute for various terms once used to designate an alleged discrete organ for apprehending religious objects. It includes both immediacy and all types of mediation, faith and belief, intuition or spiritual perception, correlating insight with reason. It also includes the practical or disciplinary activities of prayer, and all activities which make religion a "life" in so far as these relate specifically to the individual. To know its rich content is to understand how the human spirit attains both its most explicitly defined and its most nearly ineffable objects, why we believe in God. Hence Watson says of it, "If that consciousness does not bring us into the presence of God, we have no other organ by which to apprehend him."[14]

The religious consciousness is not necessarily a "higher" power of apprehending objects. It is a certain use of our ordinary consciousness. For religious subjectivity is but one phase of the inner life, intimately allied with moral

[14] J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 18.

reflection and philosophical self-consciousness. God is not present for our consciousness in the mere immediacy of superior feeling, mere religious emotion, all-uniting love or sheer faith: the religious consciousness is *awareness by various means,* some of which are emphasized by one devotee, other means being differently analyzed by religious leaders of other schools.

This consciousness has been described as "that part of religion which is present to the mind and is open to examination by introspection . . . the mental side of religious activity."[15] At the outset, this is the religious consciousness of man in general, in ordinary religious experience. The term as employed in the psychology of religion does not then presuppose what Hindoo mystics call superconsciousness, as if one must be carried aloft in mystical ecstasy in order to understand our common consciousness. Nor need one begin with distinctions between the divine transcendence and the divine immanence. One may even disregard most descriptions of the unconscious. The human ego may indeed range from the lowest deeps of the subconscious to the highest plane of alleged self-transcendence. Propositions concerning a transcendental world are not necessarily excluded. But our consciousness may be said to approximate the universal in so far as it becomes acute awareness of the distinctions which fall within consciousness itself, whatever remains to be said about the focal point in contrast with the marginal and the subliminal. Naturally, a great deal depends upon the heightened self-consciousness to which we become habituated, if we have pushed introspection to the limit.

Religious Experience Is Subjective.—Recognition of the religious consciousness is inseparable from the antithesis between the objective and the subjective. Thus we find that writers who undertake to define religion tend to fasten upon "the features which unite the religious and non-religious sides of human nature."[16] There remains a sense

[15] See Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 5 foll.; J. Caird, *Introd. to the Phil. of Religion,* Chap. VI.

[16] See article, "Religion," in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.*

in which the subjective side of our nature is the essentially religious side. To say this is not merely to call attention to discrepancies in the reports of religious experience as described by people of diverse types. For underneath all differences there is a respect in which religious experience *is* subjective for all. A mental process may be as normally subjective in the uplift of heart and will during prayer as it is normally objective when one is observing a mechanic at work with his tools. So too there are normal subjective events involving sequences of mental processes when, for instance, my prayer passes through regular stages from the point where attention ceases to give heed to occurrences round about my body to the point where my thought becomes absorbed in contemplation of God, and is silent before Him. My events and processes are not merely those of my privacy, despite the fact that I alone feel them as such; for, by comparing notes with others, I find that multitudes (each in his privacy) have the same kind of experience. Thus in large measure the element of privacy becomes common property. Symbols and other figures of speech help to make it so. By a mere word you and I intimate to each other that we have stood on holy ground. The more deeply touched, the more we wish to share with others this surpassing element of the religious life. Thus there is an enormous distance between the privacies of self-love and the privacy of the greater religious consciousness.

The Inner World.—To affirm that religious experience is understood in part by appeal to the introspective method is not, however, to hold that subjectivity constitutes a separate world. To urge such separateness would be to become as one-sided as the radical behaviorist when he ignores consciousness. The real difficulty in many cases is due to failure to look from mind toward body, as well as from body to mind. Either mode is one-sided, although no one ever looked in any other way than from the viewpoint of his consciousness. We *are* within. We *look* toward such things as rocks, trees, mountains. We turn our eyes upward and look at the stars *around* us, with a sense of the magnitude of what we call the objective universe. The-

oretically, we think as if from the without to the within, especially when we start with the assumption that nothing can be known about the mind save by reference to the structure of the body and the configuration of the nervous system.

To realize that we are truly at home in the mental world, from which we look outwards upon what we call the material world, is not, we repeat, to regard subjectivity as constituting a world apart. There is in fact a sphere of activity within another sphere. In our self-consciousness we are both objective and subjective. As observer and thinker, as the one who feels, enjoys experience, one is essentially a subject. Contemplating the flux of experience, a man sees himself as object, reflectively attributing sentiments and volitions to the self as participant, analytically distinguishing elements of experience which pertain essentially to the body and through the body to the natural environment. When I look from the assumed viewpoint of the flux of my own mental states toward myself as implied observer, I am said to be introspecting. If I am unduly habituated in this respect, I am probably an introvert by disposition; and I must learn not to pay the penalty of "introverted faculties." But it is perfectly normal to be aware how I feel, what I take to be my motives, why I choose them, and to note what intervenes in my disposition to make it difficult to be constant or stable in my choice.

Within and Without.—Religious consciousness seems to be separated from non-religious objects. Yet a mere thing, such as the altar before which the penitent kneels, may assume through its symbolical meaning a relation to such consciousness, so that it becomes identified with prayer, with certain postures and their significance for the one who is humble enough to take them in the hour of need. So too the house of prayer is affiliated in all its precincts with conscious associations. Religious consciousness binds together any number of objects within and without the immediacies of one's feeling. The more deeply one penetrates the precincts of religious consciousness on its interior side, the more one realizes how through motives and ideals what is

"within" relates itself to what is "without." Religion characteristically tends to set an exceedingly high standard of motives, thought, and conduct; it demands an absolutely sincere manifestation of the inmost self, and an absence of selfishness and guile. Hence religion must be regarded as involving all that is which is profounder, more constructive and more permanent."[17]

Participation.—Thus we realize anew why it is that knowledge of religious consciousness implies the individual's participation in the realities of religion. Our consciousness persistently reminds us that we are referring all the while to God as transcending what we are and what we do, so that in a sense the religious object may be said to be inaccessible. Yet the meaning of divine transcendence exists for the one who takes God to be also immanent; as immanent God is thought of as intimately related to our aspirations and our needs. On this side one seems indeed to participate in a common experience, testified to by every person who yearns for comfort and liberty. Accordingly, "those who have experienced religion as an internal conquest of self-deception stand on the common ground of possessing, and of being capable of possessing, the kingdom of religion. Religion can be apprehended only by participating in it." It is true of religion "beyond all other empirical life that it affords no objective perception." Thus religion "in its realization makes requisition upon all the motives of life."[18] What religion "presumes to be, or the reality it asserts, is evident only to him who in his experience attains religious life. His own religious self-existence is filled in every impulse with an incommunicable conviction." Thus there is a sense in which religion transcends science: it would be absurd self-consciously to set out to experience the living realities of the spirit and then surrender these to science. Inevitably there is a field of experience, the inner life, in which the community can be said to participate only so far as its members appear to ap-

[17] *Ency. of Relig. and Ethics,* Vol. X, p. 668.
[18] Art. "Religion," in *Schaff-Herzog Ency. of Religious Knowledge.*

proach each other in confidence. Yet each genuinely spiritual observer can by giving heed to the inner values appreciate these meanings, as we noted in our analysis of worship, which disclosed both subjective and objective elements in worship at large.

Summary.—The function of consciousness is twofold. Without it experience would be impossible, and its primacy or reality is beyond all question. We look from within outward because we are within, where thought is, where the spirit is. But our self-consciousness has many pitfalls. Aside from making us aware of our motives and sentiments, our actual state of development, it implies an introspective method, with the possibility of extreme emphasis on our own states, taken over-seriously. A great need of the religious life is discrimination between subjectivity as normal and all trends toward introversion and undue sensitiveness. The sphere of religious consciousness is the inner life. But religion seeks the inward world, the God that exists for all mankind. The inner life is as full of the trivial as the outer life of worldly absorption in mere details. What signifies in either is what is eternal, what is real, what is true. Thus the way lies through, not around the inner life, as if somehow subjectivity were negligible. My world is in a sense as large as my consciousness makes it, as I constructively look outward to nature, inward to grasp my larger self, and upward in aspiration to realize the presence of God. Thus the apparent exclusiveness of the so-called "inner private order" of experience in which I find myself placed, proves to be no merely subjective world, as if cut off from the universal order of reality. Abstracting from one's momentary self-existence and concentrating upon the eternal purposes, an inner life of a higher order with an imperishable content is disclosed. There is a challenge to unqualified reality which yields the essence of religion as intercourse of the soul with God. Hence our religious consciousness has been taken to mean above all a quest for the unity which underlies all differences, overturning all ordinary standards of value in our demand that all our knowledge of the universe shall be

brought to a focus in the knowledge of God, in the religious view of the world.[19] Thus regarded, religion does not pertain to one department of life only: it is the "summed-up product" of man's entire experience, it involves the ultimate attitude of his thought and will generated by his intercourse with the world. The central contrast is between (1) the self (soul or spirit) as *subject*, thinking, willing, acting; and (2) the world of experience as *object*, as disclosed to consciousness.

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[19] Cf. E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,* Vol. I., p. 34.

CHAPTER XII

THE SPHERE OF EXPERIENCE

Knowledge and Experience.—It is generally admitted that all knowledge begins with experience, all knowledge pertains to experience, and all knowledge is for experience. Our knowledge rests on our own experience to some extent, but relates to and builds upon knowledge acquired by our forerunners, so that on the whole we depend very little upon personal experience except in the reëxamination of facts and in the comparison of results for the sake of intelligibility and verification. Whether originally our own or adapted from others as developed through social experience, our knowledge is both subjective and objective; it involves the functions of mind and the contributions of the world in which we live. Religious knowledge is particularly rich in subjective elements. It implies objects which are not alone traced to the world of things in space and time, but ideal realities or objectives not wholly attributable to external things.

Threefold Classification.—Religious experience may then be classed as threefold: it pertains to (1) the world of things in space and time, those things especially which are said to imply the reality or presence of God; (2) the realm of values or ideal objects, including God (the Supreme Spirit), the society of finite spirits, and possibly an eternal spiritual world; (3) the inner world of the participant. Again, experience, although originally spontaneous or "given" and constantly coming unsought, may also be sought, with the hope of finding its ultimate basis in a system of first principles. In a religious sense, one of the most impressive characteristics of experience is the fact that it appears to come at times wholly unsought, like the wind which bloweth where it listeth, when it listeth.

Religious Experience.—The term "experience" as applied to religion is sometimes regarded as vaguer than "religious consciousness," because it is used to designate the feeling-element in such consciousness: the feelings which lead to religious belief or are the effects of religious conduct.[1] Thus used, the term connotes especially the sense of the presence of God described by the mystics, the feeling of peace after prayer or the sacrament. But if used to include not merely the less intense emotional undercurrent accompanying ordinary religious life, but also with respect to emotions germane to our nature and the native promptings usually classed as instincts to which religion was originally due, the term takes on other meanings. Religious experience, regarded as prior to consciousness and belief in the more distinctive sense, appertains to mankind at large. Out of this the religious experience of the race have come the doctrines, traditions, modes of worship, and the other elements which the pioneers have formulated, which the prophets have renewed, and for which the mystics have pleaded by a fresh return to the sources. The psychology of the experience is in a sense the effort to reconstitute (explain and interpret) the experiences to which religious consciousness in the higher sense of the term is due.

To William James was especially due the awakening of interest in the psychology of religious experience in so far as its varieties may be said to be too wealthy to articulate in a single system of thought. On the other hand, John Watson made an excellent point by showing that in this usage experience is uncommonly abstract, since "no one has made so little use" of experience as James.[2] The man of science, the theologian, and the philosopher are ruled out of James' study of varieties. The term experience is finally limited to the intellectually weak (the saints and mystics) and unreasonable; and what remains is a "something" which may be this or that, as a partial and fragmentary consciousness of this or that individual. Conse-

1 Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
2 *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 151.

quently, Watson appeals to "the whole wealth of experience, refusing to generalize from a mere fragment of it."

It does not, however, follow that James virtually ignores the religious experience of the great majority of mankind in favor of what Watson calls "the dark abyss of the subconscious." Nor is it true that James prefers the accidental to the essential; since he appealed to *values* in all types of experience in contrast with the accidental, notably in the case of adverse judgments which have been put forward by medical materialists.[3] If there is a law in all deliverances from the subconscious, this principle may clarify religious experience in general. Furthermore, if James is right in appealing to experience *as the origin of religion* in the types he studies, the same method can be applied to the varieties which he neglects because of his well-known lack of interest in rationalism.

Other critics have pointed out that, great emphasis having now been put on exceptional religious experience in mystical forms—on trances, visions, ecstasies, interior revelations, and the like—it is time to give attention to usual or habitual religious experience, attained through the effort of people at large to practice what the leaders have taught. Hence, as Watson says, "a true theory of religion must be based upon religious experience . . . taken in the widest possible sense."[4] Experience in this sense is both habitual and exceptional, and may be understood to include the products of the subconscious. It becomes a question of relative values, including those emphasized by the rationalists. We may then undertake to interpret the experience of the individual with reference to what Watson calls "the spiritual medium in which he lives, and the stage in the process of experience as a whole which he represents." If clearness of thought is accepted as essential to the full development of religious experience, and "therefore an essential factor in the religious consciousness itself," we have what Watson calls "a safe-

[3] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 13 foll.
[4] *Op. cit*, p. 156.

guard against the extravagances and aberrations of religious emotion.''[5] There will be as good reason to include the religious experience of a rationalist like James Martineau,[6] and the descriptions offered by Edward Caird and John Caird, as the visions and revelations of a medieval saint.

The Sources of Experience.—It is plain that the conception of religious experience depends in all cases on the implied theory of the origins of experience in general. The assumption at large that in religious experience the same organs and functions are present and active as in any experience is well justified. But when a narrow view of the originals is advocated the sources of experience are so limited that apparently religion was alone due to instinct and emotion, and this view is as meager as the hypothesis that there is a religious instinct as such. If we lay down the proposition that ''all activity, ideational as well as motor, is initiated by sensory stimuli,'' we are prepared for a description of behavior almost solely limited to exertions traceable to sensory stimuli.[7] Again, to begin with the assumption that ''consciousness and brain action are one'' is to formulate an entire psychology vitiated by this radically misleading assumption: this means neglect of all mental functions falling outside of the field indicated by the formula.[8] On the other hand, the merit of James' great work, *The Principles of Psychology,* 1890, is its fidelity to living experience in contrast with merely theoretical consistency.

What Experience Is.—If then we avoid dogmatic assertions which limit the origin and scope of experience, and if we accept experience as a whole, we once more find ourselves in the inner world, looking from within outward. It then becomes a question of progressive awareness, as we detect one aspect of consciousness or inner experience after another. When made aware of the deliverances of experi-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[6] *A Study of Religion,* 1888; *The Seat of Authority in Religion,* 1890.
[7] Cf. H. A. Carr, *Psychology,* 1925, p. 68, foll.
[8] See F. H. Lund, *Psychology,* 1927, p. 8.

ence of various kinds, we will naturally refer these to their several sources, physical, social, self-conscious; and by reference to belief in God or the spiritual world, whatever our ultimate objects may be.

We mean then that experience makes itself known by first-hand impressions, when we are sensing things for ourselves. From this the immediacy, intuitive apprehension, or directness of experience, we proceed to our beliefs in the realities and values by which we interpret and by interpreting enrich it. Conversion includes personal experience of this sort. The mystic intensely feels and believes he knows the realities of the inner life at first-hand. The experience of the presence of God is for many the primary reality. For others, Christ as inward presence, or inner peace through an immediate sensing of the Spirit, is central; hence the emphasis which falls on the quest for inner guidance or divine wisdom. Granted an initial experience which is partly convincing, the so-called mystical conversion may follow in adult life. Religious persons insist that they *know* because they have lived and wrought and suffered. The empirical test or evidence is for many the only sure criterion.

Religious Instincts.—The attempt to trace religious experience to its origins in the so-called religious instinct was beset with difficulties from the first; since it proved impossible to determine what that special instinct is, also difficult to persuade critics to identify such emotions as awe or holiness with this instinct. If no religious feeling or impulse is as instinctive as are anger and love, it would seem impossible to sustain the view that there is a specifically religious prompting. The result of criticism of ancient propositions, such as "fear made the gods," has been acknowledgment that an emotion like fear is a mere constituent only, as wonder or curiosity is, as the emotion of awe and the sense of holiness are constituents. If we conclude that imitation, suggestibility, sympathy, sensitiveness to social influences, and other evidences of native promptings constitute what has been called the *form* of the individual's religious experience, then it becomes a question

of the *matter* or general content as chiefly the contribution of society.[9]

When a group of instincts is substituted for the alleged religious instinct as the origin of religious experience, the objection is that psychologists have not even been able to agree on the list of instincts and their corresponding emotions as attributed to life in general.[10] Religion might seem to be due to the instinct for self-preservation in combination with the emotions of fear, wonder, and allied emotions; for the salvation motive has been very prominent in our religious history. But this view proves to be as limited as the hypothesis that the sexual instinct is the original source of religion in our nature. At best the evidence indicates that this instinct is a part of the instinctive basis of religion.[11] The evidence does not show that we have here the whole origin of religious experience. Thouless remarks that the instinct of self-preservation "seems particularly to be operative in the production of the peculiarly emotional religion of the adolescent and in mystical experience."[12] Hence if we adopt the view that religious sentiment is due in large measure to "sublimation" of inferior drives and emotions the sexual instinct may be regarded as a source, as indeed the sentiment of human love is partly traceable to the same origin. The same result would be reached if, with Trotter and others, we were to put the first stress on the herd-instinct or gregarious instinct, thereupon developing a social psychology with special reference to imitation, suggestion, and the alleged crowd-psychology which some writers have taken to be fundamental.[13]

Religion as a Passion.—A more promising view is to regard religion as one of "the major passions" of mankind, not on the ground that it is an immediate biological endowment, but that it depends on the primary instincts

[9] Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 74.
[10] Compare the classifications summarized by H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology; Its Facts and Principles*, p. 493.
[11] Thouless, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[13] See W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 1916.

(whatever these may be), including that of "self-preservation" and sex. Thus religion is a derivative emotion "arising by transformation of the primary emotions."[14] On this view the transformation is extremely indirect, and religion may be taken to be an adventitious emotion or derivative sentiment due to several primary instincts, influenced by suggestion and education. We need not then assume that religious emotion is essential and universal. We note that while in the Middle Ages religion was "enormously powerful," it has fluctuated from age to age, from one individual to another, and that it has to be taught; while egoism, love, social feeling, and the sexual prompting do not have to be taught. Another advantage is that on this view the energy may be attributed to egoism, sex, morals, and other factors (to none exclusively); and thus we have one explanation at least of its "wide and embracing appeal to the most diverse minds." Thus too we observe that "when the moral character is congenitally strong, it is likely to appear both as morals and as religion; but where it is weak a high religious transmutation leaves an enfeebled moral stamina."[15]

Plural Origins and Values.—To try out any special hypothesis, such as the effort to trace all religious experience to feeling, belief, or behavior; to wholly natural promptings in the primitive sense, or to wholly supernatural sources (to "sacred" *versus* profane sources), would be to reach the same conclusion, with the realization that we have both multiform facts and manifold values on our hands. If religion originated with the several inner needs of human nature in relation to man's total environment, it is a question of the manifoldness of human nature in the great wealth of responses to that environment. It is out of the question today to trace religious experience to an exclusively individual or an exclusively social origin: man is a social being, and his instincts and emotions are at once social and individual.

To adopt the terminology of any of the rival psychologies

[14] Hugh Elliott, *Human Character*, 1922, p. 86.
[15] Elliott, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 97.

now in vogue is to find the description pressing beyond the limits of a general account of the human mind. If, for instance, we choose the term behavior, in the sense of the typical responses man makes in the presence of religious objects, through religious instruction, through prayer, by means of worship, as a result of conversion, revival meetings, moral codes and customs, we find that the description soon passes from behavior (objectively regarded) to the inwardness which our study of consciousness shows to be characteristic of religion. But we may say that through religious experience a need is felt within the personality, there is a conscious lack, a longing for guidance, comfort, or companionship. This awareness of personal maladjustment leads to a quest for the means of consolation or salvation. An opportunity offers (the stimulus). The person in need accepts the opportunity (response), somewhat as the psychophysical organism reacts to a "situation." The result may be measured by the effort of thought and volition in meeting the opportunity. The religious consciousness may then be said to arise with this process of development from need, through quest, opportunity, and response to environing conditions. Man's religious nature as a whole acting through mind-body may then be compared to the organism as a whole, with emphasis on conduct of religious types as the objective evidence.

Behavior as a Factor.—Religious consciousness is, however, efficacious. It is not a mere spectator (epi-phenomenon) added to life's fitful fever like a series of film-pictures. It takes the initiative and seeks opportunities. It brings a wealth of considerations acquired through the rich complexities of experience. Man as a religious being takes an attitude toward his environment, and very much depends on what his total environment is said to be. If we accept Allport's definition of behavior as "the process of responding to some form of energy in the environment by an activity generally useful to it,"[16] then religious behavior may be defined as the process of responding to some symbol, event, or other object of religious significance in

[16] *Social Psychology*, p. 17.

the environment by an activity "generally useful" to the spiritual life. The stimulus may be a hymn, a prayer, sermon, sacrament, or other religious object. the environment being that of a church, the home, one's sanctuary in the home; or, more generally, life, the universe, including (perhaps) the spiritual world interpreted by spiritual values. This summary so readily suggests the sphere of inner experience or religious consciousness, that we might well drop the term behavior in favor of the higher term conduct.

The critically suggestive clue afforded by this social psychology is not that of the term behavior as such, but that implied in the more careful discrimination between two modes of explanation of man's native equipment for behavior. To emphasize neural coördinations as innate would be, as Allport shows, to favor the view that the several activities in question are due to highly integrated reflexes popularly known as instincts.[17] Hence heredity would be the ground of explanation. But to favor those modes of behavior said to have been *learned* is to emphasize habit as a purposeful integration of reflexes. This agrees with the current tendency of psychology to use "instinct" sparingly, by attributing as little as possible to innate coordinations.

Our Native Responses.—Cautious in employing any mode of description tending toward the traditional idealization or condemnation of heredity, one may be equally cautious in regard to the idealization or disparagement of environment. Examining the hypothesis of a religious instinct as the origin of religious experience, Flower tries constructively to recover the responses which people make prior to the existence of religious ideas or consciousness.[18] An instance is seen in the little child saying prayers. The religious response "is so far from being the expression of a specific religious tendency or instinct . . . that it is practically the outcome of the inadequacy of specific ten-

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

[18] J. Cyril Flower, *An Approach to the Psychology of Religion*, 1927, p. 23.

dencies. It is man's attempt . . . to supplement the paucity of his original endowment when he discovers himself in a strange world." Hence Flower finds the origin in "the frustration of mental equipment," in "a negative response which provides the opportunity for effecting a new orientation" that proceeds "through the liberation of fantasies and images, and their projection upon the situation." Religious experience is response to the subjective element of the fantasy and image thus projected.[19]

The Beyond.—This view provides for the beyond which is characteristic of religion, namely, "beyond the capacity of existing equipment," an outreaching which "provides the nucleus for all fantasy and imaginative forms of religious belief." Religion begins with an awakening which implies a beyondness that runs all through man's religious experience as the germ of his behavior. The new response is something more than a mere compound of existing tendencies, newly adjusted to meet the situation which frustrates the soul. For there is also "a new power of discrimination," and the imagery is no mere projection of fantasy upon reality, but is used as a means of contact with the reality thus lying beyond. Moreover, the agent is still affected by elements of religious experience which remain unaccounted for, as if out of range, religion being in brief "an attempt to deal with that which lies beyond man's ordinary equipment."[20] Hence man claims for his religious formulations an authority and a sanctity altogether beyond reason; hence the whole question of revelation and its psychology, with the assertion that supernatural revelation is the means by which the world beyond communicates itself. Thus too in the case of a religious person like George Fox there was an imaginative interpretation and reconstruction of experience bringing the beyond into relation with human capacities "on the condition of an exercise of faith."[21]

Flower develops this thesis, not to discredit religion or

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

in any way to underestimate religious experience; but to show that the clue is to be found in man's outreaching rather than in even the most complete description of the equipment wherewith man attains ordinary satisfaction. Essential to this view is the idea of a growing plasticity of mind by which man is able to break down the fixity of the usual stereotyped responses. Thus Christianity gained wide acceptance because, in a growingly mysterious world, the early Christian found it offering in unforeseen and unthought ways the firmer foothold which he needed. "It provided means of release and expression for activities which would otherwise have been baffled . . . a mode of response which brought harmony into life." [22] To say that religion means "the impingement upon human consciousness of that which cannot be understood," is also to say that "its very process involves an ever-deepening awareness of the mysterious immensity, the intellectually baffling ocean of the uncharted 'beyond' in which all appearances float." [23] But when this writer asserts that "it is impossible in *religion* to substitute understanding for belief," he exceeds the province of psychology. Flower's description needs to be supplemented by that of writers who place more emphasis on understanding and less on mysteries of any sort. Experience takes on new meanings, for example, with the distinction between the eternal and the transient, with reference to intuitions of the unity of the spiritual life. It gains other meanings when we cease to limit the term to contacts with the natural world, as if there were no spiritual world implying an intelligible relation of every-day experience to the beyond.

The Reflective Element.—Although never complete and always suggestive of possibilities yet to be tried, there are distinctive experiences which stand out as wholes, marking epochs in one's development. This is especially true when conversion brings permanent changes, when a prophetical vision discloses the pathway which one actually follows for years, when great sorrow or joy brings one to the parting of the ways. Inner happenings which bring a great expan-

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 191. [23] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

sion of feeling arouse new emotions, yield new insights which transfigure the hour or the day. By contrast, a long period of doubt, struggle, depression or defeat may also seem to be a whole in itself. Again, experiences may take on the appearance of unity or wholeness through the interpretation by which they determine one's faith or optimism during a considerable period.[24] Because we believe all our religious values will be conserved, we are apt to think that immediate experiences preserve themselves. But it is by reflectively assigning values that this process goes on. We do not actually transcend the stream of passing experience to seize upon it as a whole, although intuitively we may discern its meanings under what Spinoza called "the aspect of Eternity." What experience then yields is a *motive* which for us is the clue to religious values.

An experience, its sources, and its meanings often seem to be one; in contrast with the three moments which Höffding calls the state itself, its cause, and its expression. We are apt to identify the experience of the presence of God, for instance, with God as such, forgetting that the experience is composite; neglecting the significant fact that various elements of emotion, feeling, belief, will, enter into our interpretation so that experience and idea are identified. We can scarcely mediate the experience at all until some time after it has gone. Contrast is essential. Belief in the cause of religious experience is far from being the same as the experience. We arrive at a conclusion regarding causality through manifold processes of thought, including allowances made for illusions and the projection of our sentiments into reality. Thus we are brought to a realization of the fact that experience as such does not show whether or not any of its elements are supernatural.[25]

The Need for Philosophy.—The source of our experience may appear to be supernatural because we have been unable to propose a natural explanation. But some one may presently offer a perfectly natural explanation of what we took to be a complex mystery. The more prone to mysti-

[24] Cf. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 98.
[25] Höffding, *ibid.*, p. 101.

cism, the more we are likely to assign supernatural causes, unaware that we are commingling belief with the immediacies of our experience. A philosophy of experience in general is a necessity of thought. Penetrating criticism is required to distinguish between the experience signalized as a conversion in contrast with traditional views regarding conversion. Höffding remarks that "very often it happens that it is the traditional ideas themselves which evoke the experience. Religious experience consists for most men in strivings and states which are described and inculcated by tradition."[26] We need not go so far, however, as to say, with Höffding, that most men "make" their religious experiences by aid of those who share the beliefs. But it is certainly a fact that in some groups the range of permissible experience is "restricted in advance."[27] Thus dogma may close the door where liberal religious empiricism would open it wide. Even those in authority hesitate to penetrate beyond the traditionally "safe" confines. Confirmatory experiences within prescribed limits are of course warmly welcomed.

The Priority of Experience.—The religion of authority will not admit that experience is normative. Every aspect of it must be explained as doctrine decrees. But to insist on this point is to forget that originally *it was experience which led to doctrine,* that religious symbols were once empirical patterns. Belief is supposed to generate experiences in verification of its own propositions *as beliefs,* as if these were wholly independent of the experiences from which they sprang. But the whole investigation into the psychology of religion in recent decades leads to the conclusion that experience has always been prior to doctrine: through primary emphasis on the inner life as evidential, as the disclosure of personal needs and aspirations. Experience also seems to have been prior to belief in revelation, revelatory experience being prior to the giving of revelations accepted on authority.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[27] This is especially true when officials prohibit any investigation bordering on psychical research.

Hence partisans of religious experience have insisted that the true test of religious conceptions is to be found by returning in thought to what was conceivably the first-hand experience, for example, the experiences which led people to believe in the guidance and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Sometimes it is as important to try to recover the values of sacred experiences of the religious past as to open the way for religious progress. For our attitude toward the future depends on our view of the past. Thus one may attain a view of what religious experience might have been if less curbed by tradition. It seems possible that man might have developed far more spontaneously and freely, keeping spirit above form, intuition free from dogma, faith from tradition.

The Possibility of Change.—Only the future history of religion can determine how far experience shall show what is possible. Much will depend on religious persons who branch out into new fields of inquiry. Our view of the supposed total meaning of experience with respect to the persistence of human personality is always an important factor. Values once attributed to the immediacies of feeling and emotion may wane in comparison with what comes to be for us the great truths concerning experience. Again, there may be an advance from self-centering experiences of a mystical type to experiences pertaining to the spiritual world. So too much will depend on what a man takes to be the secret place of the soul, the inmost center of religious experience. Because this is "the holy of holies" one may claim much less for experience and much more for thought, in the effort to attribute what is highest in our nature to the experience of communion with God.

What is real in this inner unison of wills must be that which withstands all tests, what is worthy of survival in our progress in eternal life. Wishing to "enter into life," to possess and be possessed by it "more abundantly," we seek to overcome any empirical element that might impede the coming of the light which lighteth every man born into the eternal world. Thus the religious person who enters deeply into the possibility of religious experience is likely

to identify life's highest religious values with supreme Reality as their ground. The eternal verities, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good belong together in one system for religious devotees who regard the beatific insight as the test. Insight, as the term is here used, typifies well-ordered, intelligently mediated experiences. If there be a mystical element in such experiences, it is not a mere vision, surely not an ecstasy. Experience here depends in large measure on the enriching values which have gone before. In aspiration one may anticipate religious experience which is very pure and noble in type, free from anything that is petty in human personality. Approximations are discoverable within the whole scope of the religious life: adult baptism at best is inner experience, if the performance of the rite means that the soul is touched, if it is a baptism of the Spirit; prayer at its best is inner experience, so is worship (in spirit and truth), the reading of sacred books in quest of their inner content, also inspiration, and especially conversion—when it is a disclosure of spiritual realities, not the mere acceptance of a creed or church.

Summary.—Thus our study of experience brings us to the conclusion we reached in studying the function of consciousness. Consciousness of religious objects *is* in a sense experience of them, notably consciousness of the presence of God. Personal religion depends on the degree of inner experience. The believer in religious objects adheres to those objects as real so far as personal experience has disclosed their reality. Hence his ardent longing to convey to others what his experience means to him. We are here speaking of those devotees of the spiritual life for whom God is profoundly real and religious truths intensely true. These set the standard for us, the standard of the abundant life. For those of us whose experience is less convincing, consciousness may be said to add an inspiriting element. Consciousness quickened by faith flies on before. Where two or three are gathered in the name of the highest ideal, there is a beatific presence which surpasses all present attainments. Yet because this presence is "in the midst" of the group it arouses new efforts to press forward and

achieve. Naturally, the earnest devotee puts primary emphasis on the realities and values of which experience has made him conscious. As naturally, the progressive leaves many matters open for future experience to decide. Personal religion is in a profound sense religion in its most intensely real form. Granted the primacy of religious consciousness or experience, each individual having "experienced religion" in this sense, the way is open for the study of secondary matters, such as dogmas and institutions.

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CHAPTER XIII

MYSTICISM

Conflicting Impressions.—Few terms applicable to the religious life are so vague as "mysticism." Having classed a man as a mystic, we assume to be as well acquainted with him as when we use such terms as "atheist," or "radical." In the same breath we discount and praise one whom we call a mystic. He is at the same time what no one should be and what all men ought to be. Inclined to take himself far too seriously, the mystic is likely to mistake his lowest for his highest passion, more strongly tempted than any one else to identify religious reality with his own egohood; he may also be the true prophet or forerunner, possibly the founder of a religion, the giver of revelations, the one who restores faith by returning to first-hand sources. To claim that mysticism is prior to and above all creeds, that it explains all religion and is still the essence of all, would be to overdo the matter. Yet the great mystics devoutly believed themselves in possession of a reality, a life, a truth such that all men would leave whatever they are doing and follow—could the ineffable be put into words, the incommunicable conveyed, the beatific vision disclosed.

The Elements of Mysticism.—The value of mysticism for psychology lies somewhere between the extravagances of those who eulogize and the absurdities signalized by those who see nothing in mysticism save hollow symbolisms, sexual fantasies, imaginal subjectivities intensified by emotion, delusions bordering on disease and insanity. Essential to such discriminations are distinctions seldom drawn between (1) mystical experience, however mild or intense, and mystical doctrines, theological, practical, or philosophical; (2) moderate and extreme types of experience and

doctrine; (3) the mystic's personality as an individualist and mystical experiences separable for the most part from the personal equation, the age, and the other determinants. The objective is to know mystical experience as a type, mystics as types; to find a mode of interpretation free from the extreme mystic's tendency to identify (1) the direct experience of the presence of Reality with (2) the description of this experience, the doctrine offered in interpretation of it, and the practical values ensuing from it.

Possibly one must be in some sense a mystic to follow these distinctions appreciatively, as one might combine criticism with productivity in the arts. In any event experience is either discerned from within by being *within its intuition,* or it is not apprehended at all. As one may seem to be in love a dozen times and yet not know love till infilled with its transforming reality, so one may behold mystical experience from the outside but later see it from within, beholding what the mystic means when even his symbols fail him, understanding why (because of his incomplete psychology) he confuses subject, object, and experience in one whole. There may be an advantage in being moderately mystical in type, that one may apprehend the experiences and values without enlarging upon what we may call the mystical element of religious experience, the element which in the ecstatic degree is far too intense for analysis (by the mystic).

The Empirical Element.—Mystical experience is by common consent religion in its intensest form. Usually the extreme mystic specializes in the spiritual life, in prayer, meditation, instruction, the effort to direct religion into the mystical pathway, with its stages, conditions, laws, its culmination in the ecstatic or ineffable union with Reality. The experiences as such appear to be unique, to involve a special faculty or God-sense, and an identification of the subject or participant with his Object in such a way that to describe or mediate would be sadly to mar if not to deny the reality of this immediate apprehension of the divine. What is said to be communicable is the group of symbols, the description of the steps toward the ineffable

height, and the practical guide to contemplation. But comparison shows that even in this his intensity the extreme mystic conforms to principles already laid down in the foregoing chapters: in the stress put upon personal consciousness, the appeal to the immediacy of experience as intimately real, the personal confession (with its emphasis on introspection), and the effort to mediate experience by appeal to emotion, feeling, ideas, volitions. Hence the appreciative psychologist may venture to articulate the ineffable, discriminating colors where all seems pure white light.

Mystical experience is not then a mystery, as if one must be initiated into the secrets of a lodge. It is not unique, does not involve a special faculty, or belong in a category where analysis has no place. Nor is the mystic to be set apart from the rest of humanity as if he possessed something beyond the capacities of other men. The differences are in degree, not in kind: the degree of interior openness or responsiveness, in contrast with the absorption of the majority of men in external affairs. It is partly a question of attention, and partly of the unusual response of the participant to his experience, a response comparable to that of the rapturous lover of music who dwells for the nonce in the ideal world of a symphony, opera, or oratorio. As the music-lover may claim that it is music and music only which lifts the soul to the ideal world, or reality-in-itself, so for the mystic there is an experience which lifts the soul beyond awareness of limitations, and (apparently) beyond all distinctions both within and without the soul itself.

The experience then in brief is immediate communion with Ultimate Reality (God, a higher order of Being, the Determiner of Destiny, the Absolute, the One), with its energies and values. Mystical doctrine is belief based on such experience of transcendental Reality, according to (1) the mode of describing or merely reporting it as beyond description, and (2) the type of belief at hand in the particular case, a belief which may run over into the spiritual pantheism of India, may involve a version of Platonism or

Christianity, or an infusion of Oriental and Occidental elements readily identifiable by the orthodox Christian as heresy. Since the experience as reported and the doctrine offered to account for it anticipate union with God as the great objective, mysticism as a mode of religious practice involves the classic stages of preparation through intensive training for which mystics have been so well known in the past. Naturally, the description of the beatific union depends on the mystic, the land and generation in which he lives, his relation to tradition, his ability to pass into poetry or his tendency to lapse into vagueness, amidst excesses due to asceticism, solitude, or confusion between the emotions and passions.

The Cognitive Element.—Taking the experience at its face value for the moment, we note that the communion with transcendental Reality is said to be direct, notably with reference to all appeals to emotion, feeling, and intuition. This assumed identity between the mystic and his vision is doubtless due for the most part to his absorbed attention. In less pronounced visions, however, the accompanying imagery is less immediate. Derived attention may therefore seize upon aspects of the experience which elude the extreme mystic. The experience in general implies: (1) a discerned Reality, whatever the assumptions may be concerning the means of approach to union; (2) a truth concerning that Reality; and (3) a way toward union with it. Obviously, the mystic would not describe Reality as ineffable, would not bring forward his mystical truth, or unfold "the mystical way" unless he were able to mediate his experience more fully than he suspects. The experience for the participant is genuinely cognitive. The assumption that it has cognitive value is likely to imply either (1) the alleged existence of a mystical faculty functioning by a mode superior to that of the physical senses or (2) the unanalyzed postulate that Reality is supra-rational. In any event, the ontological or metaphysical doctrine propounded to account for the experience is likely to turn upon the conviction that Being is beyond all those alleged realities which form the subject-matter of the discursive

understanding. We are not here concerned with the metaphysics, but only with the implied psychology. The mystic's thought is plainly concerned with the Reality which is said to lie beyond any ordinary mental function. We may describe it in brief as an ontological intuition (an intuition of Being or Reality), with the implication that the mystical process is the only direct means of access to Reality.

One can hardly appreciate the force of this intuition without abstaining at first from the comment that doctrine is read into experience. For the mystic at least this ontological intuition or cognitive immediacy is the highest type of certitude. It is sharply contrasted with all knowledge based on inferences and the discrimination of object from subject. It is an emotional or empirical certainty rather than a dialectical or logical one. The experienced unison of the finite with the infinite, the union of the human spirit with Supreme Spirit is fundamental to the true cognitive relation. Mystical doctrine presupposes this union as an implicit revelation. In extreme form such doctrine affirms absolute identity between subject and object. Indeed, the identity is such (in the case of the most pronounced Hindoo pantheism) that even if the mystic should undertake to mediate his "superconscious" union with the Absolute, what he might say would fall under the head of "illusion," as a kind of hypothetical concession to the unenlightened.

If this were a study of mystical doctrines it would be part of our task to compare rival mysticisms to determine the system offering the best account of this ecstasy as the culmination of mystical experience. Without venturing beyond psychology, we note the fact that failure to analyze the content of the experience increases with the emotional types, in contrast with the cool scrutiny of Spinoza, who is able to tell his readers precisely what all his emotions signify, including "the intellectual love of God."[1] Critics of mystical doctrines have frequently pointed out the fact that by emphasizing the relation of the soul to God so as to abolish all other relations the extreme mystics separate

[1] *Ethics,* Eng. trans., Bohn Lib., Parts IV, V.

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inner experience from life in general instead of spiritualizing it, the only resource being pure contemplation of the Absolute.[2] Having thus separated God from the world and from all ordinary experiences, the mystic is unable to characterize God save in negative terms. Thus God is put beyond knowledge. A better psychology would lead to a positive reformulation, with the hope that even the ecstasy may be analyzed; for each negative proposition is tacitly an attempt to do what the mystic has declared impossible.

Mystical Experience as a Type.—The mystic seemed to be a privileged character, possessing a secret access to Reality, only so long as the assumption passed unchallenged that the mystic is endowed with a faculty absent in other men. With the proposition that mystical experience is one variety only, it became a question of psychological analysis in which experiential factors, values, and doctrines fall apart; while mystical interpretation was shown by James to be different in type from rationalisms.[3] What has since been required is sufficient mastery of psychology to enable the investigator to appreciate the emotionalism and the appeal to immediacy in general without too quickly discounting the mystic as intellectually deficient, and without passing over to rationalism as superior at all points to voluntarism. To bring the mystical experience within the range of every-day activities is to find that its constituents are those of any experience when immediacy, intuition, and emotion are assigned to the first rank in relation to yearnings for satisfaction through desire, will, or love. We shall find increasing evidences in favor of this conclusion as we proceed. The mystic brings to his experience what he is, what he believes. Anticipation and interpretation are elements in any case. Essentially the same the world over, mystical experience becomes a well-known type; while the modes of approach and retreat by way of interpretation depend on the patterns of thought,

[2] Cf. J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religious Experience*, p. 434.

[3] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lectures XI-XVIII.

for instance, in India, in the age of Plotinus, or among the Christian mystics.

Christian Mysticism.—Thus mysticism in both experience and doctrine has functioned in Christianity from the beginning, although it does not follow that Christianity is mysticism.[4] When "purity of heart" is designated as the condition through which the Christian may *see* God, moderate mystical experience finds its proper place. The life which the Christian is to lead thereby becomes the test. The exaggerations of doctrine, due for the most part to wrong emphasis on unanalyzed inner experience, may be traced to the extraneous beliefs with which Christian dogmas were confused, notably in the case of deification.[5] So too Mrs. Herman observes that although the Christian may have a mystical passion for intimacy with God, this tendency is checked by the Christian sense of sin, which is based in turn on a deeply ethical conception of salvation and sanctity.[6] Hence mysticism proves to be essentially a spirit or tendency which has more or less prevailed, rather than a system or method. At the conclusion of her profound critique, Mrs. Herman finds it true that "only as dominated by specifically Christian convictions can mysticism bring us an inwardness which carries within it no peril of delusion, a spirituality which does not menace our ethical life, and an absorption in the Divine which does not destroy the sacredness of our personality, the reality of our freedom."[7]

Mystical Faculty.—Regarded from the viewpoint of its spirit, mystical experience is attributable to the impulse common to all religions in which communion with the Unseen and Eternal is the aim of those who are devoutly seeking salvation or freedom. We may then distinguish the essential from the accidental factors or the form of the experience and the peculiar phraseology by which it is described.

[4] W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 1899.

[5] This "heresy" is analyzed by Dean Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 356, foll.

[6] E. Herman, *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, pref. to 1st ed., 1915, p. viii.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3rd ed., 1922, p. 371.

As long as the notion prevailed that mystical experience required a special organ of apprehension of the divine, there was an apparent explanation of the inability of mankind to test mystical doctrines by experiment. To maintain that this faculty was different from reason, the emotions, and the will, was not only to put religion in opposition to reason but to discourage any attempt to analyze man's spiritual attributes of any sort. Moreover, with this assumption that the mystical faculty was different in kind, outside of or beyond reason, came the notion that the divine grace and inspiration (hence divine revelation in general) are introduced from without, through a power fundamentally unlike the qualities of the recipient.[8] But if, rejecting the initial assumptions of this artificial psychology, we regard God as accessible to man through emotion, reason, will, or any other quality, according to his temperament, all people may be said to share these qualities, the experience of the presence of divine realities being within the capacity of all. Because some of these activities are "latent and neglected," it is an easy matter to assume that they are very special in one whose whole life is dedicated to their highest function. But if "man's susceptibility to God" is what is meant by these claims, this is in reality "nothing else than the intellectual, volitional, and emotional powers turned upon their source and goal."[9] Reality becomes more clear and convincing in the mystical experience at its best than through the testimony of the senses; precisely because emotion, intellect, and will are raised to their highest potency in this great religious experience. We may then observe, with Mrs. Herman, that "man's hunger for communion with God," for "spiritual inwardness," for "inspired insight into Reality," is not confined to mystics. We also agree that there is a continuity of spiritual immediacy with ordinary immediacy or direct apprehension. The mystical experience does not imply another sort of consciousness, another sense beyond the normal qualities of the self; but rather "man's native

[8] Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

susceptibility for God as the controlling principle of his whole personality—that steeping of mind, heart and will in what is vital and eternal.'' [10] We are therefore concerned with what Inge calls ''the logic of the whole personality,'' also with all the *energies* of the soul. It is once more a question of coming to one's self.

The Experience Defined.—Although less sympathetic than most writers on religious experience, Leuba arrives at what is likely to be the conclusion of all who approach the subject psychologically, when he declares that all problems raised by the mystic are ''explicable in the same sense, to the same extent, and by the same principles as any other consciousness.'' [11] One may then develop any clue afforded by this consciousness precisely as any tendency, impulse, instinct, or motive implying an essentially dynamic conception of human personality would be considered; and one may make the ordinary appeals to the non-rational and the not-conscious.

In general, Leuba defines mystical experience to be ''any experience taken by the experiencer to be a contact (not through the senses, but 'immediate,' 'intuitive,') or union of the self with a larger-than-self.'' Union with God would be an instance. Leuba quotes briefer definitions of mystical experience as ''a consciousness of immediate relation with the divine,'' and as ''an intuitive certainty of contact with the supersensible world.'' Granted an experience of contact thus understood, it is a question of studying its elements as we would investigate any claim for intuition, any evidence that there is a supersensible world.

Moderate Mysticism.—Pratt, defining mystical experience as ''the sense of the presence or reality through other means than the ordinary perceptive process of the reason,'' emphasizes the fact that mysticism is the *sense* or *feeling* of this presence, not the belief in it: the experience is ''not the result of sight or hearing or touch, nor is it a conclusion one reaches by thought.'' [12] Mild mystical ex-

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 30, 32.
[11] J. H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, 1925, p. ix.
[12] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 337.

perience, being "commonplace and easily overlooked," is found among perfectly normal persons; while the extreme experience, usually striking in both its intensity and its effects, is "a sign either of supernatural visitation or of a pathological condition."[13]

Characteristic of the milder experiences is the report of one of Pratt's respondents: "I have experienced God's presence so that I felt the lack of nothing and feared nothing. It is hard to describe the feeling, but everything seems bright and clear ahead, and I feel as if I had the support of some great unimpeachable authority behind me for everything I may do then."[14] Pratt finds a sensational element in some accounts; in others, ineffability is the chief quality, with cognitive and emotional elements mutually influential. Joy and calm sometimes predominate; again, pain and shadow. These are influences largely beyond control of the participant's will. A "mild and constant sense of the Divine is consistent with great activity, and can abide with many people through a large part of the working day."[15]

Doubtless, the milder form of mystical appreciation is often an element in the belief in God. In this moderate form, mystical experience may in fact be regarded as coextensive with religious consciousness, whenever in prayer, worship, or conversion the spirit testifies that experience is decisively evidential. Thus conversion may begin with mildly mystical experience, prayer may be inner realization of the divine presence, worship may imbue the spirit in a markedly interior way. There may be a deeply impressive mystical element in the experience of partaking of the bread and wine. Spiritual meditation in all its milder forms may belong under this head, also silent worship. Thus the doctrine of the inward light or "light of Christ in the soul" has come into vogue among Friends. The essentially practical character of this doctrine is evidence that the experiences of the Friends in establishing their

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[14] Quoted by Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

type of Christianity were moderate, amenable to will, capable of being reproduced, and within the reach of all. George Fox seems, however, to have been a more pronounced mystic.[16]

The Witness of the Spirit.—Granted the empirical witness to the Spirit on the part of great numbers of people who make no special claims, intense mystical experiences become more intelligible, since these involve essentially the same elements thrown out of proportion. If in religion as a whole we distinguish between the unchanging tendency and the tendency to revivify what is permanent through fresh and spontaneous experiences, the mystical experiences of those who accomplish this great contributory service belong under the head of the spontaneous.[17] Hence Rufus Jones describes mysticism as "the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence." Given religion in this "its most acute, intense, and living stage," we have a clue to the successive interactions of permanence and change. The mysticism of the Gospels is implicit, unconscious, never becomes a type of thought. But "every disciple was summoned to expect a direct and conscious incoming of the Divine Life." Hence the significance of the saying, "Wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them."[18]

Objective and Subjective Elements.—When, however, mysticism becomes a special cult involving a theologico-metaphysical doctrine of the soul's possible union with God, the experience, "not sharply focalized or clearly differentiated into a subject-object state," is likely to imply a fused consciousness.[19] In this the more intense form of mystical experience the soul "feels invaded, vitalized with new energy merged with an enfolding presence." This experience signalizes indeed one of "the great tap-roots of

[16] See James, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[17] Cf. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, 1909, p. xiii.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[19] R. M. Jones, Art. "Mysticism" (Introductory), in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics.*

religion." Hence "the undemonstrable but irrefragable certainty of higher personal life in contact with the personal self," with the heightened functions and new depth-levels of truth. Although there may be oracular communications and other unusual phenomena, Jones holds that mystical experiences do not enter through a secret door. There is a historical background, the descriptions give evidence of group-experience; in fine, mystical experiences "do not drop ready-made from some other region." There may be cognitive elements or noetic values.[20] But the truth or knowledge thus received comes by what Jones calls "leaps of insight through heightened life, in an intensifying of vision through the fusing of all the deep-lying powers of intellect, emotions, and will, and in a corresponding surge of conviction through the dynamic integration of personality, rather than in the gift of new concrete knowledge-facts."

Lacking this acute insight into the constituents of the experience, the mystic merges subject and object into one by articulating a doctrine of union with God or the Absolute, and a mystical way of attaining that union, presupposing a secret door to account for his experience. Hence the array of descriptive psychological terms mentioned by Jones, such as recollective faculty, apex of mind, abyss of mind, synteresis, divine spark, increated center (standing for the original ground or junction of the soul with God), "an unlost and inalienable soul-center." Having assumed that the Absolute is "super-empirical," it is natural for the mystic thus to postulate a special faculty, and to adopt "the negative way" of approach to union. Evidently, Mr. Jones, as a devotee of the moderate mysticism of the Friends, deems neither the special faculty nor the negative way essential; for he holds that in Christ's own personal experience is found "the supreme mode of true mystical experience," that is, in "words and acts penetrated with an infinite depth of experience . . . fused with a

[20] A "noetic value" seems to be a state of knowledge; possibly it includes illuminations or revelations of higher reality. See James, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

warmth and an intimacy of direct fellowship with God. He reveals an interior *sense of life* which explores and possesses new depths of reality and which releases for Himself and others new energies by which to live.'' [21]

Eckhart's Mysticism.—Less intense than some of the great mystics, Eckhart (1260-1327) has given forceful expression to this sense of life through which the participant feels himself born into eternal reality. ''There is a power in the soul untouched by time and flesh, flowing from the Spirit, remaining in the Spirit, altogether spiritual. In this power is God, ever verdant, flowering in all the joy and glory of his actual self. Such dear delight, such inconceivable joy as none can fully tell, for in this power the eternal Father is procreating his eternal Son without a pause.'' [22] There is one power in the soul then which alone is free, free from names and forms, ''exempt and free as God is in himself.'' This is the ''spark of intellect that never dies,'' and in this the mind reaches its apex. To seek God under ''settled forms'' would be to lay hold of the forms, while missing the God concealed therein. The eternal Word, still unspoken, the Logos of the Father, is being born within the soul. But God's being is ''fontal,'' flowing, though fixed. Hence, ''as one and impartible,'' we are to behold him entering the fastness of the soul. God being the one power, we should control, integrate, or coordinate and unify ourselves ''so that this one power may energize in us.'' [23]

Thus far experience leads. But when Eckhart ventures to tell what the soul is in relation to God through Christ he turns into regions of doctrine where the ways differ for typical Christians. In the soul he finds no ''like, no image; for no image can show us God's nature nor his essence.'' To remain at this point would not mean being ''the same as God.'' Everything ''latent or defined'' must be cast out. Man cannot be the son of God unless he has the very same

[21] R. M. Jones, Art. ''Mysticism'' (in the New Testament) in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics.*

[22] *Meister Eckhart*, ed. by Franz Pfeiffer, Leipsig, 1857; tr. by C. de B. Evans, 1924, p. 36.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 37, 40, 57.

nature which the Son has, "the same in essence and in substance and in nature as he is in himself." In the twinkling of an eye, the soul is to be made one with God. But the Father is already present to beget his Son in the innermost ground of the soul: "here God's ground is my ground and my ground is God's ground." [24] Consequently, Eckhart departs more and more into mystical theology, assuring his readers on the one hand that God is not comprehensible, transcends all human conception, is unknown and unknowable, the "modeless Undetermined," best known by negation, to be sought by opposites, as "the denial of denials, the one which is exclusive of all otherness"; while asserting on the other hand that "God makes us to know him, and his knowing is his being . . . and his nature and his substance are mine." [25]

Empirically speaking, therefore, we can follow Eckhart only so far as he dwells upon what the divine presence (not the doctrine) means for him. In this sense, "all things are simply God to thee, who seest only God in all things." Knowing God and being known by Him, seeing and being seen by Him are, so far as experience goes, one and the same: we know by being known, when God makes us conscious. When thus transported into God, then God is mine and all he has. "In proportion to my nearness to God does he speak himself into me." Hence above all things one should follow that spark or ray which discloses the form of God without any difference at all—the one light radiated in all things by the Father for the purpose of revealing his own hidden light: when we love God with his own love, awareness of it deifies us. Eckhart especially says that it is where creature stops that God begins, God being nowhere so much as in the soul, in the *innermost*, the "highest," howbeit depth and summit are the same, namely, in that region "where time has never entered and no form was ever seen, at the center, the summit of the soul: there God is creating the whole world." [26]

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 48.
[25] *Ibid.*, 33, 53, foll., 117.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 31, 34, 70, 91, 147, 163.

The Central Fact of Mysticism.—Granted this profound inner experience, in which self-possession proves to be God-possession, God's birth in the soul being "God's self-realization," the Godhead is describable as "motionless unity and balanced stillness . . . the source of all emanations."[27] This is in accord with Miss Underhill's conclusion concerning mysticism as a whole, namely, the "central fact of the mystic's experience is an overwhelming consciousness of God and of his own soul . . . self-giving on the divine side answering to the self-giving on the human side."[28] This is the first essential or common basis of the various mystical types, such as the temperamental symbolist, the quietist, the nature-mystic, and the transcendentalist, with their distinctive or "incompatible" views of the universe.

The "way the mystic feels about his Deity . . . his adoring and all-possessing consciousness" having been recognized as the basis, the secondary factors become intelligible: such factors as tradition, conscious or unconscious symbolism, emotion, the invasion of cravings from the lower centers, the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes. From the common basis arise also the various formulations of the mystic way: through purification, illumination, and union (Dionysius); through dilation of mind and enlarging and deepening of our vision of the world, elevation of mind, and ecstasy (Richard of St. Victor); or according to some other mystic's formulation of these stages.[29] To the mystic, his symbolic representation of the divine presence is essential, because his experience far transcends his terms. But this factor varies with the mystic, also whatever divine visions he may see, the voices he may hear, the "dramatization" of his desires, the so-called divine revelation, the trance-states, and the ecstasy.[30] Granted sympathetic appreciation of his experience as surpassing all description, as the central fact of his life,

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 267, 417, 418.
[28] E. Underhill, *The Essentials of Mysticism*, 1920, pp. 2, 4.
[29] *Op. cit.*, pp. 2, 8, 11.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 21.

we readily see why the mystic adopts a psychology of his own, symbolically portraying what he cannot state as bare fact, dramatizing when his symbols fail, but always insisting on the reality of what is *given,* as if his own mind made scarcely a contribution to his disclosures.

Summary.—Mysticism in general consists of empirical, doctrinal, and personal or temperamental factors. Mystical experience is doubtless the most intense form of religion, but moderate doctrine is the intelligible clue rather than the extreme types. The experience is, for the mystic, in some sense ontological (an assertion that Ultimate Reality is directly present), and in some sense cognitive or noetic (implying an intuitive or higher type of knowledge, probably transcending subject and object). But at best mystical experience is a type, mystics are types, with the probability that mystical experience is only an element in or phase of a religion, for example, in Christianity. So too the study of rival descriptions of the mystical faculty leads to the conclusion that in mystical experience the same factors function as in human experience in general, for example, feeling, emotion, desire, will, mental imagery of various sorts, ideational elements, symbols. Moderate mystical experience may be common to many varieties of religious experience not ordinarily classed as mystical. What is needed is an intelligible clue to the witness of the Spirit in general. A standard or test seems all the more imperative, when we note the mystic's tendency to confuse subject with object, to fuse the central fact with the doctrine founded on it. The central consideration is the form which religious consciousness assumes in mystical instances, with its rich values in feeling, emotion, life, the renewing energies which are so convincing and the sense of freedom or expansion of spirit which is so persuasively real. Very much depends on the distinction between (1) the self as the subject or percipient of religious experience; (2) the experience as perceived, observed, or accepted; and (3) the explanation or interpretation offered by the mystic, by appeal to his favorite theory of feeling and emotion, coupled with his favorite idea of God.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE VALUE OF MYSTICISM

The Quest for Objectivity.—In the foregoing chapters we have distinguished between introspection as a method which has borne results in the history of religion, introversion as a tendency which concerns the specialist in abnormal psychology, and subjectivity as a normal viewpoint wherewith to envisage religious consciousness. The aim there as at other points of our inquiry was the discovery of religious objectivity, the universal elements of religion. Hence we saw the importance of the expansive thoughts of God, those which lift the soul out of the confines of self-consciousness. The symbols by which the ardent religious person suggests what he cannot portray—because of the intensity of his experience—may seem to the critic like an illusory film-play of mental images reeled off within the narrowest limits of the percipient's selfhood. But they are not meant to be thus secret. Nor is the imagery intentionally projected upon a supernatural screen. With windows open towards eternity, the mystic regards the great world lying "beyond" as an objective scheme of realities which he looks upon; hence his images are not merely cast into his soul, as if by miracle.

The Cardinal Propositions.—We note then that for the mystic the eternal is an object of reference far beyond himself. By contrast, the temporal includes in a very subordinate way the mystic's responsive efforts to "realize the immanence of the eternal in the temporal."[1] There are in fact three significant propositions in this undertaking: (1) the assumption attributed by Inge to Proclus (411-485), that the soul can *see* and perceive; (2) the proposi-

[1] See Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 5.

tion that *"man, in order to know God, must be a partaker of the Divine nature";* and (3) the implication which Inge adopts as the clue to the element of mysticism in Christianity, namely, holiness or purity of heart as the essential condition, in contrast with sensuality and selfishness as "absolute disqualifications."[2]

Psychological criticism has shown us that the so-called spiritual "eye" which makes it possible to see God is not essentially different from intuition or spiritual perception in general. It has also shown that the "nature" through which God is known is nothing else than *human nature,* with all its richness of content. The third proposition also pertains to our nature as a whole, in the light of a certain standard or test. We are free then to assimilate the values of mysticism according to the particular scheme of interpretation which we adopt, meanwhile carefully distinguishing between (1) mystical experience; and (2) mystical doctrine as moderate, extreme, or practical in type. The evaluation of mystical doctrines will in turn show in what respect such doctrines are a "revolt against dry formalism and cold rationalism."[3] We may also, if our interest lies in that direction, follow Inge in tracing the development of moderate mysticism within Christianity, so mediating it that what we have as residue is enlightened Christianity itself; with emphasis on the ideas of God as Light, Love, Spirit, the Word as Life, and the revelation of Christ. The discovery of a tendency toward degeneration and the analysis of pantheism will still further clarify the situation, so that when practical considerations come to the fore communion with God will be sought very differently.[4]

Essentials and Accidents.—While these distinctions fall for the most part outside of a study of religious psychology not limited to Christianity, it is plain that every student must discriminate between the essentials and the accidents, the matters that are primary for the percipient who is sincerely seeking communion with God and those

[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 7.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 22.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 44 foll., 82, 117 foll.

that are incidental to his experience, his type and symbology. It is no less important to avoid any identification between what we judge to be normal to moderate mystical experience, and what some writers on the psychology of religion regard as abnormal when judging extreme mystical experience.

The difficulty here is the same as that which besets nearly all studies of the inner life of man. Because the physician is concerned for the most part with disease, we are apt to overlook his findings with regard to health in relation to man's mentality in general. Because absurdities and delusions are connected with psychical phenomena, we are likely to neglect the profounder significance of psychical research and the light thrown on human personality by a writer in this special field like Mr. Myers. So too the nobility of religion is lost sight of through preoccupation with its lowliest origins, in the case of writers on the history and science of religion who devote the major part of their investigation to the crudest notions and myths. Confusing experience, doctrine, and participant in one utterly uninteresting mass, some critics of mysticism have seized upon certain secondary matters—notably those bordering on dissociation of personality, vestigial associations pertaining to primitive man, and confusion of sexual with spiritual emotion—and have judged mysticism in its entirety by these variants. By contrast, Pratt, with due caution, discriminates two characteristics readily carried to excess by mystics of the intense or extreme type: the demand for immediacy and love of the romantic.[5] The reasoned or conceptual element of mysticism is a minor matter; the feelings and imaginings are intense, especially the love for the Divine, the Absolute, or Perfect. Associated with this intense longing for union with God may be an "almost fanatical moral earnestness," and possibly an "incipiently pathological condition of the nervous system, which manifests itself sometimes in a tendency toward mental dissociation." These matters become intelligible in relation with the series of elated and depressed moods, the

[5] *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 366.

"dryness" and ecstasy, the rhythms of contemporary activity and other factors, such as the efforts at self-control and the inhibitions incidental to the progress toward the culminating ecstasy.[6]

The Modalities of Mystical Experience.—To appreciate these elements of the experience, the method, and the doctrine in their vital context is to follow the stages of a mystical biography, developed appreciatively yet critically from within. Thus F. von Hügel, preparing the way for such study, differentiates three modes of apprehension and forms of appeal and outlook: (1) sense and memory (the child's modality), for example, with the mother, the father, or the teacher as the symbol preferred; (2) question and argument (the youth's mode of apprehension), through which religion becomes thought, system, a philosophy; (3) intuition, feeling, and volitional requirements (the mature man's special approach to faith).[7] Granted certain interior experiences, amidst deep-seated spiritual pleasures and pains, weaknesses and powers, helps and hindrances, the experimental, mystical side of religion comes into view. The three modes of apprehension are conjointly present, so that there is "never a mere apprehension of something external and sensible without any interior elaboration, any interpretation by the head and the heart." The individual and traditional are always blended, so too are external and internal; the institutional, rational, and volitional constituents. This conjunction of elements is seen, for example, in two crises of the soul: (1) when it adds speculation to institutionalism, and (2) mysticism to both.[8]

Von Hügel finds parallels to this triad of religious elements in three constituents of knowledge: (1) the sensational element in our actual apprehension of particular sights and sounds; (2) the various forms of thought, the contents being presented as both actual and necessary; (3) the ethico-mystical element, that is, "the worth at-

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 369, 394, 433.
[7] *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 51.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

tributable to the least or greatest of our thoughts and feelings and acts . . . the warm faith in and through action.''[9] Naturally, some of these factors are at times minimized or suppressed, or the need of multiplicity is denied; for the religious temper longs ''to see things in one,'' that the devotee may himself become one, find one God and become one with Him forever. But even the most truly living unity consists in a multiplicity, for example, when historical and institutional elements are opposed to the other factors, and when the emotional and volitional oppose the institutional and historical. The intellectual modality readily splits up into the analytic and synthetic factors, while the experiential includes intuitions and feelings of every mental and moral kind, as well as volitions. Synthetically speaking, there is an activity of the soul by which the participant has a direct and ''immensely potent sense and feeling, an immediate experience of Objective Reality, of the Infinite and Abiding, of a Spirit not at all unlike yet distinct from our own, which penetrates and works within our finite spirit and in the world at large, especially in human history; and by which we will, and give a definite result and expression to, our memories, thinkings, feelings, and intuitions, as waked up by their various special stimulants and by the influence of each and all the others.''[10] In other words, stimuli are operative in mystical as in all other experience; the participant draws upon memory, tradition, intuitively accepted religious beliefs; will or aspiration toward a profounder self-integration is a very active factor; and the decisive factor is the direct apprehension of Reality so imbuing the participant's spirit that he assimilates life or energy from it as his own, although acknowledging this Abiding Presence to be other than his own mere finite self.

The Mystical Scale.—Granted the presence of a decisive factor worthy of the highest type of symbolical interpretation, there may be all kinds of fantastic, even hysterical and anti-moral exaltations mixed up with the sane and

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[10] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 390.

solid, deep and delicate constituents of the mystic's experience. Endless combinations and conflicts may ensue. The saving factors are: (1) the "vivid, continuous sense that God, the Spirit upholding our poor little spirits, is the true originator and the true end of the whole movement, in all it may have of spirit, beauty, truth, goodness and vitality"; and (2) the fact that "all the various levels and kinds of reality and action are . . . already fitted to stimulate, supplement and purify each other by Him who . . . gives thus to each one of us our own degree and kind of spiritual possibility and ideal."[11] With the emphasis thus securely placed on the great essential, one may follow Miss Underhill's analysis of the stages, practical methods, symbolisms, and culminating steps of the mystic way, assigning to each phase of the more intense mystical experience its appropriate place in the scale.[12]

The Absolute.—Before mysticism was subjected to psychological study, experience and doctrine were judged in one breath, because the mystic (emerging from his ecstasy) gave a purely negative account of the Absolute, with which he was ostensibly united in a supreme moment utterly beyond all description, explanation, and interpretation. The Absolute was supposedly super-essential or supra-rational. To qualify in the slightest respect was to deny. To discriminate between the great Object and the contemplative as subject or participant was to lapse into discursive reasoning, as if one were proceeding from mere data to an account of these facts, their conditions and laws, thence to inferences based on this careful discrimination. Such reasoning was objectionable because finite or human. Hence the utmost the mystic could say was summed up in a classic phrase: "Who knows Him is silent." So too the Hindoo mystic exclaimed, with reference to any effort to characterize the Absolute: "Not this, not this." All that could be truly said was this: "That art thou." Thou art "the One without a second." "That which exists is One; sages call it variously." In Brahmanism this One was

[11] Von Hügel, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 392, foll.
[12] E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, 7th ed., 1918.

Brahman (the Absolute) or *Atman* (the Self). While the existence of the One could indeed be stated, differences due to "name and form" entered into the account as soon as the expositor tried to say *what the One is.* In the philosophy of Plotinus the Absolute was also the One, or the First, in the sense of a Reality beyond all qualification.

Formerly, such language seemed to the critic the negation of all intelligence.[13] Regarded from within, in the light of the mystic's reasons for such terms, the Absolute seems infinitely rich, namely, in the content of the mystic's surpassing experience. Since the days of sympathetic analysis of such experiences, it has become feasible to penetrate even the most sacred precinct of the mystical ecstasy itself. For, psychologically, this experience is an intense form of emotion as we all appreciate it, when immediacy and mediation are for the moment fused, for example, in the enjoyment of nature or music, or in love's highest experience of unison with the beloved. Apparently, the mystic is merely telling what his experience of the Absolute *is not;* actually, he is describing and interpreting it by every word he utters, however negative. Subject and object are not really lost, although they may seem to be. Comparison of mystical utterances the world over discloses essentially the same features, essentially the same reasons for believing in the Absolute, and for classing the ecstasy as supra-rational. It would doubtless be better psychology to say that this unifying experience is one of those rare moments of the inner life when energy of a finer type, interiorly received from sources imperfectly understood, wells up into consciousness in a beatific insight or feeling. Allowances could then be made for the extra-marginal energy not yet cognized as we have come to know vital energy from the way it functions in the body, and for the intra-marginal response (not superconsciousness, but a mode of momentary absorption presently giving place to partial realization of what this activity signified). It

[13] Hence the critique of the theory of knowledge implied in mysticism, cf. J. Royce, *The World and the Individual,* First Series, 1900, Lectures II, IV, V.

would then become plain that the Absolute is far from being a mere negation or zero. Doubtless the term "Absolute" would be rejected altogether, in favor of the surpassing aspect of the experience which, in verity, is a remarkable synthesis of relativities.

The Mystical Intuition of Plotinus.—Long before it became apparent that the mystical Absolute, instead of being an empty universal or mere zero, is a richly replete concept, Benn had examined the extreme instance of this negativity in the Occident, the mysticism of Plotinus, which was more influential than any other doctrine when Greek thought and Christianity commingled to produce Christian mysticism. Noting the exaggerated emphasis on Plotinus' mystical experiences, reputed to be "the climax of complete unification," Benn called attention to the fact that "on the strength of this single point some critics have summarily disposed of Plotinus and his whole school as unreasoning mystics."[14] It is highly significant that in the Neo-Platonic method of attaining full union with the One, ostensibly "the extreme instance of mysticism," the man of genius in this field "arrives at an intellectual conception of absolute unity by the most strictly logical process." Clearly indicating that Plotinus is commenting on Plato, Benn persuasively shows that the ultimate intuition does not displace logic. This intuition substitutes "a living realization for an abstract and negative conception." Hence the intuition is won, "not by forsaking logic, but by straining its resources to the utmost." The prime result, in Benn's showing, is *a mystical element* in Plotinus' philosophy, an element which occupies a relatively small place in the original Neo-Platonic system. While, then, the mystical element is present in the philosophy of Plotinus, his system is *essentially a rationalism.*[15] Indeed, on Benn's showing, the mystical element represents not more than one per cent of the total. So too Whittaker has shown that the method of Plotinus is not mystical, the theory of

[14] A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers,* 2 vols., 1882; 2nd ed., 1914.

[15] *Op. cit.,* 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 285.

emanation from Ultimate Reality being a systematic expression of a principle common to Plato and Aristotle, in terms of which the lower stage is to be explained by the higher.[16]

Dean Inge, the greatest interpreter of Plotinus, has given the complete demonstration in his monumental work, the result of many years of intensive study.[17] Granted the clue thus yielded by philosophy, one is prepared to follow the history of Christian mysticism during the Middle Ages, observing the various modes of mediating the stages of the mystical way. Plotinus himself was the forerunner of the essentially spiritual psychology which was the guide to subjective analysis. Equipped with his rationalism as a corrective, we are prepared to reinterpret the misleading statements in which the text-books have abounded.[18] It is essentially a question of the great wealth of content of: (1) the experience of the presence of God, culminating in the ecstasy which now becomes intelligible as the mystic's highest moment in a long series; (2) the thought of God as a concrete *fullness* (not a "blank" or "zero"); and (3) the participant's subsequent efforts to disclose the way to the culminating union, in which the mind is to be *filled* with one great idea, in a highly *enlightened* feeling. Obviously, Plotinus would never have thought of assigning so important a place to the culminating phase of this union, had not his own four distinctively marked experiences (according to his disciple, Porphyry) first led him to believe in the ecstasy which he later assigned to its logical place in his scale. So too the experiences of love have led to the romances, novels, and poems in which their authors venture to tell us what love is. Mysticism has been well called "the romance of religion." As an explorer, experimenting in the

[16] T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 1901, p. 55.

[17] W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 2 vols., 1918.

[18] For example, A. K. Rogers, in *A Student's History of Philosophy*, 1st ed., 1901, describes Plotinus' God as "the infinite blank, before which all human thought is powerless. . . . We must . . . cut loose from every definite fact that can occupy the mind, and reduce this to a blank: God thus lies beyond even the Idea itself. . . . We recognize Him only by a blind feeling of 'something real'." *Op. cit.*, pp. 188, 189.

spiritual world, the mystic beholds by contrast the visible world from within, noting the spiritual causes of visible effects; understanding "the essential nature of trees and flowers and mountains and the live creatures of the world. No longer does he see men by these dim lights that penetrate the dense and cloudy world of matter. He sees them as angelic toilers bowed by the burden of their own mundane selves."[19]

Extreme Mysticism.—Various modes of interpreting extreme mysticism have been proposed. These are summarized by Pratt under three heads: (1) the supernatural view, involving the assumption on the mystic's part that "the soul comes face to face with God and receives from God revelations, comfortings, assistance, which it can carry back into the world for the benefit of all the faithful. This hypothesis is usually based upon a dualistic view of the universe, "namely, the realms of Nature and of Grace, the contact of the soul with the supernatural realm being more or less miraculous; (2) the completely naturalistic interpretation, according to scientific psychology, the sources being found in the individual mind and in society; (3) or some compromise between these two (Miss Underhill's view, for example).[20] If the mystic's idea of God's presence be due to social education, the intensity of the *experience* would still be held over for explanation: the fact that God *is* present is for the mystic fundamental. Possibly the mystics are "the seers of the world." Whenever they open the eyes of their souls "the Eternal Light" may pour in. In any event, there is nothing to prevent the religious man, seeking to be loyal to logic as well as to truth, from seeing in his experience the influence of the living God. The mystic's ecstasies may not be of value, philosophically speaking. But as "earnest poetry" his description may effectively disclose "a certain cosmic sense, an apprehension of the ultimately real, a suggestion of a spiritual environment which though undemonstrable is

[19] Clifford Bax, Introd. to trans. of *The Signature of All Things*, by Jacob Boehme.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 442.

also irrefutable."[21] The present writer, agreeing with Pratt on the whole, would suggest that "scientific" psychology, whatever the type, must be supplemented by a spiritual psychology completing the studies of the human mind which are least satisfactory at the most important point, namely, the higher level or most interior region of the human spirit.

The Secondary Phenomena.—Doubtless any description of the visions, auditions, and ecstasies which a psychologist might venture to contribute would be correlated with the highly sensitized psychophysical organism which they imply in case of this or that mystic.[22] Here the matter apparently ends. But to stop here would be to neglect the fact, insisted on by Mrs. Herman, that the validity of the experience, such as a vision or audition, does not depend on its objective reality: it is not a question of things "seen" or "heard," but of the practical effects wrought in the percipient. There may be hallucinations of the senses in a perfectly normal subject. The mental mechanism in question does not explain the religious values, the "life-enhancing quality," or "the blessed country which is no mere vision, but a home." Even a vision or audition "palpably wrought out of the subject's previous knowledge and experience" may have come "to make all things new . . . cutting through mists of indecision with a clear, sharp word of command, speaking undreamed counsels of perfection into the groping soul."[23] The vision may be the percipient's "deciphering of a message given for the first time," or it may be "the pictured reflection of what was already in the mind." The great dynamic vision must be measured by the extent to which it ministers to "the enlarging and deepening of the religious personality and to the building up of the life of communion with God." Visionary experiences are in any case "entirely normal *to the subject who experiences them.*"[24]

Some writers regard the results as meager indeed, when

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 458, 468.
[22] Cf. E. Herman, *Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, p. 60.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

matters are reduced to what mystics have actually said and done.[25] The results accomplished may have been wrought in spite rather than because of mystical experiences. Even in Paul's case, the apostle's work, in so far as it was significant for the world, was done "well after his mystical period was ended." Evidences of relapse and reaction abound. The emotional states of the mystics do not appear to be progressive. It is a question whether the self be permanently transmuted.[26] Doubts naturally arise because "man is never more egotistical than when under the stress of religious upheaval. The disorganized ego tends to force itself perpetually upon the attention, just as a disorganized digestion would." Since the percipient cannot forget himself, it is probable that by becoming highly important to himself the power of good and evil is greatly intensified. Each mystical narrative should therefore be sifted of this element of self-importance, the "bare occurrences" being abstracted. Thus in Mrs. Burr's purely naturalistic description the whole process seems to be a disturbance due to some "disuniting force" within the nebula of the given personality. Granted "vague and cloudy dream-recollections," it is a simple matter for the mystic to supplement experience by inventions, namely, "creations of a powerful imagination colored by his anthropomorphic inheritance." [27]

Assuming that hyper-suggestibility, habit, and emotion, reproducing oft-repeated impressions, coupled with "lowered vitality plus emotional excitement," and an appeal to "vestigiary" forces, Mrs. Burr believes these experiences can be explained. Mystical experience seems to involve an "animistic revival, acting counter to the later-developed intellectual and social elements of personality, with a result temporarily or permanently disintegrating." The peace, joy, and reunion are merely evanescent effects. Apparently, the personality is established on a higher level. But the reaction into doubt and gloom indicates that further crises are to follow. The positive benefits

[25] Cf. Burr, *Religious Confessions and Confessants*, pp. 336, 342.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 354.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 392, 428.

attributed by some writers to mystical experiences are by Mrs. Burr attributed to some kind of work, which, fortunately for the mystic, relieves the situation. The symbols adopted have indeed served a purpose. But the symbols change with the generation. If mystics understood that their visions and voices, terrors, and trances appertained to their lower nature, they need be plagued by these no longer.[28] Even more skeptical are the conclusions reached by Leuba, who judges both experience and doctrine by the attendant psychical phenomena.[29]

The Criterion.—To push criticism to this limit is to overlook the criterion so reasonably insisted on by James, when he shows that it is a question neither of origins nor of processes along the road to the religious goal. The psychologist is not justified in attributing the phenomena of mystical experiences to an animistic survival, to the percipient's "lower" nature; while neglecting possible present origins and the mystic's *higher* nature. Granted the presence of either "survivals" and besetting disturbances due to mental and bodily upheavals, or both, these phenomena may well be considered in the light of the values to which they lead. A mystic may have a beatific as well as a degrading vision. He may seem to see the presence of Christ in an experience so far-reaching that his whole life-work will bear testimony to its surpassing value. One would expect the vision as such to end, the emotion to wane, and a readjustment to ensue if, as in Paul's case, a great work is to begin. The memory carried with the participant will then be the unfailing incentive of all his works and days. It is not for the critic to class the vision as "imaginary," then discount the ensuing experiences in agreement with his adverse opinion. Granted that all visions and auditions are as subjective as all ecstasies obviously are, there may still be a profound inner conviction of divine reality, *vividly present*, namely, a core of reality underlying the experiences. Moreover, the participant himself may learn to make allowances for the phenomena so

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 483, 485.
[29] J. H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*

critically dwelt upon by Mrs. Burr and Professor Leuba, and push on to the discovery of that Reality which withstands all tests.[30]

Interior and Exterior Experiences.—Mystical experiences may be intelligibly classed as "exterior" for the mystic when, *for him,* there is a difference between experiences plainly pertaining to his own inner life and experiences no less assuredly related to what he takes to be the presence of God, the Absolute, Christ, the spiritual world, or some other superior object. For exterior experiences are different in value from those classed as *imaginal,* because they readily take on the sort of imagery to which the mystic is habituated, and may not have the deeply convincing sense of reality aforementioned.[31] A third class includes what Thouless calls "intellectual" experiences, because the objects are not described as either "seen" or "heard"; but by appeal to feeling are attributed to a presence or communication. St. Teresa records the fact that she did not experience exterior visions or locutions, although the Presence was in every way as evident and certain. Exterior visions and auditions are obviously the least trustworthy; imaginal experiences are somewhat more so; intellectual experiences are most credible. A trance-experience may yield a very vivid impression of the presence of God. What is consequential is the fact that the mystic is undergoing a longer or shorter period of unhappiness due to a painful inner conflict, amidst a restless yearning for something more than life is giving him. The experiences through which the mystic passes are not then to be judged by the phenomena as such, but rather by the struggle of the individual to renounce his own will, the "inner necessity" driving the mystic through manifold excesses toward his goal.[32] Thus he once more experiences conversion, namely, "mystical conversion." Such conversion is presupposed in

[30] Cf. E. Herman, *op. cit.,* Chap. III.

[31] With admirable caution, Thouless substitutes "imaginal" where the uncritical would assume that a religious experience is "imaginary"; the latter term involves an irrelevant judgment, *op. cit.,* p. 74.

[32] Thouless, *ibid.,* pp. 206, 212, 222, 226.

the mental state characteristic of mystical prayer known as "contemplation," described by the mystic as "the ineffable perception of God." Hence we again reach the conclusion that God's indwelling presence—a direct apprehension equivalent to a "possession" rather than a *thinking about* the presence—is the essence of mysticism. Thouless also notes "the absence of voluntary control over the earliest stages of mystical prayer" as still further evidence that the experience is a possession.[33] Thus contemplation may begin and end independently of the actions of the percipient. When ecstasy ensues there may be entire cessation of sense-impressions, also temporary loss of power to make voluntary movements. Direction of activity toward God is the psychological beginning of the process rather than "introversion." Values may accrue if man's highest activity is to love God.[34]

The Validity of Mystical Experience.—Although the ecstasy or transport remains for the mystic essentially incommunicable, we have then as signs such qualities as passivity, transiency, the predominance of states of feeling, and the conviction that the experience is in part noetic or cognitive by which to identify it.[35] Whatever the shortcomings of the mystic's attempts at mediation, the experience is sufficiently marked to prove the validity of his type of consciousness, in contrast with the non-mystical or rationalistic type. We chronicle the fact that for the mystic his states are absolutely authoritative; and yet the authority of these states is not sufficient to warrant uncritical acceptance of the revelations coming by their means.[36] We may well compare our supposedly "rational" beliefs with those of the mystic, noting how we too depend on the deliverances of experience. Plainly, "the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content of its own."[37] Since the most diverse doctrines may be derived from its content, the results, both

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 237.
[35] James, *op. cit.*, pp. 380, 405.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 422.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 425.

theoretical and practical, remain to be tested as we judge the products of any other experience. We may add that if the forerunners of Christian mysticism during the Middle Ages had been able to discriminate between experiences occupying a justifiable place in terms of the Gospels and doctrines derived from Neo-Platonism, centuries of controversy might have been avoided. For it was especially through an alleged Christian mystic (now known as pseudo-Dionysius) that extraneous views entered into Christian thought, notably the view that God is super-essential.[38] When mystical doctrine, confused with mystical experience, became a tradition, *mystical thought became a pattern,* the authoritative guide to the mystical way.

The resource is reinterpretation of mystical experience, notably the extreme type, according to the best results of the psychology of religion as a whole. For example, if putting ourselves sympathetically into the percipient's place, we venture to estimate ecstasy, we observe that "ecstasy or vision begins when thought ceases, *to our consciousness.*" [39] Differentiating ecstasy from (1) dreaming (the percipient is "awake" during his ecstasy), and (2) hallucination (the percipient has no "organic disturbances"), we learn that in this the surpassing phase of mystical experience there is said to be at least a temporary enhancement of mental activities. In contrast with poetical inspiration, the imagination is relatively passive. Again, the mystics were themselves able in large measure to make allowances for disordered nerves, weakened digestion, and delusions; while also distinguishing between self-induced visions which imply pride and bring abnormal results, and directing their attention to actual spiritual benefits under right conditions.[40]

Recent psychology adds to these qualifications the fact that thought does not actually cease when it seems to, either in the state called passivity or in ecstasy; but that the experience itself, together with its interpretation, is

[38] Inge, *Christian Mysticism,* p. 106.
[39] Inge, *op. cit.,* p. 14.
[40] Cf. Inge, *ibid.,* p. 16 foll.

partly conditioned by mediating thought, as indeed all visions partake of the types of imagery that belong to the percipient. We may then conclude that the values of mysticism are those of religion at large, the factors being essentially the same, with the same possibilities of error and the same opportunity to preserve values. We have the same reason for guarding against any excess of experience, inference, or practical result, as in studying other phenomena which involve both the ordinary intra-marginal factors of consciousness and the extra-marginal operations concerning which we know so little. Doubtless, mystical experience as a whole can best be envisaged in the terms for which we are indebted to Mr. Myers, with reference to the larger self below the threshold of ordinary consciousness, with the probability that other types or modes of energy are brought within the range of this subliminal self. In these terms, we may conserve the facts which withstand the test, assigning to inner experience a certain primacy in so far as such experience yields its distinctive qualities; its renewing life or energy, its creative influence on our ideas and our imagery, and its emotional power and feeling-tone. Other values of this experience will be considered in subsequent chapters, with reference to symbolism and belief in the spiritual world.

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CHAPTER XV

PERSONALITY

Its Significance.—By implication the preceding analyses of aspects of the religious life point to the existence of a self or spirit that prays, worships, adopts an attitude of faith, hope, love, aspiration; believes in God. So too the self is implied in the distinction between the old man and the new, so far as conversional experiences or the mystical vision accomplish a central change or interior unification. Such a center or unity may also be said to underlie the experienced contrast between the mind of the flesh and the mind of the spirit, with intimations of a larger or deeper self whose deliverances suggest the possibility of the highest type of unity.

Personality may be said to range from these, the most interior meanings or values of the self, to those outward manifestations cited in popular terms when a religious speaker is described as magnetic, persuasive, or eloquent. By personality we ordinarily mean those qualities which either repel or win and deeply influence in a direction of which we approve. A leader may be either inferior or superior to his message. If distinctive in type, we refer to his individuality as in part the combination of capacities and traits which differentiate him from his fellows. Again, personality may be implied in religious experience because of its intense emotionalism, its keen susceptibility, or profound absorption in mystical contemplation. The emotional personality often impresses us as one-sided. We say the same of a person who espouses either the religion of healthy-mindedness, sometimes called the joy-philosophy, or a pessimistic type of religious belief. By contrast, we especially approve of a well-balanced or rationalistic type,

although this approval depends upon our judgments concerning the function of reason in religion.

Types of Personality.—Inasmuch as our whole study is in a sense an effort to determine what personality is, we may give more attention for the moment to what may be called the empirical values. That personality is something we experience, a value rather than a matter to be exhaustively analyzed by reference to traits and mental elements, becomes clear when we consider what underlies religious consciousness and experience in impressive instances of religious people we have known. If personality stands for what I am when I participate in experiences reaching into the great beyond; for what I feel, love, hope for, pursue with my heart or will, also for what I think when thought is at its best; then it must be said that I know personality appreciatively rather than by analysis or by unifying its moods or contrasts.

Indirectly, I apprehend my selfhood in this larger sense by relationship with my fellows, in the light of their effect upon me. At times, I am more concerned to know their deepest response, especially with regard to my ideals, my purpose in life, than in any mere self-estimate. Thus I may come to know my type more intimately, and, by relation, to know others whose type is akin to my own. Again, I discern personality in a measure when, noting significant qualities in correlation, I generalize religious types according to the balance or contrast between spirit and form, spontaneity and precision, creative insight and stereotypes, coupled with the ability of these people to inspire other men. Thus I approximate an ideal for all who would adequately realize their type. Still further, I may try at times to articulate the salient characteristics of this or that religious leader, with the hope that others who know these people will offset my limitations by picturizing these men as they in turn class and appreciate them.

Here is a leader, for example, who in external appearance is pleasing, who is free from mannerisms, does not seem unduly self-conscious, is neither too serious nor too formal in his utterances; he talks freely in a clear-cut,

distinctive style, essentially smooth-flowing, a style that admirably agrees with his ready insight. By effective appeals to homely incidents in daily life, he leads the way toward general principles and their application without intruding his personality in a didactic or authoritative way. He gives evidence of sure grasp of the eternal verities by reformulating what for him are the essentials or permanent qualities of religion, meanwhile subordinating what is transitory and declaring his independence of creeds and sects. His own cult seems merely means to an end far beyond itself. So his utterances serve as means to the end he would have you see, while persuasively setting forth his convictions, that you may realize that he is in every way affirmative. If optimistic, it is because he has grappled with the issues that sometimes suggest despair to other men. If keenly reflective, he brings the truths of the inner life out into the open, giving no evidence that he introspects too much. In brief, the religious spirit finds expression through what we call the normal life. Adequately to know him would be to know a type of what we may venture to call normal personality, although we admit a difficulty in undertaking to say what it is to be spiritually normal. The beauty of character in this instance consists in large part in this man's ability to transmit what he sees, what he hears, what he thinks, what he yearns for as through a transparent medium which, in its turn, is all the more genuinely typical of personality because each aspect of his utterance partakes of what he is.

Here is a leader of smaller stature, spiritually, who gives every evidence of moral earnestness, religious zeal, intense devotion. His attitude, manner of showing his emotions, and his way of putting things prove his consecration. But distracting mannerisms, facial expressions, and signs of habitual self-consciousness indicative of intense introspection betray his impeded personality. In a better mood for praying and preaching at one time than at another, on occasion he is plainly laboring under persistent difficulties while trying to bring forth his sentences. Personality is so plainly in process in his case that he falls far short at

nearly every point where the smooth-flowing personality excels. One must penetrate sympathetically beneath these processes in order to discern what for him is the true gospel, a gospel which he is somewhat painfully trying to realize. Yet he is typical of thousands of impeded people in the religious world, some of whom are introverts, others subject to moods of depression, and still others overwhelmed at times by emotion, far more richly developed in power to feel than in ability to come forth into objectivity and service.

A Balanced Type.—A third leader suggests by his deliberate utterance an inner life marked by composure, poise, profound control. He brings the spirit of one who has really attained, or realized. Moderated utterance befits his type, although he permits an impassioned sentence or two to pass his lips to emphasize a significant principle. Intellectually, he seems to possess a formally precise, systematized group of principles and eternal verities; he develops his theme by aid of universals which suggest a philosophy of the universe rather than a theology. His thought is keen, forced home by utterances as clear-cut as those of the first leader mentioned, though different in quality. Emotionally, his spirit finds expression through prayer in which he shows himself zealously worshiping, devoutly believing in God. The unusual stillness of the house of worship during the long prayer bears testimony to the fact that his prayer is being attentively followed. By appealing in his sermon to central principles, to life at large as the intelligent student may see it, he puts faith on a rational basis, and appeals to religion as part of a life in which the same laws are implied on one day as on any other. He shows that the religious life is for him central, but by touching the bed-rock of faith so as to manifest freedom from peculiarities frequently associated with the ardently religious person. He appeals especially to religious truth, very little to religion in a mystical sense, to emotional imagery, or to any quality that seems to demand introspection. Some would object to his deliberate manner, the simplicity of his spiritual appeal; and the youth of our day would be

impatient when he pauses to let the spirit of his utterance have its effect. Worshipers of other types would also object, and find him dull. But these would be the people who demand an elaborate ritual, spectacular ceremonialism, with rapid modes of utterance, and constant appeal to the emotions; they would not appreciate either silent worship or any other religious simplicity. And this man is admittedly a great believer in the values of the religion of the Spirit. His is a balanced type of that sort. Others would prefer a representative of the religion of authority.

An Emotional Type.—Turning to religious followers, here is one whose personality shows that she has suffered deeply, worked persistently for others through a devotion and self-sacrifice which have sometimes reached the extreme; and that in sympathy, love, buoyant hope she is unexcelled. Gratitude or thankfulness is paramount in manifold expressions of her faith, in spoken and written words. Incurably optimistic, always anticipating a better tomorrow wherein today is disappointing, faith in the divine providence is with her a central principle. Intuitive rather than intellectual (if intellect means science), her piety is in a measure paradoxical. For she is conservative in the extreme in adhering to doctrines which to her are essential to the church which she finds preëminent, and yet she is uncommonly alert regarding new discoveries and recent teachings of the special sciences which if followed out logically would conflict with her theology. At times her faith seems triumphant. Again, her depression is abysmal. She is typical of people whose religious life is emotional in the nobler sense of the term; while subject to emotional vicissitudes which criticism might overcome, to which intellectual integration would bring relief. Such a temperament shows by contrast the deficiencies of those who, through pride, egotism and cold analysis seem to overdo intellectual religion. Yet if the religious person whose cold scrutiny penetrates the emotions to the limit is no less religious, what we have here is a type, not the standard. For her partisanship is so pronounced, because her emotions are so intense, that only with difficulty can she

accord to another type its due. Religion, for her, is solely what she believes; and to be religious is to be touched in one's sympathies as she is touched (amidst an assumption of self-righteousness of which she seems totally oblivious).

An Intuitive Type.—Here is a no less eager religious person whose tendency toward self-sacrifice is equally pronounced, who is gentle-spirited, touched with humility; but whose sincere faith in God is wholly independent of the doctrinal conservatism of the person just mentioned. This man seems to make the transition from religious needs and the call to communion with God without the traditional intermediaries and emotional associations which others deem absolutely essential. Intuition now takes a practical rather than an emotional form, and the realization of the nearness of spiritual realities seems to be such that others are appealed to by this faith as at once simple and intellectually persuasive. This intuition affords a practical method of a quietly persuasive type, which leads one to question whether the usual religious emotions, observances, and institutions are essential. In emotion, fineness of feeling, beauty of sentiment, his mind is of the quality sometimes distinguished as feminine. Yet he combines with this receptivity a masculine strength of conviction that God is profoundly real, intimately near, a power to live by in every contingency. It has been said of him that "if ever a man believed in God it is he." Personality with him is inexpressibly tender and gentle, and from what he is one can see what his God has come to be, a God whom he has suffered to win by first casting from his mind every vestige of Calvinism, as so much "lumber" blocking his mind (this is his phrase).

Contrasted Traits.—Traits which we readily associate with religious personality in the comprehensive sense of the word are paramount in this or that individual whose entire life may be summarized by one motive. Thus the evangelist whose zeal is devoted to saving souls in the slums of a great city may personify an emotional faith that is remarkably contagious, as if emotion and word were perfectly coördinated in every sentence. Apparently, the con-

stancy so often dependent on a theological system or upon an institution gives place to integrations based on experience, and capable of meeting an emergency where faith wells up almost like a miracle. Again, religious personality is manifested by the serene countenance of the Friend, dedicated to the values of inner guidance and silent worship, eschewing the emotions so ardently espoused by the evangelist. Love toward God and man may apparently be the ruling motive of an evangelist like Mr. Moody, who emotionally impressed thousands of people who could not by any means accept his theology. This may also be the central motive in the calmly quiet person who goes about his daily philanthropies as if never actuated by emotions. The intensely personal individual, whose religion is ostensibly emotional, will marvel at the apparent apathy of the one whose sentiments, because deep, are hidden save in the deeds to which these promptings lead. A religious emotion does not seem to be real unless ostentatious, unless it leads to impassioned utterance; but the quietly poised person finds it real because it lacks all ostentatious traits. One religious personality finds vent in a rapidly uttered ritual which the Friend, because interiorly quiet, cannot follow, or does not wish to follow at the expense of his composure. The devotee of silent worship may seem so insufferably dull to the ritualist that apparently there can be no religion not made manifest by a certain type of behavior. Yet the Friend may inwardly possess the great boon of the religious ages, the permanent value of all mystical experience, without any of its eccentricities.

Individual Differences.—To note the fact of individual differences so great that the ceremonialist can scarcely appreciate the Friend, while the emotionalist may be almost as intolerant as the doctrinaire, is to realize that personality is indeed a baffling term. If personality as a clue to man's religious nature may be regarded as approximately universal, then this or that individual may be said to exemplify certain constituents only; while the limitations of this type are obvious. Thus the intensity of consciousness in the introspective person may seem an obstacle to one

who by type is social and objective. Yet the latter, as an extrovert, if religious at all in the profound sense, is also religious through response to conscious values, although he may not be aware of it. Consciousness is a direct clue to any type. Inner experience may however be discounted by high-church persons who do not permit experience to function save within doctrinally authorized precincts. Experience is no more likely to be exaggerated by the man who reflectively starts with it than by the one who tacitly appeals to it all the while, amidst what seems to be mere doctrine accepted on authority. The doctrinaire inveighs against the liberal, on the ground that the latter asserts self-intelligence or intellectual pride. But what is to be said of the former, continually jumping to his feet in protest every time a speaker ventures to depart one iota from an established formula?

The self as a whole may figure in any case. There are always intellectual coördinations of some sort, however deeply the personal rationalizations may be concealed. Usually, there is an emotional expression of some sort, varying from extreme control to excessive partisanship, in the case of one who is a mere follower. Our preferences are partly temperamental, whatever we may attribute to doctrine. We expect our disposition to be reformed, our character to be remade, a new will to be created, and a new heart to come forth as it were by miracle; actually, we carry over beyond conversion whatever we are, many traits being unchanged.

The Religious Self.—Psychology does not disclose any instinct, emotion, sense, faculty, or power exclusively religious; for any mode of consciousness or experience, immediacy or expression may yield a religious clue. At the outset, we naturally regard man's entire personality (intellectual, moral, practical) as implicitly religious. Any power or quality may be transfigured, and a man may become so intensively spiritual that we describe him as a religious personality. So too there may be a focus of powers and values yielding what has been called God-consciousness, or any other integration of activities and experiences to which

special value is attributed. Thus the term spiritual mind acquires a particular meaning, so special indeed that we brook no confusion with the mind of the flesh. Inevitably, the intense religionist distinguishes a phase of his selfhood as inferior, although he may not deem it sinful or evil. For he is concerned with personality as a eulogistic term, capable it may be of the imitation of Christ. But this contrast involves a value-judgment. It does not imply two distinct minds. To refer to several selves within us is still to mean that there is one personality. So, too, the unconscious, subconscious, subliminal, and the superconscious (in Hindoo mysticism) are phases. The religious self is whatever we set apart, especially when we identify it with our basic nature and describe it as spirit or soul. An extreme instance of artificial sundering of the self into two is seen in Hudson's popular view that there is a subjective mind and also an objective.[1] What is meant is that there are externalizing modes which differ from modes in which the mind is more explicitly subjective. The preferable contrast, for religious psychology, is the one we shall adopt, namely, that between the interior phase of selfhood or personality which we identify with man as a spiritual being, as his basic mind or nature; and his exterior phases, which are subject to environmental change. This is admittedly an interpretation. But our study leads to a point of view, we are concerned with personal religion, and personal religion centers about the inner life; this in turn appears to be our basic nature.

Constructive Personality.—Any religious devotee is likely to protest against a realistic description of personality, as if it were merely what external appearances indicate, for example, when a leader is called magnetic. What we mean by spirit as the acme of personality is partly what our doctrine teaches us, and the mind of the spirit is the mind we praise. This is especially true in case we identify our basic mentality, what we call our real nature, with the divine image and likeness into which man is said to have been created. This our true nature,

[1] T. J. Hudson, *The Law of Psychic Phenomena.*

as some of us say, yields the standard. We hope that this nature will sometime be dominant. Permanent conversion is precisely what some of us mean when we say that the greatest personal change is, after all, *self-realization.* Thus the Greek type of ethical thought is preferred by some to what seems like excessive emphasis on losing the self, in the conventional Christian's eulogy of self-sacrifice.

Granted the conclusion that spirit in our selfhood is basic, the whole problem of personality is this: to discover how to make the spiritual mind habitual, while also learning how it is that we are so prone to submit when people condition us into a secondary mind—the mind of mere patterns, conventions, traditions, uncritical values. In other terms, we hope to understand and master the mind of the flesh, and the patterned mind imposed upon us by our education and our social contacts in general. If, with Plato, we believe the soul or spirit to be partly a prisoner in the flesh (hence the mind of the flesh), although it is rightfully a denizen of the eternal world, our conception is essentially idealistic: self or personality is a value-term.[2] Consequently, the problem of personality is one of adjustment while we are here on earth, hampered by inferior processes calling for progressive sublimation. Personality is in any case a constructive term, notably when we make allowances for what is denominated the subconscious mind or subliminal self, with the probability that there is also a measure of truth in the Freudian unconscious.

Any description may be suggestive, even when we read about glands regulating personality and why we behave like human beings when we are queer. So too the central aspects of behavior described as traits of personality and correlated with capacities of the individual may at least suggest the possibility of complete integration of man's behavior.[3] Naturally, all popular self-estimates are rejected as untrustworthy from this point of view. Personality is suggestively defined by Allport as "the individual's characteristic reactions to social stimuli, and the quality of

2 Cf. Plato, in the *Phaedo,* 65 foll., Jowett's trans.
3 Cf. Allport, *Social Psychology,* p. 99.

his adaptation to the social features of his environment." Thus personality figures as a "result" of social behavior, although it does become a "cause" in the social leader. Thus regarded, personality is: (1) *"native physical endowment,"* including the qualities of nervous tissues underlying intelligence and other physiological factors; and (2) "the *systems of habits* developed in the process of adjusting an individual of given physical endowment to his particular environment."[4] For the moment we seem to have lost personality in the religious meanings of the term. But a partial religious clue may be found in such a classification when, for example, it is noted that "submissive habits commonly attend an inferior physique."[5] Again, the native capacity or drive involves "habitual trends of effort in the direction of accomplishment." Intelligence is defined as "the capacity for solving the problems of life," a factor which obviously differs in religious people, and was very great in the intuitive type already mentioned. Since this capacity functions by aid of symbols that epitomize the individual's past experience in relation to his social situation, much will depend on these habit-patterns in the guidance of responses pertaining to the individual's future. Memory, perceptual ability, constructive imagination, special abilities, soundness of judgment, general adaptability, the characteristic emotional level, and emotional breadth are also factors in personality as thus described.[6]

Personality Drives.—Applying these terms to religious people, we readily characterize one who, for example, has a "continuous high potential of emotion." In a personality of great emotional strength, the leading trait is this emotional attitude, for example, in the emotional type before mentioned, in which what has been called the "personalism" is so strong that it amounts to an assertion that to be personal in her way only is to be religious. Again, a person

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[5] The intuitive type described in the preceding pages was that of a man of exceedingly frail physique, temperamentally submissive. The behaviorist is not interested in the slightest degree in the remarkably rich religious consciousness of such a man.

[6] Allport, *op. cit.*, pp. 103, 105.

may be essentially timid, embarrassed, over-sensitive, and "self-deprecatory" in type. Hence the religious experiences and consciousness will be affected accordingly. Granted the native trend or drive, namely, "the prepotent habit, or group of habits, which acquires a compelling power similar to that of the prepotent reflexes," the personality may be described by reference to such considerations as shyness, compensation (for example, in a retreat from reality), extroversion or introversion, insight, submission, expansion, or whatever the distinctive trait involving what Allport regards as "intense personalization." When there is a passion for souls in case of a leader like Moody or Evangeline Booth, the whole personality is integrated toward this achievement, religion being "the major drive." Self-estimates would be faulty in the study of such drives and traits from within because, for one thing, "rationalization" tends to make us "oblivious of our true natures."[7] In these modern terms, one would avoid any tendency to be "centered in the drives of his own personality" lest this should involve introversion. A religious motive, like that which quickened John Wesley, who was "actuated by the desire for the religious redemption of mankind,"[8] would naturally lift both the interior attitude and the habitual emotional response to a higher level, the "drive" having been interpreted by appeal to its divine relationship.[9]

Personality as an End.—With the acceptance of a value-judgment, human personality is no longer regarded as a group of behavior-patterns, not as a means, but first of all as an end.[10] Personality then becomes a center of values,

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[9] The term "drive" was introduced by R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, 1918, in favor of an advance beyond both introspectionists and behaviorists; since "neither consciousness nor behavior provides a coherent system of processes" in our effort to assign causes. Consciousness falls short, since the processes partly disclosed also occur in part below the threshold. Behaviorism omits the intervening or dynamic process between stimulus and reaction.

[10] In the Kantian ethics, for example; cf. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 279.

a living central point or "locus of values." Personality invests all other factors of religion with value. It becomes a symbol of or a clue to the divine nature. Granted personality as the center of interest in religious experience, a scale of values is possible. Thus the factors noted in Allport's description take on a very different meaning. As Höffding clearly shows, "the burden of proof must always lie with those who wish to inhibit, limit, force, or pain."[11] While religious officials, in behalf of authority, plead that such restriction is necessary, personality does not seek justification by appeal to authority. "Only when the individual has won and developed his religious conviction for himself can he throw his whole nature into it. Hence the ideal to be arrived at is the greatest possible activity of the self," all tradition and authority having been restricted to the stimulative, guiding or educational values. The individual personality is not only a center of value but also a center of experience. "For it is within the realm of personality that the relation of value to reality is experienced, and such experience forms the foundation of all religion."[12]

Expansiveness as a Test.—Thus the term expansive acquires new meaning: the spiritual life will be greatly enriched when the individual is permitted to make up his account "on the basis of his own experiences and of his own intellectual development."[13] Allowances will naturally be made for those discordant and unduly quiet natures in which there is one-sided emphasis on values. So too the persistence of personality will be distinguished from substitution, separation, and distinction. When the mystic who becomes a pantheist inculcates real substitution of the divine being for human nature, man is depersonalized; and "without personality the universe falls to pieces."[14] To personality is due what Inge calls "the strictest unity of which we have any experience," on which the very postulate of unity in all philosophy is based. It is not necessary

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 279.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 281; cf. J. A. Leighton on "The Status of Values," *The Field of Philosophy*, Chap. XXVII.
[13] Höffding, *ibid.*, p. 317.
[14] Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 30.

to conceive personality by taking the human spirit to be a monad, as if it were sharply separated from other spirits; for "distinction, not separation, is the mark of personality . . . it is separation, not distinction, that forbids union." It would be a psychological error to regard consciousness of self as the measure of personality, the depths of personality being "unfathomable." Thus the term "expansion" once more appears with new meaning, namely, through "realizing new correspondences, new sympathies and affinities with the not-ourselves"—those affinities which condition, "and in conditioning constitute our true life as persons."[15]

The Levels of Personality.—Avoiding the identification of personality with any mere assemblage of traits or dispositions, modes of conduct, or any experience such as that which the extreme mystic so readily misconstrues, we may envisage its affinities on various levels, (1) that of sense-perception, for example, determined by organic structures and processes; (2) the level of desire, with its emergent drives, later described selectively in terms of will; (3) the level of thought or understanding; and (4) that of a constructive idea of the soul or spirit with special reference to the secret place or inmost region, distinguishable from the idea of God, though yielding a basis of thought for communion with the divine and relationship with the spiritual world.

Where once the stress was put upon spiritual substance, as if the soul were a sort of monad as determinate as a chemical atom in its objective relation with other souls, recent thought characterizes the persistence of personality by envisaging the "togetherness and continuity" of inner experiences.[16] Our experiences plainly do not "float," do not occur singly; but, coming together and developing in a certain manner, the central feature of this integrated growing existence is *personal* togetherness. Personality is thus defined anew as "integrative totality." Since each of our individual acts is the result of former experiences, "every

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[16] Cf. John Laird, *The Idea of the Soul*, 1924, p. 64.

pulse of the soul has the signs of its history upon it." Self-consciousness makes us "aware of the personal togetherness of our knowing." So we cognize our emotional solidarity, moodiness, temperaments, and sentiments; also "the active organization of our endeavor" (character). Thinking guides, feeling prompts, and prompted endeavors imply the self.

The Self as a Whole.—Does it follow that the self as a whole enters into experience? The answer is that the self as a whole is a changing self, differently exercised from moment to moment. Naturally, the manner of psychical continuity puzzles us because of the intermittence of our functions.[17] If we ask, what is its single stubborn totality? Laird answers that it involves "the ripening and maturing cogitative sequences which cannot be . . . explained by any conscious effort." Hence there appears to be "some fundamental continuity of the soul" that is not *conscious* continuity at all. In other words, there are capacities and powers such that a given individual denominated a brave man is one who *would* act courageously if an occasion arose, his permanent capacities not being examinable. Laird does not fall back on that "disingenuous expedient," the unconscious, but leaves the matter with our psychical dispositions. What we are concerned with then is *the whole self* underlying all these phases.

The religious inference to be drawn from this suggestive conclusion is that there is need of closer integration between the several phases of our nature. This is difficult because of (1) the intermittence of our consciousness, and (2) the mutability of the psychical unity.[18] Again, there is the physical factor, the behavior which is contrasted with the effort to attain greater mental integrity; the unity of selfhood for which we strive is a matter of degree that may pass out of sight. Not in any case does it seem to be a new self that appears. What the facts lead us to assume concerning the soul is a continuant rather than an invariant or permanent: the soul is a descriptive rather than a ra-

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 81, 85.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

tional essence; there is a continuity of dispositions rather than a persistence of experiences.[19] Hence we may say of the great apostle: the dispositions integrated as Saul continued into the new integration (Paul), while the old experiences associated with the persecution of Christians came to an end. The conversion on the road to Damascus did not create by miracle a new invariant or permanent personality. The apostle's inner life as disclosed in his epistles is in process of struggling toward a better continuant.

Psychological description does not reach beyond the fact that "the individual reacts at one moment with one set of traits and at another with another, perhaps of an opposite character."[20] Thus sentiments of hatred and love may alternate, as do interest and its opposite, charitableness and uncharitableness, intelligence and stupidity. Prince presupposes a suppressing or switching off from the functioning systems of the personality, which may now be defined as "the *sum total* of all enduring traits and their underlying organized dispositions, potential and active, innate and acquired."[21] Character includes those traits and dispositions which are predominant, those that distinguish the personality at different moments; it is not stable, but is a variant of personality. On this view the practical religious question would be: What are the varying moods to which the functioning parts of the personality is subject from time to time? What are the conflicts between mental systems? Since not all the variables of personality are assembled into a functioning whole, the problem is to become aware of and allow for all the variables, traits, systems of disposition (innate and acquired) which are likely to determine the reflexes, the native tendencies and appetites, that is, the primary units of personality. While the description thus offered does not reach beyond the physiological basis of neural dispositions, the religionist may find a clue for investigation apart from the assumption that

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 146, 155.

[20] Morton Prince, in *The Pedagogical Seminary*, June, 1925, p. 269.

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

conversion is a means of attaining the desired integration of personality.

Summary.—Psychology investigates the dispositions, traits, and other temperamental constituents of personality in its relation with bodily behavior, habits, and the various patterns from which come the beginnings of character and conduct (as higher terms). Emphasis falls on those processes in which mind and body are in most intimate relation. The picture disclosed is that of tendencies striving for expression and control, more notable for diversity than for unity. Personality is so rich that analysis falls short in proportion as matters of fact give place to value-judgments. Our ideals lead toward the coördination of traits and dispositions in accordance with a moral and spiritual purpose. The whole personality becomes significant for religion through this striving for a better integration. But there appears to be no normal person as such. At best there are types, describable according to the predominance of religious emotion and feeling, the values assigned to experience, the significance attributed to will and reason, the effort to realize the accepted standard of religious conduct. The implication is that individuals have contributory functions which they may fulfill by realizing their type. Naturally then the idea of personality is constructive. In saying this we bear in mind the fact that mental integrations of various degrees of effectiveness have been in process among those people who, at one period are keenly aware of the divided self, are at another stage recipients of the experience known as conversion through which they are said to acquire a new will or to become a new self. We also take account of the wider connotations of the term self and personality in our day, with reference to the region of selfhood said to exist below the threshold of consciousness The self, soul, or spirit which *is* conscious, *has* experience, undergoes conversion, prays, worships, participates in the mystical transport or ecstasy, or passes through yet other phases of religious activity, is the personality we are here considering with special reference to certain of its traits and characteristics.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE SUBCONSCIOUS

The Integrative Process.—A number of assumptions have come before us to which we need to give brief attention, in passing to other branches of our inquiry, notably the assumption that subconscious processes are active in religious experience; and the implication that there is a general trend toward integration operative in the quest for unity which is so significant in instances of the divided self. Much attention has recently been given to the integrative process in describing the stages of growth from childhood to maturity, with respect to the directive stages of such development, integration being the central principle. Again, the clue to the study of the subconscious and mental dissociation is found in the prior analysis of integration as the key to normal mental life.[1] Among the directive factors thus receiving renewed attention are the emotions, such as anger, fear, sympathy, appearing on the general background of dispositions, instincts, temperament, and character.[2] Given this complexity with its several trends, we move forward to the stage where the complicated emotions of self-assertion, the struggle for pleasure and power, for "the vast ego" with its eccentricities, discover themselves as integrations of activities which went before.

Meanwhile, the organism as a whole may be envisaged with reference to "the well-graded and appropriate reactions" which exhibit the fundamental organization of the sound body, the "necessary basis for a unified, harmonious, sound mind."[3] Thus mental integration, making for that

[1] Cf. *Readings in Abnormal Psychology*, ed. by W. S. Taylor, 1926.
[2] *Op. cit.*, Introd. by Jastrow, p. xxi foll.
[3] *Ibid.*, (Paton), p. 137.

high degree of control which we call sanity, presupposes the development of the nervous system and the body; efficient mental action depends on the coördinated, properly adjusted responses of a great many organs. Imperfect coordination, in Paton's terms, "spells inefficiency and waste of energy."

This emphasis on integration prepares the way for a description of the normal mind, a criterion of significance for our purposes, despite the fact that it is difficult to say precisely what it means to be normal in a religious sense of the term. Integration is defined by Tansley as "putting together to make a new whole," for instance, in the combination of simple motor responses to form complex ones.[4] If we interpret these specific responses as functions, we may illustrate the coördination of many single actions to form the main action by the achievement one makes in learning to drive a car. This main action is in turn part of a more extensive system of actions which have become habitual. The process of integration of minor into major responses is in turn "the key process" in the evolution of conduct.[5] In this combination of simpler into complicated and extended conscious actions, certain of the responses are signalized as purposive or adaptive. Thus we may envisage our most intelligent modes of conduct as highly appropriate responses to the given situation, as instructive instances of the normal mind.

The "acme of integration," the highest form of this coordination on the bodily side, is found in "the master tissues of the human organism, the nervous system."[6] The central nervous system is "the controlling system, and its special function is that of coördination and integration." As in the man of "integrity" there is no break in character, but an unsullied reputation, so in the sound organism as a whole there is control through integrative action. This unity of action is greater than that of the coördination of parts. In the process of evolution there has been a welding

[4] *The New Psychology*, p. 38.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[6] W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, 1924, p. 31.

together of component parts so that the organism has successfully reacted as a unity to the changing situations of its environment. Hence too the possibility of that unified activity which we call experience. In the body, the brain is "the supreme integrator." In the mind, there is a corresponding activity which is, in brief, "the essential characteristic of the normal mind."

Interferences.—Two factors intervene to prevent the smooth-flowing tendencies toward developmental integration: man's vigorous self-assertion, and the organized social pressure of the environment in which he lives. Competing with others whose strivings are no less intense, he is frequently repressed and thrown back upon himself. His emotional responses having been thus interfered with, his conduct is restricted, his temperamental self-expression is curbed. In brief, the development of character is conditioned by the socially complex situation in which man finds himself, first in childhood and adolescence, as we have described these stages of development in a previous chapter; then in the more complicated situations of adult life in which the social contacts are determined by conventional patterns of varied types. The prime result is inhibitions within, in response to social pressure from without. The typical instance is that of the curbing of passion or the emotions of anger and hatred. Granted this inner restraint, with the laying up of "complexes" in the less accessible region of the mind, the individual is likely to put on an appearance which is the opposite of his complex, whether it be an inferiority or a superiority complex. In his overt action a man may be shy, awkward, self-conscious; in his inner life he may be anything but timid or cowardly. Great indeed is likely to be the contrast between what his parents and teachers make of him, what he seems externally to be during adolescence and early adult life, and what he is inwardly in his ideal self or spirit. In religious terms, the result is two selves, two voices or natures, more or less dissociated. One self tends toward the socially imposed integrations. The other tends toward the integrations of the more or less baffled or submerged ideal. Thwarted, indulg-

ing in manifold compromises, man lives a life of alternating moods and baffling phases in which his complexes or repressions are represented by a struggle which he does not understand. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, not yet knowing the power of his ideal self, man identifies himself with his secondary mind, with his socially conditioned self. Thus from childhood a man is likely to take himself to be what society is making out of him. Religious workers are as likely to make the same identification, that is, they regard the man who stands in need of conversion as essentially what his conditioned self seems to be, as if he were wholly a sinner, a complete rogue, villain, thief, or criminal.

We may picturize the inner process at first in purely deterministic terms, as if it were solely a question of survival of the strongest instinct, desire or drive, in competition with the most positive repression or complex. Thus in describing emotional conflicts Morton Prince calls attention to the fact that the arousing of an emotion necessarily involves a conflict between its impulse and the impulse of any other mental state that is antagonistic to it.[7] Thus the instincts and sentiments which drive a man's behavior in one direction meet with resistance on the part of rival impulses impelling his behavior in another direction. The stronger impulse overcomes the other, and the central and efferent parts of the accompanying process are inhibited, with resulting modifications in the man's behavior. Thus an uprising sexual emotion, an emotion of fear or anger may be the victor; or under other circumstances it may be tender feeling or self-abasement which comes off victorious. Fear may be suppressed by anger. But it may also be overcome by tender feeling or curiosity (wonder). Or fear may in turn triumph over its rivals. So, too, hunger and the sexual instinct may succumb to disgust.

The vital consideration is that any one of these affective states may be overwhelmed and suppressed by any other affective state proving itself the stronger in the emotional conflict. The individual's knowledge of himself might well

[7] *Readings in Abnormal Psychology*, p. 258.

suggest a much wiser course of conduct, might mollify his anger, for instance, restrain his fear or check the rising tide of his passion. But the onsweep of his impulses is such that his better mental state cannot enter the focus of attention to gain control. Again, it may be the tender emotion which, by checking its rival, contracts the field of consciousness to its own associated states and memories. In either case, the emotion that is cut off, more or less dissociated, continues to be a factor in the conflicts of the inner life. A man may so far yield to a fear as to identify himself with it and become a slave to it; or, if he knows how to meet it, by cultivating the appropriate moral and religious sentiments, his will may triumph over it.

The Submerged Conflict.—Still taking our clue from the stronger impulse, we observe that a religious victory presupposes the awakening of a mental state sufficiently strong to lead the way to triumph over competing impulses and states. This newly acquired religious integration may then be instrumental in striving toward a still greater victory, in coöperation with other integrations, each of which stands for a triumph over its rivals. In time, the series of victories may be such that the secondary or socially conditioned mind, the mind of the flesh or lower self, may in large part give way to the mind of the spirit or basic mind. In this process of advance toward moral victory, a religious idea becomes effective in so far as emotional dispositions and sentiments are organized around it so that it can successfully compete with other ideas, reënforced by their accompanying sentiments and dispositions. Once acquired, such an idea may continue as a subconscious trend, encountering other trends below the conscious threshold.

We may then describe the old man (Saul) in our nature, struggling against the new man (Paul), as a group of ideas and sentiments acquired long ago when these old states were uppermost, conditioned by the several social contacts of childhood, adolescence, and early adult life. The more persistently we will to realize the new standard, the more steadily the old man struggles, apparently as much dissociated from our present will as if another personality re-

sided under our skin. The extreme instance is what we call an obsession. Doubtless, in the majority who undergo religious changes amounting to an upheaval of the entire inner nature the conflict is at first below the level of consciousness. Hence the conscious life discloses what is nowadays called "compensatory behavior." Indeed, the actual life known to a person thus inwardly torn by incompatible impulses may involve one compensation after another, in his thoughts, his imaginings, fantasies, and his day-dreaming. Meanwhile, he may be more or less relieved from the stress and strain of conflict. If, however, he were aware that the conflict persists for the most part because he still identifies himself with the old man, he would about face with a vengeance, utterly refusing to identify himself with anything short of his spirit. The vital point, psychologically speaking, is implied in the transfer of dynamic attention from the old to the new. For when we break inwardly with what we have been, the ensuing changes are rapid and decisive. Hence it is that the change of heart is the real conversion.

Religion as a whole has frequently been described as a compensation for the tensions, strains, and disappointments of the world; and it is well to recognize the measure of truth in this interpretation of the inner conflict. On this hypothesis the sentiments in question do not actually triumph over and assimilate the dispositions with which they contend: they are substitute mechanisms for an intolerable state of affairs, a means of escape or retreat, as the early Christians sought refuge from worldliness. Thus the Kingdom of Heaven or City of God became the great compensatory idea. So within recent times young people disappointed in love have found compensation in social service or in the field of foreign missions. Religious services of worship are consolations for the lonely. Eternity compensates for time. To push this view to the extreme would be to characterize religion in general as a substitute mechanism, as if the spiritual life were never to become victorious. The objection is that religion is judged by life's interferences and failures. The profounder reaches of human per-

sonality are ignored. By contrast, the ideal of courageous religion is: coördination of those activities which make for the highest integration of human character.

Religious Integration.—Bringing together the foregoing considerations, we observe that there is a developmental integration of the organism as a whole, with a remarkable culmination of attainments in the human brain. Correlated with this organic development is the mental development coördinated with self-control, which in turn is a highly organized resultant, a master integration. Normal mental life implies a regular direction of growth toward more highly integrated conduct, for example, intellectual efficiency, moral integrity, and other types of moral and spiritual success. It is no less normal to be actuated by desires, emotions, and sentiments which impulsively tend toward goals of their own. As individuals, we are least likely to be integrated at the point where we need it most, in this emotional and impulsive complexity. Identifying ourselves with what our social situations have instilled into us as patterns of behavior and conduct, religious integration has remained an ideal which we have not known how to realize. Most of us are as little aware what our complexes are as aware of our basic nature or spiritual self. We do not seek the causes of our conflicts with the determination to overcome them. Hence life remains a conflict, the problem of the divided self being the typical difficulty.

Adolescence as described by Starbuck is from first to last such an assemblage of competing and more or less mysterious impulses amidst which youth is striving toward an integration which is to make the self more socially useful. So too James describes religious experience as disclosing itself among useful and erring impulses in relative chaos, howbeit there is also a straightening out and unifying of the inner self, a progress from a state in which higher and lower feelings commingle.[8] Ideally speaking, these conflicting impulses must somehow end by "forming a stable system of functions in right subordination." The assumption underlying the whole process is the conviction

[8] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 170

that unity and inner peace *can be attained.* This great victory has indeed been won in notable cases, for example, that of Augustine and Alline (a modern instance). For both of these men emerged into "the smooth waters of inner peace and unity."[9] The process may occur gradually or come abruptly, and the religious way of attaining unity is but one instance of a general mode of "remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord." The significant consideration in the religious instance is "the irruption into the individual's life of some new stimulus or passion, such as love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion," including a transition from a period of storm and stress and inconsistency to a firmness, stability and equilibrium. In such experiences as those of Bunyan and Tolstoy, the participants actually found "a *something* welling up in the inner reaches of their consciousness." James calls it "a faith, a force that reinfuses the positive willingness to live, even in full presence of the evil perceptions that erstwhile made life seem unbearable."[10]

The Stream of Thought.—We have only to note the sequences and alternations of our own mental processes, in comparison with the ideal of complete inner control and coordination, to realize how far short actual mental life is with most of us. Beginning with the struggle to arouse one's self in the morning to spring out of bed, and continuing through the day's complex activities to the last moment of active consciousness before sleep at night, the stream of thought is a strange commingling of order and disorder. Even when we concentrate upon the task at hand during several hours in succession, attention wavers more or less between the main interest, the distractions and details of the process in which one is engaged, the thoughts that intervene, and the repeated efforts by which this sustained attention is achieved. Then ensues the hour of rest, exercise, or sociability, the new interest, or the subsequent task; while the preceding task or interest drops into relative inactivity below the threshold. Mental integration is per-

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

haps best exemplified in this surprising complexity of moods, emotions, volitions, and ideas in relation to one's central purpose in life, to which the main task of the day is contributory. Again, there are integrations making in the direction of character and life's ideal in general. But even in the most profitable days of the entire year these greater integrations are dominant during a part of the time only. When sleep ensues, the whole stream of thought and character-activity drops below the threshold. Fatigue and illness are but two of the more serious interruptions in which a man seems to be only in part himself. A different phase of the stream of thought rises into activity during portions of those days which, like Sundays and holidays, and days during the summer vacation are characterized by other interests. What we call human personality somehow includes the total of all these alternations, and so includes them that it persists during sleep.

Subconscious Fruitions.—In studying personality in the light of religious values, we saw how difficult it is to describe the continuity which persists through contrasted dispositions and partial integrations. Does it follow that intuition achieves its unifications subconsciously? This hypothesis is popular at present. Apparently, all religious experience is accounted for in this way. Our study of conversion tends to confirm this view. Apparently, our own efforts have little to do with the process; and by assigning the process to the vague subconscious we leave a large unexplored region open to doctrinal interpretations favoring the older theology.

On inspection, however, the popular idea of the subconscious mind is found to involve a confusion between: (1) the neural processes which go on in the brain and other nerve-centers, unattended by consciousness at the time, but likely to affect the contents of consciousness at a later time, in accordance with the principle of integration; (2) dispositions or mental trends of which we are not yet adequately aware, including those old-time integrations which constitute the mind of the flesh or lower self; (3) the basic or spiritual nature, with its trends or aspirations, often-

times largely quiescent, because we are absorbed in our external interests; (4) after-effects of experience and thought, lingering in our marginal consciousness when we have ceased to give attention to the interest in question; (5) the inner contest or struggle between old and new integrations, likely at any moment to rise above the threshold in the latest phase of this conflict; (6) representatives in the field of consciousness in which our complexes appear in disguised or inverted forms; and (7) conscious integrations which we produce in so far as the potential becomes actual, when the voluntary meets the involuntary, when will becomes a factor in the stream of thought by giving an impetus to this or that mental trend.

The fact that mental activities (as less-conscious) continue in the marginal region when interest or attention changes is undeniable. The misconception lies in attributing to the mysterious subconscious whatever we have not yet explained in the competition of activities summarized in the preceding paragraph. As a result we are likely to overlook some of our conscious processes, to forget our many years of preparatory training, the assembling of data, the effort to acquire insight, the acquisition, in brief, of something worth recurring to mind. To put matters in their proper setting, so that we may assign to our subconscious fruitions that which actually belongs to them, it is important to picturize the process which continues when we cease actively to mull over a subject that has been in mind, dismissing it for the nonce in favor of another interest. We note, for example, that all thinking proceeds by associations and integrations, with their effects, which we are scarcely aware of as processes; since we are absorbed in our objectives. At times we seem to command the process, steadily pushing toward our goal, for instance, when definitely thinking about a topic for a public address. At other times the associational process apparently determines the field of attention for us, while in the experiment known as "free association" we let one word suggest another without limit or restriction. There is no reason for assuming that the marginal and subconscious effects and frui-

tions proceed by any different law. What is assumed in behalf of one version of religious psychology is that never-ceasing activity continues whatever we are doing above the threshold, and during sleep; hence the possibility of the "indrawing" of spiritual power with reference to what James calls the "work" done, and the increment of energies received through prayer. Granted evidences of inner change, when we next take up life's round and find ourselves refreshed, with what we call new ideas, insights, revelations, we may reasonably infer that the inner processes have been unbroken. Apparently, it is a question of renewing energies, of the life which quickens us, rather than a question of wholly new ideas. Undoubtedly, the best way for the individual to determine this fact for himself is to note what occurs during those exceptional moments of insight in the early morning hours when the mind is more intimately illumined from within.

The Question of Priority.—We may then accept the current theory that "subconscious apprehension is prior in time to conscious knowledge and is at any moment working in advance of it,"[11] if this means that our less-conscious intellections precede our moments of highly conscious insight. But to say this is to put in other terms the fact long ago recognized that experience precedes reflection, art appears before æsthetics, moral judgments before ethics, thought before logic, and religion before theology. The fallacy in this popular view enters with the additional proposition that, "as the subconscious side of man is ever working ahead of his consciousness, it is ever dealing with higher realities and is ever nearer to the truth of things."[12] On the contrary, the most defensible proposition is that the subconscious is neutral. What we derive from it depends on what we are and what we put into it, the degree of our knowledge of the basic nature of man and the degree of our openness to the quickening energies by which the spirit is said to be environed. What is "higher" in the scale of realities implies a value-judgment. What is "real" or "true"

[11] E. Holmes, *Dying Lights and Dawning*, p. 28.
[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

is such for criticism. What is truly "near" or contiguous to the human spirit is what is real for a profound philosophy of the inner life. The only ground for assuming that the self is subliminally more extensive than the self above the threshold, is knowledge of what the self at various junctures discloses *above* the threshold. Thus at last we may come to know what the basic mind really is.

All we need assume, therefore, with regard to processes functioning in part below the threshold is what we have already discriminated by our analysis of what occurs above it. Here, as in religious experience at large, it is not origins but values which are determinative; not processes but what is wrought through them; not conditions, but what we accomplish despite or through the conditions, when we succeed in bringing worthy results out of more or less unpretentious beginnings.

What is necessary to determine those deliverances which bear evidence of what Myers calls "subliminal mentation" is profounder study of well-known phases of experience within the reach of all. It is a well-known fact, for example, that the mind is otherwise to a very large extent inactive while a given process requiring great skill occupies the attention. Naturally, one assigns as many facts as possible to memory, latent capacities or potentialities, intervals of rest or change, with reservations in favor of new moments of selectivity when other occasions occur. Conscious attention normally and habitually fluctuates. Some of our interests are becoming less central, while others enter the focus of the moment's activity, for example, when the shock of painful news or the insweep of an intense passion drives all other interests aside. It is not necessary to assume an essentially different inner process to account for this interplay. If the subconscious exists, we may well withhold references to it until the facts compel us to look beyond the marginal or less-conscious region, beyond memory and our several capacities.

The Marginal Region.—Granted a marginal or "fringe" region, it does not follow that this part of our mentality is mysterious, or in any way "higher" or "purer," than

processes central to consciousness in general.[13] By hypothesis, this region "contains evil as well as good, or rather, it contains neither the one nor the other, but the materials for both." The background is then "only a background," what is best and purest being out in the sunlight of full consciousness rather than in the obscure shadows. Nothing is gained by appealing to the unknown in the effort to explain the contradictory. Accordingly, Pratt suggests that "the influence of the subconscious upon the religion of most of us is due to our racial inheritance and our individual history." Ideas, visual and verbal images, moods, emotions, impulses, prejudices, complexes having their roots in some half-forgotten past have indeed their abiding-place in the dark region of the fringe; for the subconscious is essentially conservative.[14] Since the great source of the subconscious is the experience of the past, little light is thrown by appeal to this region when we seek the sources of higher experience, when it is a question of the inmost factors of religion.

Whatever truth there may be therefore in the hypothesis of submerged centers of mentality, the significance of these hidden activities can only become known through some *new moment of conscious experience.* The deeper self may be regarded as precisely as copious as conscious experience (so interpreted) shows it to be. Keeping close to the facts of religious experience, and explaining these by appeal to well-known conscious processes so far as possible, one need appeal to the subconscious only so far as may be necessary to complete the picture. The religious life as a whole is a process of discovery of the constituents, interrelationships, and values of the self. We are all the time drawing new inferences concerning experiences we have lived through, learning what we were by what we have done. If complexes were buried for a while because we did not wisely meet our struggles with the divided self, these repressions will become intelligible when new integrations make a new retrospect possible. If there be a submerged center of

[13] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

mental life in conflict with the center of life's consciously attained purpose, we may hope to learn the lesson of this submergence. Only figuratively could we say that an experience remains unconscious, that an "experience" is recovered. For *experience ceases,* and new experiences come: an experience as such cannot recur. Even more significant than any new experience referring to our past, may be the new intuition which we can more or less explain by noting the conditions favorable to it, for instance, during the stillness of the night, or in the quietude of the early morning hour. What we learn concerning our ordinary desires and impulses by comparison with our ideals may be more instructive than any lesson we learn by appeal to the subconscious.

The Deeper Self.—Myers' description is the best yet offered for this remarkable interplay of mental states and processes above and below the threshold.[15] Any phase of our mentality which we distinguish as a "self" is a fragment of that larger self which compasses both the current of consciousness (*supraliminal:* above the threshold) and all that takes place below the threshold (*subliminal* self). While the conscious self is intermittent, the subliminal or ultra-marginal self does not seem to be so. The deeper self has "a continuous chain of memory . . . involving just that kind of individual and persistent revival of old impressions, and responses to new ones, which we commonly call a self." The subliminal self also appears to be much more comprehensive, with a profounder faculty, also potentialities not fully called into play in our mundane existence.

The first reason for presupposing that the subliminal self is larger in scope, with activities and memories that are continuous, is the one already indicated: the stream of thought is a succession of minor consciousnesses implying a central consciousness. These minor consciousnesses are far from disclosing the unity which would nat-

[15] F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death,* 1903, Vol. 1., p. 9, foll. The references to this hypothesis do not commit our inquiry to the beliefs and alleged facts of spiritism, or even to the viewpoint of psychical research.

urally be assumed as the basis of human personality. At best what we regard as the unity of self, judging by the sequences and incoherences of our passing states, is "federative and unstable."[16] Hence it appears to have arisen from "irregular accretions in the remote past; it consists even now only in the limited collaborations of multiple groups," that is, "discontinuities and incoherences in the ego."[17] It is reasonable to presuppose an activity within these sequences above and below the threshold analogous to the force of cohesion, a power which operates in the psychical contexture of personality, "the aggregation of countless minor psychical entities" with their persistent characteristics.

This description of mental life as in large part incoherent does not preclude the possibility of a larger psychical entity as the unifying continuum of which the smaller entities are fragments. But the larger truth is that each man is "at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite." Inheriting from our early ancestors what Myers calls "a multiplex and 'colonial' organism," each of us also possesses a ruling and unifying organism. But the soul as ruler is still for the most part beyond present analysis. Although possessing and using the body as a whole, it exercises only a partial control, amidst the concurrent and alternating streams of consciousness which make up our mental life. To be the adequate basis of all this complexity, it must possess an attribute capable of being present in all kinds of varying degrees of our selfhood in its totality. Although natural selection operates within our activities so as to keep ready at hand the perceptions essential to the conditions of our ordinary life, the upbuilding of our personality is subjected to internal stress and strain. Taking these alternating processes and states as they come, we may compare this upbuilding to the development of cell-groups. The tendency toward disintegration of personality is indeed sometimes so strong

[16] Cf. Paul's realistic description of his states, in writing to the Romans.

[17] Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

that small groups of psychical units, may "set up a process of exaggerated growth which shuts them off from free and healthy interchange with the rest of the personality." [18] Thus dissociation results, the first symptom being a fixed idea: "the persistence of an uncontrolled and unmodifiable group of thoughts or emotions, which from their brooding isolation . . . become alien and intrusive, so that some special idea or image presses into consciousness with undue and painful frequency."

The Nature of Genius.—The second reason for postulating this larger self is that it affords an intelligible theory of genius, of those exceptional states, including religious experiences at their best, which imply supernormal power, power beyond that ordinarily exercised through our physical senses. Myers points out that it is not possible to foretell the relation of our larger personality to the ordinary stream of thought. There is no ground for assuming that all our mental operations will fall into the same current of perception at the same time, or at any time. Nor can we predict what operations will rise above the ordinary conscious threshold. What we can be sure of is that there is very much more that will not rise. That swarming fragments of thought or imagery are in perpetual process, we can indeed infer from the fact that in our dreams these undercurrents rise into the foreground. By contrast, our waking life "implies a fixation of attention on one thread of thought running through a tangled skein." [19] Dreaming is in a sense the normal form of mentation, the form which our mental activities most readily assume: a dream is "a subliminal uprush." Sleep indicates "the existence of a submerged faculty, of a rarer type than even that to which genius has already testified." Taking his clue from this implication that below the threshold the soul has access to higher power, wisdom or intelligence, Myers defines genius as "a power of utilizing a wider range than other men can utilize of faculties in some degree innate in all —a power of appropriating the results of subliminal mentation to subserve the supraliminal stream of thought—

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 40. [19] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

so that 'an inspiration of genius' will be in truth a *subliminal uprush,* an emergence into the current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating.'' [20]

Our Two Mentalities.—Human personality holds, then, two types of mentation: (1) the supraliminal or intramarginal, with its type of memory; and (2) the subliminal or extra-marginal, with its own chain of memory. The mentality beyond the margin is probably much more extensive and more miscellaneous. Here, for example, is the field of religious ecstasy as we have already considered it. The religious genius is one who is widely capable of drawing inspiration from beyond the margin. What the totality of our selfhood may be we know in part at least from these occasional glimpses in which ''we seem to see our subliminal perceptions and faculties acting truly in unity, truly as a self—coördinated into some 'inspiration of genius'—or of some far-reaching supernormal achievement of clairvoyant vision or of self-projection into a spiritual world.'' Then the momentary flash of genius is followed by a return to the less coherent processes of ordinary thought. Thus in a genius like William Blake ''we see the subliminal self flashing for moments into unity, then smoldering again in a lurid and scattered glow.''

Myers assumes that there is a *soul* underlying and owning, and likely to survive all these fluctuations in the life after death, because this theory best fits the facts concerning the fluctuations and imperfect control which we exercise, amidst glimpses of that strength and concentration of inward and unifying control which might be ours. These glimpses suggest the true normality which we are seeking. In our flashes of insight we greatly widen our outlook on the reality of things. Naturally, we will take our constructive clue, from these extensive intuitions. The genius is one who enjoys ''a happy mixture of subliminal and supraliminal faculty. Thus Socrates, with the monitions of his inner guide, possessed the subliminal self of a man of transcendent genius, with an ideal unification of human powers.'' [21]

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 108.

The Religious Self.—While Myers devotes his two large volumes to an elaborate study of processes belonging in the margin of religion, as we are considering its general field, his conception of human personality is the one which most intimately corresponds to the religious self so far as that self discloses unusual powers and involves an attitude pertaining to the spiritual as well as to the natural world. Religion, in Myers' terms, is "the sane response to all that is known of cosmic law." [22] The term cosmic is here inclusive of the total spiritual system of laws and energies. The assumption is that man, as a soul, "can draw strength and grace from a spiritual universe." It also involves the assumption that in the spiritual universe there is a Spirit "accessible and responsive to the soul of man." In this relationship *love* is "the energy of integration." "Love and religion are thus *continuous.*" Our energies are perpetually replenished from that higher source, with which we have direct and supersensory communion.

Adopting this view of the human spirit as larger in scope than the passing phases of our selfhood ordinarily indicate, we may bring the inquiry of this chapter to a close by attributing to the spirit as a whole the central integrating activity. Duality of self is merely one aspect of human antithesis in general. Religion offers the highest program for the unification of the self. The integrations of the nervous system are at least a suggestion of the systematic endeavors of our mental life so far as we are seeking centralizing self-control, profound intellectual coordination, a high degree of integrity of character. Conversional experience is one of the approaches to the unity which very many of us hope to achieve. We may well be moderate in our claims in its behalf, so far as ordinary types of conversion are concerned. Moderate, too, are likely to be our claims for the deliverances of our own subconsciousness. "What we have been trying to find out is what religion is *for consciousness*, once it has emerged into it, by whatsoever process it arrived there . . . what is highest and most significant is to be sought in our conscious state,

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

and not in the dim outlying regions of our being where . . . values do not exist.'' [23]

The main point of our discussion is that any view of the self or spirit is necessarily theoretical, hypothetical, or constructive. Even when we assert the existence of subconscious activity, continuing while we sleep; when we say that a part of the mind is unconscious or subjective, or that the self below the threshold of consciousness is more extensive than the self above it, we are drawing inferences from what we have learned from the analysis of consciousness. For, as we saw in Chapter XII, all knowledge begins with and pertains to experience, and experience consists of that which has been disclosed by consciousness. We begin by distinguishing the *self* as subject, as percipient, from the passing *stream of experience,* consciousness or thought. We refer some matters to the world outside as the object of our thought. We refer other matters to the self, notably, feelings, emotions, desires. In the case of religious experience, we push the analysis still further, by attributing to Ultimate Reality the sources of the highest experiences we know. Some religious people hold that the self has a more direct or intuitive mode of contact with this Reality within its interior precincts than those modes of contact which yield sense-perception in our relationship with nature.

The hypothesis of the subliminal phase of the self is descriptively justifiable, if it enables us the better to account for the more direct contact with Reality. The additional hypothesis of the subconscious is descriptively justifiable, if by appeal to it we can more intelligently account for those fruitions of inner experience which, so far as we know, we have never consciously wrought. But both hypotheses are based on the richly complex facts delivered to us by consciousness. It does not follow that either a subliminal ''uprush'' or a subconscious fruition is higher in value or any nearer divine. For we are still comparing the indications or traces of consciousness, trying to interpret them more rationally. It is always a question

[23] Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion,* p. 91.

of relative values. We are always passing value-judgments. We are always seeking to describe, explain, and interpret or integrate. Even though we are constrained to admit that our spontaneous or intuitive integrations or unifications are wiser than those we have consciously wrought by persistent analysis, the view which we base on our spontaneities and intuitions is a consciously accepted theory, and on this we proceed to found our ideas of the soul.

No discovery is more important than this one, the discovery that any possible idea of the self, soul, or spirit, is a constructive conception based for better or worse on the deliverances of experience. This being so, our major interest is to discover *what religion is for consciousness,* and what our consciousness implies in relation to the Determiner of Destiny—God, the Supreme Spirit, or Ultimate Reality. What religion is for consciousness, necessarily depends in large part on the conclusions we reach concerning the marginal region of our experience; for religion admittedly relates to the great Beyond, which we picturize or symbolize as best we may, according to our favorite view of the spiritual life. For some, the pathway is barren, the outlook meagre. For others, there is a current setting in from the present stream of experience into the spiritual world as the locus of the eternal values, as the Kingdom of Heaven or City of God. The latter class of believers will naturally lay very great stress on the larger or subliminal phase of the self, in their eagerness to establish continuity of thought and experience with the eternal Beyond.

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CHAPTER XVII

SYMBOLS

Their Universality.—All language is symbolic. Ideas are representative images standing for an infinite diversity of events and things in a complexity varying from the most precise matters of fact to poetic impressions which call for the surpassing artistry of dramatic genius. A single word may embody a wealth of actions and meanings, even in a primitive language, a single letter may be a pictograph. Oriental languages, replete in flowery imagery, consisting in large measure in figures of speech with little reference to matters of fact, compete with Occidental languages admitting of scientific precision in which fact triumphs over sentiment and sheer demand for truth over every type of fiction. Mathematical diagrams, symbols, and ordinated terms constitute their own realm of thought. Music has its particular symbolic world. Symbology extends, too, into the realm of specific objects where such emblems as flags, a lion, an eagle, a cross become nationally or spiritually representative. Thus one sphere of interest discloses itself after another, from the dawn of magic when symbols stood for occult power to the highly developed formulas and diagrams by which chemists represent atomic structures, protons and electrons.

Sources of Religious Imagery.—All this is clear and intelligible till we come to religion. While a religious emblem, like a cross, may be a visible object signalizing a system of beliefs in its entirety, religious words are symbols in the more specific sense, and religious language is by common consent the most highly symbolical of all. A mathematical or chemical symbol is definitive, excludes ambiguities in utmost degree. Hence precise verification is possible the world over. But a religious term as a sign or representa-

tive of experience, feeling, emotion, thought, conduct, admits the mind into the limitless region of the imagination where each person grasps, rejects, or interprets in his own way.

The dawn of religion was in the epoch when man vaguely projected his emotions and ideas upon his surroundings in nature, and it has always been difficult to distinguish religion from magic. Religious interests passed from mythology to methodical reflection, which became more precise as it became more literal. But various motives intervened to keep religious language persistently symbolical. The imagery in which man embodied his early religious notions proved faulty in two notable respects. Man drew his imagery from spatial relationships and events occupying time, and to this day religious thought encounters a difficulty when it tries to articulate spiritual realities that appear to be non-spatial and non-temporal. Man also derived imagery from his own personality, and portrayed the gods, later the one God in human form with its limitations. Religious thought was compelled to be symbolical or suggestive where spatial and other finite imagery fell short. The essence of religious realities seemed to baffle description, and religious truth to escape definition, although there was a choice between figures of speech in so far as they approximated such truth and reality.

This was especially the case in the effort to know God in essence, or even to intimate what God is apart from psychological terms which betray human limitations. In India, where religious symbols have so widely prevailed, agnosticism as readily acknowledged that the Absolute is indefinable as in the case of the agnosticism of many centuries later in England, when God became the Unknowable.[1] Admitting fewer limitations, because of the authority of its teachings, Christianity chose such symbols as "Father," "Lord," "King," to represent a positive faith in God as actually known through revelation and in the incarnation.

[1] Notably in Herbert Spencer's argument in his *First Principles*, Part I, 1864.

All rituals, ceremonials, mysteries, and initiations into the inner circle where esoteric doctrine is imparted to those who have met the test, are of course symbolic. The ceremonials are especially intended to appeal to imaginative emotion rather than to reflection. Hence each participant responds in his own way, and ritualism begets its patterns. Rituals are as truly meant to suggest living realities which surpass all definition as are the terms in which ineffable truths find formulation. Religious symbols stand for experience, and by entering into their inner meaning one is supposed to enjoy or recover such experience anew. Indeed, it may be said that the function of religious language of any type is to aid the reader or hearer to put himself into something like the original state which led religious pioneers to interpret their experience.

The Reaction against Mythology.—Again, a motive for fostering symbolism is implied in the transition which carries religious thought from the skeptical reaction against mythology, as in ancient Greece, to a much later reaction against philosophy when religious partisans began to spiritualize the ancient myths. Given a critic with the keenness of Xenophanes (b. abt. 570 B. C.), the gods are speedily reduced to projected psychological terms. Mortals readily assume that the gods "are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form."[2] Naturally, Xenophanes insists that if oxen, horses or lions had hands and could paint the works of art in which they tried to depict the gods, their gods would assume the form of oxen, horses, and lions, according to the imagery of each. "The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair."[3] As naturally, too, this great religious reformer insisted that the true God is "neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought."[4] The day of literalism began to pass with that criticism, and religious thought became sophisticated without possessing an adequate psychology.

[2] Frag. 14, tr. by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd ed., 1920, p. 119.

[3] *Op. cit.*, Frag. 16.

[4] Frag. 23.

Analogies and Values.—This insight was too radical, however, for the religious world in general, and if Xenophanes had become the guide to all religious thinking many chapters in symbology would never have been written. Subsequent ages discovered an effort to preserve the truths and realities hidden in the myths. Thus allegories gained special recognition, and it became a question of interpreting symbolical allusions and analogies of all types. As religious imagery drawn from space and from human characteristics falls short yet survives as a vehicle, so indeed an intellectual formula or dogma is imperfect, and the content of faith must be made explicit and must be interpreted. Furthermore, values began with Plato to be recognized once for all as a special type, namely, the values which stand for inner spiritual meanings exceeding the significance of any literal text. Criticism might show the lack of correspondence between known matters of fact and the faulty symbols chosen to clothe the realities of life, as indeed creation-myths fall short when compared with our actual knowledge of the planet on which we live. But criticism could not keep men from developing a conceptual world of surpassing verities: the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. This ideal world became the locus of inner meanings or hidden truths without number.

Symbols become in a special sense psychological whenever analogies, poetic representatives or esoteric interpretations are substituted for literalism or external authority. When the inner meaning of sacred writings has been identified with a system of representative terms, we must discover the true psychological key wherewith to unlock the mysteries long concealed from the uninitiated. Granted this hypothesis, then this esoteric system of significant words is comparable to the soul concealed within the body as its visible garment. To detect this system is to possess a certain type of psychology, verifiable by applying this hidden system of doctrine to the human spirit as the real meaning of an individual's history. Meanwhile, this psychological approach to the interpretation of sacred writings has itself had a natural history which is very suggestive.

Allegorical Interpretation.—We find Philo (25 B. C.–50 A. D.), for example, undertaking to correlate or identify Greek and Hebrew religious truths by means of an allegorical interpretation in which the spiritual meaning of the Jewish scriptures becomes the "soul" of the sacred text, the literal meaning its "body," susceptible of manifold interpretations. If the four rivers of paradise be the four cardinal virtues, any sort of analogical comparison becomes possible, according to the interpreter. In early Christian times, Origen (185-254) advanced the view that the inner meanings of scripture constitute a system such that divine revelation is distinctive in type, in its unity and fullness. Truth by truth, the spiritual significance is established in the literal text or related fact, so that each symbol is "accommodative," figuratively embodies divine principles. To adopt the literal or fleshly view when that view involves an unworthy idea of God would be to lapse into the merely obvious, the historically absurd, as if, for example, there could be "days" before the creation of the stars, or as if all precepts were to be literally followed. Only the "soul" imbuing the scriptures from first to last was written by the divine Spirit. This interior meaning pertains to the more real or spiritual Word. Moreover, this interior Word, slumbering in the hearts of unbelievers, is awake in the saints, and can be made explicit through enlightenment. Thus we come to the beginnings of a psychological theory of revelation, as inner process or experience.

More definitely still, Eucharius taught that every individual thing in the text has its spiritual meaning. From this position it is an easy matter to advance to the discrimination drawn by Thomas Aquinas between the "historical" and "spiritual" senses; thence to the standpoint of Luther, who calls attention anew to the "literal" sense. Given Protestantism with its right of private judgment and its tendency toward sectarian divergences, spiritual exegesis will develop without limit. Modern scriptural criticism became much more deadly than the agnosticism of Xenophanes, when it disclosed not only the imperfec-

tions of texts transmitted and garbled by tradition and by copyists, but the limitations of human (psychological) factors in general. It became impossible for liberals any longer to believe that even the inner meanings of the Bible constituted one consistent revelation by one Author, difficult to believe revelation is ever perfect. The Bible was resolved into a literary collection of highly symbolical or figurative traditions requiring psychological knowledge for interpretation; since the people whose religious development is portrayed in the Bible were subject to all the instincts and emotions which psychology in our day has disclosed at the roots of human nature. The obvious resource was to preserve under the caption of "values" such truths as each religious leader might discover amidst all this psychological symbolism.

The Value of Analogy.—It has been said that "the notion of analogy ultimately determines the religious concepts of every race."[5] Thus in general the appearances of the visible world seem to mirror the realities of the spiritual, and religious occultists "do not hesitate to cast the grotesque shadows of these [analogical] mysteries upon the unseen world." The implied principle is that of correspondence between envisaged symbols and truths intuitively discerned, as indeed there is said to be an analogy between the "flesh" and the "soul" of scripture. Granted a system of such doctrines, established by correspondences, the psychological critic points out that the symbols are still analogies. Widespread doubt prevails concerning all arguments based on analogy. The terms employed are at best symbols which correspond only more or less to the reality symbolized. Thus we compare society to an organism, but thereupon indicate one respect after another in which a free-moving, self-determining individual is *unlike* an organ, such as the heart or the brain, with its fixed position in the human body. Psychological terms have such a wealth of meanings that in despair we often revert to the most literal meanings, and try to expound our truth by ordinary modes of argument, instead of trying to

[5] E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 192.

prove it by appeal to texts rich beyond calculation in ambiguities.

Boehme's Symbology.—A persistent effort to push symbolism through to a complete system is implied in the writings of Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), who took man to be a microcosm or complete abridgment of the universe, a living emblem and hieroglyphic of eternity and time. In the spirit of man is disclosed the "signature" by which outer things can be understood by inner, as the sound of the voice discloses the spirit. Thus in conversing with a man I understand him when "his sound and spirit out of his signature and similitude enter into my own similitude, and imprint his similitude into mine."[6] To develop this principle to the full is to have a psychological clue to all human properties, hence to the principle of the universe, the one Spirit or Word. The signature or form is not itself spirit, but is called by Boehme "the receptacle, container, or cabinet of the spirit." Man has all the forms of the world lying in him, since he is a complete image of God. To know the signature contained within himself is to know "the essence of all essences" to which the forms in himself correspond. Thus man's nature corresponds to the natural world, to the eternal, and to "the divine essentiality." Men differ in will and desire (with its contrariety). Hence voluntarism in psychology is the clue to the conflict or departure from perfect adjustment with the divine.

The Value of Symbology.—Comparison between symbologies offered in explanation of the spiritual "mystery" of things has led the critics to conclude that very little light is thrown on the essentials of religion by appeal to analogies and symbols.[7] We might indeed aver that on the inner side of experience life is continuous, while matter is an object of thought corresponding point by point with this essence. But there would still be the question whether we could justify this analogical relation between inner and outer aspects of experience. Höffding maintains that the

[6] *The Signature of All Things,* Eng. trans., Everyman's Library, p. 9.

[7] Cf. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion,* p. 70.

assumption concerning the inner as the *essence* would be made on faith.

If we decide in favor of the psychical or inner side of experience in contrast with the material, this division is purely empirical. By so deciding we may be limiting ourselves as we would if we knew only two colors and if we should take these as decisive with regard to all color.[8] As we can break light in more than two ways, so the light of existence might be variously broken. Faith, proceeding by analogy, readily develops its figures of speech; figures of speech are adopted because no concepts are adequate; [extreme] mysticism even rejects analogies on the ground that God is outside of every concept or genus, all ideas whatsoever being inadequate.

Hence the religious consciousness reaches an impasse. To use sensuous and human figures of speech for an infinite object is to fall far short of Reality. Even intuition is faulty, because it proceeds by appeal to sensuous perception, memory, imagination, on a pathway of analysis. Yet this consciousness is "reluctant to rob immediate feeling of the lively and striking expressions in which it instinctively relieves itself." Sheer silence does not satisfy, save perhaps in India, where the Absolute is negatively characterized. Analogy at best is a relation of similarity: mere *relations* between figurative ideas and the realities symbolized never constitute sure knowledge. Even the idea of revelation must be given up unless we can somehow identify figure with reality. Hence Höffding insists on the shortcomings of even the best figures of speech.[9] To call God "Lord" or "King" is to suggest the relation of servants or subjects differing from Him, standing in an external relation to Him. The term "Father" is replete with the symbols of family relationships.

The Finite as the Clue.—Even "personality" as analogy fails at the essential point. Drawn from the idea of the finite ego, personality is a single member of the great world-order, in contrast with the inexhaustible principle:

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

but in the idea of God nothing finite remains. Pantheism finds the idea too low.[10] So too all ideas of "force," "life," "substance," fall exceedingly short. Baffled in their attempts to express or even envisage the ineffable, people fall back on the long list of figurative notions with which religion abounds. Our knowledge is unmistakably a part of our existence, and yet we seem under compulsion to transform it entirely if we are to preserve its value. Sometimes the resource seems to be to exalt the religious object altogether above all finite relations. Again, the struggling and suffering God replaces the eternal and perfect. The idea of God constantly undergoes change in our effort to claim that an image is more than an image. If religious ideas are to retain their significance, Höffding concludes that it must be by serving as "symbolical expressions for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men in their struggle for existence; thus they are secondary, not primary, both in significance and origin."[11] So too Windelband describes value as consisting "in a relation to an appreciating mind, which satisfies the desires of its will or reacts in feelings of pleasure upon the stimulations of the environment."[12] Value exists then "only in relation to a valuing consciousness."

The Content of Religious Symbols.—Symbols may, however, represent our original religious intuitions, the fullness and life of concrete religious experience in a way that is perfectly intelligible. There is, for example, what Watson calls "the warm and breathing intensity of faith," a reality which surpasses analysis and must be poetically suggested if at all.[13] Religion, in this view, has "a wealth of content which escapes formulation" even in theology, the ideal of which is "the complete comprehension of the Eternal by the intellect." A symbol is therefore meaningless save in relation to what it represents, and to know that it is a

[10] In discussing belief in God, we observed that "personality" is used as a value-term, evading definition, yet empirically suggesting what God is as somehow nothing less than personal.

[11] Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion,* p. 93.

[12] *Introduction to Philosophy,* tr. by J. McCabe, 1921, p. 215.

[13] J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion,* p. 15.

symbol of anything is to reach out beyond it. We possess real knowledge of God despite what we say concerning "the unsearchable riches of His Being." [14]

It might be said then that religious devotees rejected conventional formulations because they began to know God so much better than creeds or theologies indicated. Thus students of sacred writings came to adopt a new exegesis by appeal to allegory, analogy, and other symbols said to embody divine truth, because they could no longer believe either in the literal accuracy of such writings or in the alleged consistency of their several propositions as a whole. Despite all imperfections there might still be a precipitate of truth in these crystallized forms, and this might prove of priceless value. Much depends then on our view of spiritual truth in relation to the manifold errors and imperfections of form in which it is embodied. In any event truth must be delved for. All modes of expression being symbols of some kind, we may use those that are preferable to make manifest our view of the spiritual life (adopted on faith).

Religious Diagrams.—Nevertheless, there is also a psychological value to be attributed to symbols in so far as these stand for diagrams of the spiritual life in its intimate realities, in contrast with the shortcomings of all attempts to define what is transcendental or infinite. Thus interpreting religious symbols, Miss Underhill finds the Christian mystic adopting "a chart and pilot-book of his voyages and adventures, the scheme of faith, and the diagram of the spiritual world." [15] In this sense artistic representations or symbolic schemes are very useful in suggesting both the special experiences of mystical consciousness and the doctrines springing from it. For in each symbolical description there is a picture of "the country of the soul seen through a different temperament," and it is notable that a comparatively small number of essential doctrines or fundamental ways of seeing things thus find expression.

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 20.
[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

Three deep cravings of the self or expressions of man's restlessness are thus made articulate. The devotee may see his adventure as an outgoing journey from the world of illusion, hence his inward craving will lead him to adopt the symbology of the pilgrim or wanderer. The mystical way may seem to involve such an "inward alteration" that he is able to commune with "the Fontal Being which he loves and desires," the symbols chosen being those that portray this yearning for inward purity. The third group will express "the craving of heart for heart, of the soul for its perfect mate," which makes man a lover, the satisfaction of love being the supreme factor. Granted motives which lead towards a Place, a Person, or a State, the symbology becomes typical of the motive in question. Those, for example, who regard "the Perfect as a beatific vision" external to them and very far off, take the process of their entrance to be a quest or arduous journey from the material to the spiritual world. Others will fall back on imagery derived from the language of earthly passion. Thus in Christianity the personal aspect of the Godhead is emphasized, the object of intimacy or devotion being found in Christ.

Religion as an Escape Mechanism.—Discussing the map and the flag as symbols, a recent critic suggests that while maps admirably serve an army, religious ideas (intelligibly compared to flags) are sometimes used *as maps* in response to the desire for a map of the spiritual world.[16] Thus value-symbols are used as charts: religion draws up a diagram of the new world it has created. Given this fabrication, all creation is viewed as a staging of the drama of salvation, and a religious system becomes a kind of house of refuge from the natural world.

Through this "elaboration of useful fictions into alleged charts" the production of "escape mechanisms" into logical systems readily follows. Such a substitution of fictions for reality as empirically known is comparable to a "delusion of reference" (in abnormal psychology), since it involves intense preoccupation with the interests of the

[16] E. D. Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*, 1924, p. 55.

ego "common to paranoia and religion." This blurring of the map and the flag, or confusion of symbol with reality, is also due to neglect of the truth that all religious thinking is symbolical: all religious ideas are "either symbols of unconscious impulses, or are rationalizations of such symbols—secondary elaborations fabricated in order to make the religious symbols acceptable to the consciousness of the believer." Theology is an instance, also Christian hymns ("Crown Him with many crowns, the Lamb upon the throne," "Throw out the life line"). The truth sought is the devotee's own truth, expressing the assumption he started with, the implication being that the soul demands these symbols.[17]

Religion then becomes "the symbolic appreciation of the mystery of existence in terms of the ego," the salvation-motive being obvious.[18] The ego must secure itself against its own disintegration. Hence the mind creates a sort of "personality picture" which amounts to a necessary fiction about ourselves, because we need escape from repressions so that the energy of rejected psychical forces shall be utilized. Thus an idea of God may "preserve intact an infantile image of the ideal father, perfect and 'pure' and sinless."[19] Later, there is an attempted reconciliation with the father, between the infantile jealousy and the fact of one's maturity. Christianity is said to be a device for ridding the ego of the notion of inferiority which we speak of as "the conviction of sin." The fixation upon the parent-image is a natural result. All experience being essentially personal, the leaders and prophets have created the values of religious faith by fabricating symbols out of their own inner life: religious fellowship serves to complete the "transference."[20] The Church is the "mother symbol," the confessional a "function of transference." In religion men "orient themselves to their world."[21] Religion is thus projective imagery.

17 *Op. cit.*, p. 77.
18 *Ibid.*, p. 99.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 149.
20 *Ibid.*, pp. 220, 222.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 335.

Over-beliefs.—Thus "the country of the soul" which, in Miss Underhill's description, is taken seriously, becomes a sheer "fabrication" of our consciousness, with no saving clause regarding a supposed "real" country susceptible of different types of description. In James' description (which we have adopted in the preceding chapters), the tendency toward objectification is one of "the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region," namely, the tendency to take on *objective* appearances.[22] There is also an implicit tendency to suggest to the subject an external control. In the religious life this control is taken to be "higher," and the implied beliefs become literally and objectively true. Thus in the case of highly subjective people of an intense emotional quality there is a tendency to project their experiences in the forms of sensible and palpable imagery. These forms are then identified with the spiritual world. James does not, however, overtax psychology in favor of agnosticism. He leaves the matter with recognition of a positive content, "the *something* larger" to which such experiences are attributed by the recipients.[23] Whatever the "over-beliefs" in the particular system, the primary consideration is "the *fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come.*" "All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves."[24]

Writers on psychology who do not assume to pass judgments concerning religion which psychology can never justify, customarily leave the matter here. We are not justified, for example, in assuming that the essence of a thing is "to be perceived."[25] Nothing is settled concerning the objective references of religion. Martin's effort to show that "the real trouble is that people *cannot stand them-*

[22] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 512.

[23] Hence the very great advantage of Myers' account of the larger self, with its response to real energies bearing actual results of practical value, in contrast with the psychology advocated by Martin.

[24] James, *op. cit.*, pp. 515, 525.

[25] Cf. Flower, *An Approach to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 189.

selves" is a reduction of the whole matter to absurdity. The "unstable person does not found a religion because he is unstable."[26] We might add that if Martin's theory were true, Buddha and Christ would be cited as the two greatest examples of self-delusion.

The Utility of Symbols.—We seem justified then in taking religious symbology at its face value in so far as other language falls short, in such types as those described by Miss Underhill and Professor James. The "country of the soul" is not a mere fiction riddling human experience for ages, even though this country is for the most part the present world: the positive content of religious experience implies conditions, processes, laws which, taken together, involve a way of life, for example, in Christianity at its best. This "Way" is in large measure common to people having experiences of significant varieties.

While it is true that symbols tend to "petrify or evaporate," it is also true that they give more or less successful expression to "that dim consciousness of the *beyond* which is part of our nature as human beings."[27] Granted that our effort is to portray or suggest, that we may "attempt to realize in thought and feeling the immanence of the eternal in the temporal," we may guard against the abuses of symbols as instruments. Brightman suggests a distinction between "true value" and a "simple value-claim." A true value would be "what is liked, desired, or approved in the light of our whole experience and our highest ideals . . . and the total ideal of personality."[28] Our religious values were "not originally produced by logical reflection." But, given our various values, we may apply as our criterion of truth and reasonableness the "coherence" of these ideals and principles, for instance, in marshaling the elements of our theistic belief. Religion claims more-than-human values. Hence we may rightfully relate these values with the eternal Reality which they imply.[29]

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 199.
[27] Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 5.
[28] E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values*, p. 15.
[29] *Op. cit.*, pp. 135, 170.

Is there, then, a standard by which to judge symbols as true or false, or at least as legitimate rather than fantastic? Undoubtedly, if we remember that symbols have two uses: (1) representation of inward activities and values by aid of externals, and (2) representation of transcendental truths when our conceptions and intuitions fall short. Our external deeds and the things which stand for religious values may be said to correspond to the ideas and volitions which they more or less faithfully embody. So too the realities and truths which surpass both description and interpretation may yet have an affinity with the experiences and values which lead us to symbolize where we cannot define. The true symbol of the eternal verities, possessing real affinity with these objects, is a sign and vehicle of higher and better principles.[30] Such a symbol is inadequate in the scientific sense of the term, because the eternal objects cannot be reduced to matters of precise fact. But the symbol is not only justifiable but highly significant and useful by virtue of its correspondence or affinity.

Symbols as Correspondences.—Thus too the sacraments find an intelligible place as modes of expression, typical of the consciousness of the communicant. The bread and wine stand for a consciousness far more extensive than the external act or object. Where words fail to express "the immediacy of the communion," this the highest state of the soul is represented by the sacraments. "A sacrament is a symbolic act, not arbitrarily chosen, but resting, to the mind of the recipient, on divine authority, which has no ulterior object except to give expression to . . . a relation which is too purely spiritual to find utterance in the customary activities of life." [31]

The symbology would of course have a different meaning were one to interpret baptism and the Lord's Supper as miracles, or magical performances actually conferring immortality and causing real transmutation of substances. A psychological view takes us to the point where we find the

[30] Inge, *op. cit.*, pp. 251, 253.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

communicant participating in a rite involving not merely his response in consciousness but one which associates him with his chosen group, the community of the faithful. To the average communicant the experience of partaking of the sacraments may be simply a mystery-value. The Friend does not find the sacraments essential. Mystics may discount them altogether. For some, the divine immanence in nature is the basis of all true symbology. Thus all things in space and time may be said to represent the divine purpose. Granted the given system of symbols, it is a question of the unseen verities of which they are what Boehme called the "signatures." Thus correspondence may become a legitimate principle by which to correlate the truths and values in their "coherence" with Ultimate Reality.

The Ultimate Locus of Values.—The discussion of symbols is apt to leave the impression that the "conservation" of values is a sort of concession to the worshiper. With this result religion appears to be wholly subordinate to philosophy. Bosanquet puts the matter the other way about: philosophy depends on religion.[32] For religion, attaining its climax, includes "the vision of all that has value, united in a type of perfection," while philosophy is at best a theoretical interpretation of the results. Religion is larger in scope because it "unites the attitudes of practice and conviction," although philosophy and religion may unite in such thinkers as Plato, Dante, or Spinoza. Religion as "a very full experience," is highly essential to philosophy. If we regard religion as inclusive of everything that is *in* the mind, it "permeates, at least, the whole of finite self-conscious life." It does not follow that religion *proves* the reality of its great objects. More important than any alleged "proof" is the fact that the religious consciousness is "self-contained, and stands on its own basis," a basis which "includes the greater part of our most vital experience." Nor does it follow that religion affirms the existence of a Supreme Being "as a person external to ourselves and the world." What this consciousness does affirm, by dis-

[32] B. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, Second Series, 1913, p. 229.

closing "the infinite-finite nature of the human spirit," is the existence of "an underlying reality which inseparably belongs to it." God then is neither isolable nor external, and the world of spiritual membership is inseparable from our finite self-consciousness." [33] This conclusion implies a basis for psychology which leaves us in secure possession of the greatest religious truth, while also distinguishing appearance from reality.

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[33] *Op. cit.,* pp. 239, 251 foll.

CHAPTER XVIII

REVELATION

The Uncritical View.—To see the import of psychological study of the process and content of revelation, it is interesting to revert to the period when divine revelation was accepted as a miracle. Since it was the Jewish and Christian Bible to which the miracle was especially attributed, we may confine our references to that. God as author of the Bible in its entirety apparently chose obedient scribes for His authentic disclosure. Through these faithful instruments there was conveyed a single coherent message, a system of truths different in kind from natural or profane truths, because wholly supernatural in origin, communicated by heavenly inspiration. Neither the temperaments nor the modes of speech or thought of scribes, prophets, evangelists, made or marred any part of the sacred narrative or its content. The content of revelation was not distinguished from inspiration as its process. The divinely chosen words were dictated by a process so surely inerrant that the recorded text became infallible in minutest detail. Thus the literal text was a perfect embodiment of divine truth, imbued with an authority which was vested in its words and even its syllables, if not in the punctuation points: revelation was absolutely divine, there were no mediating factors to be described psychologically. This view was pressed to the limit by Protestants who opposed the authority of an infallible Book to that of the Roman Church.

The Critical Reaction.—With the incoming of modern criticism, the content of divine revelation was gradually distinguished from the process as human. Eventually, revelation and inspiration were regarded as almost exclusively

human. The imperfections, errors, contradictions of texts, were taken into account. The variations of temperament and character, also other variants in scribes, prophets, copyists, and others who participated in the process of transmitting and recording tradition were taken into consideration. With the decay of belief in miracles and the supernatural, the contrast between sacred and profane truth disappeared; a different theory of knowledge came into vogue, with emphasis on human judgment and the possibility of error, also a constructive view of principles withstanding the test of comparative study. Thus the Bible was reduced to a collection of literary products recording the survivals of variant traditions, articulated by many writers at different times. The prime result of this criticism was the view that inspiration is a human process susceptible of complete psychological analysis.

Inspiration as a Process.—Comparison of these extreme views naturally suggests a psychology of revelation as the content produced by the process known as inspiration, although the term revelation has often been used to cover both the body of truth conveyed and the process by which God makes this truth accessible to man. When revelation is regarded as content, distinguishable from the process of communication, its inspiration may be: (1) *plenary,* all parts of scripture being equally inspired, authoritative; (2) *verbal,* on the assumption that every sentence, word, syllable is inspired; or, (3) *moral,* with reference to its truths or doctrines, amid contexts replete with personal and historical details, including psalms, parables requiring interpretation, and other modes of writing through which divine principles find expression. When revelation is understood as a process, two views have ordinarily been distinguished: (1) the *mechanical* view, and (2) the *dynamic.*

Both the plenary and the verbal conceptions involve the assumption that the process is mechanical. The process may be regarded as essentially external, for example, when words are heard and voiced by one who is an absolutely faithful mouthpiece. Or, it may seem to be chiefly internal,

as an amanuensis serves as penman for one whose dictated words are so recorded that the very words perfectly and literally embody the subject-matter. To make the doctrine of infallibility or inerrancy absolutely secure, it was necessary to assert that even the Hebrew vowel-points and the punctuation points were inspired (supposing that these marks were actually present in the text). The process of communication was therefore radically different from the conception of inspiration that formerly obtained; the personal witness was not required, the self-preparation of the scribes was not a factor, and inspiration was not an ecstasy. But granted the discovery that vowel-points and punctuation marks were not in the original texts, it was still possible to defend the idea of plenary inspiration by regarding the recipients as having been equipped to receive it, the efficiency being the Holy Spirit.

Revelation was thus in a measure qualified according to the historical period in which it was given, the value assigned to the human factors, the variations of the written word, and the limited intelligence of the scribes. It became evident that although the original writers may have received the influence of the Spirit so that they did not err, the infallibility could only be attributed to the original autographic text. With recognition of the individual peculiarities of the writers, variations of statement, divergences in reporting or describing occurrences in the gospel period, changes due to copyists (the originals having been lost), it became less possible to defend the mechanical view. Hence the view of plenary inspiration gradually gave place to that of partial inspiration, the transmission of the substance of revelation. On this view, the recipient was so far infilled with the Spirit that he could communicate the moral content, although using his own mental powers, manifesting his traits of character and making his choice of words. Emphasis thus falls on the sense or spirit of scripture as the disclosure of the divine will. The human powers are said to function without being controlled (as in mediumship), but with sufficient witness to the presence of the Spirit so that the divine origin of

revelation is recognized. The Bible itself, in its unity, inherent excellence, development of purpose, is the primary evidence of inspiration.

The Dynamic View.—Thus the way is prepared for the idea of degrees of inspiration by appeal to the divine educative purpose in the race, including widespread revelation in man's moral and spiritual history as a whole and a specially authoritative revelation culminating in Christ. Inspiration is still a divine self-revelation through which heavenly truth is communicated, howbeit the process is conditioned by the capacities of the recipients. Since man's whole growth in spiritual knowledge is by divine provision, the antithesis between sacred and profane truth can no longer be sustained. The process of revelation began with man's dawning self-consciousness, and continued as a kind of dialogue through which the living God guided the spirit of man. The stress once put on the Book as inspired is progressively transferred to man: it is the individual who is inspired in so far as God-consciousness is achieved in him. The process involves no suspension of man's powers. Inspiration is attributable to a book only so far as it bears testimony to the vitalizing process through which living truth shapes itself in the mind of man.

If then we define revelation by appeal to the process by which God makes the truth known to man which is required for his progressive education, we may presuppose man's need of this revelation, his desire to make use of spiritual knowledge, and a nature such that God can be known by man.[1] It is then a question of the psychological possibility of giving a revelation. If no valid distinction can be drawn between discovery and revelation, revelation becomes possible only in case attention is paid to it, the impulse to seek it being presupposed. The distinction between natural and revealed religion has given place to recognition of the conviction that it is "natural" to be thus guided. It is essentially a matter of meaning or purpose attributed to the content.

[1] *Ency. of Religion and Ethics,* Art. "Revelation."

Revelation as a Process.—Since on this view man plays an important part in seeking revelation, preparing to receive it, yielding to it as having power over him through disclosure of the divine will, the entire experience comes within the purview of psychology. Revelation as a process depends on the interaction of the divine will and the human factors of response, including man's judgments in favor of the doctrine that the truth thus received is divine. It is still feasible to assume that divine initiative is prior to human response, for psychology does not pass judgment on ultimate sources. But the human response is according to inward need, as in religious experience in general.

Granted the view (beyond psychology) that divine revelation proceeds by accommodation to human capacities in different periods of history, according to need, revelation being in this sense a heavenly reality, then a superior value may be attributed to the sacred works of various peoples.[2] On this view revelation is activity, rather than communicated word: God communicates His character, truth, purpose by what He does; His purpose is discoverable *by interpretation* of the facts of the universe, the facts of history, especially those concerning man's religious experience wherethrough his spirit bears witness to the presence of the Divine Spirit. Human autonomy is thus said to be compatible with God's activity. Words and activities may be said to come together, inspiration being the correlate of revelation. The divine activity may then generate the revelatory process or dynamic experience. This view also accords with Sabatier's conception of prayer, revelation being "the response of God to prayer," while the religious life is not a fixed state but a movement of the soul.[3] If religion is "the subjective revelation of God in man," revelation is not a communication once for all of immutable doctrines to be held fast. Revelation involves "the creation, the purification, and the progressive clearness of the consciousness of God in man—in the individual and in

[2] See, for example, the claims for inspired scripture noted in case of the great religions by R. E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, p. 263.

[3] *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 33.

the race.''[4] The mythological and dogmatic views give place to the psychological. Revelation, taken to be evident, interior, progressive, is ''able to repeat and continue itself'' as an actual process, an individual experience in your consciousness and mine.[5] Essentially one in spirit or meaning, its forms and degrees are different. We may then reflectively supply the constituents, the process implied in the traditional truths, the formulation and acceptance of the moral codes which have come to receive the sanction of revelatory authority, the interior perception which made revelation possible, the confirmatory inner experiences, and the general processes of interpretation following upon diverse modes of exegesis. Thus we understand how the same principles which we find in parts of the Bible, coupled with the divine sanction (in case of the Commandments, for example), are also found in the sacred books of other peoples, where the sanction is merely ethical.

Revelation as Intuition.—Any attempt to reconstitute the process of inspiration will take account of human creativity, its modes of functioning, and its deliverances as coöperative products, the substance or content of revelation being attributed in part to the divine activity, in part to the human factors of response. This creativity will of course be partly intellectual, but will include an appeal to the heart, imagination, emotions, conscience, and other factors active in religious personalities, many of which are represented by the term ''intuition.'' The view that inspiration is an ecstasy has indeed almost entirely given place to the idea of intuition, which suggests the immediacies of the process without overdoing the emotional factors. For if inspiration is a normal process, there is no ground for assuming either that the participant is ''possessed'' or that he is, as it were, swept off his feet by an experience which leaves him uncertain as to his whereabouts or the state he is in. If inspiration does not suspend man's usual powers, it may be said to raise these into a state where he is more keenly aware than usual what he

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

is doing and why. On the divine side of the process, the stress falls almost solely, in recent description, on the imbuing Spirit, touching the human spirit like a breath which quickens or "a flame which kindles the spirit to the finest tissues."[6]

One may still assume that Amos, Hosea, Paul, and other prophets or apostles were inspired to communicate their revelations, in this very rare sense. Yet the higher degree presupposes the general inspiration in the divine education of the race. Since inspiration is an inner process due to a condition of the human spirit, the description will vary according to our view of the stages of religious development. Examination of the sacred books of the world leads one to regard the process as exceedingly various, nationality and language always being significant factors. Since "inspiration cannot do the work of memory and research," comparative study will lead to the transfer of interest from the process to the content of revelation. Emphasis on the process is highly significant for our purpose, because it was the psychological method of study which led to the revolution in thought concerning revelation, the breaking down of invidious distinctions, and the rediscovery of religious experience as the really significant element in inspiration and the primary condition of all revelation. It thus becomes a question of the values assigned to intuition or spiritual perception as the medium of translating the immediacies of inspirational experience.

From another viewpoint, revelation judged to be different from other truth, both in kind and in degree, has been defended by appealing to certain books of the Bible only. Because of their consistent inner or spiritual meaning (the "soul" according to Philo, Origen) these books are said to contain the Word, in contrast with the lesser books of the Old Testament and everything in the New Testament save the four Gospels and the Revelation. The text of scripture is therefore what Boehme called a "signature," and what other writers have interpreted by means of "correspondences," through which by spiritual perception

[6] Art. "Inspiration," in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics.*

the divine content can be discerned. This Word is not limited to our Bible, but fragments of it constitute the basis of other sacred writings in ancient times. On this view, spiritual perception of the truths of the Word is older in point of time than such a recorded revelation as we possess in parts of the Bible.

Granted the psychology of perception which this view implies, it would be a matter of demonstration that the content signalized as "divine" is discoverable by patient research, each term in the Word being shown to possess an unequivocal interior meaning wherever used. It would follow that the literal vehicles of this internal truth are relatively external, that is, subject to the illusions, errors, and misconceptions which we actually find in the texts which we possess. The language of correspondences must then be spiritually discerned. To establish this language as universal would be to show its identity or kinship with a psychology of the human spirit. Such a psychology would be rationalistic in type, it would be a deduction from doctrines accepted as true on the ground that decisive knowledge is generated in our minds by descent of principles and precepts from the divine mind.

Present-day thought, building on recent empirical psychology, with its emphasis on will rather than intellect, has reacted against this view, and is skeptical concerning the distinction between revealed truth and other truth (classed as inferior or naturalistic). Critics would object that if only the Word be divine, the writings of Paul would be thrown out as uninspired, as valuable only so far as they illustrate and confirm the doctrines of the Word. But modern readers find Paul's writings profoundly significant precisely because they are psychologically true to religious experience as we mortals know it; and because these writings come under the head of the biblical view of divine inspiration: "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness."[7] Critics would also object that appeals to the spiritual content of the Bible turn upon analogies and symbols adopted by

[7] II Timothy, iii, 16.

the interpreter in question, and these depend on personal authority. Our age is skeptical therefore concerning the possibility of a language of correspondences.

The Scope of Inspiration.—The study would take us far afield if we were to attempt a justification of any of these viewpoints on a psychological ground; and if we were to distinguish religious inspiration from spirit-possession, dictation by means of automatic writing, oracular utterances, divination, visions, ecstasy, presentiments, inner guidance, and allied experiences. These activities have been brought within close range by reference to Myers' view of the larger self. Estimates of the deliverances vary with the psychological approach. The same is true of all attempts to account for genius, to interpret literary inspiration and creative work in the arts or sciences, creative thinking in general. The concrete result is a view of the immediate or intuitional side of human nature, its more spontaneous activities, and those which analytically imply the emotions and sentiments, imaginal and symbolical processes rather than discursive thought. The type of mind readily classed as intuitive is more likely to be susceptible to inspiration than the slowly plodding mind identified with scientific research and philosophical criticism.

So great is the appeal to authority, that the religious person sees wonderful divine meaning in a highly figurative bit of poetry, because it is in the Old Testament, in contrast with a religious poem like Whittier's "The Eternal Goodness," with its great wealth of spiritual truth. So too the mythological accounts of creation in Genesis were long preferred to the disclosure of what has been called "God's method of creation" as found in the universe itself, with the evidences that the process required hundreds of millions of years. With the advance of psychology, the tendency is to dispense with special claims in favor of this or that sacred writing, and to maintain that there is a universal process by appeal to which one may find a place for the inspiration or creative work of such poets as Shakespeare, for example. The greater our igno-

rance of ideas and doctrines already known to the world, the more we are able to praise our own revelator, as if the total content of his disclosures were made known to the world through him for the first time. In the foregoing chapters we have rejected the view that a special psychology is attributable to religious personalities, as if the favored few possessed an inerrant faculty.

The complete psychology of creative work has never been disclosed. Our effort to reconstruct the inspiration of the sages of India, the Hebrew prophets, the evangelists, or of Paul, will turn upon our ability to put ourselves imaginatively into something like the experience of the seer in question, according to our view of the prophetical function, our knowledge of this or that evangelist or apostle. It is extremely difficult to avoid idealizing those who have greatly figured in the religious history with which one is personally most concerned. The same tendency is notable among students of medicine who for centuries revered the name and authority of Galen, for example, with respect to the structure of the heart; and among those who endorsed the authority of Aristotle, including his hypothesis of the crystal spheres, in contrast with what was discoverable in nature. The religion of authority still dominates, generating its psychology to justify its assumptions.

The truth may be said to lie somewhere between the minimizing extreme of critical views ignoring all the divine factors of inspiration (thus of revelation), and views which favor revelation as different in kind from human or "profane" truth by ignoring the findings of modern psychology. The resulting content is, let us say, divine-human. One can hardly understand the crude realism of the Old Testament apart from what we now know concerning human personality. The range of activities in the Bible coming within the purview of psychology is very great, amidst the crude myths and sublime religious truths, and a picturesque symbology which is foreign to our scientific ways of thinking. The truths are there for the discerning eye. What is spiritual must be spiritually discerned; what is

inspired is there for the intuitively quickened, for those to profit by who are willing to verify by experience rather than by any doctrinal test. For what survives the onslaught of psychological criticism is explicitly *religious experience or consciousness.*

Empirical Values.—The appreciative reader well knows that Paul's great chapter on love is a culminating insight which sets an extremely high standard. Paul's nature, his experience on the road to Damascus, and his energizing activities in spreading the gospel as he apprehends it are presupposed. One would hardly venture to put the right estimate on the product without taking its empirical context into account, according to a scale of values. One may then endeavor to reconstruct this context, to consider what experiences as well as what intuitions made possible this output of religious consciousness. So indeed one may try to reconstitute the experiences of the psalmists, by regarding a psalm as essentially empirical, as a pattern for the recovery of consciousness readily lost when so very much attention is given to doctrinal content. It is not then a mere question of combining the mental elements of inspiration, to arrive at an adequate view of the process. For the value of the content is largely to be ascertained by practice. One's own spirit testifies to both the experience and its deliverances, in case of the prophet or psalmist, the evangelist or apostle—on the ground that the Divine Spirit is present and active today. Unless I, in some measure, appreciate the intuitive process as thus readily accessible, I shall fail to view the inspirational process as essentially a living experience. If I fail at this point I shall be unable to distinguish between the transient and the permanent, the form and the spirit in religion. Very much will therefore depend on one's view of man's religious history in the light of the education of the race, the purpose one sees in history. Thus the psychology readily passes into the philosophy of religion.

We may then agree with Sabatier that "revelation is as universal as religion itself, that it descends as low, goes as far, ascends as high, and accompanies it always . . .

revelation is in prayer and progresses with prayer." Hence Sabatier's conclusion, already noted, that it is not a communication of immutable doctrines made once for all, to be held fast: "the object of the revelation of God can only be God Himself. . . . Being continuous, the inspiration becomes normal . . . God lives and works in man, man lives and works in God."[8] Very much depends then on our idea of God, the divine purpose in creation, the nature of the human spirit, and the relationship between God and man. If we hold that divine truth is the same in essence throughout the ages, although variously articulated in different lands and at different times, we are likely to conclude that, on the human side, the vital consideration is the changing process in man. This process, in turn, is likely to depend on the degree of interior openness, the range of man's subliminal contacts; and the use he makes of intuition or spiritual perception. In the light of our studies, it might be said that nothing is more important than ability to detect and utilize such perception.

The situation is also simplified by the findings and conclusions of modern criticism. In the case of teachings found both in our Bible and in other religious writings, we are not likely to regard the Bible as the only revealed book. On the view that most books in the Old Testament are compilations (by unknown writers) of traditional doctrines, brought together in their present form long after these views were promulgated, we need not presuppose an original inspiration on the part of scribes. What remains is prophecy and intuition, that is, the personal equations and deliverances of those who put forth this or that group of teachings, such as the doctrines of the first Isaiah, later committed to writing. The special authority is that of the divine sanction, attributed, for example, to the Commandments, made more authoritative by tradition.

Nor need we any longer assume that each evangelist wrote his Gospel by an inspired process. The variations and difficulties which have perplexed the scholars, notably the problem of the Fourth Gospel, are compatible with

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 34, 42.

the view that the treasured sayings of Jesus were handed down and compiled by later writers. Thus we may have in the Synoptic Gospels three variations of a common tradition, the first writing having been lost. Still further removed may be the Fourth Gospel. The problem, psychologically, is one of insight or spiritual perception; for this Gospel is regarded by some as the most remarkable religious writing we possess. The Revelation has long seemed so symbolical that it has puzzled those who have sought its complete psychology.

The problem of revelation is also simplified in case of supposed revelators other than the authors or scribes of sacred literature. The psychology of mysticism throws sufficient light on most cases, notably those in which there were pronounced instances of what we have called secondary phenomena, the auditions, visions, trances, through which such disclosures were made. Naturally, a distinction will be made between content and modality. If an alleged revealed book contains doctrines of value, these may be tested by rationally accepted criteria, whatever claims are made for such a work as *The Book of Mormon*. The greater the special claims as to the manner an alleged divine book was received, the more skeptical we are likely to be.

It used to be a simple matter to class a revelator as insane, on the ground that he suffered from the delusion of grandeur. Alleged messiahs have been similarly classed. But the demented person may as readily deem himself Cæsar or Napoleon. One whose cosmos is "all ego" is not necessarily religious. Delusions assume many forms, and it is no real discredit to religion that some who were deluded were also religious. The point is that the trend toward exaltation of the ego, observable in moderate form in mystical experience, may become excessive and eventuate in dissociation of personality. This problem belongs under abnormal psychology. If some who have been called insane (at the safe distance of a century or so) were also revelators, their work may well be judged by its content, on critically rational grounds.

In judging an alleged revelation, something will of

course depend on our conclusions in regard to the auditions, visions, and trances in the given case. Höffding lays down the principle that (1) a vision differs from an hallucination when it has a certain value; and that (2) all visions are conditioned by the stage of culture, memory, and character of the visionary.[9] Thus Swedenborg's visions would have involved different angelic dogmas if his theories had been different. James regarded Swedenborg's case as the best instance of things seen and heard, "serving as a basis of religious revelations."[10] If the Swedish revelator's visions possessed value, and if revelations were developed from them, their values will be discoverable by their results. Emerson's guess that Swedenborg was the typical mystic[11] was a very poor one; for scarcely a sign of mystical experience or doctrine of the usual sort is discoverable, either in the biography or the works of this plodding, systematic author, who devoted more than a quarter century to developing his thesis concerning the Word as the clue to all revelation. Maudsley's long-distance judgment that the seer was insane is also beside the point, if we are to evaluate revelations by their content and goal. Myers' conclusion that it was Swedenborg who first regarded the unseen world as a realm of law, related to the present world by a definite principle of cause and effect, is much nearer; for on this ground one might, on investigation of the seer's entire works, class those of his experiences which may have been objective over against those which have led to the conventional judgment that Swedenborg was a deluded visionary, projecting his fancies into a supposed spiritual world. Myers concluded that Swedenborg was far from being an inspired teacher or trustworthy interpreter of his own psychical experiences, such as his trance-revelations, with their "strange mixtures of slavish literalism with exalted speculation." Apparently, the seer's "pedantic orthodoxy" was due to arbitrary fancies, "mere projections and repercussions" of his preconceived

[9] *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 169.
[10] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 481 n.
[11] *Representative Men.*

ideas.[12] On this view, Swedenborg's case would seem to be the best one for special study, especially for those who still believe that the inner content of the Bible is divine.

To undertake such a study would be to distinguish finer points than in the study of mystical experience and doctrine. For here we have a sometime devotee of the special sciences, interested in mechanical inventions and the problems of engineering, carrying over bodily his systematic habits into a field where ecstasies and other emotions are rigidly excluded, despite the fact that a revelation is said to have disclosed the clue to scriptural exegesis. Strange to say, his visions and auditions were not for him primary, and he counseled others not to seek psychical demonstrations of any sort. His psychology is severely rationalistic in type, with no concessions to mystical psychology. His assumption was that every stage of man's religious history can be explained, from the dawn of spiritual perception on earth to the minutest details of the transition into the spiritual world. Hence the first essential for any one who would evaluate either Swedenborg's experiences or their output would be to discriminate his type. Any one may thereupon apply his exegesis, coming to whatever conclusion his scholarship may suggest, rejecting the theology, it may be, by comparing it with other types.

Not until we possessed an empirical psychology of religion enabling us to differentiate types, was it possible thus to distinguish between (1) matters that may not affect an alleged revelation, pro or con; (2) the implied theology; and (3) the implied psychology following from it as a deduction. Nowadays, we are well equipped; for we possess a theory of revelation which leads us to believe that revelatory experiences are not typically different; we tend to the conclusion that all truth is ultimately one, that all knowledge is derived from experience, and that the tests of truth are empirical and rational—in contrast with all appeals to authority. In fact, we understand the whole psychology of authority, why special claims concerning

[12] F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death,* abridged ed., 1917.

revelation were set up, what they implied, and why they were supported by the assumption that revealed truth is different in kind. To reject the Medieval (realistic) theory of knowledge, that all heavenly knowledge is by descent from the highest universal by means of graduated planes and types, first to man's inner mind, and then to his externalizing processes, would be to reject the theories based on it. Today, we hold that knowledge differs only in its modalities; instead of being generated in us by the highest universal, it is attained by working up from below, by the deliverances of experience, experience being prior to doctrine. We note, also, that even the realistic theory of knowledge which prevailed for so many unquestioning centuries, was derived from the needs of Christian experience, when it became important to substantiate the claims of the Church by appeal to an authoritative revelation different in type. Finally, we observe that the working out of any theory of revelation depends upon the patterns of culture, thought, modes of conduct prevalent while it is in vogue. Hence the practical values of revelation have come to be, for very many religious people, the final criteria.

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CHAPTER XIX

BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

Modes of Approach.—There are two main approaches to the subject of immortality: by appeal to the widespread belief in the future life, the evidences in favor of the existence of man as a moral and spiritual being worthy of immortality; or, the argument may be based on belief in God and the eternal world, from which immortality is said logically to follow. We are not concerned with the validity of the arguments in either case, save as summaries of typical evidences enable us to discern the motives which have led to assured belief. Strictly speaking, as immortality cannot be proved, the evidences in favor of survival of personality after death are equivocal. Hence the religious believer is likely to urge the primacy of belief in God, the authority of revelation, or the significance of the resurrection of Christ, from which faith in immortality follows, when mere arguments fail. Nevertheless, the effort to prove immortality by argument is perennially renewed, and the conviction that the survival of the soul can be empirically established persists despite all objections. Meanwhile, the attempt to overcome objections based on appeal to the special sciences discloses manifold considerations of great moment for those who regard the subject from all points of view. However disappointing the arguments in themselves, our insight into the nature of human personality is greatly increased. Possibly the most convincing argument is the idea of personality thus achieved.

Historical Sketch.—The fact that belief in the future life is practically universal has profoundly impressed those who hold that, because immortality is true, therefore man testifies to its reality. It has been said that this

belief, with the implied moral and religious ideals, is "a cruel and senseless mockery without a parallel," if the belief be not true. Formerly, this conviction involved the idea of the compensations of the future life, as well as the view that the sinner should not go unpunished; also the conviction that evil will not really be overcome unless conquered in every individual. The effort to meet objections to this view has resulted in strengthening it, so that the conviction still persists in our time that the future is the field of the more abundant life, wherein adequate opportunities will be bestowed upon all, where justice will be done. If all things are eventually to "work together for good," immortality must surely be true.

Yet analysis of the evidences favoring a universal conviction shows that the facts are rather disconcerting. For the distinctive belief in the survival of personality in the kind of spiritual world we now approve of, when we plead for adequate opportunities for all, is not the conviction that is most prevalent in human history. Some sort of belief in a beyond is indeed widespread. But the ideas of the soul, of the rewards credited to it, and of the land lying beyond the sunset, differ with the type of culture, its imagery and mythology. This belief may mean the survival of ancestors in a very limited and unattractive world. Or, it may mean the persistence of a soul that is far from immaterial as we construe the term: a soul that depends on the care bestowed on the earthly remains, the position of this "mummy" in the tomb, and the implements buried with it. Again, it may signify the persistence of the accumulated deeds (*karma*) which, through successive incarnations, may attain a state of heaven or freedom (*Nirvana*) radically different from the future state in which the Christian places his hope. Thus immortality may imply the integrity of the moral law, but without the survival of the personal identity or individuality so dear to believers in the Occident. Belief in "first and last things" suggests indeed such varied considerations in the light of human history as a whole that one is inclined to limit the discussion to the types of psychology implied, and the bearing of the

general belief on religious motives today. If we shall ever bring unanimity out of this varied mass of beliefs, it will probably be by first agreeing on our psychology.

Reverting to the stage of thought when man projected his feelings and wishes into nature, personifying nature's forces or picturizing the existence of several souls capable of various functions, including the traveling of one of these souls during sleep, we note the readiness with which the imagery identified with the future life took its clue from material objects and deeds, such as the trappings and exploits of the warrior, whose kindred were to accompany him to the happy hunting-ground. The soul that was to survive was naturally a replica or double corresponding to the body; it was a more refined material being, reaping the rewards of heroism, or (among the Greeks) a "shade" capable of persisting beyond the Styx in a nether region devoid of attractions in comparison with life on earth. A heaven of that sort offers almost as little inducement as the ineffable bliss of Hindoo conceptions implying the commingling of human life with the Absolute.

Greek Conceptions.—Not until we come to the stage of constructive ethical thinking in ancient Greece do we find a conception of the soul compatible with the idea of personality which we have cherished in modern times. The thinking world has greatly depended on the philosophy of the soul forecast by Socrates, with his belief in divine providence and the supremacy of the good. The personality of Socrates as depicted by Plato stands out above the arguments for immortality by which Socrates' intuition is sustained. Calmly awaiting his future, ready to drink the hemlock without any attempt to escape the destiny marked out for him, Socrates bespeaks immortality because interiorly he realizes it to be true. Yet the arguments of the *Phaedo* and other dialogues add something to the intuition; they imply the vision of the eternal Ideas which Plato develops from various angles of approach in his greater dialogues, the vision of the intelligible world of spiritual essences greatly superior in type and reality to any earth-born thing. For Plato the soul, in essence immate-

rial, is a denizen of that higher sphere, while temporarily limited by existence in this fleeting world of nature. Christians encountered no speculative difficulty in ridding Plato's teaching of its mythical doctrine of preëxistence, reminiscence, and rebirth. Platonic immortality carried with it the conviction that the soul's existence is fundamentally moral; it involved the unsurpassed idea of the eternal values in which so many have found inspiration. The Stoics added ideas of moral law, obligation, and adjustment to the rational universe. The Hebrew and Christian conceptions of righteousness have been strengthened thereby. Greek philosophy tended in a less personal direction with Aristotle's conception of the eternal reason. In the restatement of Platonism by Plotinus the idea of God was remote from the Christian conception. Yet the Christian imagery of heaven was united in large measure with Platonic views in a pictured future state that was infinitely more attractive than previous anticipations. The ethical argument for immortality had come to stay. As reformulated by Kant and others in recent times it has seemed the most convincing of all evidences, the impregnable reason for believing that immortality is true.[1]

The Christian Hope.—To pass in review the ideas of the soul and its hoped-for future state prevalent from the days of Augustine, Dante, and the later scholastics to the times of the reformers, of Milton and other poets, and of religious thinkers in the nineteenth century, is to realize that both the motives and the represented content of heaven or the City of God varied with the theology, poetry, the type of life prevailing in the given stage of society. What is most noticeable is the wide range of beliefs regarding both the soul and the life after death which seem compatible with essentially the same faith or hope.[2] If this "hope" can coexist with several versions of psychology, an exhaustive study would be concerned with each of these, to determine the progress toward a unified view of human

[1] Thus immortality becomes explicitly a "postulate" of our moral *faith,* together with faith in moral freedom and the existence of God.

[2] Cf. W. A. Brown, *The Christian Hope,* 1923, p. 15.

personality. Christ is said to have "brought immortality to light" as if the eternal life began with authorized salvation. But on another view Christ disclosed an immortality which never could have begun, but attained new values with Christian idealism. The general argument is so inwrought with views essential to salvation, probation, sanctification, and other matters primarily interesting to theologians, that the layman is apt to neglect the main line of development toward a conception of the future life to which very great numbers could subscribe.

More significant is the fact that our highly wrought conceptions of human personality came into vogue with the commingling of Greek and Christian ideas of the self, and the fact that faith in the future state of the soul was largely affected by this view of personality. The prospect of the survival of the highest rational element of the soul was gratifying to the philosopher only, and a doubt was left in the mind whether man the individual really persists at all. So too the Stoic conception of adjustment by mastery of the emotions seemed essentially impersonal. But with Christianity came the conviction that both the "heart" (with the emotions and the will) and the "head" are worthy in the sight of the Creator. Thus the inner life was esteemed anew, ideas of the soul developed apace; with the new vision of personality as of incalculable worth came new insights into immortality.

Personal Desire as an Incentive.—Religious considerations have so frequently turned upon motives for individual salvation and the reasons for putting stress on it—by warning people what to expect if they did not repent and through redemption avoid the torments of hell—that the situation seems dull and uninteresting. Yet side by side with this meagerness there developed an essentially social view of human personality, a social heaven was anticipated, and this kingdom was to be realized on earth as fully as possible: the great Christian motives were compassion, sympathy, love, calling for a productive life of service.

Without doubt, desire for immortality has been a leading

reason for believing in it. The effort for individual salvation has often been identical with this desire. But recent questionnaires have shown that many do not desire immortality, and that the subject may well be divorced from this motive. The evidences for belief in immortality would seem to be meager indeed, were we to judge by such questionnairies. These considerations are not far-reaching—in an age when many are too busy with mundane affairs and pleasures to give thought to the other reasons for believing. We would naturally expect interest to wane, amidst all the emphasis put on biological considerations and on types of psychological theory based upon biology, as if these theories were exhaustive and conclusive. Apparently, the drive for self-preservation is essential to our physical existence only. Hence it would be an easy matter to neglect the truth that we cling to life for very much higher reasons, notably in our love for our kindred and the hope that we will survive with them; also our interest in individuality and our ideal occupation, with the prospect that we may be co-workers in the everlasting life in which adequate opportunities will be discoverable for all. Desire may indeed build on eligible feelings and emotions, anticipating higher modes of happiness and love; such desire may be at least one of the evidences that immortality is true, it may be an earnest of fulfillment.

The anticipated comfort, peace, freedom, or rest which we sometimes associate with the future life may be purely individualistic at first. Yet this is a consolation to be shared with others who need the stimulus of our faith; the effort to awaken this conviction is an essentially social motive, so too is the appeal to arguments in its favor. As a result of criticism we find ourselves looking forward to a more promising heaven where activity, not static peace, is to be the rule. What we long for is justice, righteousness of an ethical sort (in contrast with mere piety), a heaven where the great moral and spiritual values shall be realized. These are the values of personality; personality is social in all the wealth of its relationships, and survival seems unintelligible save through a union of self-regarding and

other-regarding motives. Desire as an incentive may thus be transfigured as at least one of the eligible motives. Naturally, people for whom existence here is still a dull earthly game not worth the candle do not as yet desire immortality.

The Argument from Quality.—Streeter urges the point of view that it is not essentially a question whether we personally desire immortality, but of "what the Universe is worth."[3] If there be no Power behind it to treat individuality as worth more than "oyster-shells at a banquet, whisked from the table to make room for the next course," it were vain to talk about love, right, and the eternal values as worth while for their own sake. These worths or values are not self-subsistent; they are names given to qualities and experiences cognized by conscious minds. Hence Streeter bases his entire argument for immortality on the plea for *quality* rather than quantity or locality. The Beyond is not a "place," but "a quality of life." The life of the quality manifested in the soul of Christ being the highest life we know, this life is "for us in this world a mirror of the creative life of God." Human life becomes then a mirror of the life of heaven in so far as it approximates to that same quality.[4] We may then rightfully proceed from what we know here as love, joy, peace, constructive work, and the vision of beauty to the pattern wherethrough we frame our conception of the richer life beyond. Granted that there is purpose in the universe, that purpose must be as noble, with thoughts as high as the purpose and mind of Christ.[5] However difficult to believe that a loving God exists, Streeter finds it more difficult to believe in chance; he chooses belief in God, he finds God's purposes at least as worthy as man's, His love at least as considerate as human affection. So he concludes that a "living personality" is the central clue. The rationality of the universe is at stake in this whole question, the quality of Reality is the final test. "If there is a God

[3] *Reality*, p. 314.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 312.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

at all, we are His children, and He must care for us." His greatness, not our littleness, is the sure approach.

Continuity of Consciousness.—When we dwell on appearances making against belief in immortality, the evidences in its favor seem reduced to the minimum. The waning of bodily powers is obvious. The great "hope" seems less credible when we dwell on the findings of physiology, chemistry, biology, and physiological psychology. Mind seems to be a product of material evolution, inconsequential and evanescent. Nature appears to be so neglectful of the individual that the whole idea of survival is absurd. Materialism, building on these considerations and entrenching itself by appeal to the least promising facts in physiology, has frequently sent up such cries as "No thought without phosphorus," or has insisted that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile."[6] But, as frequently, it has been shown that these considerations are superficial, that they are put in a new light with the passing of the scientific pronouncements on which they were based, during the popular vogue of works like Büchner's *Force and Matter,*[7] or Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe,* 1899. The situation has notably changed with reference to all arguments based on ideas of continuity and the conservation of energy; for with the coming in of the electron and the proton, radiant energy, and the conception of an electrical universe, the material "substance" of old has waned, with the waning of the old-time idea of physical force. What the physical continuum is, we do not know. We are more cautious in arguing from appearances to prove that a continuum of consciousness does not exist.

The argument for a physical continuum is admittedly constructive. So too is the conception of the continuity of consciousness. Our consciousness is habitually subject to interruption during sleep, and if we believe consciousness is somehow unbroken we must piece together evidences in favor of an uninterrupted activity which guarantees the

[6] These propositions are intelligible in the light only of their context. See Lange, *History of Materialism,* Vols. II, III; new ed. in one vol., 1925.

[7] *Kraft und Stoff,* 1855.

recurrence of the consciousness of our waking hours. Our belief might also depend on the idea of a subconscious or subliminal self, ever active below the conscious level. In any event, many have come to believe anew in continuity amidst discontinuities, on the ground that the latter are incidental. Death seems to be simply another interruption, possibly greater and somewhat more prolonged, but not necessarily serious. The life after death seems then to call for an integration of profounder significance than the synthesis through which one connects the remembered activities of yesterday and yesteryear with the purpose which one is pursuing today. The more profoundly we know ourselves in the light of a purpose to which we dedicate the spirit year after year, the less emphasis we put on current appearances incidental to the passing days. Thus we find that in order to be the self which we recognize from day to day as *essentially the same* we must be very much more extensive and real than any passing experience indicates. The continuity or persistence of a purpose enduring into the future life is in reality what we plead for when we argue in favor of the continuity of consciousness.[8]

Personal Identity.—There is an ambiguity in the argument for the persistence of personal identity. If our identity depended on traits and attainments acquired in the present existence, it might cease with the present life, or survive but a short time. On the hypothesis of reincarnation, personal identity might be as temporary as the accumulated deeds, in process of change during a given embodiment. But if our identity is based on spiritual reality, what we acquire in the present life-round may be said to add to, not to constitute, our identity. I continue as the same person not merely through deeds wrought in the name of my central purpose in this existence: this my life-purpose coincides with God's purpose for me, and is no mere resultant of my deeds. My identity is my spirit or individuality. What I am as an individual, only my im-

[8] This is a very old argument in philosophical idealism. The plea for a larger self is essentially different from Myers' empirical argument. See, for example, J. Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, p. 145.

mortal existence can show. Personal identity is not limited to self-consciousness as just now known, subject to interruptions during sleep and during submergence in bodily processes. I continue to be the same person through the persistence of *spiritual identity,* which in turn involves the conservation of character, of interior or spiritual memory. This is not mere identity of substance, as if my soul were an immaterial atom or monad; it is the identity of a spiritual being distinctively individual in character, capable of spiritual thought, will, and conduct: a highly integrated self. This conception is most nearly in accord with the descriptions of experience submitted in the preceding chapters.

Memory.—But is immortality possible? Yes, one says, by virtue of the spirit, which is constituted for it—in substance, life or energy, powers and faculties. The objections are based on what we know about conditions and laws in the natural world—the body, its processes, chemistry, glands, the dependence of mind on brain under certain conditions. Those who object have failed to learn what the spirit is, how it is constituted, what evidences there are for holding that the spirit possesses interior senses and a superior power of thought. Thus the question of memory is often treated solely with reference to the fact of brain-impressions, with the probability that all memory will cease at death.

Instead, to be true to the deliverances of religious experience, we may *begin with the idea of spirit,* one of whose functions is the power to recall impressions in new moments of experience, the power to look before and after by affiliating the remembered deeds with present activities and hopes for future achievement. From this viewpoint, memory is not dependent on objective records alone, although it may be impeded by physiological conditions. It is not dependent on merely spontaneous or mechanical recurrences, as if the law of "the association of ideas," once so much in vogue, were the only explanatory principle. My past impressions must somehow be cherished or I could not recall and know them as mine. These records are

laid down and must indeed be preserved in a sequence such that when one item in a series of experiences recurs to mind the whole series can be recalled. But what is significant is the fact that, whatever items may spontaneously recur to mind, with their associates, I am able to correlate the remembered series with my *self:* my identity, character, purpose, and with my present experiences, through which I am making ready for the future. My memory is a potential record. I do not yet know all its contents or all the uses to which I may put them. Possibly, everything I ever did, everything that has happened to me is preserved therein. Bodily conditions impeding memory may be as transitory or superficial as those of well-known instances of loss of memory due to disease or accident. What is recovered is power to utilize those contents of memory which may serve my purpose.

On this view, it is "function that determines structure, not structure that determines function."[9] The power of the spirit to function through memory is especially seen in the kind of data which the individual seeks to recall. It is not the spontaneous recurrence of remembered instances which tends to make me a certain individual. Because I am already of a certain type, I endeavor to recall the data which suit my purpose. The spirit is not then "a naked monad" encrusted with memories which might be worn off by impact. The spirit is essentially a highly organized being, subject to development through impressions by which I partly transform my character. Much that happens in and around me is inconsequential: it passes with a minimum impression. But other matters I take to myself, making them parts of myself, confirming them by what I am, what I believe, what I have done. Thus by developing my life-purpose I acquire a prevailing love. This, I am convinced, will stay with me because inwrought in what I am becoming, as my life reaches forward into the future which is to be mine. What recurs to my mind in the spiritual world may be far more than (Platonic) reminiscence, more than the inner memory argued for by

[9] J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends,* 1911, p. 397.

Descartes, the spiritual memory pleaded for by Bergson,[10] or that of any other philosopher who contends that we have two memories. In any event, I am likely to know myself as precisely the person I have thus far become, so far as I have rounded out my purpose into its fulfillment.

Our True Environment.—Some students of the problems before us have found difficulty in envisaging the continuity of personal life apart from environment; since the persistence of identity (with the interior memory) seems to call for a large measure of sameness of environment. But by hypothesis the spirit while resident here in the natural world is already in interior relation with the spiritual world, with its perpetual environment. The spirit already possesses an organization of capacities and powers which make existence in both worlds possible. Thus the hypothesis of the subliminal self as proposed by Myers is advocated not merely to account for experiences in the body, for example, the experiences of genius or of mystical vision; but for disembodied existence when our greater powers shall be more freely used. So too the theory that we possess a spiritual body forming within the natural organism, in correlation with the interior life of the spirit, is advanced to account for probable future experiences. Although some of these theories may be greatly modified, it is justifiable to propound them as hypotheses. We may reasonably envisage the soul as equipped for experiences in a continuous environment which will be disclosed to our spiritual perception after death, when sense-impressions due to our material environment have ceased. Again, we may assign some importance at least to what we already take to be our real (interior) relationships to one another, so far as we know what spirit is. These affinities may seem vague or intangible. But we have reason to believe that under freer conditions the real character will stand out, the real ties will function. On this view, the spirit's future embodiment is not left to mechanical selection. Nor is it determined by *karma*. For the spirit will not be disembodied at all, but will simply have thrown aside its earthly

[10] *Matter and Memory*, tr. by Paul and Palmer, 1896.

body, never to be embodied in that sense again. We have at least one clue to the characteristic of that new expression of our spirit: what we are actually *at heart* (in our prevailing love) will be truthfully portrayed, all linguistic and social camouflages having been thrown aside. However faulty this picture, limited as it is by what we take to be the self, it helps us to envisage the continuity of consciousness, personal identity, memory, and character *from within.* It is outlined here as an alternative hypothesis, in contrast with reincarnation.

Psychologically, we are greatly limited. We cannot prove what we would. But we cannot disprove it. We need not assume that our spirit began with our physical conception. We have no positive evidence that the spirit is identical with the body, as some aver. We do not know and cannot prove that death ends all. Meanwhile, it is open to faith to believe what is intelligible in the effort to think beyond death by taking our clues from the strongest assurances already made plain.

Modern Indifference.—Naturally, in the reaction against supernaturalism many children of the age exclaim in their indifference: "One world at a time." As naturally, some who are indifferent finally come to believe there is no other world; for mundane interests, in the lust for power and pleasure, come to occupy the whole horizon. So too our zeal for social welfare replaces interest in the social betterment which was to be ours in the artificial heaven we have rejected. But such improvement may also be compatible with the more acceptable heaven of our *eternal environment.* The moral order may find its first field here. But the best life here may be the best preparation for the future.

Our difficulty may be that we have not looked for new evidences for our belief in the future life. But, called out of our lethargy and complacency when sorrow fills the hearts of those we love, we may once more have a quickened incentive, eager indeed to cling to faith and hope. We may at least endeavor to believe in God as of old, and consider what this faith implies, what the soul must therefore be, why we are spiritually drawn to one another, and

why people call for something more than dogma when their loved ones are silent in death. We may well correlate our several beliefs, sharing our convictions with those who, like ourselves, are seeking light. Thus our "one world at a time" may enlarge into that eternal world which was obscured for us while we believed the ancient creed. And it may well be that at heart we still adhere to revelation, finding in the Bible the gospel of the immortal life.

The Need for Reconstruction.—With the fear of punishment after death taken away, and the reduction of hell to self-love here and now, it is not strange that many reasons for believing in a future life have lost their cogency. A constructive return to faith in desirable immortality has proved difficult because, for one thing, it is necessary to discover what beliefs applicable to moral and spiritual life today have survived the onslaught on doctrines. The reconstruction naturally begins with recognition of what human nature is as now environed, what ends are supremely worth while. Moreover, we may endeavor to see our character face to face, by considering what self-love is, what the alternatives are, how self-love can best be transformed, how hell is to cease and heaven more decisively begin. Naturally, too, we will wish to return in thought to the first Christian days, picking up the scattered threads of that remarkable narrative in which the great work done by Christ is so simply told, and weaving them into a fabric radically different from the old supernaturalism. We can hardly complete the reconstruction without the inspiriting idea of the spiritual community or ideal of human brotherhood centering about love toward God and man in a kingdom which was not merely of this world.

Christlikeness.—In its central trend, the original gospel yielded a standard of righteousness calling for recognition of one's fellowmen in their actual plight or hope in this world. Each soul was to count for one, and this idea was put forward with a reverence never signalized in the world before. The hope which had long been in some measure a reason for believing in immortality was created anew by this typically social faith. It is a secondary matter that

each believer today would envisage this faith according to his creed. What concerns us is that the immortality thus brought to light centers about certain interests in human personality, whatever emphasis may be put on the personality of Christ as the clue. In Professor Brown's version, the goal is Christlikeness by appeal to Jesus, who, "in His own person . . . showed what life at its best may be in such a way that the former isolation of the future from the present existence is wholly overcome." Since there is fundamentally but one life, here or hereafter, the same ideal is for both heaven and earth, the change called death being only "the opening door from one room to another of the Father's house." [11]

Christians still differ radically regarding the possibilities of human achievement, in contrast with what is regarded as "the uniqueness and supremacy of the personality of Christ," as indeed they differ concerning the emphasis to be put on the Fourth Gospel. But on any version of Christ's personality, that personality is likely to be regarded as more than anything Jesus said or did, more even than the resurrection has been said to imply as a temporal event. Thus a clue is found to personality in the universal sense, as a prime reason for believing in the future life. Adherents of other religions would envisage the future life according to their own version of the divine incarnation.

The Eternal Verities.—Belief in immortality being in a sense the discovery of what we take personality to be at its best, we may add such arguments as seem necessary to make our version complete, with reference, for example, to the opening of the spiritual mind (or "mind of Christ"), the awakening of spiritual perception, and the greater insights made possible by the truths "brought to light." Some will still derive their clue from Plato, while others will adapt the Christian ideal of heaven to modern needs. The central idea, let us say, is that God is eternal; eternal truth is true of Him, for Him; so too is eternal Goodness, Beauty. Love for the eternal verities is love for their coher-

11 *The Christian Hope,* p. 18.

ence in the divine order of the universe, which includes the natural and spiritual worlds in a single system. This love of God is love of man, too. Temporal things, proper to the world of achievement here on earth, are instrumental. The eternal is from above. It does not emerge from natural things, is no mere product of temporal evolution. Man is immortal from above; he does not acquire immortality through a merely temporal process, earthly desire, or mere act of will. Psychology acquaints us with man's progressive efforts to account for this intuition, in his gradual awakening from ingenuous belief.

The Triumph of Faith.—Naturally, many of us begin this process of reflectively stating the matter for ourselves by assuming that the life of the soul goes on uninterruptedly on the natural plane. Hence the wonder wherewith primitive man contemplated the fact of death—the original wonder, it may be, with which all philosophy began. Hence, too, the surprise expressed by children now, when told that a loved person is "dead"—strange word to apply to an individual lately seen in full vigor of activity. One understands, then, why death as an actual occurrence *must be explained,* why belief in immortality must be taught. In this connection Pratt remarks, "Almost every child, I believe, learns only with a good deal of astonishment that he is going to die—*that* surely cannot be!"[12] Consequently, actual faith in immortality as a working belief must triumph over appearances, must be inculcated by appeal to what one of Pratt's respondents calls "the expert authority of men of all ages."[13] Hence many would agree with Pratt that belief in a future life is less frequently based on argument than belief in God, howbeit belief in God prepares the way for belief in immortality. The believer is likely to continue in this faith even when doubts are entertained concerning various reasons for believing in the soul. One who has approached the question with the conviction that man is already a spirit, dwelling in the spiritual world, may hold that most arguments for and

[12] *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 225.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 226.

against are wide of the mark, that they fall far short of spiritual perception.

The Value of Arguments.—The significant consideration in many arguments for immortality is not the argument as such, but the intuition which is the believer's real conviction; for this intuition involves values that are not reducible to explicit evidences and reasons. This is especially the case when the approach is from within or above, in contrast with discussions appealing to biology. But sometimes the biological argument begins with the implication that "life" is prior to the instruments it uses, that it is the primal energy of evolution as described by Bergson. So too Sir Oliver Lodge starts with *life* as the great fact, and regards the various systems of energies as expressions of life. Assuming that life in the universal sense is spiritual, that the human spirit takes on forms and conditions adapted to existence in the natural world, it is more readily conceivable that the spirit is also fully equipped for survival, that it possesses modes of activity not conditioned by the brain. The mere argument based on such considerations may be as faulty as were the old-time "proofs of the existence of God." But the fact that believers indulge in them for reasons which (for them) are profoundly persuasive, indicates the perennial outreaching of the human spirit. This type of conviction is observable in all arguments for spiritual evolution, assumed to be identical with "progress upwards and onwards forever." It does not follow that moral ideals *must* triumph, and therefore immortality is true. But what is plain is that faith here transcends all tangible evidences, thereby giving renewed expression to the belief in the eternal life.

Meanwhile, it becomes less and less feasible to draw sharp lines of distinction between the natural and spiritual phases of the universe, between the "natural" man and the "spiritual," on the assumption that only the spiritually eligible are immortal. For modern thought foregoes the attempt to delimit spiritual from natural goodness. It favors a democratic heaven, in contrast with an aristocracy of "true believers." The old officialism with its invidious

distinctions belonged with the rationalistic psychology of the Middle Ages, which divided the soul into discrete faculties. The attitude toward death changed when probation no longer ended with it, when both heaven and hell were described psychologically. The spiritual world was brought nearer with propositions in favor of the uniformity of nature, the reign of law, and the conservation of energy. Hence the laws and conditions of the present existence have been in a measure projected into a plausible future. Thus the conviction that man is immortal has been reënforced by looking more deeply into this world, instead of importing theology from the next. Death may then be said to be relatively incidental: the removal of detrimental conditions in the transition to a more complete existence.

Granted this new outlook, some who lost all desire for immortality under former doctrinal conditions may come to desire it anew. The possibility of the persistence of endeavors after death, needed for the realization of the Christian hope through social coöperation, may then seem to fulfill the inherent longing for an adequate opportunity, the desire for the "fullness of life" to which many bear witness.[14] As Pratt indicates, the longing for immortality in this sense is not strictly speaking an argument, but rather "an immediate sense that the death of the spirit is intolerably . . . incongruous with what one feels of indubitable reality."[15] If death be irrelevant to such reality, the effort to determine why man believes in immortality once more brings us to convictions which involve the ethical argument.

While some religious believers appear to be content with what they call "the immortality of influence" (without the survival of the individuals to whom this moral contribution is due), others have contended for a form of "social immortality" (with its hopes for a regenerated society, possibly of a socialistic type). But again the argument changes form, with the conviction that neither the persistence of influence nor the conservation of social values

[14] Cf. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

can be complete without the conservation of persons.[16] Indeed, the conviction is strong that it is the human individual, "as a free agent," who is able creatively to produce spiritual values. Love seems intuitively certain of "the infinite value of the individual as an end." Granted this appreciation of the infinite value of the individual, moral and spiritual values being inseparably bound up with the existence of the individual, the other matters follow: the plea for the continued existence of intelligence, with experience, selective memory, thought, the development of character and social relations, "with the conservation of all true friendship and love."[17] Hence the frequently reiterated argument that the status of values in the universe means *the status of selves,* with the implication that "the fundamental human values endure through the permanence of the rational and ethical spirit."[18] The continuity of *conscious moral life,* as the objective, is thus enriched by the complete psychology of the content of the Christian hope or faith.[19] Since "limitless time" is requisite to satisfying the needs of "the limitless spirit," if we value life in proportion to its possibilities, the ethical argument is reenforced by current recognition of the subliminal capacities and aspirations yet unrealized, "too great indeed to be capable of realization within the span of years open to our vision here."

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[16] Cf. D. C. Mackintosh, *The Reasonableness of Christianity,* 1925, p. 64.
[17] *Op. cit.,* pp. 66, 68.
[18] Cf. J. A. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy,* p. 471.
[19] See Brown, *op. cit.,* pp. 14, 169 foll.

CHAPTER XX

THE SPIRITUAL WORLD

Types of Belief in Another World.—Although it is beyond our province to settle any issue involved in various conceptions of the other world, belief in such a world is correlated with faith in immortality: man's present attitude is partly determined by the world of his aspirations. We are also concerned with the symbolism identified with the beyond, and with the imagery referring to the region where the other world is supposed to begin. While psychology does not venture to say to what extent a real world corresponds to the subjective states and convictions referring to it, we may at least note that religious beliefs differ in presuppositions and practical consequences.

Passing by the cruder beliefs of primitive times, when sensuous imagery and animistic symbolisms were projected into the world beyond death, we note that ideas of retribution led in time to a conception of the future life as a moral order, also a kingdom of heaven, although this heaven might not be gained until after the final incarnation, when all earthly desires have been conquered. The soul, according to Plato, never ceased to be a denizen of the intelligible world. But that realm of eternal Ideas has been so interpreted that it is not necessarily an existent world from which energies emerge into the present world-order. The power of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good is seen rather in the life by which these archetypes draw the soul in their direction, away from the world of sense-experience or mere change to the immutable divine order. Much more real for the faithful was the world of Christian supernaturalism as the direct source of all exceptional events in the religious experience of men on earth. Then

with the revolt against the supernatural came the idea of an empirically existent spiritual world, demonstrably present for those who believed that spirit-return had been proved. To this list of typical beliefs may also be added the view tacitly implied in current conceptions of the spiritual life as a realm of law and order such that there is no real break at death, no cessation of the interior life we are now living.

Beliefs in the Unseen.—Whatever the origin of man's belief in an unseen order, very much depends on the beings and forces he attributes to or projects into that world, when, for example, he peoples it with his ancestors, with the saints, guardian angels, or other influential beings; when he deems it the source of a supernatural revelation, or anticipates it as a heaven, or a heaven and a hell (also a purgatory). He may seem to live all the while in company with those who dwell beyond, partly thwarted and partly aided in life's journey by their presence. For his attitudes and emotions are firmly attached to the objects of his consciousness, whether those objects are real or ideal; he proceeds in his religious activities as if those objects were literally present to his senses.[1] Thus the unseen order may be so vividly real that heaven is a very present realization. "The sentiment of reality can indeed attach itself so strongly to our objects of belief that our whole life is polarized through and through . . . by its sense of the existence of the things believed in." James puts fundamental emphasis on this "*sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call *'something there,'* more deep and more general" than our special senses yield.[2]

Symbolisms of the Beyond.—The tendency of mystics to adopt a symbolic representation of their experience gives evidence of what has been called their "inextinguishable conviction that there are other planes of being than those which [our] physical senses report."[3] Hence comes the

1 Cf. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 53.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 58.
3 E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 180.

craving of the mystic for hidden knowledge, the adoption of analogies implying the principle of correspondence between the natural world and the spiritual, man and the macrocosm, the visible and invisible realms of being. Summarizing these tendencies, Miss Underhill finds that they imply the conviction that a real supersensible "cosmic medium" exists, interpenetrating, influencing and supporting the tangible (apparent) world; "an established analogy and equilibrium" between the unseen realities and the illusory manifestations wherewith the world we call the world of sense is invested; and that man by disciplined control can so adapt his conduct by aid of this analogy as to attain mastery over his "fate."[4]

Behind the symbolism, therefore, is an effort to develop an adequate view of the spiritual world as profoundly real and calling for an adjustment of the soul to the forces making for equilibrium. Miss Underhill assumes a connection with magic at this point, on the ground that religion "can never entirely divorce itself from magic," that is, from rituals and sacraments.[5] Rationalists would certainly question this assumption; and would discriminate between (1) magical effects, supposedly wrought by some occult force, implying superstition; and (2) religious values associated with the bread and wine as symbols interpreted according to the highest objects of the spiritual life. Adjustment for practical ends is the gist of the matter, as shown by Miss Underhill's own description of the mystical way, which calls for a more profound awakening of the self, with the awakening of a so-called "transcendental consciousness," due to an experience even more penetrating than ordinary conversion.[6] There is, for example, a disturbance of the equilibrium of the self, resulting in a shifting of the field of consciousness from lower to higher levels, and the practical problem is to acquire habitual adaptation to the conditions of the higher level of existence.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 193.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 213 foll.

The awakening of the self to the consciousness of "Divine Reality . . . usually abrupt and well-marked, is accompanied by intense feelings of joy and exaltation."[7] Presumably, there is "one continuous process of transcendence: the movement of consciousness from lower to higher levels of reality, the steady making of character in accordance with the 'independent' spiritual world." Evidences in favor of the reality of this world increase with the realization of man's finiteness and imperfection, the need for purgation and illumination, the "mystic pain," "dark night of the soul," spiritual crucifixion, "great desolation," and need for complete surrender; also in the yearning for that "union" which shall mean a state of genuine equilibrium; the attainment of the purely spiritual life, with its enhanced powers and indubitable certitude. Whether the activities and intuitions which mean so much to the recipient are attributed to what Miss Underhill calls the "transcendental consciousness" or to "emergences" from below the threshold (Myers), the essential points for our purposes are: (1) the heightened sense of power, remaking the field of consciousness, yielding a drive for marked self-development, a "descent" of power or "welling-up" of energy with enormous influence in every phase of religious consciousness and life; (2) a symbolical, correspondential, or analogical representation of the spiritual world to account for the intensely real experience of "planes" pertaining to the higher sphere to which the new energies and intuitions are attributed.

The Supernatural.—Without questioning the reality of the intuition said to disclose the primacy of God in the inner life, or the ineffable proximity of the spiritual world, we may ask whether the sense of enlargement, the newness of power entails belief in the supernatural. Emphasizing the mystic's profound conviction that there is "an indwelling of this visible world by an invisible, yet truly existent world of spirit," transcending but also supporting the natural world, Miss Underhill identifies this invisible world with "Supernature," God being interpreted as more

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

explicitly the ground of Supernature or Eternity than of Nature and Time, as more truly transcendent than immanent.[8] Supernature thus regarded is the ground by which may be interpreted "the serial changes in our finite selves." The practical objective is to bring the supernatural life "by natural channels to the soul."[9] Consequently, Miss Underhill assumes that the real work to be accomplished through prayer is to establish connection with "the supernatural environment" as "more real and solid" than the natural. This means that "as Christians we are committed . . . to a belief in the priority of the supernatural world; the actual presence, and working within visible appearance, of the Creative Spirit of God." It means that the priest is "an agent of the supernatural."[10]

Critics have protested against this compromise by which the supernatural world of former times is retained under the guise of "supernature." The revolt against the supernatural is a radical objection to a disruption of the universe into two dissevered worlds, as if there were another world "above the essence and exigency" of nature as a created world.[11] The distinction must be clear-cut indeed if every vestige of magic is to be discerned and rejected.

The supernatural world was either divine in a mythological sense of the term, magical, or magico-religious. Precisely what magic is, is still difficult to say.[12] But in general it involved the idea that the performance of certain motions or rites here on earth sufficed to invoke power from the unseen world, from its deities. Vestiges of this belief still linger with those who regard prayer and the sacraments as somehow invoking miraculous powers. So too the supernatural as a dissevered world was associated with the belief in miracles, interventions of providence, special dispensations, or interruptions of natural laws and conditions. As the home of God, it was the source of the

[8] *Man and the Supernatural*, 1928, p. 51.
[9] *Concerning the Inner Life*, p. 14.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[11] Cf. Edmond Holmes, *Dying Lights and Dawning*, Introd.
[12] Cf. Art. "Magic," in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*. See, also, Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 47 foll.

creative activities which somehow produced the world out of nothing in six days. With God anything was possible that chanced to proceed from that world. The Bible was given from it by dictation. For some believers even the most incredible miracles were literally true, because due to divine decree. So too the virgin birth and the bodily resurrection were essential tenets of the Christian faith of that type.

The conflict over the supernatural began in all seriousness with acceptance of nature as the domain of law, uniformity, and the conservation of energy.[13] Here at last was a structure of thought by appeal to which the last vestiges of mythology could be scrutinized. What remained for religious liberals were the empirical values capable of withstanding rational tests, and referring to a spiritual order of reality wholly harmonious with natural laws. There also remained an idea of God as immanent in nature, although it was extremely difficult to defend beliefs in providence or design in nature. The idea of a divine revelation was retained in so far as it could be reconciled with a psychology of the divine education of the race, as already indicated.

New Ideas of Nature.—To some extent, beliefs rejected with supernaturalism have been renewed by redefining "nature." By extension of the term, everything that occurs in man's religious experience is "natural." Hence it belongs within the sphere of psychological description. Thus the term "human nature" has come to include man's religious nature in the fullest sense of the word. In so far as this nature is fed by streams from spiritual sources, these involve processes and conditions so far similar to those of the eternal world that one divine law is over all. In this enlarged sense it is "natural" for man to be religious, to pray, to worship; it is no less natural to believe in experiences not wholly explained by externally observed phenomena. The greatest spiritual event takes place under these conditions, in accordance with reason. Hence the

[13] On the development of modern ideas, see A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 1926; J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 1926, Chaps. X-XII, XVIII, foll.

"supra-rational" is rejected with the "super-essential." To allege that revelation as "supernatural" is "supra-rational," is to hold a view "destructive of unity in our ideas of God, the world, ourselves; and it casts a slur on the faculties which are the appointed organs of communications between God and man. A revelation absolutely transcending reason is an absurdity: no such revelation could ever be made."[14]

Whatever reality there may be in experiences of "higher" types is so conditioned that its action could be explained by the law and order of the universe, if our vision could compass these experiences in their entirety. Hence the belief in special providences and unique events has given place in some quarters to renewed belief in God as the Ground of law and order, the God who (if really knowing about or answering our prayers) makes no change either in His plan or in events. The works wrought by Jesus (that actually occurred as events) were accomplished by law-exemplifying forces. So too the resurrection (as a spiritual event) was according to law: it was not a revival of the physical body. The last considerations to be brought into relation with law, on this view, were the virgin birth and the incarnation in so far as loyalty to doctrine still demanded allegiance to what is unique or special. Some maintain that what is spiritual is universal, and that suspension of a known biological process is unthinkable. What here concerns us is the fact that amidst the revolt against the supernatural there has developed a new view of the spiritual world as the domain of law and order. This view we have already noted in part when observing that the more recent beliefs in immortality are grounded in the conviction that the moral life of today is essentially the same as that which will survive death tomorrow.

Beliefs in Immortality.—Disbelief in immortality, we have seen, is likely to spring from indifference, from absorption in external interests and pleasures, to the neglect of principles which are the rational correctives of materialism, pessimism, crude physiology and cruder psychol-

[14] Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 19.

ogy; it finds partial substitutes in the so-called immortality of influence and of social causes or plans for social reform. While belief in immortality is sometimes due to personal desire for it, the longing for personal salvation or comfort, it also includes consolations which may be shared with the sorrowful, with our loved ones; it adds moral incentives, has a restraining influence, fosters the larger hope, yields a nobler ideal for social service in the spiritual community; appertains to the eternal values, finding their locus in human personality, personality being in turn the clue to deeper conviction. Since death ceases to be a crucial event with this transfer of interest to the awakened spirit, interest now centers about the continuity of *life* (not death), about the spiritual world in which are continued the moral and religious activities of the present existence. While death is likely to mean an interruption in consciousness (like sleep), this may be merely incidental to the persistence of identity, character, personal integrity. Belief in immortality as thus formulated also implies an interior memory, the independence of mental activities capable of functioning as powers of the spirit, limited by physical conditions during existence in this world, but due essentially to *life* (as spiritual and eternal), not to "matter." The belief thus outlined centers about the human spirit so conditioned that it pertains to the eternal divine order, here and hereafter. One's idea of the spiritual world may then be formulated by what we know about that order. "Whatever view of reality deepens our sense of the tremendous issues of life in the world wherein we move, is *for us* nearer the truth than any view which diminishes that sense. The truth is revealed to us that we may have *life*, and have it more abundantly."[15] Hence Dean Inge adopts the view that eternal life is "not knowledge as a possession, but the state of acquiring knowledge."[16]

Science and the Spiritual World.—It may then be said that the newer ideas of immortality involve an application of science to the spiritual world. Myers' proposition is that

[15] Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

the unseen world is "a realm of law . . . of definite progress according to definite relations of cause and effect, resulting from structural laws of spiritual existence and intercourse." [17] This implies the conviction that "*if a spiritual world exists, and if that world has at any epoch been manifest or even discoverable, then it ought to be manifest or discoverable now.*" We are not here concerned with Myers' thesis that "a communication can take place from mind to mind by some agency not that of the recognized organs of sense," that is, telepathy. What concerns us is that a real spiritual world is said to exist (in contrast with a mere world of values), that law everywhere obtains in that world and is implied in whatever revelation may have come from it; and that the laws obtaining in religious experiences here will hold in experiences there. In brief, moral and spiritual existence in the spiritual world after death is continuous with moral and spiritual existence in the natural world. Hence the continuity of character, the persistence of personal identity, comes under law. Sowing and reaping will occur there as here, the law of change from within outward will hold good, the ruling love will continue; and there will be opportunities to work for the supremacy of justice. It follows that there will be no favoritism; no excessive rewards bestowed upon the few, while the virtues of others are ignored; no special privileges, no seats near the throne, or other assignments involving whims or caprices. Since there are definite laws of progress, we may assume that there are no breaks, no leaps save natural fruitions of efforts that went before; hence no sudden attainments of virtue, no miracles of grace. Instead, there will be successive changes resulting from actual deeds done, the result being measured by the effort.

Granted such a view, it follows that the spiritual world is not a region of "mere vagueness or stagnancy of adoration." [18] "Ever more clearly must our age of science real-

[17] *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death*, Vol. 1, p. 6.

[18] Myers, *ibid.*, p. 20.

ize that any relation between a material world and a spiritual world cannot be an emotional or an ethical relation alone; that it must needs be a great structural fact of the universe, involving laws at least as persistent, as identical from age to age, as our known laws of energy or motion.''[19] What is demanded is the same procedure which we follow in the description and explanation of events in nature, that is, the determination of the facts of religious experience, their conditions and laws, by presupposing an adequate environment, never ruling out such experiences because they have not been accounted for by the physical sciences.

Psychical Research.—Neglecting all critical issues raised by psychical research with regard to alleged communications with the departed, we note that it is a religious fact of great significance that many have regained their belief in immortality by appeal to such research. For it is not primarily a question of such communications or of a special mode of experience, such as telepathy; but of the view of the spiritual world fostered by Mr. Myers, the view which has helped people to extend the idea of law and order into that world, on the ground that the scientific method is applicable to the sphere formerly appropriated by sentiment, dogma, and tradition. It is difficult for some religious believers to draw the necessary distinctions. For it has been uncritically assumed that the uncertainties attending all evidences for spirit-return invalidate psychical research as a whole; whereas the great achievement of Myers is the formulation of a theory of normal human experiences with respect to abilities inhering in the race and conceivably grounded in the personality which will survive in the life after death.[20]

We may then reconsider what we vaguely call ''life'' by regarding consciousness (including subliminal activities) as not merely ''the psychical counterpart of life'' in the biological meaning of the term, but as due to *spiritual* power which is by no means biological in origin. We may

[19] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 288.
[20] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 20.

refer our higher experiences then to life in this its spiritual sense, avoiding all compromises with physical science. This conception of power or life may reasonably be retained although we are utterly skeptical even in regard to telepathy. For it is essentially a constructive idea proposed to account for whatever higher experience may prove real or true, for instance, the output of genius, the spiritual perception or inspiration for which we reserve the highest place in the interpretation of the religious life. So too conversion and mystical experiences at their best may here find their best explanation. Any one who is convinced of telepathy, lucidity, or any other type of psychical experience on the borderland, may of course extend this conception to include these matters also.

Contact with the Spiritual World.—On this view, the point of contact is not in what we call consciousness in the interrupted sense in which we empirically know it in our waking hours. Nor is it merely in the submerged region of personality where the relationship is by hypothesis closer than in one's conscious moments, as that region is described by Myers in order to describe psychical phenomena. For we may add to Myers' description whatever is called for by the highest teaching we know by way of appeal to the secret place of the spirit, the inmost or heart, the sphere of spiritual perception, on the ground that what we mean by "contact" is partly ideal or ineffable, is not mere immediacy of experience but by implication the ground of unison between the Divine will and the human, the meeting-point of God and man. The spirit may well be, in this sense of the term, our immortal basic nature. It may be so far removed from the external experiences in which we are so readily immersed that we scarcely know of its existence as yet *by experience,* but rather by implication because of the highest deliverances of spiritual experience. Here of course each man's synthesis of the highest data and teaching in his possession will depend on his type of thought and life.

Granted such a synthetic view, we may then say that the inspirations of men of religious genius spring from

a source one step nearer Ultimate Reality, and we may make reservations in favor of deliverances that have thus far proved incommensurable with the usual results of discursive thought. There may then be what Myers calls "precognitive information." In any case, two propositions emerge from Myers' effort to propose an adequate hypothesis: (1) in man there is a soul that can draw power from a spiritual universe, (2) in the universe there is a Spirit accessible and responsive to the soul of man. Our inspirations may then come through what Myers calls "spiritual indrawing," and we may describe deliverances referred to the spiritual world as *experiences* without indulging in mystical theology. The spiritual world may then be *for us* a fact of experience. One might still be cautious in adopting popular ideas of the subconscious. One might be utterly skeptical concerning all phenomena of a spiritistic type. What remains is an idea of human personality which, by enlargement, conceptually extends the reign of law into the spiritual world, with a definite view of the survival of bodily death.

The Spiritual Universe.—Psychologically speaking, experiences attributed to the spiritual world are describable by reference to "the ontological perceptions" which, in Miss Underhill's terminology, enable the mystic to construct his ideal picture of the spiritual world.[21] These perceptions become in the more cautious phraseology of Professor James "ontological imaginations."[22] Whatever may be said concerning the implied reference to a metaphysical "beyond," the significant point in James' description is that the perception or imagination is accompanied by distinguishable associations and processes, which (in James' view) are not the data which rationalism is concerned with, but considerations invested with "prestige," which is here an intuitional term. "If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits."

21 *Mysticism*, p. 323, foll.
22 *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 72.

James regards this impulsive belief, this "unreasoned and immediate assurance" as the deep thing about us. Hence it is that God's presence can be more real for some souls than any other experience. He concludes that these our varied beliefs show the universe to be "a more many-sided affair than any sect, even the scientific sect, allows for."[23]

Thus James' references to the belief in an unseen order are brought to a focus, as one of the great types of constructive thought. Practically speaking, this envisaged world may seem so real that this higher "order" may yield "a superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can compare." So too "a higher kind of inner excitement" may ensue, also a more real incentive to prayer, with new assurance that in prayer "something is genuinely transacted."[24]

Here Myers' conception of the subliminal self comes to the support of the religious consciousness, with the proposition that there "exists around us a spiritual universe, and that [this] universe is in actual relation with the material. From the spiritual universe comes the energy which maintains the material, the energy which makes the life of each individual spirit. Our spirits are supported by a perpetual indrawal of this energy, and the vigor of that indrawal is perpetually changing, much as the vigor of our absorption of material nutriment changes from hour to hour." Granted these "facts," we should so *act* as to draw in whatever spiritual life we can, prayer being "the attitude of open and earnest expectancy." Thus regarded, prayer is not purely subjective: it involves a real increase in intensity of our assimilation of power from the spiritual world.[25] While in Myers' view we do not know enough of what occurs in that world to know the way prayer operates or by what channel energy comes to us, we may at least say that "grace flows in from the infinite spiritual world." In James' terminology, there is "a department of

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 122.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 369, 466.
[25] Quoted by James, *op. cit.*, p. 466.

human nature with unusually close relation to the marginal or subliminal region." Through this region of our nature "work is really done, spiritual energy flows in and produces effects." The subjective part of our total experience of the universe may be incalculably more extensive than the objective part, our inner state may be "our very experience itself."[26] Hence the profound significance of what James describes as "the germinal higher part" of our nature. This region may be "conterminous and continuous with a More of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside." This is the over-region with which man in his religious needs can keep in working touch. Whatever this reality may be on the farther side, on its hither side we may regard it as "the subconscious continuation of our conscious life." Whatever the "over-beliefs" may be in the individual case, this fact "that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come" implies a positive content of religious experience—"literally and objectively true as far as it goes." In so far as our ideal impulses spring from this beyond, we may be said more intimately to belong to the unseen order than to the visible world; for "we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong." The spiritual world is real, God is real; for real effects are produced in this world, in our personality: when we commune with that ideal region actual work is done.[27]

This, to be sure, is only the world of our over-beliefs, real for those who have had convincing experience. Yet if, as James is persuaded, "religion . . . for the great majority of our race *means* immortality, and nothing else," God being the producer of immortality, the conviction that a real power is present, other and larger than our conscious selves, converges with the "hope" and faith already discussed in Christian terms.

Propositions concerning the spiritual world belong beyond our inquiry in so far as we try to determine what is objectively real in a universal sense of the term. Naturally,

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 483, 498, 499.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 508, 512, 515, 516.

each believer has his own spiritual world. Any constructive view is necessarily in part a projection of our psychology and of what we know of the present existence. But so too is any synthetic idea of God. This is not a serious objection, granted the being of God as the ultimate Ground of our selfhood, our universe, and the eternal life. Man as immortal spirit may then be said to be a microcosm intimately corresponding to the macrocosm in which he dwells, the structure of his interior selfhood being the intelligible clue to the total universe of the divine order. It seems perfectly legitimate therefore to utilize the idea of the subliminal self as an intermediate idea, while also, with Sir Oliver Lodge, pushing the latest results of the sciences as far as feasible, then supplementing science with the proposition that life itself is essentially spiritual. Meanwhile, students of these questions who are more skeptical will agree with Höffding that "no description of heaven or hell has been given the individual features of which have not been borrowed from terrestrial experience."[28] Yet granted that "every conception of a future life, of a higher world, is made up of elements which are taken from *this* world," and that the question whether a future world exists is "a question which alone experience can decide," we have no reason for blurring the distinctions so clearly drawn by James and Myers for the sake of describing and interpreting experiences which religious people have already enjoyed, people for whom the spiritual world is empirically real. In any event, we may undertake, with Höffding, "to live eternal life in the midst of time," that being in a profound sense "the true immortality, whether or not there is any other immortality."[29]

Summary.—Beliefs in the spiritual world depend upon the type of psychology espoused in any age. This is notably true in the case of widespread primitive conceptions, the acceptance of Greek idealism, and the incoming of Christianity with its new hope. Ideas of the spiritual world in recent centuries have largely turned upon conceptions of

[28] *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 382.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

the supernatural and the gradual revolt against the supernatural in favor of new definitions of nature. With the waning of the older theology, has come into vogue an essentially empirical view of our relation to the other world, implying an extension of the reign of law and the existence of a larger or subliminal self. It thus becomes a question of evidences in favor of quickening experiences which have led people on religious grounds to retain the idea of a real spiritual world, experiences which apparently are not accounted for on the basis of merely physiological psychology. While the psychology of religion is not decisive concerning beliefs in the spiritual world, it finds place for the experiences out of which such beliefs have arisen, and finds that these beliefs are efficient religious motives. The skeptic is likely to seize upon such terms as "ontological imagination," and to conclude that the spiritual world is simply a subjective fancy. But the believer in the continuity and eternal reality of the moral life is no less secure in his conviction that there is a moral order of which our present existence is only a part. The more profoundly we know our basic nature, the more we already possess and know our future, the spiritual world in which as spiritual beings we already live. Hence the significance for the religious life of those deeply interior insights which signalize "the aspect of eternity" in accordance with which our present existence is more truly seen.

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CHAPTER XXI

SIN AND REFORMATION

Review.—Summarizing the results of the two preceding chapters, we observe that the more determinate beliefs in immortality and the spiritual world start either with belief in God, or with an experience taken to be decisive from which the given idea of God and the spiritual world follows, immortality being an inference. Psychologically, the spiritual world may be a series of symbols, a group of ontological perceptions or imaginations, projective in type, with little reality beyond mystical subjectivity. But the projective references were very different in type in the days of magico-religious belief. With the decay of magic and the relegation of supernaturalism to the past, what remained for religious liberals was *experience* or religious consciousness, which has taken on new projective meanings with the adoption of scientific conceptions of law, order, and uniformity. In this sense, the spiritual world becomes far more real: it is thus far a part of the eternal universe of the divine order, and probably continuous with the world of our present experience, the experience of the human spirit in its integrity and permanent identity.

Yet even the successive picturizations of the spiritual world from earliest times until our own day are significant, if, taking these at their face-value, we interpret them in the light of what religious people take to be centrally real. Nothing is more real for the intense believer than the universe of his own ideas. The subjective states become objective, and even metaphors and symbols become, as it were, living beings in a moving spectacle of truths and realities along the great pathway of the soul. Myers' hypothesis of the subliminal self enables us to make the ad-

vance beyond what appears to be mere subjectivity to the point of actual contact with a conterminous spiritual world. Here our thought is admittedly constructive, and comparative study can alone show what scheme of things most nearly accords with the facts of experiences objectively attributed to that world. Much will depend on our view of that inmost region of the spirit where man is in closest relation with God or with whatever spiritual realities seem to him to constitute the divine order. James is our guide here, since a plurality of psychological descriptions helps us to give their just due to conceptions of the universe too rich in values to be reducible as yet to a single type.

In any event, reasonings concerning the spiritual world are of practical significance in articulating motives for our conduct in the present existence. Taking myself to be a spirit, destined for the spiritual world of the more complete life, I have every reason to live by this faith day by day, setting apart a region of my consciousness, so to speak, for inward reminders of the life eternal, while outwardly adjusting my conduct to the world of which I am a member through my bodily organism (my "instrument"). In this way, also, I may be more vividly in unison with my fellowmen. Those most nearly akin to me, spiritually speaking, may be regarded as especially related to me in the inward region. My spiritual world will then be as extensive as my recognition of the brotherhood which constitutes it, my vision of the City of God or Kingdom of Heaven. So too my communion and meditation, my prayers and aspirations will depend on this vision or faith, notably when death occurs in the household: *life, not death,* is the watchword. Again, there will be those who insist that what James calls "actual work" is done in this interior region, by our communion. By "the indrawing of spiritual power" the unseen world may then be unspeakably real, different in type yet contiguous to the natural world.

Again, we have noted the fact that the subconscious in the popular sense of the word is amenable to varied interpretations. The greater the claims made for it, the

more its place in religion depends on value-judgments concerning its deliverances and their utility. The subconscious is one phase only of those processes which the religious person seeks to integrate. As one person is more intuitive in type, so another may depend on subconscious fruitions. What is needed is a criterion concerning the real and the true, by appeal to what Adam Smith called the impartial spectator within the breast. Naturally, the religious person who has been able to preserve his intuitions in something like their pristine purity and spontaneity will wish to conserve this ability as a clue to religion as a life. What avails in the last analysis is what we recall, amidst all this subliminal and subconscious wealth of impressions; and the deliverances which we are able to correlate with what we already know or believe. Religious reality is what criticism shows it to be, even when we acquire our doctrine by revelation. The deeper self as such is no guarantee that we possess spiritual truth, or that we experience the real presence of the spiritual world. Moreover, its deliverances are distinguishable into lower and higher types, according to the values we assign to them. Hence we may conclude that the universal spiritual world is neutral.

Traditional Ideas of Sin.—These conclusions will guide our inquiry into the nature of sin and evil, with the possibility of moral reformation. Whatever our theory of an original evil element in human nature—the perverse or lower self to which our sins are attributed—this is an interpretation of tendencies which originally were neutral. For psychology discloses no adverse element as such, not even in our most primitive instincts and passions, our crudest emotions or most earthly desires. Hence the immediacy of any propensity or impulse is to be distinguished from the value-judgment which assigns it to a certain place in the moral scale.

Adverse judgments are, however, so thoroughly inwrought with certain propensities; the idea of sin, repentance, and salvation is so intimately related with assumptions concerning radical evil and man's self-love, that we must

give some attention to these judgments. Moreover, conversion as already considered is in some sense offered as the solution for this sense of sin. Prior to the dawn of modern criticism it would have been almost absurd to inquire into the motivation of sin; the creation of the new will, essential to regeneration, could not be credited to any effort falling within the sphere of psychological analysis. It was customary to condemn acts as wrong or sinful in themselves solely on the ground that they were transgressions of divine law, whether or not the individual could reasonably be held accountable. Not until distinctions were drawn between vice, sin, and crime; between individual and social responsibility in the light of hereditary tendencies and one's social environment, was it feasible to discriminate motives or intentions, with the hope of determining the actual participation of the individual in evil or sin. When doctrinal generalization gives place to psychological analysis, it also becomes credible that repentance as a factor in moral regeneration comes within the psychological field. At length, we come in sight of the view hinted at in another chapter: that a distinction is to be drawn between man's basic nature and that secondary nature or mind into which he is conditioned by his social contacts. Hence it has been confidently affirmed in recent times that *no man sins with his whole nature,* no man sins in spirit.

The Ethical View.—Not until our day has it become possible to gain a fairly complete insight into the factors of human nature yielding the raw material for vice, sin, and crime; and it has not yet been shown what allowances shall be made for unconscious motivation, social heredity, and disease. Ethical criticism has shown that strictly speaking the individual is responsible when, in the presence of higher and lower alternatives, either of which could be chosen, man is able to pass judgment upon himself. The implication is that in some respects man is morally free. The acceptance or rejection of an alternative will depend on the degree of enlightenment, in the presence of nature, nurture, and tradition. Thus an act which was approved in one age might be condemned in another. The relativity

of deeds to value-judgments was also emphasized on psychological grounds when it proved impossible to discover any element, organ, faculty, or even function or process of our nature that could be regarded as evil in itself.

If our native impulses, passions, and appetites have come to us through gradual ascent from the higher animals to primitive man—who responded to them according to his cultural patterns and transmitted the complex products of social response as the basis for later traditions—much depends on the use to which we put these intensified or lessened tendencies, whatever they may prove to be. So it becomes a question of the prime result in the given individual, his ignorance or wisdom, his moderation or excess, in contrast with what we may take to be his original nature. Individual responsibility with respect to the beginnings of vice or crime is a matter of detail, with special reference to the conditions peculiar to a transitional period like adolescence, when upward and downward trends are readily confused. The assumption that man possesses a primary incentive to sin having been rejected, all original drives being in themselves neutral, the situation within the individual is reduced to an antithesis between lower and higher tendencies.

Social Origins.—If perfectly normal promptings may be so fostered that they are adjudged sensual, sensuality may be intensified into vice; from vice (individual evil) may eventuate crime (social), and social evils may involve great numbers of people in a complexity so baffling that religious people see no hope save through "salvation." But to trace sin to its sources is to remember the conditions under which the harmless was made harmful through the attitude man took toward his propensities, the prohibitions placed upon him, his own inhibitions, also the resulting repressions and conflicts, all of which were due in part to the acceptance of traditional patterns. The whole race may be involved. But if so, ignorance has been more widespread than sin. The non-moral is so extensive that it is difficult to say precisely where the immoral began in human history. In any event, the sense of guilt came in a conventional way

to be associated with emotional judgments which were fostered by social patterns. The consciousness of shame arose amidst a complexity of motives which we scarcely understood until we began to separate matters belonging respectively to biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, and theology. It was not "sin," not guilt or immorality that was racially transmitted to us: it was the *problem* pertaining to our biological nature, granted the incentive to live as moral beings in a social *milieu* of customs and conventions. Having been brought to a realizing sense of the animal structure on which our moral existence is founded, we are in a position to judge anew what we call our "religious nature."

The Sense of Sin.—Whatever the ulterior view of sin, the struggle against it is brought within the psychological field by our modern view of man's native equipment and of the motives which are susceptible of moral judgment. Although doctrinally sin may be rebellion against "God alone," practically speaking it is a question of motives capable of being psychologically analyzed. So too "the conviction of sin" comes within the psychological field. Man is largely influenced from childhood to regard this or that motive or deed as sinful. Thus a person of excellent heritage and high ideals, if very strictly reared, may seem to have committed a great sin in making a slight departure from the established code. Thus conscience becomes an important factor in the sense of sin. Again, the struggle against sin may be largely due to the harsh condemnation of unfriendly onlookers, especially when a woman suffers under the bitter accusations of a double moral standard which exonerates the real sinner. The struggle may be to find some one who will admit even a ray of light into the dark situation. Unless persuaded to believe so, the sinner would probably not regard himself as utterly bad. Nor would any one apart from morbid anxiety due to doctrinal instruction suppose he had committed the "unpardonable" sin. The sense of sin is sometimes artificially stimulated by way of preparation for conversion according to an evangelical pattern. One who is persuaded to believe him-

self very sinful *in general,* although doubtful about particular sins, might be classed by most people as very good. The "sense" of sin depends then on doctrinal assumptions.

Religious people are likely to insist that sin is a vitally real problem, whatever view of our heritage is espoused. But the whole situation has changed since the traditional view of human nature as essentially static gave place to the view that the self is in process of change. If no longer a question of our original structure, as if human nature could be changed only by a miracle of grace, it is not really a matter of mere origin at all. If we take our clue from *development* and the goals toward which we are tending, all our judgments of value or worth will naturally express our idealistic insights. Hence psychologically it becomes a matter of estimating our higher nature, in contrast with our lower.

Instincts and Sin.—While the mind of "the flesh" of Paul's epistles was formerly identified with the body as the source of evil, it has been more recently described as "the earthward-tending life of mere natural impulse," in contrast with the mind of "the spirit," which is interpreted to be "the quickening life of redirected desire."[1] Thus the "original" sin of theology is taken to be the "instinctive" mind of psychology. Sin is "primarily a fall-back to past levels of conduct and experience, a defeat of the spirit of the future in its conflict with the undying past." Hence man needs freedom from this "pull-back" of his racial origin, that the "pull-forward of his spiritual destiny" may come into power. Our difficulty lies in "failure to correspond with the light we possess." We need to "change the direction of our passionate cravings for satisfaction, to harmonize and devote them to spiritual ends. This is true regeneration," namely, by unifying the instinctive with the ideal life. The raw material of both vice and virtue is to be found in the mass of desires and cravings with which we are endowed, namely, tendencies which in themselves are neither moral nor immoral, but

[1] E. Underhill, *The Life of the Spirit in the Life of Today,* 1922, p. 81.

"natural and self-regarding."[2] Granted the fact that our instincts are not fixed tendencies but are adaptable, the first great opportunity in the life of the spirit is their sublimation, through the transfer of our interests and energies to new objectives. The whole outlook changes when, instead of the old ideas of repentance and purification, we substitute: (1) the *identification* of our instinctive power, (2) the *sublimation* of these tendencies, and (3) their *detachment* from egoistic desires and dedication to new purposes.[3]

Sin as Separateness.—Jordan suggests that instead of speaking of "a universal sense of sin," we refer to "the *universality* of those instincts and prohibitions which issue in a sense of sin."[4] This terminology means in turn that while instincts "propel," these are not in themselves signs of depravity, but of hidden energy utilized in relation to raw material for either good or evil. The decisive factors in the process are: (1) the *will* which "operates," and (2) the *ideal* which "directs."

It follows that man does not sin with his entire nature but when he subordinates his ideal to a lower motive, misusing his propulsive instincts. Reformation begins with desire for it, with the redirecting (sublimation) of his energies. Thus the man who, under conflict, appeals to a religious worker for help toward moral reformation, has already made a decisive change at heart, although unaware what this decision means. What is of moment is the process toward freedom, the effort to emerge from bondage to the lower self into expression of higher motives which have been under restraint.

Sin may then be described as a condition or state due to disjunction within the self. Man sins when he separates himself—in attitudes, consciousness, deeds—from God, and turns from the best he can give his fellowmen. Sin as

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 90.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 110. Sublimation has been defined as "deflection of mental energy, usually of a libidinous character, to socially useful aims:" *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, ed. by J. S. van Teslaar, 1924, p. 382.
[4] *Short Psychology of Religion*, p. 66.

disjunction is due to self-love or selfishness, through such motives as hate, covetousness, lust, and the other passions which tend toward disintegration. Religion claims to possess the surest mode of attaining that complete self-integration which we call virtue, altruism: it endeavors to overcome all separateness, to make man every whit whole.

In so far as man is submerged by the secondary mind which social influences have instilled into him, so that he is suffering from complexes or repressions, meanwhile unfortunately identifying himself with this secondary mind, it might be said that he is scarcely responsible for this separateness. For his trouble is to a large extent due to two factors: (1) the inner conflicts which cause division within his selfhood, and (2) identification of his real self with the social patterns which are inflicted upon him. On this view, freedom from conflict, hence from any predilection for sin, will come in so far as he gains genuine insight into his basic nature; it will come with adequate self-realization, when he identifies himself *with what he is in spirit*. Psychologically, everything depends upon knowing down to the bedrock of our nature precisely how and to what extent we are submerged in social patterns, prohibitions, and the adverse conditions which these states breed in conspiracy with our repressions. Fundamental insight into our submergence should disclose the way to sublimation.

To say that man as sinner is submerged by the conditions and processes through which he is passing is not of course to explain or justify sin as such, but simply to indicate his situation, psychologically speaking. The extent to which psychological analysis discloses the way out of sin in its entirety will depend somewhat upon our conclusions in regard to the pathological conditions of this submergence, and the determination of those motives and deeds on which we still pass value-judgments after our knowledge of this process has greatly increased. The solution will also depend in part on the prospects of sublimation in individual cases. For individual analysis will sometimes displace generalization.

Temptation.—The same conclusions follow with respect to temptation. Much will depend on our view of the sources of temptation, and our belief in the power that overcomes it. If a man believes he can and should overcome his temptations alone, he will probably proceed by self-analysis, passing judgment on those phases of the self which in his opinion yield temptation, and rearing his ego into an attitude sufficiently strong to withstand the assaults of his warring forces. He may or may not know that his temptations are partly due to the fact that he has identified himself with certain of his earlier states of mind and his repressions, when he might have spiritually disowned them. If convinced of his moral incompetency, holding that God alone conquers temptation, his procedure will be very different; he will depend largely on prayer. Again, he may still adhere to the view that the forces which tempt him are largely outside, whatever their correspondence with motives rampant within him. The word temptation has gone out of vogue with those who depend on analyses of their conflicts and complexes.

In any event, temptation may be said to throw to the surface whatever phases of the self are capable of rising into opposition in the presence of new and vigorous resolves. Such opposition is partly due to habit. No one advances to a higher standard without inward struggle, due to wrestling with the old man in us. So much courage is required to break with tradition and conventionality that it is difficult to see where to strike in, how one can attain what is desirable without indulging in excesses. It is easy to yield to old habits and patterns. One's friends and associates are likely to prefer these. Some would persuade us that it is all right to indulge in any sort of pleasure if one never expects to be "found out," if one does not care a fig about social judgments. But, again, temptation is a matter of conscience with some people; especially those who balance and refine their motivation to the limit. Obviously, if I wish to advance I must overcome the inertias of my own selfhood, I must make persistent effort to do my best according to my understanding of the fact that we

pass from bondage to bondage. So too it is a question of my attitude toward habit and toward self-love, in contrast with those ideal forces wherethrough I am strengthened, while I am renewing my inward man day by day. Knowledge of what has tempted me is half the victory.

Repentance.—Although the modern attitude toward repentance has changed with our increasing knowledge of human nature, equivalent beliefs are still in vogue in religious precincts. Whatever view we hold will largely depend on our conclusions concerning sin and temptation. If the confession of sin turns on the traditional doctrine, the acknowledgments essential to repentance will of course be traditional too. The situation is not so simple as in the days when, by vicarious atonement, one could be washed clean through faith in the blood of the Lamb. Nor is the problem so readily solved, now that we no longer generalize to the effect that there is nothing good in man. If sin is still recognized as against the Lord alone, the ensuing attitude will naturally turn upon the requisite humility and prayer for that forgiveness which implies profound changes within the self. The penitent will not then hold that he can put off sin or resist temptation by any power of his own. Nor is he likely to adopt the idealistic view of the self. His attitude will become efficient when he concludes that, whatever help may come from the Lord, he must himself *cease to do evil.* Otherwise, his prayers for freedom will be in vain.

Self-examination.—Forgiveness may be said to operate spontaneously when the heart is truly repentant. Hypocrisy is as shallow as merely verbal confession of sin. To repent is not only to change in attitude and intention but "to do something about it," as we insist nowadays. It is not merely to adhere to a higher motive, professing love toward God and the neighbor. Consequently, we are skeptical concerning any mere examination of desires, emotions, intentions, as important as such self-exploration may be. We are on our guard against introversion. What is needed is perspective, in the light of the largest self-knowledge obtainable. Facing one's self became a different proposition, when we

learned so much about our native equipment. We now seek to know what is likely to emerge from the copious reserves of the larger self, to what extent we are submerged, and what trends from within the self are most promising.

Subjectivity as such is bondage. Introversion is worse. Self-scrutiny will be self-imprisoning if it means mere contrast between intentions and deeds. Yet admission of actual guilt is imperative. Evasiveness is as futile as faith without deeds. Salvation is from one's own bondage. It is not won through fear that the soul may be lost. Wise indeed is the man who knows when he is submerged or snowed under. Truly to repent is to adopt love or sympathy through an enriching faith that the spirit will become dominant. No one submerged in lethargy, lazily accepting his bondages, could reasonably expect absolution by merely discovering the psychology of human inertia. Desire for spiritual freedom is the measure of our escape. Free acceptance of a higher alternative *is* in a sense salvation. Thus salvation begins with will and love. Doctrinal changes have no magical power to accomplish what love has not willed. To say this is not to neglect the profound truth of Socrates' teaching that knowledge means virtue.

Increase of psychological knowledge may mean moral development. Granted spiritual insight, it is much more likely to yield this result. But psychology as mere disclosure of our complexes may mean extremely little. Actual headway is made when we see the thing for ourselves and separate the spirit from it. Meanwhile, we are environed by easygoing tendencies to "get by," to be evasive and to lapse into self-indulgence. By a subtle fallacy moral conduct is reduced to whatever occurs to us to do.

The child of bygone ages who believed he was born into evils of every kind, with a special predilection for certain evils, had an enormous account to reckon with, beginning with evils transmitted by his parents and nearer ancestors and ending with temptations due to the subtle presence of evil spirits. Weighted down by assumed inclinations to particular evils, infected by an evil element in

his nature, if not determined by inveterate self-love unceasingly driving him toward hell, he was at any rate in a situation where he was not free to envisage himself by first doubting these doctrinal assumptions. Simple indeed is the approach of one who, having learned that our native promptings are neutral, realizes that everything depends on our value-judgments and attitudes. Each factor of the situation then becomes intelligible in the light of its sources and conditions. The way out is in the direction of new integrations. Adequate self-knowledge is the desideratum. The reflective person sees the way of escape by learning what has brought him where he stands today, baffled as he has been by conditions in the various social environments in which he was reared, at times snowed under beyond recognition. Neither our motives alone nor our deeds show what we are or what we might have attained. If to condemn another is to condemn one's self, the incentive toward inner change should be greatly increased with this discovery. Life is indeed simplified for those who begin at home. Life itself explores us. It shows us up when we are insincere, hypocritical, self-centered. Experience also shows us that others shared in the good deeds which seemed to prove our exceeding great virtue. Life proves how futile is a merely general repentance. It is the minor matters that signify. Psychology helps us to discover one thing at a time.

Naturally, the inward quality of the spiritual life comes to mean more for us as we advance. To consider what it is in us that should rule is far more important than merely to seek what used to be called self-control. If I would control my impulsiveness, my fluctuating emotions, my moods, I must first know them. Spiritual knowledge is power, that is, poise, composure, inner peace.

A Vital Problem.—Granted this analysis, how shall we enlist our energies by appropriate substitute imagery, by reëducation or redirection? Plainly, we must very well know what the life-stream is. For we find that life is irrepressible, constantly seeking a channel. If our early training and our most influential surroundings were such that

every drive could find adequate expression in accord with its natural objective and in coördination with all other drives, life might pursue its course like a smooth-flowing river. Actually, our complex stream is beset by many obstructions, forced into narrow channels, intensified in its impulsive sweep over rapids, dashed upon rocks: the life-current produces havoc when it cannot produce peace. Granted side-channels, whirlpools and eddies, the problem is to provide adequate central channels for energies now producing mischief.

If we were wise parents, we might enlist every troublesome activity in childhood, so that appropriate use would replace condemnation and repression. But, blundering along, we reprove and restrain where interference is most unfortunate. The sensitive child is driven into himself, the inventive one is checked, the versatile one is reproved and compelled to do something he heartily dislikes. During adolescence, the situation seems hopeless; and the boy or girl is eventually consigned to college, usually the college which the parent decides upon. It is not strange that religious motivation is misunderstood under these conditions.

So too the individual who is old enough to assume self-direction may unwittingly inhibit his perplexing motives at the wrong point, enlarging a minor into a major situation. The conditions which call for readjustment in our maturity are often traceable to conflicts which began in adolescence, when we intensified this or that desire by vigorously adhering to a conventional pattern, possibly in puritanical self-judgment. Digging our channels deeper here, raising a dam there, we have established a new balance between the several parts of life's stream, without knowing over-much about the social patterns that are imposed upon us, or about the possibility of introversion. Thus one may increase self-sacrifice, without at all understanding the reasons for or against it, at the expense of those capacities which would have enabled us to make a positive contribution to society. To recognize the conflict by identifying the conditions to which it is due, is to

wonder how we shall find a constructive way to employ forces which have been repressed.

Granted that life will not rest peacefully above the dam, the issue seems to lie between sublimation and substitution. The first of these terms is ambiguous: it is sometimes taken to mean the transformation of our energies so that lower force shall actually become higher force. Substitution is the finding of new means of expression for essentially the same forces, concentrating upon higher ends by giving as little attention as possible to lower. Our natural history already shows us the way to some extent, for example, play in childhood, recreation, games, sports, and in mature life avocations. Taking life's situation under advisement, we try to keep out of ruts, to avoid overseriousness, to keep open-minded, young in spirit. But in religious terms the problem often turns upon actual need for transforming what we take to be our lower propensities into higher. The new birth seems to involve radical sublimation.

Compensation.—It is easy to assume that one tendency or force is transmuted into another, after the analogy of the transmutation of heat, light, and other forms of energy into equivalent forces. The great hope is sex sublimation. Whatever the evidences apparently favoring this hope—on the assumption that the forces of the unconscious can be utilized to the full—a more intelligible psychology indicates that what is done consists in making new intellectual and cultural achievements. Thus *other* things may be done "*in the interest of sex.*"[5] The result may be "a more satisfactory adjustment of the sexual life." What is needed is proper subordination, that the dispositions and traits of character may be duly stabilized.

Anticipating the possibilities of sublimation, Plato long ago remarked that "he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel." The problem is to find adequate substitutes, to utilize our creativity to best advantage, to realize the complete

[5] Cf. Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 75.

self. Psychology offers no guarantee that sublimation will occur. What it does suggest is that, as every new integration involves readjustment, *energies then present and then active* may be expressed through different channels. The development of a new channel demands a new incentive, so that old interests must wane, and with them their patterns. The energy of today, when I am spiritually minded, will not be the same as that of yesterday, when I was carnally minded. I cannot recover an experience. But I can profit by what I learn today, and adapt my conduct for the advances which I hope will begin in two or three days, when my efforts tell. I can renew myself day by day according to the mind of Christ, hoping that eventually the mind of the flesh will be wholly overcome. Better still, I can identify myself with my basic nature.

Ideals.—It is plain that ideals function in this process only so far as, when grounded in concrete motives *now present and now active,* these incentives to improved conduct actually participate in my conduct. I respond to my ideals according to my prevailing interests and ruling love. If an incentive moves my will because it has sufficiently appealed to my mind and heart, it becomes to that extent a part of my regular activity. Thus I may when tempted to return anger for anger, hate for hate, manifest love—granted control enough to check my adverse impulse in time. The interest which wins my attention and thereby becomes effective, so that I go out towards it, has a point of contact with my functioning motives and the actuating conditions within my personality. But hundreds of ideas, good resolutions, and aspirations pass as ineffectively by as the fluttering leaves of autumn. The idea that strikes home finds a context. The ideal that becomes effective wins a love. What I love I will to achieve. My mental imagery, my ideational pattern is an accessory. If you know me, you know my prevailing love and whither I am tending. If you know me, you are also aware that much depends in religion on what I have experienced, what I believe concerning what I have experienced, and what others have told me on the assumption that they understood me. Fortu-

nate indeed is your attitude toward me, if you are able to penetrate these surfaces to what my endowments tend to make of me, if you know my type and how to help me to achieve it without imposing any mood or method of your own.

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CHAPTER XXII

ELEMENTS OF RELIGION

Social Control.—That religion has exercised great influence over communities, notably among nations, becomes evident when we survey human history in India, Palestine, medieval and early modern Europe; and when we consider the power of Mohammedanism or the Roman Catholic Church. Its control is seen, for example, in affairs of state, in special movements like the Crusades, and in wartime. Its power over communities is also observable in ordinary social life apart from particular movements and great events, notably in the regular calls to prayer, the schedule of services of worship, in funerals and marriages, and many other activities where social sanctions are paramount. Hence the subject of religion is a significant branch of sociological investigation, and in social psychology as the study of the motivation of crowds and other social groups. Religion often proves to be the most conservative factor in social control. Religious belief may even play an important part in such struggles as our Civil War, when slavery was defended on religious grounds.[1]

Indeed, religious sanction or restriction has exercised its powers in every branch of human society, despite all efforts to separate political and economic considerations from religion, in the hope that bigotry and intolerance might be avoided. Hence have arisen far-reaching controversies, such as those of kings and popes, and the so-called warfare of religion and science. Recently, conservative partisans of religion in the United States have undertaken to say what science shall or shall not teach in the public schools. Conservatism has also exercised control through the activities

[1] Cf. Hickman, *Introd. to the Psychol. of Religion*, p. 306.

of missionaries in foreign lands, notably in instances where widespread reforms have been undertaken.

Religion has exercised control over whole groups of people, through acceptance of a certain creed or system. Again, it has become dominant in the person of an innovator or reformer, out of whose protests far-reaching social activities have sprung, as in Buddhism and Protestantism. New cult practices have given place to old, and social institutions of various sorts have developed from special modes of religious practice, especially under the monastic systems in India and Europe. Again, preparation for religious work has become a significant social activity, as ascetic practices have given place to organized effort to inculcate religion by preaching, by organized social service, and the distribution of religious literature. Thus in time a particular book, such as the Bible, has become the chief agency for promulgating religion. But more potent than its doctrines and its literature has been the officialism through which religion has fostered social control.

Cult Practices.—Although the question of the nature and origin of cult practices belongs rather to anthropology and the inquiry into primitive forms of religion involving such matters as the sacrifice of animals, drinking, and eating, we may note in passing that light is thrown on certain aspects of the problem by the conclusions of the foregoing chapters. We have found no reason to separate society and the individual. Nor can we dissociate a cult practice, like worship, from the ultimate object of the practice, the divine being or beings, or from the process which bears relation to social customs of remote origin. Thus the sacrament of bread and wine, also Easter as a special holy day, refer both to higher and to very primitive or "pagan" social values. Cult practices which we eulogize today may be closely akin to social acts which would be classed under magic by some modern scholars. Thus the idea of sacrifice may be highly complex, crude, and realistic in one respect, but inwrought with religious idealism in another connection. To identify a cult practice with merely sensuous appetites, or any primitive social custom, would

be to neglect the ulterior values of religion, as if social custom and religion were essentially one. In contrast with writers who fail to distinguish religious ceremonials from other social customs, we agree with Pratt in his emphasis on man's attitude toward the "Determiner of Destiny."[2] The affiliation with magic and crude social customs is likely to be external, as indeed the communion-table may outwardly resemble a feast in certain respects. Internally speaking, it is a question of the values which have appeared amidst these social customs and have become so strongly marked that there are radical differences between: (1) an initiation into a club or secret society, for example; and (2) the ceremonial of baptism and admission to membership in a church.

The religious problem is to account for the sense of the holy, the personal presence or impersonal principle, or whatever may be the central idea by which the practice comes to have spiritual meaning and value. Most of us are interested, not in the cultural forms which have been repeatedly modified in the long process of survival from ancient times, but in the conservation of values so ardently believed in that the higher values would remain despite whatever might be said about such matters as the sacrifice of animals or human beings on the altar.[3]

Institutions.—The limitations of religious institutions are obvious to all who are zealous for individuality, freedom of thought and progress. It is a commonplace that orthodoxy is unfriendly to genius. Naturally, religious leadership has often meant the sundering of one group of institutional ties after another. The defects of institutional religion have sometimes been most forcibly disclosed by leaders who have zealously sought to retain the religion of the Spirit as a *life*, while still loyal to their organization. Through over-emphasis on obedience and subservience to authority, the suppression of individuality has often

[2] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 260.

[3] On the types of primitive worship, see Art. "Worship," in *Ency. of Religion and Ethics;* and the problems concerning theories of Worship, Art. "Worship," in *Schaff-Herzog Ency. of Religious Knowledge.*

been the prime result. Yet when leaders keenly aware of defects also contribute to the conservation of the eternal values by remaining within the institution, the organization has itself become glorified. Officialism may mean endless repetition of "something past and gone," amidst "a passive reception and more or less mechanical solution of its commands," with an appeal to outward appearances and material output as standards.[4] But the organization, "with its noble sense of the littleness of all excessive subjectivity," may also be the corrective of individualism. The ideal would be to give precedence to "the motive force and light of the leading, stimulating, renovating few" in contrast with "the dull average" of the more or less automatic many. This would mean that the first rank would be assigned to personal religion, even within the institutions, namely, to the "deepest action and experience of the mind and spirit" when a man prays, adores, suffers, rejoices and produces with a newness of creative life which is a revelation of eternity rather than of time. God, our own soul, the community of our fellow-souls, with the experienced relation between these living realities, would then be the supreme objects, also an immensely active, overflowing life expressed through the Church.[5] But as matters stand it is often difficult to penetrate the formal exterior of the official to discern those elements of personal religion which are of primary significance for our study.

The Psychological Elements.—Creeds and institutions have played so great a part in the organization of religion that intellect seems everywhere paramount. The history of religion in the community has often appeared to be equivalent to the history of dogma, of the formal element. By implication intellectualism or rational psychology has dominated religion. Yet we have found our clues by disregarding the old intellectualism for the most part and pursuing a free inquiry into the nature of worship, prayer, faith, belief, conversion, and the other phases of experi-

[4] Cf. F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, Second Series, 1926, p. 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 22.

ence, on the ground that there is no dominant faculty. We have found that on the whole experience is prior to creed.

Granted this empirical clue, we have found the psychological factors by giving precedence to personal religion, whatever the additional values of doctrine. Thus faith, although demanded as a duty in order that one may believe aright, also has its sources in simple emotion and feeling, in volitional attitudes essential to success in daily conduct. So too prayer and worship are manifold in sources, uses, values. Ordinarily, we have found that there are at least three constituents of the religious life: (1) *affective* (emotions, feelings, including the mystical element or ecstasy in extreme form); (2) *volitional* (action, practice, conduct, life, desire, with its several "drives"); and (3) *intellectual* (formal, rationalistic, cognitive, noetic). Meanwhile, consciousness and experience have proved to be general terms, applicable to all these factors. The first of these is more directly identified with immediate experience, the second with the expression of experience; and the third with the effort to understand or mediate, preparatory to the adoption of a creed or system. The convenient term value is associated with all of these; for values have their locus in the self or personality, as perceived or assigned by the individual in response to the great religious objects. If, with Thouless, we regard the elements of religion (as a whole) as traditional, experimental, and rational, then the natural, moral, and affective factors belong under the head of the experimental.[6] This classification clearly indicates that the factors we have been considering belong especially under the head of experience.

The Affective Element.—It is always difficult to rationalize religion, because religion springs for the most part from our feelings and emotions, pertains to the blessed life toward which we aspire. Although the whole man may be expressed in religious acts, reason may be a very minor motive. The needs of the heart are prior to the problems which lead to reason in religion. Doubtless, the religion

[6] *Introd. to the Psychol. of Religion*, p. 13.

of primitive man arose in large part through far-reaching emotional responses in the presence of the more impressive, awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, notably those which readily evoked fear. Then, as now, death gave rise to a sense of mystery regarding life in the cosmos as a whole, and led to a consciousness of man's weakness or dependence, amidst a sundering of the ties which most immediately relate to the heart. We are touched or stirred before we begin to raise the great questions and seek consolation. The heart retains its own questionings and is comforted by its own intuitions, even when doctrines have been offered to the understanding.

The emotions range through the whole series of religious experiences, from the crudest response of fear and superstition to the sense of the holy which some writers regard as the essence of religion, the adoration, reverence or awe in the presence of the sublime through which God is worshiped. For many people religion not only is emotion in some form in its origin, but it remains emotional: to endeavor to interpret would be to refine away, hence to intellectualize, and emotion is precisely itself. Man is in large measure what he feels himself to be at heart. What he is at heart, that he wills; thus the heart is the man, his ruling passion or prevailing love. To object to emotion as evanescent, exhausting, superficial, misleading, or too personal, need not however mean that one rejects emotion as a value, but in order to indicate its excesses. Indeed, the emotions of pity, sympathy, compassion are the great sources of religion as the life of service in the world: until man's heart has been touched he is hardly religious at all in the profounder sense—as they understand religion who mean the consecrated unselfishness or self-sacrifice which should follow conversion.

Moreover, the tone of pleasantness or unpleasantness connected with religious experience is significant, notably man's feeling of happiness or of pain when touched by awe or wonder, by fear or pity in the presence of human suffering. The awe or wonder of one moment may give place to the joy or sorrow of the next. Although the

reverential emotion which expresses the sense of holiness before God may seem most intimately akin to the soul, the feeling-tone of blessedness may be more intimate still. So too sorrow in the presence of death passes into pain and touches the spirit to its depths. There is both a joy and a pain which cannot be shared. At best there are intimations which they discern whose hearts have been similarly touched. Technically speaking, the emotion with its feeling-tone is describable by its expression through the body, the tears that dim the eyes, the bowed head, the pained or joyous countenance. But the percipient naturally protests that these are but the signs: what is real is what the spirit apprehends, what the heart feels, namely, those sentiments which only the heart knows.

The so-called "feeling-root" of religion is not necessarily mystical, but is implied in general religious experience.[7] Thus the religious consciousness may bring a deepened meaning into life through a pervasive feeling understood to signify the divine presence. Again, the sense of sin, uncertainty, loneliness, disappointment and awareness of failure in a given phase of the individual's experience may give way to a sense of the forgiveness of sin, certitude in the belief in God and immortality, the companionship and restfulness of the phase of experience which comes with conversion, with its stabilizing consciousness. The former state has sometimes been called "negative self-feeling," with reference to its painful feeling-tone; the subsequent state appears to be due to self-sacrifice, described oddly enough as "selflessness." Negative terms are not however adequate. Our self-consciousness is positive, notably when we are aware of our shortcomings, when reminded of deeds we should have done. We must acknowledge what the self actually was in its moments of significant conduct. The self is not to be lost or sacrificed. The later is to become the truer self. With the sense of forgiveness comes an enlargement, in the wider horizons of spiritual certainties, the sentiment of permanence and repose found in the idea of God as genuinely present.

[7] Cf. Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

So too it is frequently the element of feeling which gives to prayer or worship its empirical value. Bringing to the experience his belief in God and the great host of the invisible who constitute the majority of the universal church, the worshiper may also bring lesser feelings and sentiments which he hopes to shuffle off by aid of the corporate spirit. Thus participation in the sacraments may come to represent religion as such in this its feeling-aspect. Or it may be the sentiment quickened by the music on some unusual occasion, the personality of the preacher, his sermon and what it evoked. In any event, the ceremonial is at certain points addressed to the emotions, with the hope that the appropriate effects upon the heart will be wrought, followed by that quickening of the moral will which the religious leader so persistently endeavors to arouse. The emotions stirred by the special occasions may however pass off into memory, as indeed sentiments quickened by worship easily pass into pleasurable feeling, while sentimentality as such becomes the objective for those who merely "enjoy" the service.[8]

The Moral Element.—Religion and morality have developed together, they are in many respects inseparable. Indeed, morality is sometimes regarded as the source of religion, with the expectation that what will survive will be the moral element. Morality, beginning with the customs of the tribe, becomes traditional, attains formulation in the code for which a people stands. This code may in time receive religious authorization, with the probable addition of other virtues and precepts more explicitly religious in type.[9] But in time criticism is likely to undermine the myths concerning creation and the miraculous revelation of the commandments, skepticism will probably follow: what survives will be the system of virtues, with the appeal to conscience as ethical reflection. Yet morality might never have passed beyond the stage of tribal custom had not religion disclosed its essential principles or perma-

[8] Cf. Thouless, *ibid.*, p. 70.

[9] On the beginnings and growth of morality, consult Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908, Part I.

nent elements. Religion not only adds authority, contributes the highest sanction; conscience itself, the moral law, awareness of obligation, the sense of duty, the conviction concerning what is right and wrong is in large part religious in origin. Hence comes a standard of comparison of the great religions of the world.[10]

The center of gravity of religion is regarded by Coe as the *moral will*.[11] Hence the absence of appeal in his study of the psychological content of religion to such matters as intuition and the subconscious, and his neglect of other important phases of the subject. Since life is essentially an ethical enterprise, there is a rational possibility of faith in a personal God; our life acquires its meaning by being social in these terms. This reduction of religion to the moral element does not however lead to the conclusion that religion is chiefly a mode of social control, although religion is regarded in this light by writers who emphasize certain evidences of social behavior. Coe finds that self-consciousness is in itself social consciousness, individuality being a social fact: society, in contrast with mere herds, is due to the individuating process, society and the individual being "complementary phases of the same movement." [12] Accordingly, self-realization proceeds "within a social medium." Thus conversion, or religious self-realization in intense form, is an instance, and religious experience in general is describable with reference to the progressive expression of moral will.[13]

Calling attention to the conflict between the individual's desires and the moral law—which here signifies the requirements of society—Thouless finds that the conflict results in religious belief in two ways: (1) when this conflict is strongly felt, the forces on the one side are objectified, with the belief that the good side of this contest expresses

[10] See, for example, Hume's *The World's Living Religions*, Chaps. XII, XIII.

[11] G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion.*

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

[13] Clearly discriminating the affinities and divergences of ethics and religion, G. H. Palmer shows that religion adds horizon, stability, hope: *The Field of Ethics*, 1901, Chaps. IV, V.

the will of a Being who is infinitely good; this is essentially an intellectual approach to belief in God, and leads to the well-known moral argument by which many religious people sustain their conviction; (2) when the moral warfare, essentially practical in nature, makes the belief in God a practical necessity in order that the hold upon goodness may be sustained at all.[14] Thus people, aware of their own weaknesses, become convinced that unless they believe in God they cannot be good, cannot discover any basis strong enough to sustain moral conduct. Here the element of will predominates, in the effort to realize the moral ideal. The connection between morality and religion is thus far constructive. To be especially guarded against is the assumption that religion is ever identical with conduct adjudged "moral" or "immoral" by the community. Naturally, there is outspoken protest when a person who is ostensibly religious, because he has joined a church, commits a deed which the community condemns as immoral. It is expected that the moral life, hitherto apart, will be purified through religion. The community distinguishes between (1) matters of taste; (2) conduct approved of as right or wrong, in terms of conscience as the basis of the moral law on the part of the individual; and (3) religious considerations through which a new spirit enters into the individual, yielding the highest standard of which the human self is aware. What is done in the name of conventional morality is not necessarily approved of in religion.

Formal Elements.—On the assumption that religious experience is prior to doctrine, that prophets precede rabbis, and that prayer and worship precede ceremonials dictated by rituals, religious emotion or feeling comes before its ideational expression as a means of convincing others. Revelation as a witness within the spirit is also said to be prior to the written record. Religious experience is not explained by the formulations in which the various factors described by psychology find intellectual expression; religious ideas arise out of a complexity of experienced elements, notably emotions and feelings regarded in

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

their immediacy, without which their hold upon the human spirit is unintelligible. Again, the personality of the leader may be the most influential factor in arousing religion in a group. Ideas may signify little while the founder is with his disciples, in comparison with his personality, his works, the fruits of his religion as a way of life. The religious genius having pushed forward in a new direction (whether or not his ideas are new), his followers feel impelled to convey the same impetus to others. The death of the leader may be the signal for typical formulations to appear. Thus begins the effort to awaken or produce faith, that the personal values, evidences of the works and the way of life may be preserved. The more intellectual followers thereupon venture to reduce the faith to propositions so stated as to disarm criticism. Shortly afterwards begin, also, the expositor's understanding of these propositions, with differentiations of doctrine that may prove to be influential for centuries. It has been said that "everything immediate in religion is true, for otherwise how could it have come into existence? But only that is immediate which has not gone through the conceptual mill, but has grown up on the soil of pure feeling."[15] Hence in Höffding's phraseology, while dogmatism is "the index of the book of life," it is not the book itself. The same is true of all formulas originally serving as patterns of belief and for the performance of religious rites, but which have been mistaken for ends in themselves. When spirit is submerged by form, the technique of conduct yields to the technique of terms, definitions, arguments, creeds. Thus the conduct-pattern which was nothing if not concrete gives way to abstractions and subtleties.[16]

Tradition.—Sacred beliefs, becoming the more sacred through hallowed association when transmitted from generation to generation, combine with cultural patterns, moral codes (including prohibitions or tabus), and the

[15] Schleiermacher, quoted by Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

[16] Hence the criticism of the pragmatist, who, noting the vast array of theoretical characterizations, asks the pointed question: "What is the particular truth in question *known as?*" Cf. James, *Varieties*, p. 422; *Pragmatism*, 1907, Lectures V-VIII.

authority of leadership, established through precedent to produce tradition, are in turn affiliated with the creed or system which becomes the basis of the given institution. Highly essential to organized social progress, tradition may in time receive further sanction through judgments passed on heresies, with the increase of officialism, and the dominance of conservative leaders whose function is to sustain both the organization and the doctrines for which it stands. Thus too the traditionalist becomes a conspicuous type in the religious world. He is likely to assume that the group of traditions espoused by his church involve a criterion valid for all doctrinal issues; for example, in the Catholic reaction against the radicalisms of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The liberals feel prompted to wage warfare against conservatism, on the ground that the permanent elements of religion are jeopardized. Thus begins a controversy in which the several organizations may lose some of their ablest men. In every great religious epoch, leaders are likely to arise in renewed affirmation of the essentials of faith, articulating these in new terms, exposing tradition in so far as it has become crystallized; and proclaiming the right of religionists to experience and think for themselves, to worship in freedom, by insisting upon the religion of the Spirit in contrast with the religion of authority.

Analysis shows that tradition manifests itself at every stage, notably when the child accepts what is told him concerning religious matters, in case of unreflective adults, and in the increasing power of custom and other conserving patterns of thought and conduct. Starting our religious career as formalists, some of us never venture to break with these patterns; while other very earnest souls "find in the traditions and forms of their church something so august or so beautiful, and withal so authoritative" that the great essentials are splendidly manifested.[17] As Pratt points out, "modes of feeling, thinking, and acting in religious matters are ingrained by one generation into the mental fringe or background of the next, so that they be-

[17] Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 14.

come 'secondarily automatic.' These habitual reactions are *learned as things to be revered.* Their sacredness is their most striking characteristic, so that one learns to reverence them in the very act of learning them at all."[18] Thouless shows that suggestion is also potent in inducing mental states favorable to the communication of such beliefs; for example, expectancy regarding the great prestige of a preacher, endowed with special authority.[19] Thus there may be a strong previous disposition to accept whatever is set forth in behalf of the well-organized system of beliefs in question. The emotional factor may also be an element in preparing to receive a creed on traditional authority, when the candidate is bidden to humble himself, to be on his guard against pride of intellect or self-conceit, that he may have a contrite heart. Thus he is to become truly receptive, never doubting, but withholding all objections. Any factor that might intervene has the effect of a counter-suggestion, likely to inhibit the desired process. This unreasoned response to a social stimulus is especially noticeable in a revival meeting. Here "the attitude of social conformity" according to the pattern for such meetings evidently attains its maximum.[20]

Idea-patterns.—Light is thrown on the beginnings of tradition by the study of the nature of thought and language. Reverting to a stage of development so primitive that language was not yet in vogue, we observe that habit with reference to overt action signified the acquisition of patterns of behavior. Success in practical action may be indicated to another by signs, as we still gesticulate to a foreigner whose language is totally unknown to us; or, at a later stage of development, the pattern of relations indicating how the action is to be performed may be represented by a picture, and a series of such symbols may become a highly picturate language. So too words as symbols in other languages are integrated patterns of details, some of them remarkably compact suggestions. Thought, in

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 18 foll.
[20] Cf. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 243, 251, 278, 296 foll.

turn, assimilates pictographic symbols and other patterns; memory associates thought-patterns referring to the experiences in the thinker's past.

Man also projects his sentiments into his surroundings by patterns originating in personal experience. Idea-patterns become associated with what we call modes of thought, and intellectual integrations receive official sanction when a leader formulates patterns common to his people. The moral code serves an admirable purpose, especially in generations not too remote from the lawgiver who contributes its classic formulation; so does the religious creed as a brief symbol of *what man is to do,* what patterns of behavior are expected from him. But a formula replete with the symbols which gave rise to it readily becomes a traditional pattern sustained and transmitted by other motives, possibly leading to results never intended by the prophets. In time, the only reason given for adhering to these patterns may be put in the hackneyed phrase: it has always been done this way. A religious sanction may indeed be the chief reason for adhering to cultural patterns which have become associated with a certain tribe or nation.

We note, however, that tradition has two aspects: (1) *positive,* conserving the gains or values of religious experience, enriching man's consciousness of these products; (2) *negative,* with a trend toward crystallization, because founded on custom, habit, patterns of thought and behavior, as if tradition were a complete substitute for experience. Fortunately, it is a variable, and can be utilized, may represent the changing factors of religion as well as the permanent values. The virile religious leader may be able to keep it from becoming vestigial superstition by re-expressing the values for which it stands. Tradition may succumb to the deadening automatisms of habit, or may serve to transmit what is vitally sacred.

Martial Patterns.—There is no reason for alleging that war was originally due to religious motives; for primitive man, when he felt things intensely, was intense about food, protection, and shelter: his enemies were far from being

religious in the higher meanings of the term. Yet war came in time to be identified with the tribal god himself (even in the sacred books) who was said to wage relentless war upon his enemies. Indeed, this connection became so intimate in Christian lands that some of the most terrible wars in history received ecclesiastical sanction, and the worst enemy was supposed to be embattled heresy, an evil to be utterly exterminated by the severest measures human ingenuity and barbarity could devise.[21] But since the World War the division between religion and martial sanctions has tended to become radical. To some Christians it now seems utterly amazing that religion furnished the symbols, the zeal, the ideals of self-sacrifice and loyal devotion with which wars have been fostered, as if Christianity, like Mohammedanism, were a religion of the sword. It is a notable fact that for centuries Christian tradition was inseparable from the martial virtues, so that even doctrinal controversies partook of martial emotion.

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[21] P. Van Ness Myers, writing from the standpoint of history, has shown how the war spirit came to be fostered in Christianity, *History as Past Ethics,* 1913, Chap. XV, foll.

CHAPTER XXIII

INTUITION AND VALUATION

Intuitions of the Eternal.—There is a practical difficulty for those who have experienced the contrast between the so-called higher plane glorified by the term Eternal or Universal, and the lower level identified with the temporal or transient. What we have sought to do in the preceding chapters was to be true to experiences referring to the Eternal without passing judgment on any system, at the same time noting the fact that in actual experience there is a marked difference between ideas referred to the Absolute and ideas referring to the relative. With rare appreciation of the soul's consciousness of the Eternal, F. von Hügel terms it "an enigma of life" that the Universal and Abiding "does not move the will; and what does move it is individual and evanescent."[1] The devotee longs for a permanent bond of union so that our successive states shall express what is abiding in ourselves and in our fellowmen. Meanwhile, we are actually impelled by feeling or intuition (concrete and contingent), amidst a fringe of feeling woven out of our past doings and impressions, which is non-transferable, unrepeatable, unique for the same mind. Hence we fail to convey that total impression which might win others to our faith. Von Hügel notes that the mediations advocated by the pantheistic school and by dreamers in general typify one series of efforts to overcome the enigma; the "luminous, plastic, immensely active Greek, and the strong-willed, practical, organizing Roman" typifying another series. For Von Hügel (who remained a Roman Catholic, and gave his reasons) the complete solution was found only in "the unique fullness and closeness

[1] *The Mystical Element of Religion,* Vol. I, p. 3.

of unity in multiplicity" of Jesus' life.[2] Granted that our personality is ever a one in many, "more deeply one and more richly many, in proportion to the greatness of spiritual reality" which we know through communion with God, one assumes both our own never-ending access to God and God's ever-preceding condescension to man.

The ardent religionist will always insist that what has been called "the repose of the soul in God" is the one resting-point for the ardor and activity wherewith the soul seeks the center of experience.[3] For such devotees believe that an earthly life is compatible with "the experience of God dwelling within the soul."[4] While we are still aware of God as if both within and without, we are mindful of the same pathway, not the goal. Waite finds human love the one perfect analogy of the actual union, as a possession which is "reciprocal and mutual."[5] It is a state of "being possessed and possessing . . . God in us and we in God," that implies the most nearly adequate phraseology, a state which one knows to be beyond all words and thoughts, "deeper than tears of the heart and higher than all raptures." Yet though ineffable it becomes far more intelligible through this idea of love. Thus the concrete values of inner experience suggest a correlation with the Christian hope by which one may constructively envisage the future life and the spiritual world. Doubtless, those religious people speak most confidently about this hope who are most deeply persuaded by actual experiences which have touched the heart.

The Scope of Intuition.—These references to an aspect of religious consciousness somehow transcending analytical and discursive thought bring us to the subject of intuition, often a moot-point in psychology, because of failure to penetrate to the meanings of a term which might be called the test of the realities of religion. Despite the negations of those who try to explain away the term altogether, intuition or its equivalent has been universally employed

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[3] A. E. Waite, *The Lamps of Western Mysticism*, 1923, p. 193.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 211.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

since the dawn of precise thought. At least eight usages of the term have been technically distinguished, covering the entire field of human experience and knowledge, from the stage of sense-apprehension and motor synthesis to the basic principle of the moral life, the essence of æsthetic experience, and the highest philosophical insight.[6] The term has been used in philosophy for ages to denote immediate apprehension, perception, judgment, or cognition by which (1) the directness or immediacy of objects is distinguished from (2) the conditions or terms which mediate them, by making explicit the content of this implicit apprehension. The term has taken on special significance from the days of Plato to those of Bergson and Croce, according to the philosophy in which it figured.[7] Thus intuition may be the culmination of all experiences and insights, through discernment of the Good, as the highest of the eternal verities; it may represent a process whereby we put ourselves within the heart of the fullness of life; or it may be equivalent to the highest expression of the inner life of beauty. Religious writers have usually employed the term less precisely, hence many of the confusions between immediacy and interpretation which have made the analysis of mysticism so difficult. It has sometimes stood for those prior principles and qualities which make all religious experience and morality possible, hence there has been an intuitional school of thought. Again, it has denoted the ineffably highest experience, corresponding to the heart, as the idealized religious faculty which grasps or knows what the mere understanding can never comprehend. We shall find that the significant contrast for religious psychology is between immediacy (what is direct or given, but not yet analyzed) and mediation (or description, explanation, and interpretation). A clear conception of the immediacies of experience is essential, if we are to avoid undue emphasis on the subconscious. The mere statement that an experience is immediate necessarily involves a step towards its mediation.

[6] Cf. Baldwin's *Philosophical Dictionary.*
[7] Cf. Dresser, *History of Modern Philosophy,* 1928, p. 376.

Immediacy of the Inner Life.—Taking experience in general for granted as the field within which religion discovers itself, we have described consciousness as directly known awareness within which distinctions are drawn. Religious experience on its inner side is then intuitive awareness. Its objects (God, the self, the spiritual world) are formulated expressions of what this awareness means. The inner life is to this extent an immediately apprehended world, open to introspection, subjective. From its viewpoint we look forth upon the world. But each observer identifies it with its objects. Hence by interpretation it becomes an objective world. The religious person adopts an inner point of view of special significance, in so far as he means by this intuitively apprehended world one that is not dependent on the asserted primacy of material things. By extension, the inner life becomes the life of religion in general. Thus it has been recently defined anew as "all that conditions the relations of the individual soul with God; the deepening and expansion of the spiritual sense . . . the heart of personal religion."[8] Intuition as we here use the term admits us into the heart of personal religion without assuming that there is a separate spiritual sense. Religious immediacy is but one instance of all immediacy. It is implied in all the senses or faculties which we may be said to possess as spiritual beings.

In the preceding chapters, we have noted a tacit reference to the inner side of our nature, not only in human personality as a whole, but in each of the more intimate elements or phases of personality, such as feeling, emotion, our native promptings in general. To appeal to the immediacies of religious experience is to suggest that interior appreciation is superior in value to any analysis which tends to reduce higher elements to lower, by minimizing or ignoring the inner life, as if there were nothing to us save behavior-motions like those observable when the penitent kneels in prayer. In retrospect we distinguish between what our experience meant to us in its original guise, and what it came to mean through the effort to distinguish its

[8] E. Underhill, *Concerning the Inner Life*, p. 9.

sources, to formulate its objects, suggest its values, and convey to others an impetus which may lead them to seek the interior sources instead of depending on tradition.

Appreciation.—Thus the disclosure of the eternal verities in their supremacy occupies a distinctive place in the light of the interpretation we put upon it. Into the immediacy of our experience we break with our rude analyses, marking off distinctions where there were no lines, selecting for definition phases which were given as wholes. We then proceed to arrange our facts and principles serially, for discursive purposes, often uncritically assuming that we can produce similar experiences at will. Yet on second thought we remember that these experiences came spontaneously, as gifts of the Spirit. Accordingly, on third thought, we try to discriminate the ineffable from those aspects of experience which we are able to describe or at least to symbolize. Thus values and symbols in their immediacy have come to represent the world of appreciation in contrast with the world of description.[9] A religious experience is indescribable so far as it contains aspects which I lose beyond recall when it is gone, or find myself unable to convey by singling out its elements. What I retain as part of myself, but can scarcely even intimate to another, although it may be more influential than what I can describe, pertains to my "world of appreciation."

The Test of Intuition.—We have to be sure no intuition to tell us what elements of our experience belong to the world of appreciation so that others may be said to have the same intuition. As Mill long ago reminded us, we have no intuition to show us what elements of our knowledge are intuitive. Consciousness offers various evidences of the intuitiveness of an impression, its instantaneousness, its apparent simplicity, and the unconsciousness on our part of the way impressions come into our minds. But Mill holds that we have proof that our impressions are intuitive only in case no other explanation is possible.[10] For the

[9] Cf. J. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892, p. 383.
[10] J. S. Mill, *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1868, Vol. II, p. 243.

religious consciousness there is apt to be an affirmed certainty, however, that a spiritual truth *is* true and good. So too in one of the types of ethical theory conscience is said to be the intuitively certain basis of moral consciousness. Thus intuition is regarded as prior to religious and moral judgments. Again, religious intuition is identified with the process of receiving revelation; that is, as interior openness to spiritual light and divine truth. Its validity is tacitly assumed in the acceptance of the revelation as true. If, however, the illumination bestowed upon the few is evidence of a spiritual capacity in all men, it is not merely a question of the validity of revelations, but rather a matter of understanding why this capacity is usually latent or potential, notably among people given over to external things. The difficulty here is in persuading people whose interiors are closed that this is actually the case; for the man who is spiritually blind, but does not know it and does not wish to know it, dogmatically assumes that he knows nothing whatever save what his physical senses disclose, and that his brain is identical with his mind. Our only resource is to appeal to the superior quality of revealed truth in the light of its practical values, its direct message to the human heart.

Intuitional Powers.—The evidences count against intuition as a supposed special power, postulated to account for the direct values of religious experiences and truths. Analysis discloses no distinctive sense set apart as discoverably interior or spiritual. To say then that the interiors of a spiritually blind person are closed must be to refer to a general state of his consciousness or life. It is not necessary to assume an "instinctive craving for supernatural guidance" to account for the fact that divination and prophecy make their appearance among a religious people, such as the ancient Hebrews.[11] Each function has its natural history. The prophetical power is not an exclusive insight bestowed by divine authority upon the few; it is a synthetic power involving a certain idea of God, tradition, a group of beliefs and symbols wrought into

[11] See John Skinner, *Prophecy and Religion*, 1922, p. 1.

deliverances to which special values are assigned by those who adhere to these patterns. From the integrated result there is no secure inference to the existence of a prophetical faculty. The question is this: What experiences originally led people to recognize and to trust their prophetical intuitions?

We have already noted the fact that there is a long list of terms employed to designate the divine spark, apex or abyss of the mind, the inner light or spiritual activity through which religious truth or reality is said to be directly apprehended. All these terms have been objected to on doctrinal grounds, because of the assumed identity of substance between God and man, Christ and man, or some other implication conflicting with the accredited system. Behind each there may, however, be an empirical meaning which could be expressed without special claims, to the effect that "in His light" we see light. What is most true must still be searched for within the greatest depths or at the greatest height of personality, by following this light.[12] The "spark" which in one description suggests "light," yields the idea of an "organ" for communion with God in another. The apparently complex intuition is thus baffling because we have failed to trace such terms to their origin.[13] We have failed, too, to discriminate between (1) God, regarded as universal and eternal with reference to what Eckhart calls "the God-like state," which is obviously susceptible of various interpretations and is attributed by Eckhart to the divine grace; and (2) the activity of implicit apprehension which, as Eckhart shows, is so rich in its appreciative suggestiveness that he is baffled when he would say what he means. Hence the particular significance of his phraseology when, having called this intuitive power a spark (as if it were part of God), he says that "there is in the soul something which is above the soul, Divine, simple. . . . Sometimes I have called it a power, sometimes an uncreated light, and sometimes a Divine spark. It is absolute and free from all names

[12] Cf. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 7.
[13] See Inge on the origin of the term spark, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

and forms, just as God is free and absolute in Himself. It is higher than knowledge, higher than love, higher than grace. For in all these there is still distinction.''[14]

The Constituents of Intuition.—In other words, there is immediacy or intuition which, though apprehended as simple, is rich in implications, one of which is knowledge (certitude that God exists), another love, another grace; while as a power intuition functions amidst light, the symbol preferred by multitudes of religious people. The general implication is that man as a spirit has a dormant power of union with the divine, whether through feeling, emotional uplift, descent or ascent, by interior illumination, or by an ineffable awareness of grace. Religious experience of a penetrative type is supposed to awaken our nature in this respect. This may be taken to mean that we have spiritual eyes, but they are closed; a power of direct apprehension which we are not using in that way; or an inwardness or secret place which is always existent and operative though unrecognized while we are so externally minded. There are degrees of openness as well as degrees of inhibition, all within the long series from the most external perception of tangible things like rocks to the supreme moment of the beatific vision. The conversional experience may be said to remove tensions and other impeding conditions to an appreciable extent, so that energies are released and the vision from within is made in a measure possible. Granted the new integration of emotions and sentiments, strivings and values, this new synthesis is so far intuitive; it yields spiritual perceptions on that level. So we distinguish between (1) the mode of activity, as *intuitive;* and (2) the content of that activity as an *intuition,* on the given level of development. While receptivity is one condition, the quality of experience symbolized by light is another.

Intuitional Objects.—In a general way, religious intuition denotes what John Caird calls ''the irrepressible instincts which point to something above the domain of nature,'' and the ''vast, unsearchable region out of which

[14] Quoted by Inge, *ibid.*, p. 157.

all phenomena spring,'' that is, the ''proper sphere of the religious sentiments . . . of feelings of reverence, awe, and submission . . . awakened in the presence of the unknown.''[15] Caird takes this to mean ''that the objects of religious knowledge cannot be perceived by the senses, or generalized out of the facts and phenomena which sense perceives . . . God cannot be seen or touched or handled.''[16] It does not mean that these objects are cognizable otherwise than by our self-conscious intelligence, as if by appeal to intuition we could escape from the criticism of reason. Inevitably, the serenity of simple faith must be disturbed. Arguments, notions, and abstractions (offered in place of God) ''rend the fair and seamless unity of truth, breaking up the living whole into isolated fragments.'' Yet it does not follow that intuition is the legitimate organ of spiritual knowledge, despite the popular conclusion that the critical understanding can never apprehend God. In accord with other rationalists, Caird is willing to give recognition to the saying that the pure in heart know God, to admit that the immediacies of experience are ''clothed with an intuition, a vitality, a flow and fullness of life which are lacking'' in reflective thought. But the prime result is the fact of *two stages of knowledge,* ''not the inferiority of the stage of reflection.''[17] Inevitably science breaks in by ''sacrificing the spontaneous unity and harmony of immediate perception.'' So too the finite appears over against the Infinite, with a third term to mediate the two, to show what was implicit in the fair and rounded wholeness of experience to which we cling so ardently. Thus when religious consciousness yields a philosophy of religion there is a return of the finite consciousness into union with the Infinite, a conscious development of the process which is given implicitly in religion, whereby man finds his truer self in the life and being of God. Caird holds that ''all true thought of God is itself divine thought . . . in which the individual mind surrenders its narrow

[15] *An Introd. to the Philos. of Religion,* p. 10.
[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 12.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 47.

individualism and enters into the region of universal and absolute truth.''[18]

The Ground of Certainty.—In this appreciative analysis intuition is preserved without the misconceptions which have set it apart. Thus the certainty which has been taken to be immediate perception is assimilated on the ground that truth is its own witness. On Caird's showing, the intuitive witness of the human spirit ''*may* implicitly contain the highest evidence of truth.'' It does not necessarily contain it. Immediate conviction as such does not guarantee that we actually have reached the original or underived element of spiritual knowledge. In any event the certainty is purely empirical: it marks a stage of knowledge, not its completion. It may involve evidence that there is a process of divine self-revelation. But if so, it is a revelation addressing itself to the whole spirit of man, reason being competent to judge at least ''the credentials of revelation.''[19] This agrees with our analysis of revelation in a preceding chapter.

As rational beings we are capable then of receiving or producing religious intuition because we are able to transcend the particular and accidental, meanwhile preserving our self-consciousness in its universality amidst the changing phenomena of sense-experience. If we ''feel'' as individuals, we ''think'' by means of universals in which we share the universal life of reason. Our intuitions refer especially to *the whole spirit of men,* which is never ''purely intellectual.''[20]

Thought as a Corrective.—This conclusion is specially significant for all who have theoretically separated feeling or volition from knowledge, or knowledge from feeling, the passive from the active. It also assigns thought to its place in a self-consciousness which runs through various activities, characterizing them, giving unity. Feeling, emotion, intuition, become intelligible when we make explicit *as thought* what was implicit as inner experience. That

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 53.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 69.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 161.

experience was indeed "mine." But into it there entered various culture-patterns. Individual, variable, and accidental factors were intermingled with the principles which thought alone can make explicit by bringing these matters out into the light. My experience might seem to show the mystical identification of my individual self with God. But criticism may disclose the fact that instead of *becoming God,* my spirit reaches its intensest individuality through this intuition. By losing my life, I find it. Hence the profound meaning of the Pauline saying: "When I am weak, then am I strong." So, too, the apostle says: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

The study of intuition takes us into the whole field of experience and development, from the crudest acceptance of doctrines on authority, because urged upon the novitiate, to discernment that the Good and True are such for intelligent insight. Absorption in mere things might blind us to the values of this immediacy: conversion would then mean a return to the productive values of inner experience. The ideal is: seeing things face to face, in spiritual light; not "in a glass darkly." Comparison of evidences is therefore requisite. Criticism is inevitable, with a breaking down of ingenuous assumptions.

Plainly, there is a great difference between (1) acknowledging a principle as true from tacit apprehension in which it *seems true* because we feel it to be so, because we like the teacher who sets it forth; and (2) *understanding* it through insight into its applicability, or its relationship with other principles, as tested by the history of criticism. What faith adopts, intuition may indeed later verify. What intuition discerns, reason may confirm. Our knowledge of religious objects is greatly enriched by insight into the conditions, processes, and laws, together with their goal for both thought and will, through which we arrive at truth. Eventually, the term wisdom comes to mean, for some of us at least, more than intuition. Wisdom arises through practical contact with the realities themselves; it pertains to the more interior life, becomes a means to discernment of the truths essential to *religion as*

a life; it becomes, in short, verified intuition, yields repose, bespeaking an inner quietude and constancy, a grasp of verities of primary value.

Intuitions and Values.—It is evident that all values are in a sense intuitions; and that values are proved by our analysis to have several roots. If values were purely objective, like the fixed measurements of a structural steel building, out there in space for everybody to examine who has the technical skill to articulate its precise dimensions, then we would say: "There they are; take them or leave them." We might then claim that our intuitions are absolute or indefinable. But our analysis shows that values are "appreciations of an object which are discerned by a subject."[21] Hence we are concerned with the valuing consciousness of a self, which proves on analysis to involve three elements: feeling, will, and affirmation. In Miss Calkins' view, these may occur separately or in combination. The philosophy of religion becomes, in these terms, "a valuing science." Intuition, as we have characterized it, is an aspect of this valuing consciousness; a given value, such as the Good, or Goodness, is the culminating insight, made explicit, through which we summarize a long series of observations. But acceptance of the psychologist's analysis of the valuing consciousness as subjective, does not keep us from agreeing with those religious thinkers who insist that our value-judgments with reference to the True, the Beautiful, and the Good "are in no sense private ends which we seek to impose upon the universe."[22] These values stand for what "we recognize as greatest and best" in the universe itself. Thus value becomes "an immanent presupposition." Our valuing consciousness refers, in fact, to the great objects of religion, namely, religious thought in its effort to become universal.

Practical Values.—This conclusion that our valuing consciousness or intuition has several roots, and that at its best it pertains to the highest objects of religion, is of

[21] Cf. M. W. Calkins, "Value: Primarily a Psychological Conception," in *Journal of Philosophical Studies,* Oct. 1928.

[22] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy,* 1917, p. 42.

primary importance for our study. In the first place, it is corrective. There is no reason for identifying intuition with any sense, faculty, or mental element, such as feeling. Nor are we able to appeal to any intuition guaranteeing that intuition itself is true. Hence one should be cautious in putting forward any religious proposition as certain, on the sole ground that personal intuition sustains it. Intuition as popularly used is an exceedingly vague term. Mystical intuition is subject to all the confusions we have noted in our study of the immediacies and ecstasies of mysticism in general. Yet, having made these qualifications, we find that intuition in the sense of plural origins, disclosing plural values, remains intact. For intuition is essentially synonymous with religious consciousness on its appreciative side. To deny that we have appreciative experience would be to deny religion itself.

The particular misconception to which religious people have been subject is the notion that intuition functions by a process other than that of our intellectual processes. Because intuition is keen and quick, its utterances direct and subtle, its partisans have assumed that it has an independent contact with spiritual reality, separable from the better known contacts of reason, by means of concepts and percepts; that is, inferences and conclusions based on the facts of sense-perception. Hence practical values have been based on intuition as if in our intuitions we were not dependent on prior experiences and thought. Analysis shows, however, that intuition does not differ in either type or process from perception. The difference is that intuition is often so penetrative and its content so synthetic that we are for the time being unaware how it operates. As matter of fact, intuition is decidedly dependent on what has gone before. Its greatest practical value lies in the fact that it so intimately puts us in touch with what is significant in our past experiences and impressions.

Thus it is that intuition in the guise of what the Friends call inner guidance comes to have its special practical value. Intuition as guidance may be a direct impression, it may be what some call a feeling, or it may take the form

of what others call insight. Under the form of guidance the mind rapidly summarizes for practical purposes whatever experience or teaching, or experience combined with teaching, most directly applies to the situation at hand. One who sincerely believes in it knows by experience that intuition is more likely thus to disclose its inner content under favoring conditions, akin to those of prayer. In fact, the quest for guidance of this type is identical with prayer in so far as there are moments of lowly listening when the mind is not imposing one idea after another so rapidly that intuition has no opportunity to yield up its values. Silence or expectant receptivity is an essential condition. Another condition is faith. And it is obvious that this lowly listening typifies a different phase of consciousness; that is, the element of receptivity or expectancy is not the same as our interest when we self-consciously examine our facts, draw careful inferences, and arrive at conclusions which we are able to sustain in the face of criticism. Naturally, some religious believers will place much more emphasis on such guidance than others; for some live far more in their immediacies, depend more on impressions and opportunities spontaneously disclosed.

Insight.—In our study of subconsciousness we have noted the fact that there are after-effects or fruitions bringing to the surface activities or trains of thought previously in the field of attention. Some of these deliverances flash upon us after a period of rest or change of thought. Others occur to us in the morning. In either case, one is likely to note the advance which the mind has made meanwhile. Coming to one's topic afresh, one views it in such a different light, or the synthesis now disclosed is so much better that one can hardly tell when or how this progress was made. This contrast is especially observable in the early morning hours.

The term insight is undoubtedly the best to use in this connection, since it does not exclude any intellectual process or conclusion. By insight we mean in fact the highest product of intellect or reason. Here our valuing consciousness rises to the upper-level, to the world of appreciation. This is Plato's intelligible world, the realm of the eternal

Ideas. Insight at its best yields what Spinoza describes in classic terms as "the aspect of eternity." Here mystical valuation receives its full due without the disadvantages of those types of mystical doctrine which use such terms as super-essential or supra-rational. For intuition would not be insight as we here use the term unless it brought us knowledge of essences, unless it were reason itself. Intuition or insight becomes "spiritual" by virtue of its interests, its associates and objectives; it differs *in its modality only* from perceptions and insights in general. Thus a religious seer is one who *specializes* in the inner life, with its feelings and other immediacies, together with its intuitions and insights.

The Locus of Intuition.—While the sphere of valuation is shown by our analysis to be as extensive as value-judgments of any sort, there is good reason for distinguishing between the two modes in which the mind functions: (1) the externalizing mode, in which our attention is absorbed in things around us in space or in bodily processes and conditions; and (2) the subjective or internal mode, in which the mind may be described as open or illumined. This distinction is significant for religion because the impeding or detrimental conditions of religious consciousness and experience are mostly external in type; while the seers, prophets, and other leaders who have recalled religion to the first-hand sources owed their insights to the internal mode. The difference between the two modes is empirical. When absorbed in externals we do not know it. We may even be snowed under and be totally unaware of it. To emerge into the open once more is to be able to evaluate our externality, to see what bondage means, what spiritual blindness is. By contrast we plainly see that the world of our externality was indeed a closed world, whereas the world of appreciation is open and free; so open, in fact, that religious seers habitually describe this as the eternal world. While the locus of intuition is within, is internal, in that priceless inner life for which religion stands as a perennial value, it is also in a sense no locus at all; for when the mind discerns reality under the aspect of eternity

this is a vision of the total universe, both eternal and temporal, inner and outer, the region once called supernatural and also nature in all the marvels of space and time.

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CHAPTER XXIV

RATIONALISM

Reason in Religion.—With the passing of our inquiry from intuition to thought, hence to reason or rational insight, we are reminded of the fact that in religious circles it is extremely difficult to advance to the stage of reason as the test of truth. It is a familiar fact that religious subjects are more persistently prohibited in some quarters than any other matters of discussion. This may mean that creeds are ruled out as undebatable, because identified with ecclesiastical authority; or because a man wills to believe as he likes and does not tolerate inquiry. Rational inquiry is sometimes banned by officials on the ground that, if emotions and prejudices were set free, heated controversies would result; and by common consent religious controversies are the most intensely partisan. But failure to respond may mean that a man does not know his doctrines well enough to discuss them, does not know to what extent he uncritically adheres to tradition, why he came to believe what he now professes, or why he should still hold to his creed. Nor are officials themselves always sure they could justify both the creed and their acceptance of it, amidst difficulties which involve numerous reservations or compromises. Naturally, reason is under suspicion in many quarters. History shows that many a doctrine has proved untenable when subjected to rational analysis. Moreover, religious believers, unaware to what extent they adhere to traditional patterns, accepted for *poor* reasons, are also profoundly unaware of the very great advantage of acquiring beliefs for *good* reasons. Thus people lapse into ratiocination (rationalization) when they might use reason in the better meaning of the term.

The tacit assumption in many religious precincts, however, is that religion is rational, notably in case of our own favored theology by which other systems are tried and found wanting. Indeed, a complete apologetic or rational justification seems possible; namely, a grouping of arguments which would win universal assent if the adherents of other sects would be good enough to give adequate attention to them. Thus we cling to the conviction that sound reasons for believing in God and immortality can be persuasively given, that we can establish the existence of the soul, if not that of the spiritual world.

Some partisans would, however, object to such an enterprise on the ground that religion is essentially the conservation of empirical values, including sentimental associations affiliated with the hymns we love, the particular group of symbols which appeal to us, the sectarian interpretation of the sacraments, and various factors which the rationalistic critic would class as irrational. Rigidly to apply rational criteria might be to negate values transcending definition. There might be no room for over-beliefs, and these are what we care most for in religion. It seems perfectly reasonable to believe, to accept on faith what we cannot fully see. One must be affirmative to enter into the greater joys and blessings. To try to give adequate reasons for every item of one's faith would mean the giving of very poor reasons for what we value most. When we try to make our faith explicit with the hope that we may persuade a non-believer, our failures lead us to be cautious. Our arguments fall far short of the convictions which for us are intuitively true. Hence we have good grounds for assigning to the realm of values whatever surpasses argument. And some of us assign religion to one category, science to another.

Yet few of us would like to say that our beliefs are true because needed for prayer and worship, and because we need something to teach in Sunday-schools. The resource for many has been to class religion as revealed (hence as beyond debate); or to distinguish between spiritual and natural religion, on the ground that the latter is crude or

primitive. We assume that our beliefs could be justified were we able to discern all divine truths in their fullness. This might mean ability to transcend this world altogether, and for such insight we must await the life after death. Or, it may mean that the inner content or Word of all sacred writings is rational, but that this must be spiritually discerned before it can be made explicit as a system.

Religious liberals are more apt to maintain that all propositions are to be rejected which cannot be reconciled with the nature of things as disclosed by science. The expectation is that when orthodox believers are permitted to think they will dispense with all mythology, together with the last vestiges of magic, and all dependence on mysteries, just as they gave up the notion that the earth was the center of the universe and the mythical view of creation out of nothing in six days. The religion of authority is obviously based on dogma and ecclesiasticism; that is, on doctrinal patterns and tradition. Once see this fact, and you will revolt against the whole doctrinal scheme. What remains will be infinitely more valuable, that is, the religion of the Spirit. These the essentials or permanent values should prove coherent with a sound philosophy of the universe. We can still believe in God, but it will be the God whose method of creation is that of evolution through gradual but progressive changes throughout æons of time.

When an ecclesiastical system of the authoritative type is defended, reason (for the faithful) is nothing more than the logical development of the initial assumptions. Reason is then concerned with the support of such dogmas as the omnipotence or the infinitude of God against the heresies of those who aver that God is limited. But reason might have been employed in behalf of the central truths of religion in its universality, with the hope that all sects may be dispensed with. The religious believer usually hesitates, however, to be dispassionate. For organization is essential, an ecclesiastical system must be definite, life is short, it would take too long to study the history and science of religions, and a creed must be adopted in order to enlist partisanship. Moreover, it is not customary in this world

to investigate most thoroughly that which is most important.

Loyalty.—Is religion therefore irrational? No more so than life in general. We espouse a political party by slurring over the arguments vouchsafed by the other parties, by dwelling on what is most negative in the character and life of the other candidates, and by appealing to ignorance and bigotry. During a campaign year, a reasonable man who is very decent in all other connections will disparage a candidate of sterling principle, merely because he belongs to the other party. In fact, non-partisanship or genuine adherence to principle on rational grounds has been declared impossible in politics. So too in case of criminals, we do not carry on an impartial scientific investigation to see whether or not these men are really guilty, in the light of the best that is known about human nature: we sustain criminals whom we happen to like, we slur over the faults of criminals in league with the financial system we approve of, we permit unscrupulous lawyers to carry certain types of men through to exoneration from blame; and we are still taking advantage of the ambiguities lurking around crime, sin, insanity, and disease. In the game of getting by and getting people off, we often care more for thrills than for justice, narrow in our partisanships, petty in our motives, and mean toward our critics.

Yet life is also rich in values, complex in motives, judgments and eventuations. Language falls short when we try to disclose human love in its integrity. Friend will stand by friend when enemies and critics alike assail him. Lovers will love though all the world objects. A mother will defend her son when there appears to be no justification whatever, socially or legally speaking, or even from a moral point of view. Loyalty and love, passing over into devotion, become religious, enlisting every available motive. Some of these motives seem reasonable. Others are pardonable under circumstances calling for loyalty. But others we cannot even justify to ourselves. Yet we all admire loyal devotion, realizing that a man's religion is really what he cares most for. The religious person continues to believe,

adore, pray and worship, despite what onlookers say about the irrational. It is profoundly true, as Pascal said, that "the heart has reasons which reason does not know."

The Meaning of Dogma.—In our analysis of tradition we have seen that there are both positive and negative values. We object to some doctrinal patterns because they are traditional. But we adhere to others as reasonable. Hence we realize that even the despised term dogma occupies an important place in the progress toward reason in religion. It should be plain that the significance of a dogma depends on the grounds which led very genuine religious believers to adopt it.

No doubt dogmas were originally intended to be "the reflective formulations of faith" guided by the most spiritual insight; they were sorely needed in early Christian times when alien beliefs threatened the original faith. A dogma in this sense may be the finest result of a whole group of enlightened minds zealously working together in behalf of divine truth. But dogmas once accepted and made venerable by tradition are likely to be confirmed by succeeding generations by neglecting their original validity, or the validity of arguments which might be tested by reconsidering the usual grounds for belief in God, the soul, and immortality. Furthermore, expositors disagree, and there is a tendency to rationalize some one's version or some sectarian version of a dogma accepted on faith. A dogma may well be true for us, whatever other believers may say.[1] So too a bias dear to the heart of some one we love may displace former intellectual motives.

We continue to sustain our dogmas when the rejection of any one of them jeopardizes our creed or organization, and might cause disruption. Again, the liberal who believes he has paid the penalty of doubt and rational investigation, wandering here and there in quest of satisfaction, modifying his beliefs one after another to meet the advances of science, may revert to orthodoxy to find rest. Henceforth he will use all his intellectual powers to substantiate this orthodoxy, and he may forget that there ever was such a

[1] Cf. Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

state as openmindedness. The beliefs of the progressive are inevitably plastic, so far as contemporary matters are concerned. This willingness to consider and reconsider becomes intolerable to some people. For repose in religion is supposed to be solely due to the affective and volitional elements which we have already considered. Criticism has so often proved destructive that the ardent believer hesitates to trust himself to what Inge calls the logic of the whole personality. Fewer still are willing to go in quest of the logic of the whole of life. Still fewer try to carry the logic of science into the spiritual world. On the other hand, there is a very reasonable doubt concerning criticism: it may be too radical, as in the hypothesis that no such personage as Jesus Christ ever existed. Again, a principle may be true, while the usual modes of defending it are defective. Giving our creed the benefit of the doubt, we cease to apologize for it, preferring faith to its justification, emotion to cold intellect (cold in other people). Hence we fall back upon a type of psychology that is wholly out of date, totally unaware that we are accepting a form of rationalism.

There is also the possibility that even if we tried to carry what we take to be reason as far as possible our rationalizations would be our private confirmations of what we will to believe. Intellectual chaos would ensue were we all to rationalize in this fashion. The obvious instance of weakness in our arguments is in the traditional effort to prove the existence of God. Plainly, man did not first come to believe because he reasoned matters to their conclusion; nor does the rational element greatly figure in beliefs dear to the heart today. A dogma is an idea-pattern essential to these our beliefs.

It is worthy of note, however, that by the term dogma we sometimes mean merely those theological doctrines which we dislike.[2] Again, it may stand for propositions which seem so complicated that we entrust them to the doctrinal experts. Dogma is more apt to mean what is decisive in the Christian world, and we sigh for the day when every sect

[2] See McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, 1906, p. 28.

shall be willing to give up what is peculiar to it; since sectarian dogmas are due to misplaced emphasis on this or that teaching or event, to the neglect of Jesus' gospel as a whole. But the chief objection many of us insist upon is the arbitrary character of this or that dogma. Hence the propositions in question become associated in our thinking with what we call the dogmatic temper, one which arrogates to itself the right of decision, which indulges in *ex cathedra* statements. Naturally, we mean by the religion of authority precisely this insistence on doctrines promulgated without sufficient evidence, in defiance of modern knowledge.

We may agree with McTaggart, however, when he defines dogma as "any proposition which has a metaphysical significance."[3] This definition includes doctrines as dear to the heart as belief in the existence of God, in immortality, or free-will. In this sense of the term Jesus regarded various dogmas as true and highly important, although these propositions were few and simple, and were inculcated as a rule without any effort to establish them by proofs. Thus Jesus unmistakably believed in personal immortality and in a personal God (by appeal to the metaphor of fatherhood).[4] In any event, our beliefs on metaphysical or ultimate subjects are for us matters of supreme importance in determining our attitude toward Reality.

If then we all espouse dogmas of some sort, our interest with respect to other people is in persuading them to emerge into the open, that we may discover what their propositions are; for we may readily supply the motivation, and as readily undermine those dogmas which on inspection prove superfluous, arbitrary, or antiquated. If we could induce the victim of the traditional fear of punishment in hell to engage in friendly study of life's situation, psychologically speaking, we might set him free from one superstition or obsession after another. If we could enlist from the conservative clergyman an utterance as free from submergence in traditional patterns as that of

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 1.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 28.

the typical man of science in our day, we could doubtless persuade him too. For religious people surely wish to become more intelligent. They have proved this hundreds of times in their adoption of the deliverances of science on secondary matters, and the sophisticated now make no mental reservations. Few would like to admit that they adhere to dogmas because these are irrational and could not be defended.

Typical Propositions.—We may illustrate the metaphysical references of a dogma by appeal to various possible conceptions of the universe. The believer might adopt the view that the universe is neutral with respect to values, good or evil, on the ground that impersonal or mechanical law is supreme. Since nothing that man can do makes any difference, fatalism readily follows; and if values are said to exist at all they are mere concessions to the worshiper. Again, existence might seem to be an evil beyond remedy, this being the worst of possible worlds. Pessimism in religious belief and conduct logically follows. There would be no escape from this conclusion, unless by some theoretical distinction between natural *existence* here and now, and future *being* in an eternal heaven a way should be provided to gain freedom from all earthly desire, as in Buddhism with its doctrine of *Nirvana*. But our central proposition might be that the ultimate nature of things is harmonious with the supremacy of good over evil in such wise that even in this temporal world the moral victory can be won. To adopt fatalism would be to negate the religious propositions implying free-will. To adopt the world-view which coheres with moral freedom would be to reject fatalism and pessimism. Advocates of rationalism in religion in the Occident are likely to assure us that the third view indicated above is true, that the universe is a moral order (no values neutral or indifferent), despite the fact that the forces of nature seem unfriendly and despite the prevalence of evil in the existing social order. It is frequently said that the cosmos is a system such that by conformity of thought, will, deed, to the rational order of the universe one can live a truly religious life. Thus the

ancient Greek Stoics were wise enough to ask the important preliminary question (seldom raised by Christians): What is within man's power? The answer is that it is within our power rationally to adapt our attitude to the universe; also to become aware of and to eliminate those emotions and other impeding mental states which tend to check our efforts in behalf of this profound enterprise of human reason. To adopt this view, hypothetically at least, is to have a criterion by which to bring out into the arena those dogmas which involve the assumption that man can change his nature or change life.

We have noted the fact that it is difficult even today to detect and eliminate the last vestige of magic in religion. Apparently, many people expect magical effects from prayer, conversion, and the sacraments; to the neglect of those values which might withstand the test of criticism. Yet when magic is defined so that there is no qualification in favor of the divine government of the universe, every thoughtful religious person would undoubtedly reject it. For magic turns upon the belief that by means of charms and rites I can both "compel men and non-human spirits to do my will in certain ways, and also . . . influence matter . . . so as to cause it to conform to my desires."[5] If now we agree at least tentatively with McTaggart that religion is "an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large," we can radically differentiate religion from magic, which leaves us in the sphere of miracle and caprice. The foregoing studies have led us to McTaggart's conclusion that religion "has always . . . implied a belief in some fundamental harmony, some sort of reconciliation between the claims of our own nature and the facts of the universe."[6] If then as religionists we are in quest of peace and happiness, we cannot reasonably avoid the comparison between magic and religion, between the possible world-views, with the hope that we may find ground for believing that the universe is good. What can or what cannot be done with

[5] McTaggart's definition, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

matter, for instance, is of great moment to us. If, noting the fact that contact with matter may yield great pain; if science, as commonly understood, yields no reason for holding that this power in matter will not be permanent, mechanical laws being indifferent, we are driven beyond matter and beyond materialism in quest of doctrinal reconstruction—by appeal, it may be, to the aspect of eternity, or to some view of the spiritual world affording belief in reconciliation.

Goodness of the Universe.—By implication, we have given up the idea, in the preceding discussions, that the mystics or any one else can know empirically that the universe is good as a whole: this is an interpretation, a value-judgment. Empirically, our knowledge of the total cosmos is extremely limited. The alleged experience of ultimate Reality rests, we have seen, on unanalyzed deliverances which lead the mystic to discount reason or intellect, as if all discussion were unavailing. We have conceded not only to mystics but to all religious people the right to adhere to intuitions and values, analogies and symbols, as elements in religious conviction. But comparison of intuitions put forward as authoritative in themselves shows that at best we have groups of conflicting propositions. Even the most sacred convictions—belief in God, in immortality, the soul, revelation, Christ—have been doubted by other believers whose intuitions were different. We have not been led to infer that immortality is true because some religionists have affirmed the universality of this belief. Nor has our study led us to infer that any dogma is true because it appears to be of great significance for our happiness. It would be reversing matters with a vengeance to declare that immortality, for instance, must be true because the universe would be intolerably bad without it. Another believer, first looking to his world-view, might contend that unless one could first establish belief in the pre-existence of the soul, one would not be in a position to pass judgments of value. In our day, one finds a disposition to consider first of all whether free-will, for instance, *can be established,* before condemning the universe as incurably

bad (because all human actions are determined). We also find that among young people especially there is a pronounced tendency in favor of first-hand facts regarding the nature of things. If nothing be more securely established than the uniformity of nature or the reign of law, we must somehow reckon with our universe and man's power in the presence of it, whatever else we may come to believe concerning human adjustment. Doubtless, every reflective person would agree with McTaggart when he says: "What is real is real, however bad it is. What is not real is not real, however good it would have been." It is then "our duty to be humble in judging of reality, and imperious in judging of goodness. For what is real is real, however we may condemn it."[7]

Existence having been accepted then for what it is, with the facts of pain, suffering, and evil frankly acknowledged, what attitude toward the nature of things is most reasonable? Shall we simply trust that good will somehow be the goal of ill? Having accepted the doctrine that God is the highest perfection of which we can conceive, omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent, shall we pass by those considerations which have led critics to protest by appeal to the facts of evil and injustice in the world? Shall we try to inhibit our doubts, by dwelling on the limitations of our intellect, persistently affirming that the universe is organized in behalf of the good? Or shall we do our utmost to base our faith on reason by resolutely inquiring if our reasons are valid, if we could establish them on a secure foundation when challenged? If we adopt the last of these alternatives, we are likely to conclude that our propositions are matters of argument; and that we should *be prepared to reason,* not resorting to dogma save so far as dogmas when taken together constitute a philosophical world-view. In accordance with the results of the preceding chapters, we might add that a reasoned view of religion as a way of life is also possible; namely, in so far as we endeavor to ascertain facts, processes, conditions, and laws, on the principle that the same laws exemplified by the

[7] *Op. cit.,* p. 65.

spiritual life here today will hold true of the future life.

Rationalistic Motives.—Our inquiry has been chiefly devoted to a study of religious emotions and feelings, desires and volitions, imagery and symbols, intuitions and values functioning in well-known types of religious experience. We have been especially concerned with the immediacies of experience and consciousness, assigning the leading place to values and intuitions on their less intellectual side. Only secondarily have our studies been concerned with intellect or understanding. This apparent neglect seems to substantiate the doubts suggested in the foregoing in regard to reason in religion. It seems, indeed, to imply confirmation of the anti-intellectualism of recent decades which owes so much to James, Bergson, and pragmatism in general.

The emphasis falls in James' inquiry, for example, on feeling in a general sense as the deeper source of religion, on immediate experiences rather than any attempt to account for them, on facts instead of any induction based upon them, and on concrete verifications in contrast with abstract theories.[8] It is possible to class facts by conceptual processes, to define and interpret them; but our concepts do not reproduce the individuality of facts. Moreover, rationalism is likely to invent artificial conceptions, to discuss such strange matters as the aseity, simplicity, and necessariness of God. Apparently, all this "ratiocination is a relatively superficial and unreal path to the deity," especially in the case of a dogmatic theology. There is no coercive reasoning by which to transform faith into public certainty or universality. What actually happens is that the mind "always defines the divine which it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellectual prepossessions."[9]

We may well agree with this criticism in so far as it is directed against needless or artificial conceptions, the old-time supremacy of the intellect, the speculative assump-

[8] *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* pp. 431, 433, 443.
[9] *Op. cit.,* pp. 445, 453, 455.

tion that pure thought constitutes a realm by itself, and the notion that by mere argumentation one can prove the existence of the great religious objects. These were the special points of James' critique. But it would be a radical misconception to take one's clue from the title of James' well-known essay, *The Will to Believe,* and assume that one can therefore believe anything one likes, having leaped to the conclusion that reason has failed. What James undertook to show was that absolutism has failed. Hence his vigorous reaction in favor of the relativities and immediacies of experiences, in favor of a truer type of empiricism. This was as far as constructive efforts availed.[10] It remains for any one deeply interested in the deliverances of the several types of religious experience to profit by this critique. James shows, for example, the failures of mysticism; also that rationalism is a type only. Obviously, whoever profits by the result will adopt some form of rationalism. For whatever the plea for emotion, feeling, mystical experience, over-belief, surpassing values, or any phase of the religious life described as anti-rationalistic, such a plea necessarily involves rival propositions, and to contend for them is inevitably to enter the intellectual arena. Granted that the mystics were intellectually deficient, as James shows, the resource is to improve upon their analyses, stating their truths better, and comparing their propositions with rival theories of religious experience.

To do this is to advance from faulty description to improved psychology, and thus prepare the way for a permanent contribution to the philosophy of religion. This is precisely what has been in process since the publication of James' great work, in 1902; namely, in the literature to which we have referred in discussing mysticism. It has been conclusively shown that mysticism, as an element either of experience or of doctrine, is the same in kind as other religious experiences and doctrines. In so far as the extreme doctrine has tended toward deification, pantheism, or any other scheme of things which criticism has found objectionable, the resource has been found in comparative

[10] Cf. Dresser, *History of Modern Philosophy,* p. 423.

study of other doctrines. If Plotinus found it empirically necessary to reserve a place in his philosophy for the culminating experience and insight of mysticism, namely, a *logical* place for the propositions pertaining to his highest intuition, we may well follow his example. Here, too, recent thought has shown marked progress.

The New Apologetics.—The conventional justifications of Christian theology in vogue for centuries exemplified some of the intellectual defects of which Professor James speaks, notably in the traditional assumptions concerning revelation, the nature of Christ, the supernatural, the appeal to miracles in support of dogma, and the speculative descriptions of deity. But recent expositions of Christianity proceed on a philosophical basis in contrast with dogmatic theology, and by appeal to a reasoned view of religion which many would accept who are not avowedly Christian, or at any rate not sectarian. Widespread recognition is given to the psychology of religion, especially the appeal to experience. But, naturally, reason is adopted as the criterion, because it is the ultimate test, because the constructive motive in religion leads to the effort to propound a system which shall rationally accord with the nature of things.

At the risk of doing injustice to the new apologetic by briefly summarizing a typical approach to a Christian system, we may refer to a recent work in which Christian reasonableness is defined by appeal to "the permanent positive value for the life of man" which *human experience actually finds* in historic Christianity.[11] Reasonableness is no longer what doctrine decrees. It postulates the idea of the theoretically permissible, regarded in the light of all we know. The second test is found in that which is essential to the realization of our purposes in practical life. Hence in our faith, as in our philosophy, we should coordinate our values with the pertinent facts. Christian morality is essentially empirical in type: it judges conditions in the light of consequences. The optimism implied in

11 D. C. Mackintosh, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 1925, p. 12.

this morality is reasonable, for it logically involves the faith that, despite the existence of evil and the partial loss of values, and despite the fact of physical death, "no absolute and final disaster can happen through purely external events."[12] The concept of freedom essential to this faith leads to the other great considerations, notably immortality with reference to the conservation of persons, which in turn involves central prominence assigned to love with respect to the infinite value of the individual.

Revelation is viewed in the light of God's reality in and through human experience, the experience of moral salvation; namely, in the dependable response of Reality to man's right adjustment.[13] God ceases to be a remote Absolute, as if the divine transcendence sundered His dominion from ours. Instead, God becomes "great and good enough" to sustain man's dependence and trust; He is "adequate" in power, wisdom, love to meet the needs that are imperative in religion as we know it. So too He is "adequate in providential control" despite the facts of evil.[14] Again, the historicity of Jesus turns upon what is logically indispensable with reference to the actual contributions which Jesus made to history. God is the dependable Source of religious experience because He enters into communion with mankind, Jesus being "divine in quality and function" in accordance with this relationship. The argument holds resolutely to the criterion of the *reasonableness* of "the spiritually valuable content of historic Christianity." The critic who is disposed to cavil in any case is most likely to object to the conclusion that Jesus contributed "the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God."[15]

The Problem of Truth.—Analyses of the motivation of religious beliefs show that the realities and values are most clearly articulated by writers who, like Mackintosh, *believe religion true,* especially their religion. The critic who disavows Christianity is perfectly free to find equivalent

[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 17, 32, 39, 64.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 126.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 134.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 149.

instances among believers in Mohammedanism, Buddhism, or some other claimant for universality. Some will find their clue by a comparison of the great religions.[16] But the judgment in each case will depend on such matters as the inquirer's prior conclusions concerning the idea of God, the self, revelation, incarnation, and the ethical content of the world's great faiths.

We have been guided for the most part by the studies of those for whom religion is true. We have seen that worship and prayer are most real for those who earnestly believe that God exists. So too we have sought out the convictions of those for whom faith is sincere, who believe in conversion, in mystical experience, immortality, and the other significant objects or elements of belief. The prime results are: (1) recognition of a pluralism of religious experiences, each of which may yield a constructive clue; (2) the conclusion that there is no inherently corrupt trait in human nature, no evil instinct as such, no sinful faculty; (3) acceptance of conversion, sublimation, return to the basic nature or spirit, self-realization, or some other unification emerging from the dualities and conflicts of the inner life; (4) reservation of a place or category for intuitions, valuation, appreciation, or spiritual insight, with its deliverances, standards, also its symbols; (5) the priority of experience in contrast with formulations calculated to interpret it, brought forward as if they antedated the religious life; and (6) the fact that religious beliefs (including religion as a way of life) tend to become articulated as doctrinal or philosophical propositions in a system accepted as true, and involving the conviction that there is an Ultimate Reality in which religious truths and values are grounded. Inevitably our inquiry has passed from description to interpretation in so far as we have considered constituents of religious experience and belief which point toward convictions concerning that Reality, in contrast with mere processes and such secondary phenomena as visions. Thus we have ventured to go part way with believers in the real existence of a spiritual world,

[16] Cf. Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, Chap. XIII.

on the ground that man's selfhood is far larger than in our ordinary mundane experiences and externalities we take it to be. The implication of our inquiry as a whole is that all knowledge is one, although there may be various modes of acquiring it; and that what we call spiritual knowledge is no longer an authoritative "universal" which generates its particulars in our minds, as if the mind were virtually independent of psychophysical processes. For knowledge as actually possessed is a human attainment; truth is won through experience, effort, criticism, dialectic, and by comparison of systems. The corrective of artificial conceptions is to be found by a fresh return to experience, that we may persistently seek those formulations which are actually called for by the facts, amid the conservation of values, and the tests of enlightened reason. The corrective of ratiocination or rationalization is reasoning. The truth will justify itself, because it will explain and interpret experience.

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CHAPTER XXV

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS

The Protest of Youth.—That religious values are changing in our day is evident from the widespread reaction against the religion of authority, notably in case of the younger generation. A respondent who has recently graduated from college outlines his position as follows: "Regarding Sunday-school, church, chapel, I have come to a conclusion. Whatever connection I have had with religious exercises has been under compulsion . . . I would rebel for that reason alone. However, there are other reasons. . . . Now that I am no longer obliged to attend similar exercises, I have decided not to attend church until I feel that the church service has something to offer which I really need. I wouldn't think of joining a church, just as I would decline an invitation to join a lodge, for I could not give myself to it as things now stand. I want to make a choice, otherwise there cannot be complete interest and loyalty. I have practised that same principle in rushing freshmen for the fraternity. I have told them who and what we are, what we do, and what we stand for; then in every case I have stated quite definitely that I wanted the choice to be made by the freshman himself . . . I joined it because I wanted to, because I felt it would have something to give me, and because I hoped that I could offer something in return. . . .

"I have no objection to religion as a life, neither have these young people with whom I have been in contact. The big objection is against compulsion. . . . The approach of those in authority is wrong. Their psychology is wrong. . . . The subject of religion is discussed more frequently than you may imagine. The fraternity house discussions are

without question the most informal, frank, honest, definite, and complete I have witnessed. No one hesitates to express his views, regardless of personal creeds. Personalities are omitted from discussions of religion. They are definitely included in other discussions. I have had a chance to get plenty of first-hand information, much of which has been worth far more than the intellectual, statistical, educational material furnished by some professors I have known. I feel safe in saying that the average college fellow feels just as I do. He believes in honesty, good fellowship, justice, sincerity, fidelity to ideals. He may forget himself frequently, but at heart he believes thoroughly in what he knows to be best. If these are ethical matters, then he lives by a code of ethics, or believes in a code of ethics.

"I hesitate to venture an opinion regarding belief in God. I think that many of the fellows take the statements in the Bible concerning the birth of Christ, the miracles, and all that, with considerable salt. We have been exposed to a great deal of science, science from many angles. One professor, who gives a course in evolution which almost every one takes, takes pains to point out the many unscientific statements in the Bible. He is convincing. I believe him, and I think I am justified in doing so. I cannot accept statements which defy the laws of science. How does one make food enough to feed a young army out of a small loaf? How does one walk on water? . . . I do not mean that the Bible has no worthwhile teaching. I do not mean that I cannot accept many of the statements. Religion seems to demand an acceptance of the Bible in toto. It needs revision, I think.

"The question of a belief in God is one to which I have given considerable thought. I can't believe that there is an actual Person who watches over the universe. That was the teaching I received in Sunday-school. The story is terribly inconsistent. As for the future life, I haven't given it much thought. From a scientific standpoint the thing is absurd, otherwise we would have had proof of it. Science may be wrong, but at present its explanations appear quite logical to me. I believe in something, but do not

yet know what that something is. . . . Do you believe that when we die we go on to another world? What is it that goes on? What does 'it' look like? What part of the body is it? Certainly, it is nothing which we can see, feel, measure, weigh, dissect in this existence. . . . Physically, there is neither soul nor mind. Are they not human concepts? Is not 'divine guidance' something within ourselves, something which we receive if we assume the proper attitude? Can it come from some external source? . . . What is intuition? I agree thoroughly that something of that nature exists. I have had too many personal evidences of it to think otherwise. I do not yet know what it is, or from whence it comes. You suggest that each one of us construct his own approach to these matters (a belief, faith). Is it possible to construct such an approach on a scientific basis? I don't believe it is possible. . . . I have no objection to a living faith, but I do not know how to get it. . . .

"As I see it, at present youth is on one level, or is speaking one language, while those in authority, or those who try to lead, are on another level, and are speaking a different language. The approach to the question is different, but essentially the goal is the same. Youth demands the concrete; it cannot think readily in terms of the abstract. It cannot be taught scientific laws on one hand and be expected to accept unscientific statements (without explanation) on the other. Youth is not defiant—quite the contrary."

Science and Religion.—This frank statement puts matters where history has placed them, whenever a new age has protested by appeal to science. Not even in case of the greatest skeptics do we find that the moral values are rejected, either in theory or practice. Honesty, justice, and the other virtues are still compatible with rational reflection on the nature of things, and with concrete service for one's fellows. What is discarded is what conflicts with such reflection and such conduct when man tries to see life truly and see it whole. Granted what is retained—intuition and its deliverances which have proved true, a moral standard involving the greatest virtues, willingness

to meet one's fellows on a basis of honest inquiry, readiness to believe in religion as a life, and belief in "something" which might prove to be at least a vague "beyond"—we have an exceedingly interesting program. The pity is that the leaders whose psychology is wrong have not seen their way to build on such a basis by first correcting their psychology.

Oftentimes, the leader in compulsory chapel is one who, still clinging to the old intellectualism, assumes that man is chiefly intellect. Conducting the services as a matter of duty, uncritically insisting that the mind of youth needs discipline, the central assumption is that the precepts offered "ought" to be believed, and when believed as true will produce right conduct. Any infraction of these doctrines is a departure from what ought to be known and ought to be willed, therefore it is wrong on general principles. Since these precepts are ideally right and true, they should be accepted as standards; all motivation and all deeds ought to be definitely measured by them, however far the implied ideal is from actual attainments of human society today. The leader, in enforcing these precepts, is likely to fail where failure is most unfortunate, through neglect of the point where science has left the youth of today. If the reflective student actually paid attention to the leader's discourse, he would note a great discrepancy between the antiquated intellectual moralism of the discourse and his own newly acquired psychology. Naturally, the student would find the odds greatly in favor of science, and would insist that any doctrine offered for serious consideration today should begin where chemistry, physiology, biology, and psychology reach their tentative conclusions, looking forward to a complete philosophy of science.

Yet our typical student would probably be unaware of the fact that the criticisms of the Bible to which he has listened with such interest relate almost wholly to such secondary matters as miracles and creation-myths which religious liberals long ago ceased to believe. Nor is he likely to realize that small-mindedness in science is no better than dogmatism in religion: the specialist in biology

who is skilled in reducing the soul and immortality to sheer negations is no more worthy to be followed than the alleged fundamentalist who insists that every statement the Bible contains is to be literally believed. Again, he is probably unmindful of the fact that, all scientific matters having been referred to our own age, what is accepted is what proves its ethical and spiritual value, as one might adopt certain teachings from Confucius, Buddha, or any other great religious leader.

Our inquiry leads us to take full account of the motivation of adolescence, with its conflicts and its trend toward a new orientation. Some of the most persuasive evidences that religion is a spontaneous product in the human soul are found in that period. It is no wonder that religious teachers have appealed to youth with zeal, in the hope that conversion would result. But such teachers have often been weakest where they should be strong: in their ability to construct a science of the spiritual life on the basis of the actual deliverances of youth and the trends toward maturity in religion. Religion has too often resolved itself, not into a life to be lived, but into a series of dogmas to be believed. Naturally, youth has objected. The fault has seemed to lie with youth. The conflict between religion and science will continue until teachers of religion bring their instruction up to the standard of science, in their effort to determine facts, conditions, processes, laws; while also giving attention to intuitions and values, with due recognition for the primacies of experience. It should be remarked, however, that many of our best preachers have already changed their mode of approach, by advocating universal religious principles with due regard for the psychology of religion.

Significant Clues.—Two facts of special significance in this connection stand out in our inquiry. We have found that man in his religious responses tends to conform to a type of religious experience. There is, for example, the mystic for whom God is an ineffable Presence, for whom feeling or emotion coupled with ecstatic intuition is central. There is the Friend, who believes no less profoundly

in God as living Presence, self-revealing today as of old, but whose serene attitude of lowly listening for inner guidance or the light of Christ in the soul implies a radically different psychological approach. There is the devout ritualist, who is so convinced of the value of his mode of worship, his creed, church, with his appreciation of the apostolic succession, that only with difficulty can he be brought to admit that other religious types may be just as true. Again, there is the rationalist who, rejecting the old intellectualism, sincerely believes that reason in religion is perfectly compatible with what he regards as the universal or permanent principles and values of religion. We have found no reason for concluding that any type should impose its patterns on any other.

The other great fact is that, whatever the variety of experience or mode of worship, the values, worths, or ideals tend to be much the same the world over and in all ages, so that the great types have a common basis on which they might unite. For, whatever the failures when religious partisans seek common ground in their doctrines, there is a basis of union in the values which withstand the test of time, especially when religion is regarded as a life. Even the greatest variations in modes of experience, prayer, belief, quest for unity within the self, and ways of regarding the basic nature or spirit, fall within human personality. It becomes a question, therefore, of the logic of personality as a whole, in the light of religious valuation. The great fact, after all, is this intensive valuation of eternal principles large enough to compass all types and all living religions.

A prominent clergyman has recently given eloquent expression to this great truth. Discussing the nature of the universe, Dr. Fosdick says that "the most incredible fact in the entire affair is not its size or its law-abiding order, but the spiritual values which have appeared in man. On *a priori* grounds they are an event unpredictable from anything visible or to be conjectured before they actually arrive. The love of truth and the capacity to use it, which created our science; the love of beauty and the power to

produce it, which make our literature, painting, architecture, and music; the love of goodness, from which radiant characters and creators of social righteousness have come; the love of people, by which we are woven into . . . families, friendships, and societies—these values make life worthfull."[1]

If we were as impartial in our efforts to determine the variants and invariants, what is universal or permanent in religious experience, as a way of life with a trend toward the perfect ideal, as the chemist in his laboratory when allowing for every favorable and unfavorable condition involved in an experiment, we might discern those facts and values which imply a complete science of the inner life, a science which might not conflict with the constantly progressing science of today. By way of preparation, we might venture to meet the inquiring mind on intermediate ground, by assuming as little as possible concerning the beyond or the something postulated to account for religious experiences and religious values in addition to scientific facts and scientific truths. For the sake of the argument we might put aside such matters in dispute as the question whether God is finite or infinite, whether or not we must declare Him to be a omnipotent, omniscient, or omnipresent. We might even say that He is non-creative; if what the universe calls for is perpetual maintenance or conservation of those operations by appeal to which we describe evolution in its varied forms. Or we might substitute the idea of an eternal world-ground for the idea of God. We would then have as a minimum, let us say, universally conserved energies known under one group of modes as centering in electrons and protons, and in another group as centering in what we call human selves with the values assigned by selves to the universe as eternal. Man would still be, in Pringle-Pattison's terms, "organic to the universe." Each of us may complete the picture from this point according to our acquaintance with contemporary scientific and philosophical thought.

Doubtless, there are very many religious people in our

[1] H. E. Fosdick, *Spiritual Values and Eternal Life*, 1927, p. 2.

day who, having revised their psychology by appeal to experience in its wealth of emotions, feelings, desires, trends, intuitions, have assigned to the intellect an instrumental or correlating function which gives it no authority to dictate terms. In other words, the conviction persists that religion can be rational, granted priority of experience and the willingness to test all conclusions by reference to experience to see if our formulations accord with the facts and values, to see if our conceptions are called for. It is not a question at the outset what kind of God can be believed in; but of the deliverances of experience which persistently lead people to believe in a something even though they apparently do not believe in what Christians call a God or a permanent self at all. We may regard as "rejected" all those superfluous or detrimental dogmas which have brought theology into discredit, with the implication that dogma in the good sense remains in the form of propositions essential to a reasoned world-view. No two of us might reject the same dogmas. But the point is that we would resolutely adhere to what is concrete, needed, or reasonable, allowing for the fact that we differ in type or temperament, in interest in the eternal values, in social surroundings, and the point attained in moral and spiritual development.

Recent psychological studies of individual differences remind us that as people differ in height, weight, color, disposition, intelligence; as one creed prohibits meat on Friday, while another demands total abstinence from pork, as one sect insists on the total immersion of adults, while another is content with the sprinkling of a little water on the heads of infants, so in general people vary all the way from militant advocacy of their creed, with the attempt to convert or exterminate all dissenters, to the assumption that religion and brotherly love are identical, the great lesson being *tolerance,* since we cannot standardize religious matters.[2] Religion in these terms is reducible to whatever things man prizes most.

[2] Cf. R. S. Ellis, *The Psychology of Individual Differences,* 1928, p. 513.

Changing Ideas of God.—If, however, we insist on pushing our intellectual values to the limit, we may profitably make a study of such problems as the infinite and the finite with reference to the idea of God, tracing with Beckwith and other recent writers the development of the thought of God as finite, meanwhile noting objections to this view by defending the widespread conviction that He is infinite.[3] Very little investigation is required to convince the student that much depends both on the definition of the term "infinite" and on our idea of the universe as described by modern science. If we regard space and time as infinite, it is natural to refer to the power and purpose of God as infinite. In religious terms this means attributing to God all that may be possible in all creative forms, in all time, everywhere; and this is practically what we mean when we praise the Creator as "infinite."

So too any study of the problems of transcendence and immanence, of the divine personality in relation to human personality,[4] and of the divine attributes is likely to lead to a practical conclusion such as that suggested by Farnell in his discussion of the Absolute.[5] Instead of leading our thought into the abstruse regions of metaphysics, the idea of God as the Absolute may mean "no more than that He is the Highest Being in the cosmos, of absolute value in himself and for us, and the source of whatever absolute values certain [things] possess for us." What we are somewhat vaguely saying, therefore, is that there must be an ultimate source of our intuitions of duty, truth, beauty, goodness. God then is *the first principle of our thought* when we venture to assign a basis for the values we recognize in religious experience and the effort to interpret such experience. Even when we refer to God as eternal and unchangeable, we are likely to mean something concrete;

[3] C. A. Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, p. 207 foll. See, also, Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy*, p. 331 ff.; W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 331 ff.; H. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 85; G. H. Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*.

[4] See, for example, C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, 1918; *Divine Personality and Human Life*, 1920.

[5] L. R. Farnell, *The Attributes of God*, 1925, p. 250 foll.

namely, our principle of valuation, by appeal to which a value judged to be "eternal" is higher than one classed as temporal.[6] Referring to God as "infinite," we wish to say that those powers, functions, attributes, which in our view constitute the divine character are not bound by limitations. Real difficulties are not likely to enter into our investigation unless we insist on attributing both omnipotence and infinite love or beneficence to God, in the face of the facts of sin, evil, suffering in the world, notably the widespread prevalence of injustice. Some give up the idea of the divine perfection and beneficence at this point. Others cease to believe in God as regarded in the Occident and turn to Buddhism or some other Oriental doctrine. Still others revert to the idea of a dualism of good and evil in the world, on the ground that God (as finite) needs us as we need Him, with the possibility that through coöperation evil may eventually be overcome. Our inquiry has suggested from time to time yet another view; namely, that through the subliminal self man is connected with a wider region from which higher energies flow into the soul: the emphasis here falls on *the sense of higher power* by coöperation with which we may achieve our spiritual ends.

Evolution.—The crucial issue is evolution, with believers in God and a scientific world-view who are eager to retain both conceptions without sacrificing the validity of either as an incentive to religious consciousness. In his Foreword to a recent symposium adapted to this intellectual need, Osborn points out how very much more the word evolution has come to mean in contrast with the original idea of an unfolding or unrolling of that which already exists. For evolution is now understood to mean "the incessant appearance of new qualities, new characters, new powers, new beauties, for which there is no antecedent in experience or no evident promise in the germ itself."[7] Hence Osborn suggests that incessant creative or emergent evolution is peculiarly distinctive of life, or the biological order of nature.

[6] Farnell, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
[7] *Creation by Evolution*, ed. by Frances Mason, 1928, p. ix.

The discussion especially enters the religious field, with C. Lloyd Morgan's study of "Mind in Evolution."[8] What seems to be common to events may be called *passage,* what persists is some *state* of flowing events; and when we speak of the *status* of man we refer especially to organisms on a *higher* level, notably with reference to a character that is more complex. The analysis leads to a definition of evolution with reference to its "*upward* passage."[9] This definition specifically relates to the progressive steps (very little or by big jumps) "along definite, recognizable lines of advance, with continuity of progress from lower to higher," by which we envisage the universe as a whole.

While in this upward and progressive advance what is higher may be higher in *quality,* there may also be degeneration, dissolution, or regress within the cosmos; and evolution does not mean "natural descent through heredity" in case of molecules and crystals. But when we have in mind the upward and onward advance through nature as a whole, evolution as thus understood may be "subject to the directive presence of God." There are, for example, successively higher and richer modes of "fellowship" in the series from protons and electrons to atoms, atoms to molecules, and from molecules to cells; thus to our own bodies, in which myriads of living cells participate in the fellowship of the organism as a whole. We ourselves are "caught up as active and open-eyed participators" when mind in evolution appears in this progressive advance.[10] Enjoying experience with what seems to be the same kind of feeling as that which actuates our fellowmen, and undertaking to guide our actions with reference to ends which we wish to attain, we note that mind possesses these distinctive characters: enjoyment, objective reference, and guidance of action. Guidance in turn involves the dawn of free choice, deliberate and thoughtful reference with regard to the expression of purpose. Thus we may come to a new formulation of the idea of divine purpose, in terms of the creative

[8] *Op. cit.,* p. 340 foll.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 342.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 347.

fiat: *"Let there be one natural plan of evolutionary progress exemplified throughout in many and diverse ways."* [11]

We may then continue to refer to God with respect to the guidance of conduct. The idea of God still retains its place in our spiritual contemplation. And we may also retain our belief in the eternal verities. Lloyd Morgan's idea of the directive presence of God is a convenient intermediate conception for the religious believer whose intellectual emphasis falls on the divine immanence. Such a conception is compatible with many types of religious belief in our day, notably those which depend for the most part on empirical values. The concept of fellowship suggests a type of social psychology like that of the Apostle Paul. The term "enjoyment" signifies power to have experience of any sort, not necessarily what is called pleasure; "objective reference" means that our experience or consciousness is not purely subjective, but relates to a real world-order; while the idea of guidance admits us into the field of possible progress by aid of religion. Thus additional clues are offered for those who, adopting a constructive view of human personality, regard the self as the locus of values.

A Philosophy of Religion.—Granted the possibility of retaining the idea of God, in correlation with the advancing views of science, the chief interest for many students of religious psychology is likely to center about religion and philosophy. We have already indicated the importance of certain principles advocated by John Caird, Edward Caird, Sabatier, and Höffding. The first three of these writers are constructive; while Höffding, whose critical rationalism leads to agnosticism so far as the possibility of a metaphysical system is concerned, leaves religion in the sphere of the conservation of values germane to our present existence. It remains for those who believe in God, immortality, and the spiritual world, as something more than analogies or symbols to be retained for present purposes, to coördinate these conceptions with a constructive world view. While this enterprise lies beyond our inquiry, we may at least follow its motivation.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 353.

Discussing religion and the problem of knowledge, Edwards regards the question whether religion is true as central to the whole inquiry; since religion turns upon essential postulates such that religion *means* to be true with respect to the character of reality behind all phenomena.[12] Indeed, it is belief in its objective truth which keeps the subjective worth of religion alive.[13] It is impossible to make definite headway without facing the issue whether or not the mind of man is capable of knowing ultimate reality. Edwards does not then give up the enterprise, on the ground that our ideas of God and personality are figurative and analogical, and that they throw us back so to speak upon our own limitations. Höffding's idea of the conservation of values is too closely akin to the theory of the conservation of physical energy, and is inadequate as a clue to the philosophy of religion.

Edwards is quite ready to admit that each of us is limited by the fact that we do not possess final or infallible knowledge of the world. Our knowledge is always incomplete, but knowledge increases with growing experience. We are all subject to error and illusion, amidst the inadequacy of all merely human modes of apprehension; yet while we do not know all, our knowledge is valid so far as it goes.[14] It is reasonable to begin by regarding Reality as objective and self-communicative. For truth comes to us with the force of something persuasively objective or given; it is given to be used, and an idea works because it is true—it is not true because it works, as the pragmatists say. While Reality tends in general to reveal itself to all who have ears and are willing to respond, religious experience seems to be the point in our life as a whole wherein the diffused light of revelation attains its focus, where God is revealed to man on life's deepest and richest plane.[15]

There may well be many ways of knowing, many planes in fact, hence a hierarchy of modes, implying organic coherence within the one system of knowledge. The sig-

12 D. Miall Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Chap. VI.
13 *Ibid.*, p. 180.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 207.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

nificant consideration is not, as once believed, that faith and reason belong in separate compartments; but that the religious life, both to be possible and to have meaning for us, must be experienced on its own plane, from within. The problem of experience is thus more widely inclusive than that of knowledge. Neither percepts nor concepts are complete alone, nor feeling apart from its articulation in our thoughts. Experience is not here referred to as if it were merely subjective, as if the subject were without an object outside himself, or as if there were not something knowable by contact with Reality as self-communicative. Consequently, Edwards finds religion able to withstand the test of experience as "the only criterion of truth we possess."[16] The human mind has then the capacity to have such contact with Reality, and to mediate its increasing knowledge into more and more adequate knowledge of what is ultimate or fundamental. On religious grounds we are justified in believing that the highest and best values recognized in our human experience are akin to the ultimate nature of Reality, in contrast with the hypothesis that such values are merely "human conventions pitted against the nature of things." Our thought would be far from complete without the idea of God as the home of these higher values—Truth, Goodness, Beauty—converging in one Being as their necessary ground.[17]

Naturally, the religious person is impressed by those aspects of the idea of God which indicate that He is somehow unique and incommunicable; essentially exalted and holy, in an ineffable majesty which baffles us when we try to articulate our thought in its fullness. But this transcendent quality does not signify that God is a remote Absolute, transmuting differences into a totality beyond all finite recognition. To affirm this would be to neglect the permanent value of the individual, also the highest known type of unity: "the dynamic unity of a *society* of souls realizing their destiny in love and mutually enriching fel-

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 216.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 227, 256 foll.

lowship."[18] Here, Edwards agrees with many others in our time who hold that God (as Love) needs such a society and is in essential relation with the actual flux of human history.

Religion and Philosophy.—Some thinkers regard religion as superior to philosophy, on the ground that philosophy is essentially intellectual and neglects aspects of religion as inner experience and value, neglects the Church and its history. Others find philosophy more significant because it comes later and correlates all results and values. Thus philosophy in Hegel's sense of the term occupies the highest place among the great disciplines. Without accepting this position in its fullness, there is a noteworthy tendency in our time to pass from dogmatic theology to a reasoned system, as we have already indicated by reference to the new apologetic. Thus we find theologians taking part in the discussion of theories of knowledge, pluralism and monism, relativity and absolutism, realism and idealism, preparatory to a constructive exposition of their own type of Christian idealism. The result usually is the rejection of the idealisms of Hegel, Green, Bradley, Royce, and McTaggart in the direction of such criticisms as have been passed on monism or absolutism by such a thinker as Pringle-Pattison.[19] The outcome is likely to be an idealism akin to that of Bosanquet,[20] in which the individual is given greater recognition, or in some form of personalism or personal idealism.[21]

Rashdall's discussion of the relationships of religion and philosophy is based on the consideration of such questions as the Ground of creation (as a temporal process, implying a previous existence which has no beginning), the creation or existence of spirits, the distinction between the human mind with its self-consciousness and God as a higher

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[19] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, 1887; *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, 1897; *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy*, 1917.

[20] B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913.

[21] Cf. B. P. Bowne, *Personalism*, 1908; E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Ideals*, 1928.

unity of being, the alleged existence of immediate knowledge of God, and the impossibility of proceeding from the psychology of religion to reasoned belief in God without metaphysics.[22]

Dean Inge may be regarded as typical of thinkers who find religion and philosophy essentially one.[23] Unable to distinguish between the two disciplines, Inge finds their identity in their great objective. Each discipline seeks to know God as the perfectly real Being. The "perfectly real" is that which can alone be perfectly known. To declare that we know what is true in this the highest sense of the term, is to find God real "in a world of actual values," not a hypothetical world of hypothetical symbols.[24] Our logic is the instrument through which we realize the meaning of this great truth. It is a part only of the activity of our whole personality. If then we were to class this pursuit of knowledge as intellectualism we would fall into gross misconception. Already possessing God and being possessed by Him, since otherwise we could not know and would not seek Him, our ideals are given to us and our best thinking is an earnest of Being. This of course is faith. But we must trust what we deeply and truly are: the great incentive is to find room for all the intuitions and aspirations of this our love of wisdom or love of God.

Living, not in the universe He has created, but rather above it, God produced what was conformable to His nature, not under compulsion. Hence we will naturally distinguish between God's activities and His objectified thoughts, transmuted into vital laws in space and time; between the eternal world where "he spake and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast"; and the half-real world of temporal and spatial processes which you and I know. From this point, Inge develops his world-view by reference to the Idea, indicating his dependence on Plato and Plotinus, but also his allegiance to Christ, whose "art of living" taught us the wisdom of just valuation and that

[22] H. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, 1910.

[23] W. R. Inge, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, 1924.

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

development of love and sympathy through which we rise in the scale of being.[25]

Psychology and Religion.—It might seem feasible to develop one's working plan of religious values by remaining within the field of the religious emotions and feelings, drives, imagery and symbols, beliefs and social patterns which we have described. Thus we might consign to the winds all doctrinal systems, apparently content with the several types of religious experience as intimations of what is most feasible for persons of this or that temperament. Indeed, some critics would protest against even an excursion beyond psychology into philosophy, on the ground that beliefs pro and con are at best mere facts for description. Yet the critic might be challenged to find any writer on the subject whose analyses and descriptions are not at some point governed by his own scheme of beliefs passing beyond psychology. Indeed, we have found that religious experience of whatever type is conditioned by the belief which makes it possible. Belief in conversion, for example, determines the sort of conversion possible for a mind of that type, under those conditions and those auspices, granted the priest, missionary, or other aids to the experience by which it is in part induced and in terms of which it is for the most part interpreted. The Buddhist's religious experiences are impossible for those whose view of the universe is Christian,[26] because the whole outlook differs from the ground up. So too the Christian's religious experiences are incompatible with the Buddhistic theory of the universe. Inevitably, there is a metaphysical outlook, howbeit the given world-view may be devoid of belief in God, the soul, and the future life as the usual Christian understands these terms.

What is possible is the discovery of factors common to religious experience *as experience*, with a view to determining the interpretation which shall prove most reasonable. Some writers would begin (with Sabatier and James) by appealing to the exceptional experiences of great re-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[26] Cf. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 114.

ligious people, for example, the mystics. Others would protest, with Temple, that the constant experiences of the average man whose life may be pervaded and permeated by religion afford the intelligible clue.[27] From the latter standpoint, mystical experiences are the least representative and doubtless the least important (because so intense). Hence our study would naturally begin with the religious experiences of the average person who, without doubt, is more important in the sight of God; namely, those experiences of dependence and devotion which we share with countless others, in our consciousness of obligations to be fulfilled in relation to the divine purpose. Indeed, if there be such a thing as a specific act of divine self-revelation, we should expect to find the clue in "the average sincere religious experience of those who have received that revelation."[28]

A Synthetic View.—By correcting the conclusions of naturalism or the mechanistic view of the universe, Pringle-Pattison maintains that the objective basis of values can be established in accordance with a completely reasoned cosmology.[29] In the corrected idea of nature, the emergence of real differences is compatible with the continuity of the cosmic process. In contrast with the mechanistic denial of real differences, the attempt to deny quality in nature or explain qualities away, this view proceeds on the assumption that the process as a whole must be known in order to know the power at work, especially in case of man, human experience, human knowledge, as last terms in a series. Indeed, the goal or consummation of the evolutionary process becomes intelligible only in the light of man as *organic to the world;* since the final terms are not disclosed until the emergence of beings with powers of knowledge, appreciation, and self-determination capable of yielding them. As essentially "*within* the real system which he knows," man enjoys a living experience "steeped in

[27] Wm. Temple, in *Contemporary British Philosophy,* First Series, p. 424.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 426.

[29] *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy,* p. 42, 48, 91 foll.

feeling and instinct with action." This experience is the real fact in which cognition is only an element, as in other connections the poet and the artist discern aspects of beauty and sublimity in nature, and as the moral order is found to be part of the universe itself. Granted such a reading of the universe in its totality, by keeping in view the whole range of accessible facts, the nature of Ultimate Reality is to be found "in its manifestation, and may be read there truly."[30] We cannot then as philosophers find satisfaction in any principle short of that named the Absolute or God.

What is absolute is not, however, remote, but rather *the principle of intellectual coherence* which is accepted as absolute; for although this philosophy avoids the pitfalls of subjective idealism and adopts an objective scale of values, the crucial consideration is found by analysis of human life "as capable of appropriating and realizing these values."[31] Otherwise no argument about God would have any force. In fact, the criterion of value is derived from "the ideals present and operative." God is not then an inacessible Beyond. As surely as man is organic to nature and nature organic to man, so that it would be a false abstraction to separate the world from the central fact in which it finds expression (in man), so in deepest truth the existence of God and man is "*the existence of the one in and through the other.*"[32] In other terms, apart from our own lives, or spirits resembling us, God has no meaning. The idea of transcendence remains. But in this version of ultimate truth transcendence signifies, not the separateness of one "being" from another; it means distinction of value or quality; namely, "the infinite greatness and richness of the containing Life." Pringle-Pattison bases his teleology on the view that action and purpose are the clues to the divine mind, since otherwise the finite would mean nothing to God.[33] In fine, "the movement to the finite and

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 122, 127, 175.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 235.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 254.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 255, 340.

the realization of the infinite in the finite must be taken as the fundamental character of the divine life."

We are justified then, in terms of this philosophy, in making the direct inference from the actual content of the religious life to its divine ground, even in case of the religious experience which is said to disclose the eternal in contrast with the temporal. Our author notes the remarkable fact that although our "experience" of change is everywhere intimate, in both our speculative and our religious thought we refuse to regard change as an ultimate predicate of Reality.[34] We find it impossible, to be sure, to overcome our temporal patterns of thought and speech. At best, we can do no more than appeal to analogies and metaphors adapted from sense-experiences when we try to describe Reality as eternal or timeless. Yet we cannot get away from the remarkable idea of the eternal. Our resource is to regard time and eternity as correlative conceptions, with the conclusion that the temporal process, although transcended in the divine mind, is retained. Human perspectives are of course transcended. Yet the experiences and relations of the time-world are represented there.

It is significant that analogies and symbols rejected as falling too far short by Höffding, and other philosophers whose ontology is at crucial points negative, are adopted by Pringle-Pattison as instrumental to the development of a constructive view. Thus the principle is laid down that the divine may be interpreted on the analogy of what we take to be most profound in our own experience.[35] The prime result is that instead of existing in solitary perfection and bliss God is said to partake of the life of man, even bearing the burden of his finitude. Hence the divine omnipotence is not forbidding. It consists rather in that all-compelling power of love and goodness through which even the grossest darkness is penetrated and the hardest heart melted. This synthetic view brings to a focus many of the principles which have come before us in these pages. It is

[34] *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy*, p. 343 foll.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

a sufficient answer to the charge that rationalism is merely a harmony of temporary intellectual prepossessions.

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CHAPTER XXVI

RELIGION AS A WAY OF LIFE

The Complex Situation.—In our analysis of the religious consciousness, we have recognized the fact that for some communicants religion consists in participation in the ceremonies decreed by the church in which they believe. The mental change afforded by witnessing religious rites, together with the æsthetic appeal, seems to justify religious organizations. We have also given place to the convictions of those who, while admitting that ceremonies give outward expression to inward consciousness, find the heart of religion in service in behalf of love toward God and man. A third approach turns upon right belief as imperative, whatever the effect on ceremonials and service through social values. Religion is objective in extreme form for those who assign the first place to divine worship, as if the individual's response did not signify. The extreme type of subjective religion is embodied in the mystic's graduated ascent to union with God, to the neglect of both institutions and rational systems. It remains to consider religion as a way of life which does not overlook either individual experience or service for the needy and the afflicted.

When we consider its typical modes of belief and conduct through the ages, religion presents a bewildering array of responses. The situation is relieved, however, by the fact that we of the Western world today have for the most part discounted fanaticisms, asceticism, emotional revivalism and conversion, introversion, and modes of meditation involving isolation from society, extreme self-examination and self-discipline. Introspection must stop short of the New England conscience. Isolation from our fellows must be brief and carefully restricted. We are skeptical when the confessional is used as a means of freeing one's

system, preparatory to further self-indulgence. We are interested in the study of individuals, ready to profit by any branch of psychology; but cautious in accepting any view of the human mind which neglects every-day consciousness out in the open, away from the unconscious, tested by the newer standards of the normal mind. The hypothesis that religion is a substitute mechanism for sexual and other repressions did not carry very far. Nor have we been convinced by any attempt to explain away religion in its higher forms by realistic analyses of what is crudest and most primitive. The critics who protested against the stress put by James on emotional and unusual types, to the detriment of the religious experiences of the average man, seem to have gained the day. So have those who still earnestly adhere to rationalism.

Moreover, by recognizing that there are varieties of religious experience leading to different ends and that these should be evaluated by their goals instead of their origins, James disclosed a highly important criterion. In contrast with the mere roots of religion, and with such phenomena as mystical visions (now classed as secondary or incidental), it is a question of worths or values. If the result is a pluralism of values and ideals, with various philosophical implications, the field is freer than ever for reconstruction. Hence one may seek afresh to grow into moral helpfulness by realizing one's type, combined with the new reasonableness, by considering how religion functions on the whole: as experience, life, service; free also to appeal to any experimental results which enable us to judge whatever seems eligible for conservation.[1] It does not follow that a religion is true because it works, not even in the case of Christianity at its best, although religion in operation is a direct clue to the conditions and laws of what is called the way of life.

Recent psychology suggests that all religious instruction should be adapted to the factors of change and growth in childhood, adolescence, and adult life, with the opportunities for conversion which the more favorable conditions

[1] Cf. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 18, 21, 24.

imply. Religion as a growth may be said to correspond to some extent to the development of the mind, notably in the transition from the emotional conflicts of early adolescence to the so-called age of reason, when youth protests against compulsory chapel. The philosophy of evolution has naturally been applied to the religious development of a people, such as the ancient Hebrews; and there appears to be an evolution of religion of which evidences are found when polytheism gives place to monotheism, mythology to philosophy, the religions of authority to those employing the general term Spirit. Religious experience in the case of typical individuals seems also to involve a pilgrimage amidst hardships, temptations, opportunities for heroism, which, if taken, will mean spiritual progress. The mystical way, or *via negativa,* is the natural resource for some; the way of the cross appears to be the more popular version of this view that life is a pilgrimage. Life in this world seems to be a first chapter only.

The general implication seems to be that there is a life-current flowing from within and that the traveler on religion's highway should go whither this inner upwelling impels him. Much will then depend on his *recognition* of this influent or imbuing life, his *conception* of its meaning and trend, also his attitude of *coöperation* with it, if he believes it to be divine in origin. If this life be due to Spirit (however interpreted), its trend may be said to be toward the fullness of life, the fullness of spiritual freedom and power. A man is most likely to coöperate with it (granted self-knowledge of his type) if his spirit bears witness in what seems to be a decisive way to what he takes to be the Determiner of Destiny. His witness-bearing spirit is then by interpretation his basic nature. The "way" is that of the spiritual life. If this way is said to lead on without a break into the future life in a real spiritual world, the spirit will be envisaged in terms of two-world experience: (1) with senses, sensibilities in general, modes of thought and volition adapted to the natural world, in space and time; and (2) with powers or capacities adapted to a non-spatial world where spiritual *states* rather than

temporal or similar conditions are the significant factors. Those who hold this view will naturally consider to what extent man's present existence is either favorable or unfavorable to his eternal pilgrimage.

The idea of religion as a way of life is not then new; but the approach is very different, now that we have passed out of the doctrinal into the empirical age, with the assumption that life itself discloses trends and conditions susceptible of being articulated in accordance with the conservation of values. When we look back to the great founders of religion, we find that for them life and teaching were to a remarkable extent one. In the case of Jesus, life and precepts were mutually contributory. His words have become more authoritative because so exemplified and so uttered. The way, the truth, the life appear to be identical. Our difficulties are partly due to the fact that doctrines and life were more or less sundered when the former became dogmas. Hence the need for reconstituting the life. Does this mean the reconstruction of the social impetus, aims, and principles, as suggested by Rauschenbusch and others who have put stress on a social program?[2] For our present purposes, this interest in primitive Christianity is significant only so far as it fosters personal religion wherever it promises to become universal.

Living the Life.—We may, however, find that personal religion is splendidly exemplified when its devotees concentrate on a particular mode of social service. We could ask for nothing better than that each person, adopting Paul's social psychology, should find his type, learn what his work is, then do it by remembering that spiritually all men are members one of another. For his psychology is the corrective of personal salvationism. It calls both for knowledge of individual differences and for insight into what the apostle calls spiritual gifts, all pertaining to the same Spirit. Hence if we are to avoid over-emphasis on the inner life we will naturally look to those who, inwardly quickened, immediately set about doing something for their fellowmen.

[2] W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, 1920.

The impetus to live the life is exemplified by the work of Dr. Grenfell in Labrador, where definite modes of needed service coupled with Christian conviction have found unusual embodiment. Recently, Dr. Grenfell, in narrating his own experience in quest of a life-purpose consonant with his ability and training, has told how the turning-point came while attending a meeting addressed by Dwight L. Moody, the evangelist: "I resolved to make my religion a mode of life rather than merely a bundle of beliefs, and when I left the tent that night it was with the determination to do things that I thought Christ would do if he were a doctor in my place."[3] Granted such a purpose, with talents organized to perform a type of work essential to human welfare, religion as a life becomes a matter of daily adaptation to opportunities, each of which is a call to service in response to clues yielded by the occasion itself. Efficiency in any worthy field of service seems compatible with living the life, and the religious person outside of organizations may be every whit as spiritually minded as those who make a profession of teaching religion.

By religion as a life we are likely to mean both the significant inner experiences which make religion so profoundly real for the recipient, and the social relationship by which we organize our beliefs to make them helpful. In the preceding discussions we have been considering religion as inner experience through its characteristic consciousness. The conversional process seems to solve the religious problem in part only, unless we understand by it such a profound change as that which came over Paul, Augustine, or Francis of Assisi. The same is true of worship. There is still need of study of personality in the light of its total relationships, need for discipline through reiteration of ideals and a better coördination of habits. But at the point where religion seems almost incurably subjective or individualistic, as if the extreme mystic had the last word, real creative work begins, amidst the tests of our social relationships when we emerge to make religion *a life in the spiritual community.*

[3] *The American Magazine*, April, 1928, p. 45.

The Complete Life.—Religion, regarded as originating in duality or contrast, involves not only the opposition between the inner and the outer, the higher self and the lower, with a need for self-integration according to type; some of its adherents find an even greater contrast between the eternal and the temporal, calling for a mode of existence adapted to both worlds. This antithesis is in turn twofold. We may live for the spiritual world as the home of eternity and the immortality of the soul, or we may live for the essentials of religion in the natural world as reëxpressed from age to age. We have rejected the view that the spiritual world is supernatural, because our psychological approach implies the conviction that law and order, continuity or uniformity, and the persistence of personality are the constructive clues. As a life adapted to this world, religion has at least an outlook toward the eternal, save for those children of the age who, having proposed "a religion without revelation," now offer a religion "without God." Thus the outworn creeds may be overcome, and the advance toward the fullness of life may have the inspiration of the eternal values. Man is to become a well-balanced spiritual being living in the natural world, where people now wisely say, One world at a time. Plainly, the complete life is in remarkable degree synthetic. To do that which is worthy of a spiritual being whose opportunity is to function in a progressively attained social "organism," is also to be mindful of all conditions essential to practical existence where evasiveness is as foreign as fits of abstraction.

Confronted by the external world, where adaptation to economic conditions of survival leads us to assign the first place to quantitative considerations, however much we value altruism, we find that persistent effort is required to keep religious values in the foremost place. Our psychophysical environment (in the bodily organism) seems to imply a determinism as unflinching as the economic determinism which keeps even the clergy subordinate to the conditions of the age. The mind or spirit seems to be utterly without power save that of the passive onlooker—

when faced by this determinism. Yet religion moves in large measure within a sphere where consciousness is efficacious in meeting alternatives, external opportunities being regarded as favorable to the development of character and the triumphs of spirit over flesh. New interactions between dispositions, desires, emotions, and ideas are always a possibility of the inner life, despite our heredities and determinisms. New integrations between deeds accomplished and volitional faith are always feasible. Hence the religious life may always be in the making. The whole individual may become active in religion, whereas in our physical and social contacts we often function within limited phases of the self.

The Way of Life.—The way at its best is no doubt best exemplified by those devoted men of the past who gave themselves resolutely to an ideal, having renounced all other interests whatsoever; those who were willing to pay the full price, even to endure persecution, and possibly suffer martyrdom. One naturally thinks of Buddha and the illumination that came to him as a consequence of his devotion; of Socrates, whose dedication to moral principle is the ideal instance among philosophers; and of Jesus and the apostles who were most zealous in their faith. But collecting the sayings of the great leaders and instilling these into the minds of the multitude in times of peace has also proved essential. No one by imitation of either master or disciple save in inner spirit has made noteworthy headway. No peculiar external sign seems to be more than accidental, not even the suffering of martyrdom.

What is essential to actual pursuit of the way is at least a brief creed, a mode of adjustment to the physical world and to existing social conditions, coupled with fidelity to a view of life capable of being enlarged into an attitude toward the universe. Thus the ancient Stoics combined a mode of mastering mental states with a serenity which was wisely adapted to the environment in which they lived, and an attitude toward the universe as fundamentally rational. So too in the ancient Chinese doctrine, Taoism, the essence of righteousness consists in imitation of nature's way, its

constancy or regularity, in relation to which man should acquire constancy, impassibility, quietness, humility, serenity, benevolence, and other virtues. An entire doctrine of life is implied in the following summary of Taoism: "There are no gateways to calamity or blessing save those which men open for themselves. The recompense of good and evil follows as naturally as the shadow follows the substance. Enter the right path; avoid the wrong path. Do not walk in the way of evil. Be compassionate towards all creatures. First correct yourself, and then convert others. Have pity upon the orphaned; assist the widow, respect the aged; be kind to children. Be grieved by the misfortunes of others and rejoice in their good luck. Do not publish the faults of others nor praise your own goodness. Bear insult without hatred; accept kindness as unexpected; bestow charity without seeking reward; give to men without regret."[4] Again, one might pursue the way by reference to the "Four Noble Truths" and the eightfold path to virtue (with its four stages) of Buddhism.[5] Naturally, the guidance adopted depends on one's habitat, the period in which one lives, and one's conclusions on such matters as the future state of the soul, notably in case of belief or disbelief in reincarnation, belief or disbelief in God.

It is observable that whether such doctrines are classed as ethical, in enlightening studies like those of *History as Past Ethics*,[6] or as religion, essentially the same principles are formulated independently, as in case of ancient China and ancient Greece. Such precepts as those characteristic of Taoism are essential to the devotee's relationship to society, while a scale of values enables him to distinguish between duties pertaining to transient things and those germane to the soul's eternal welfare.

The complete program is likely to involve (1) discrimination between the greatest good or perfection, the higher good (happiness or blessedness, in contrast with pleasure)

[4] From the *Kang Yin P'ien*, p. 338; quoted by E. T. Williams, *China*, 1923, p. 317. See equivalent summaries of Taoism in Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, pp. 128, 137 foll.

[5] See A. Menzies, *History of Religion*, 1903, pp. 364, 370 foll.

[6] P. Van N. Myers, 1913.

or good that endures and gives satisfaction, and any alleged good which involves a compromise with earthly standards; (2) a mode of daily conduct through the selection of eligible means of service, with reference to what is wise for our fellowmen in contrast with what they want; (3) an attitude regarding mistakes, failures, ignorance, evil, vice, sin; (4) the conviction that the greatest or higher good can be attained by persistent effort, here or hereafter; and (5) an idea of the self, its motives, deeds, conditions, ideals, in relation to these means and values.

In short, religion as the path toward perfection involves a method of striving toward what *ought to be* through wise adjustment to that which exists. Thus morality is to be fulfilled in religion, and apparently one could lead this life in any of the great religions. The important qualification which our study suggests is that one should avoid all invidious distinctions turning upon the old intellectualism. For perfection is not attained by resolutely comparing ourselves with a standard far out of relation to our status today. Repressions, conflicts, and puritanisms without limit have resulted from these abstract efforts. Actual headway is made, we have seen, in so far as our efforts are grounded in processes now in operation, by taking our whole nature into account. To act wisely with our whole nature we must begin by thinking wisely in terms of it: its impulses, emotions, desires, aspirations; the head and the heart; the social selfhood and the spirit. For religion today calls for "the full, total and harmonious union and fulfillment of the human functions at their highest power . . . in the human community or fellowship." [7] One is to live then "as in the presence of God—to possess a tranquil certainty that between ourselves and Him all causes of offense and alienation are removed . . . to have Him showing Himself for our encouragement, for all restraint from wrong, for our encitement to all good." [8]

Christianity as a Way.—Many of us are likely to think of the early centuries of our era in the light of the overt

[7] J. A. Leighton, *Religion and the Mind of Today*, p. 78.
[8] H. W. Clark, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, p. 83.

consequences which the apostles and earnest followers suffered, of disputes about the personality of Christ, or the disappointments over the apocalyptic vision, unless we resolutely disengage our minds from these matters by trying imaginatively to put ourselves into the spirit which prompted people to live the life, avoiding what has been called the excess baggage of doctrine and dogma. Dr. Fosdick has suggested that, by putting deeds above belief, one make central and mandatory what Jesus deemed worth while, excluding the doctrinal additions of a later time. The original gospel was far from being a matter of apostolic succession, of controversies over the Trinity, theories of inspiration, forms of sacraments, and credal subscriptions. The doors to heaven were much more widely open. Controversies had not yet divided the followers into opposing groups, save in a minor way. Dealing directly with individuals, Jesus addressed individuals, regarding each as of worth in himself. Each one was met where he was and helped to take the next step, never by abstractions or by demanding allegiance to a system.

Paul's psychology is, we have seen, replete with personal realism indicating the difficulties of following the way as an inner process developing through contrast of motives. If we regard his experience as primary, it reads very much like those which have in recent times suggested the psychology of religion. Granted that his vision of a radiance which he believed to be Jesus, appearing in a glorified body, was therefore an objective vision, we note that it was also an inward revelation calculated "to reveal his Son in me" (Gal. 1, 16).[9] Hence the communion with the indwelling Christ became the great consideration, as for so many since Paul's time. So too the Fourth Gospel, whoever may have been its author, admits us into a revelation of Light and Life, as the direct clues to the revelation of God. Through Jesus the divine nature is said to have been brought "within the range of our knowledge. Hitherto we could only surmise that beyond all things visible there was the unchanging God, but now we can apprehend Him as a

[9] See E. F. Scott, *The First Age of Christianity*, 1926, p. 125.

Reality. And as he was the Light, Christ was the Life. . . . The life which God possesses dwelt also in Christ, and the great end of his coming was to impart it to men.'' [10]

One may also follow psychological clues in the epistles of other writers. We find reference, for example, to the warfare of fleshly lusts against the soul (I Peter, ii, 11); a certain type of resistance of inner evil is advocated; knowledge of ''the hidden man of the heart'' is essential to the incorruptible life; and there is one source of power, light or wisdom (James i, 17; iv, 12). Since no man can serve two masters, it follows that ''a double-minded man is unstable in all his ways'' (James i, 8); and it is a question, according to Paul, of allowance for such emotions as fear, in contrast with the affirmative power of ''love and of a sound mind'' (II Tim. i, 7). Granted that ''God is light, and in him is no darkness at all'' (I Jn. i, 5), ''if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another.'' But by banishing hatred, loving one's brother, and so abiding in the light, abiding in Christ, one knows far more conclusively what is the way to the abundant life.

Here, the great contrast is between (1) that consciousness which is of the world, darkness, sin, death; and (2) the vitalizing conviction that we have ''passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren'' (I Jn. iii, 14). The love which, calling for compassion, establishes itself ''in deed and truth,'' is the type called for. In a peculiar sense one knows God because born of Him, loving Him and one another; also loved by Him, with that love which casts out fear. The witness which the individual has in himself is indeed decisive, as unmistakably showing what is demanded by this new consciousness as in enforcing the truth that God by giving us eternal life has bestowed what no man could win alone. The mental states of primary significance are inseparable from the virtues through which they are to be transfigured: one can make no headway with the psychology without the idea of God as love and light (I Jn. iv, 7 foll). The religious consciousness is here portrayed with

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 223.

a simplicity which is intelligible apart from any sectarian version of Christian theology.

Seeking the Kingdom.—Given this psychology of motives that become effective, one may turn to the Sermon on the Mount as a schematization of eligible states of the spirit, belonging within the scale of values and processes which function from within outward. No two expositors might agree in formulating this scale, or when showing how love for enemies (or non-resistance) is to be made effective. What we wish to suggest is that one may test psychologically the teachings that life is worth more than raiment, the soul than its treasures, the kingdom than its accessories.

Thus one finds that wishes are differentiated from desires, everything that defiles from what purifies, content from form, along the definitely marked-out way which leads to freedom. It is left to the individual to identify motives intimately akin to his present state, to see that the law of change from within outward is not theoretical but a verifiable relation between activities already in process; that reward or result is measured by conduct; and that this inner process from intention to deed, deed to fruition, fruition to further consequences, is the clue to the more overt process which makes social life in its fulness a "way" also.

Thus the kingdom which with reference to the individual is *within,* is with reference to the discovery of the social world also the kingdom of God and its righteousness; a kingdom already provided with the conditions and forces essential to the advance toward perfection. Prayer in the secret place is essential to right adjustment with respect to the accessories, already in process of being given. The application of these principles to individuals, as indicated by discourses here and there in the Gospels, shows that whatever thing may hinder him who wishes to "enter into life" must be resolutely put aside, so that first things shall be first. The disciples, at first summoned to walk with their Master on the way, are later sent forth, each to try himself out by taking the decisive steps—steps which will

bring some failures, even temporary rejection of the Master. Remarkable, indeed, is that integration into which each hearer and doer of the word is summoned, when bidden to keep the greatest commandments with all his mind and all his soul and all his heart (a complete psychology is here involved).

A Simple Faith.—Perhaps the best modern summary of principles essential to living such a life is the following: "It is held by the Religious Society of Friends that God endows every human being with a measure of His own Divine Spirit, by which He has revealed Himself to His children in all generations; that this Spirit, which although in man, is the manifestation in our human nature of the Eternal Word 'which was in the beginning,' and which was manifested without measure in the person of our Divine Master, Jesus Christ, and that as we submit ourselves to the leadings of this Light of Christ in the soul, we are loosed from the bonds of self and sin, and enabled to live in conformity with the will of our Heavenly Father."[11] Granted the psychology of the spirit which centers about the divine endowment, such that no one is without a witness in any race or any age of men, we are counseled to become aware within ourselves of the same Spirit (the Inner Light or Christ Within) which is here put beyond confusion with pantheism or deification. Since it is *in* us to be discovered by each, but not of us, we have a standard by which to test it. The hope is that as we submit ourselves to its leadings, we will also be enabled to live in conformity with the outworkings of the Spirit, which is "the most potent influence that can be applied to the affairs of men." In other words, "the immanence of God implies the divine sonship and the brotherhood of all men. It implies the capacity in all to discern spiritual truth, and to hold direct communion with Him."[12] Only the sheer partisan of the past would object to the asserted possibility of present-day direct communion with God; only

[11] *The Book of Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends,* (Hixite branch), ed. of 1918, Introd. This unequaled sentence is broken up into less persuasive propositions in the ed. of 1927.

[12] *Op. cit.,* ed. of 1927, p. 7.

the strict traditionalist would be likely to reject the propositions that "no mediator, rite, or sacrament is a necessary condition of worship," and that "all that is necessary is the seeking spirit on the part of the worshiper."[13] Given the earlier, less controversial version of this faith, one could universalize the terminology so that the earnest adherent of any religion might adopt it, passing by the doctrines which have made the Christian world divisive.

Spiritual Law.—It seems feasible then to approach the question of universal religion, with the principles which imply an ultimate world-view as suggested in the preceding chapters, by first reckoning with the psychology of religion as a guide to the art of the spiritual life. The contrasts are reducible for practical purposes to those between what we have called man's basic nature and the mind which is instilled into him by conventional patterns, and between finite spirit and Infinite Spirit. Experience in trying to live in conformity with the outworkings of Spirit, is naturally a clue for each individual in discovering for himself the conditions that impede or favor, the guidance which meets the test of Light and Life, and the clues to those principles which may well be called laws of the spiritual life in all times and places, and in the spiritual world also. Turning to the history of religion, one finds a tendency to enunciate essentially the same principles and precepts, for example, the various formulations of the Golden Rule.[14] One also finds abundant testimony to the reign of law in the experiences of all who are seeking and following the way. It is made clear that man reaps as he sows, that his deeds accumulate both for the development of character and because they must be reckoned with, and that no man is exempt from the consequences of deeds which he has taken unto himself. Thus it is that "its own punishment is inscribed on every evil." No man can put upon another what he has done or is still doing in his own life, even

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 7. The present writer is not a Friend, although persuaded by type and experience, comparison of faiths and modes of worship, that the Friendly faith is the direct clue to the religion of the Spirit.

[14] Cf. Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, p. 265.

though he tries to shift his burden by mere confession of faith in the so-called atoning blood of Christ. To resist an evil, a man must see it for what it is, and will to have it overcome. "No man can be withdrawn from his hell . . . unless he sees that he is in hell and wishes to be led out." Hence we find widespread recognition of human freedom and the need for coming to judgment, whatever the scheme of repentance and salvation.

Granted the proposition that law extends into the spiritual world, that there is no escape anywhere, we may collect what seem to us the laws and principles of the spiritual life throughout all time, as we would classify the facts and laws which taken together constitute a natural science, such as physics or chemistry. We note that the spiritual life exemplifies laws amid conditions that can be accurately described; that it discloses a movement, tendencies toward growth or progress, and implies universal principles which may be interpreted with reference to ends or purposes. That is, there are origins or beginnings, sequences of causes and effects, and changes of state which may be traced to the conditions under which they appeared; for example, fear and its results, or serenity and its fruits. To bring together certain of these principles and view them in their connection is to realize that the spiritual life can be depended upon to produce definite results, as we depend upon and employ physical and chemical forces.

It is out of the question to think coherently until we give up the idea of caprice or favoritism in the universe, until we cease praying to be forgiven—before we have changed our attitude. So long as we believe in miracles, in a God who interferes with nature to please some one who has asked a favor, we do not know what to depend on. But when we grow into a belief in the God of law and order, we realize that this spiritual system includes every deed in the whole sphere of conduct, so that as we measure, we shall be measured unto; as we judge, we shall be judged. In short, we see that action and reaction is a law over all motivation and all deeds.

From Within Outward.—Again, we realize that the inner life is expressed in overt conduct according to the law that the inner is decisive. Hence we conclude that as a man thinketh *in his heart,* so is he. Our lives then become in large measure a question of motives which find confirmation in our attitudes and their expression in conduct; a question of what we really love, really choose, truly believe, and actually seek—not what we pretend to be. It conclusively follows that no man can serve two masters, however hard he tries, whatever the appearances. Hence the forceful condemnation put on hypocrisy in Jesus' teaching.[15] Hence the central precept: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you," a doctrine which implies the sequence from within outward. We know then where to begin. We know that spiritual things take precedence, that we should first seek the gifts or powers which enable us to be of service in the spiritual order of reality before we seek the rewards or secondary conditions. Indeed, "virtue is its own reward."

The law of change from within outward involves a process of transformation which may be compared to evolution in the external world; since it may be said to go on by means of immanent or resident forces, without leaps or breaks in the process save as fruitions, but rather by almost indiscernible changes. For instance, a religious conversion which appears on the surface to be sudden, almost a miracle, has an inner history of gradual changes. Regeneration may then be a process of self-realizational change from within outward.

Laws of Self-expression.—Still further, we find universal testimony to the truth that the spiritual life when effective is grounded in concrete deeds: it is not a generality. If you sincerely hold to what you profess, you will

[15] A recent writer has forcefully contrasted the sins commented on by Jesus—hypocrisy, worldiness, intolerance, and selfishness—with those which, unluckily, have occupied the attention of the Church: impurity, murder, the drinking of alcohol, swearing, and the neglect of the Church's services and ordinances. R. Keable, "The Mind of the Master," in *The Atlantic Monthly,* Dec. 1928.

endeavor to prove it by carrying it into social expression in the activities of the day that now is. The relation between motives, thoughts, volitions, and deeds is not then the random relation it has seemed to be. As man's inner attitude or life (for instance, the serenity of the ancient Stoic or the modern Friend), so his outward world of self-expression tends to be. The ruling love is central. It would be contrary to man's nature to serve two masters. If he loves self and the material world with its pleasures, wealth, power, he will steadily seek these ends. If he loves his brothers, service in their behalf, truth, goodness, beauty, the spiritual life, then these ends he will habitually seek, however much he may utilize material forces as means to his goal. The prevailing love is deeper than belief, emotion, imagination, or even will as commonly understood: it *is* will in active pursuit of life's main interest. It manifests the man himself in case he has sundered his basic nature from conventionality and identified himself with spirit.

Yet although what man not only believes in his heart but loves and pursues tends to find such expression in his conduct that his deeds accumulate, it does not follow on any empirically ascertainable grounds that the consequences are eternal. Here the ways part for those who advocate the dogma that a man's paternal heredity cannot be overcome, that the prevailing love determines man's future to all eternity, or adhere to the theory that one must be successively born into a fleshly body to overcome his "bad *karma.*" Others will aver that "the law of unending life must be the law of unending growth; for growth is the essence of life. The moment when improvement comes to an end, must be a moment when that which is most valuable in life has come to an end." If our deeds yield their own punishment, their baneful consequences may end with what we gain from them. We are all the while facing consequences. We are squaring up some of our accounts, and these are being marked off the ledger of time. Our inquiry suggests the conclusion that it is far too soon to say what can and what cannot be done with human nature. We have barely begun to understand it,

even in case of such suggestive clues as those indicated in the preceding chapters.[16]

More interesting to some of us in these days of escape from dogmas is the principle of affinity between people by which they tend to group themselves through community of interest and affection. If this is an essentially interior relationship, it may be said to depend on the spirit or basic nature rather than on worldly conditions and the flesh. Hence there may be ties that endure. An essentially social psychology follows, in contrast with the present attempts to classify people by glands, modes of behavior, intelligence tests, repressions, complexes, and other doctrines which leave us with determinism. For, granted knowledge of our type, showing what our deepest trend is, what our capacities are—this is only a beginning. The real problem of life is to find our opportunity to do our individual work in coöperation with others who are doing theirs, so that we shall no longer work at cross purposes, shall no longer fight, and so that there shall no longer be any evil in the world.

We have found little help in the foregoing studies in any negative judgment, as if religion were merely a means of release, an escape mechanism, or consolation offered to the feeble-minded who lack courage to see things as they are. We have tried to judge by the best, at least the higher average. We have not hesitated to express belief in the soul and immortality, in the spirit as man's basic nature. Thus taking the clue from those whose beliefs are strong, we may reiterate the conviction that the spiritual life is not limited by time or space, although at present conditioned by the relationships of this fleshly world, as Plato long ago suggested. A man's total affinities at any period of his development may be said to constitute his system of social relationships, beginning with such a friendship as that which existed between Plato and Socrates, or Plato and Aristotle. When he leaves this world of time-cards and express airplanes, he may then carry with him those states of spirit which determine his relationships for him at a

[16] Cf. A. Adler, *Understanding Human Nature*, Eng. trans., 1927.

given stage of experience. He may then begin his future life where the present ceases to function—if indeed there be any break in *life*. If death be merely "a step in life" there will be scarcely an interval. A man need not then fear that his future affinities will fall below the level of that which is most intimately active in his basic nature. The spiritual life is a question of states; not one of "things," or of conditions imposed from without. Man finds himself in a different state when, fortunately for him, he turns from self-love as his dominant motive to larger-affectioned relationships with his fellows. Any number of changes of state follow upon the decisive one. If a man loves peace, if at peace with his neighbors, in repose with respect to life, this attitude springs from a love which carries its own states, its own sphere. People know him by his sphere. A man seems near or far from us according to the sphere which unites or repels.

To be sure, man takes on all sorts of conditions at birth which seem to contradict this law. So religion as a life consists for most of us in adaptation to social conditions, in our efforts at social betterment; while we are also contending, within, with our secondary mentality, our repressions, complexes, desires struggling for satisfaction, urges to more adequate self-expression. Man is born in the slums or in the house of mirth, in poverty or what we call riches, amid disease, where war is waged, in every conceivable adverse condition. There appears to be no affinity whatever between spirit and the forces by which it is overtly conditioned; no justice anywhere, although there are manifold opportunities for struggling for freedom amidst adversity.

Yet it also seems to be a law of the spiritual life that the soul needs incentives, opportunities for development, conditions to be overcome. In any event, life leads us to face what is before us; it seems to be quickening us to grasp its law, discern its inner causes and their purport, that we may learn wherein it bears relation to our own most deeply cherished purpose. Life breaks in upon us and spurs us onward—if we will to make the venture. It may

well be that law is the expression of love, holding us close to life's process amidst conditions which may be said to make for freedom rather than for bondage. When the last doubt has been raised, it is still clear that for religious faith there is a way of life which, like the course of the world about us, has its sequences to which we may adjust ourselves. The more secure our knowledge of the stages along the way as psychology describes them, the less we need any doctrinal scheme. Indeed, a man may simplify his mode of thought, attitude, and conduct to recognition of and coöperation with what for him is Spirit.

Every devotee of the religion of the Spirit will have some way to envisage his particular religious enterprise according to a scale which must be reëxamined from time to time. For as existence is now constituted the tendency toward crystallization is far more pronounced than the impetus toward the progressive conservation of values. Religion as a life must also become in some sense a matter of habit. Yet its adherent will guard against his own habits, lest he too lapse into patternism, then into servitude to tradition, finally taking up his place in a conservative institution. Our ideals are both practical and theoretical, and each group needs to be rephrased imaginatively and creatively by a new self-orientation through which one finds his opportunities afresh. Thus James counsels us to take a moral holiday, while Emerson helps us to keep "aloof from all moorings and afloat." [17] It will be time to consider how far our religious ideal is that of conventional Christian self-sacrifice when we have reconsidered the Greek ideal of self-realization.

We may well take leave of the subject with the suggestive reminder of a great scholar that religion, "like poetry and most other living things cannot be defined. But . . . some characteristic marks" may be given, and it is these which we have been considering. For religion "essentially deals with the uncharted region of human experience," just "fragments of the fringe of it" having been explored, and these imperfectly. Moreover, "religion deals with its

[17] "Intellect," in *Essays*, First Series.

own province not . . . by the normal methods of patient intellectual research, but directly, and by methods of emotion or subconscious apprehension.''[18] It is important to realize that the uncharted region surrounds us on every side and is apparently infinite. Religion in the organized sense of the term has appeared because man ''must have some relation to the uncharted, the mysterious tracts of life which surround him,'' that is, an attitude involving, not the conscious intellect, but man's whole being, ''using all its powers of sensitiveness.'' Although what we thus gain through faith is an insecure possession, not a safe dogma, in reality we gain very much more; namely, practical guidance on questions where experience and argument fail.

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[18] G. Murray, *Five Stages in Greek Religion,* 1925, p. 19.

GLOSSARY AND INDEX

The definitions vary somewhat from the phraseology of the text, and some of the terms here defined have not been used in the text. The purpose is to remove ambiguities and foster systematic study. *See*, especially, Environment, God, Identity, Metaphysics, Object, Pragmatism, Projection, Psychical, Quality, Religion, Subject, Subliminal, Threshold. *See* Table of Contents for subjects not indexed.

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